EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

(HISTORICAL SERIES)

VOLUME XII

EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

1960

◆

MADE PUBLIC NOVEMBER 1982

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1982

48
S381-~~53~~1

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

86th Congress, Second Session

J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, *Chairman*

THEODORE FRANCIS GREEN, Rhode Island
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana
WAYNE MORSE, Oregon
RUSSELL B. LONG, Louisiana
JOHN F. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
ALBERT GORE, Tennessee
FRANK J. LAUSCHE, Ohio
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho

ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, Iowa
GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
HOMER E. CAPEHART, Indiana
FRANK CARLSON, Kansas
JOHN J. WILLIAMS, Delaware

97th Congress, Second Session

CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois, *Chairman*

HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr., Tennessee
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
S. I. HAYAKAWA, California
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr., Maryland
NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, Kansas
RUDY BOSCHWITZ, Minnesota
LARRY PRESSLER, South Dakota

CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
JOHN GLENN, Ohio
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
EDWARD ZORINSKY, Nebraska
PAUL E. TSONGAS, Massachusetts
ALAN CRANSTON, California
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

Edward G. Sanders, *Staff Director*
Geryld B. Christianson, *Minority Staff Director*

PREFACE

While effective foreign policy is the product of long-range planning and carefully crafted diplomacy, the makers of foreign policy need always to expect the unexpected and to be prepared to react immediately to an unanticipated turn of events. For both the Eisenhower administration and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1960 was to have been a year devoted to lessening the tensions of the Cold War, finding means of suspending nuclear testing by the Soviet Union and the United States, reaching a new mutual security accord with Japan, shoring up old alliances with Latin American nations, and building new relations with the emerging nations of Africa and Asia. Instead the focus of the year became the crash of an American U-2 photo-reconnaissance plane. For nearly 4 years the United States had secretly conducted high-altitude flights across Soviet territory, taking photographs of objects as small as 12 inches from a height of 80,000 feet. Equipped with enough film to photograph an area 750 miles wide, each U-2 brought back a staggering amount of information for the Central Intelligence Agency to interpret, and provided invaluable data on Soviet missile launches and military activity. In effect, the U-2 flights permitted the United States to adopt unilaterally President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal, which Soviet leaders had rejected at the 1955 Geneva Summit. Then on May 1, 1960, the Soviets announced that they had shot down a U-2 near Sverdlovsk.

Operating under the assumption that the pilot had died in the crash, American officials offered a pre-arranged cover story to explain the incident. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) claimed that the U-2 had strayed off course during a routine weather research flight. State Department press officer Lincoln White insisted that there was "absolutely no—NO—deliberate attempt to violate Soviet airspace." However, on May 7, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced that the pilot was still alive and would stand trial for espionage. The administration was forced to retract and repudiate its cover story.

The crash of the U-2 had immediate repercussions on the Paris Summit Conference between the heads of the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, scheduled to begin on May 16. Premier Khrushchev refused to participate in the talks unless President Eisenhower apologized for the U-2 flights, ceased all future flights, and punished those "directly guilty" for initiating the flights. President Eisenhower rejected this ultimatum, saying that the flights had not been aggressive and had already been suspended. He also took personal responsibility for ordering the flights, for which he would not apologize. Khrushchev angrily denounced the United States and walked out of the Summit Conference. With his stormy departure came an end to the "Spirit of Camp David," the early thaw in the Cold War that had followed Khrushchev's visit to the United States the year before.

Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had been closely following the events at the Geneva Test Ban negotiations and the preparations for the Paris Summit. Immediately following the Summit's collapse, the committee held closed hearings with Secretary of State Christian Herter, CIA Director Allen Dulles, Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, and NASA Deputy Administrator Hugh Dryden to unravel the convoluted facts surrounding the U-2 crash and to assess the administration's response. So deeply did the incident divide committee members that it took seven difficult mark-up sessions to prepare the final report on the Summit fiasco. Never before during the 8 years of the Eisenhower administration had the committee's bipartisan approach to foreign policy been so shaken. These closed-door debates, often angry and accusatory, are included in full in this volume.

The U-2 story overshadowed other issues of 1960, but the Foreign Relations Committee also spent much of its time considering the problems of those nations moving from colonial to independent rule. "We are in a transition period in this period," said Senator Bourke Hickenlooper. "What happens in this period . . . will determine what the situation will be 50 or 75 years from now." Among immediate concerns were the independence of the former Belgian Congo, the secession of its Katanga Province, and the sending of a U.N. peace-keeping force. In the Western Hemisphere, the committee continued to study events in Cuba with deepening pessimism. Spurred on by the Cuban revolution and its spreading influence, the Eisenhower administration proposed a new economic program for Latin America, which foreshadowed the Alliance for Progress.

Foreign policy events of 1960 took place within the context of a pivotal presidential election, pitting against each other the Senate's presiding officer, Richard M. Nixon, and a Foreign Relations Committee member, John F. Kennedy. Kennedy's election to the presidency marked another period of transition for the committee and its relations with the executive branch. It also brought to a close the presidential administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower and the events chronicled in this "Historical Series"—the Bricker Amendment controversy, the Formosa Resolution, the Hungarian and Suez invasions, the Eisenhower Doctrine, the landing of troops in Lebanon, and the crash of the U-2 plane in the Soviet Union. In the decade ahead lay more unexpected crises of even greater proportion.

The selection of transcripts for this volume represents the editor's choice of material possessing the most usefulness and interest for the widest audience. Subheads, editorial notes, and some documents discussed in the hearings, are added to bring the events into perspective. Any material deleted (other than "off the record" references for which no transcript was made) has been noted in the appropriate places, and transcripts not included are represented by minutes for those sessions, in chronological sequence. Unpublished transcripts and other records of the committee for 1960 are deposited at the National Archives, where they are available to scholars under the access rules of that agency. Appendix E of this volume lists all published materials of the committee for 1960 for further reference.

In accordance with the general policy of the series, portions of this volume were submitted to the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and participating Senators for review and comment.

This volume was prepared for publication by Donald A. Ritchie of the Senate Historical Office.

CHARLES H. PERCY.

CONTENTS

Page

Preface ... III
Minutes, January 7 ... 1
Minutes, January 8 ... 2
Minutes, January 12 ... 3
Briefing on the World Situation, January 18 ... 5
Testimony of: Allen W. Dulles, Director, Central Intelligence Agency.
Minutes, January 19 ... 52
Briefing on the World Situation, January 21 ... 53
Testimony of: Christian A. Herter, Secretary of State.
Minutes, January 26 ... 101
Minutes, January 26 ... 102
Minutes, February 1 ... 103
Minutes, February 2 ... 104
Minutes, February 9 ... 105
Minutes, February 10 ... 106
Minutes, February 16 ... 108
Cuba and Caribbean Affairs, February 18 ... 109
Testimony of: Roy R. Rubottom, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs; Philip W. Bonsal, U.S. Ambassador to Cuba; Robert C. Hill, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico; and Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Matters.
Minutes, February 22 ... 161
Developments in U.S. Relations with OEEC, February 25 ... 163
Testimony of: C. Douglas Dillon, Under Secretary of State.
Status of Geneva Test Suspension Negotiations, February 25 ... 183
Testimony of: Philip J. Farley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy.
Minutes, March 10 ... 207
Minutes, March 15 ... 208
Minutes, March 24 ... 210
Minutes, March 25 ... 211
Minutes, March 28 ... 212
Minutes, March 29 ... 213
Minutes, March 30 ... 215
Minutes, March 31 ... 216
Minutes, April 1 ... 217
Minutes, April 5 ... 218
Minutes, April 6 ... 219
Minutes, April 11 ... 220
Minutes, April 13 ... 221
Minutes, April 19 ... 222
Minutes, April 20 ... 224
Pre-Summit Briefing, April 21 ... 225
Testimony of: Christian A. Herter, Secretary of State.
Minutes, April 26 ... 244
Minutes, May 3 ... 245
Minutes, May 9 ... 246
Minutes, May 24 ... 248
Events Incident to the Summit Conference, May 27 ... 251
Testimony of: Christian A. Herter, Secretary of State.

Page

Events Incident to the Summit Conference, May 31 279
Testimony of: Allen W. Dulles, Director, Central Intelligence Agency.
Events Incident to the Summit Conference, June 1 361
Testimony of: Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, Deputy Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
Events Incident to the Summit Conference, June 2 393
Testimony of: Thomas S. Gates, Secretary of Defense.
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security With Japan, June 7 405
Testimony of: Christian A. Herter, Secretary of State.
Disarmament Developments—Spring 1960, June 10 415
Testimony of: Philip Farley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy.
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan, June 14 423
To Consider Report on Hearings Regarding Events Incident to the Summit Conference, June 15 433
To Consider Report on Hearings Regarding Events Incident to the Summit Conference, June 16 477
Minutes, June 16 536
To Consider Report on Hearings Regarding Events Incident to the Summit Conference, June 17 537
To Consider Report on Hearings Regarding Events Incident to the Summit Conference, June 20 549
Minutes, June 21 571
To Consider Report on Hearings Regarding Events Incident to the Summit Conference, June 22 573
To Consider Report on Hearings Regarding Events Incident to the Summit Conference, June 23 591
Ambassadorial Nominations, June 23 617
Testimony of: Loy Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration; A. Burke Summers, Ambassador to Luxembourg; Arthur L. Richards, Ambassador to Ethiopia; and Joseph S. Farland, Ambassador to Panama.
Passport Legislation, June 28 643
Restrictions on Passports to Communists, June 30 651
Briefing on the World Situation, August 11 659
Testimony of: Christian A. Herter, Secretary of State.
Economic Assistance for Africa and Latin America, August 16 705
Minutes, August 25 742
Minutes, August 26 744
Minutes, October 26 745
Minutes, October 27 746

APPENDICES

A. Correspondence Related to Secretary Herter's Testimony on Events Incident to the Summit Conference, May 27, 1960 747
B. S. 2287—Restriction of Passports to Communists 751
C. S. 3839—Economic Assistance to Latin America and amendments and S. Res. 353 767
D. Committee on Foreign Relations Publications for 1960: Hearings, Committee Prints, Senate Documents and Reports 782
E. Volumes Published to date in the "Historical Series" 784

MINUTES

THURSDAY, JANUARY 7, 1960

United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Disarmament of the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m., in room 4219, New Senate Office Building.

Present: Senator Humphrey (chairman), and Senators Gore and Church.

The subcommittee discussed a budget for its forthcoming operations during the year and other matters.

For record of proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 10:50 a.m.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, JANUARY 8, 1960

United States Senate,
Subcommittee on European Affairs of the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a.m., in room F-53, Capitol. The meeting was executive.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, Senator Sparkman (subcommittee chairman), and Senators Mansfield, Lausche, Wiley, and Carlson.

The subcommittee met with Former Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen, and Francis Murphy, Chief of Lend-Lease and Surplus Property Division, of the Department of State, to discuss forthcoming lend-lease negotiations with the U.S.S.R.

No record was kept of the proceedings.

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JANUARY 12, 1960

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session in its committee room, F-53, Capitol, at 10:45 a.m.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Green, Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Long, Kennedy, Lausche, Church, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

The committee voted to report resolutions adopting budgets and authorizing employment of personnel to carry on its reception of foreign dignitaries and inquiries into the foreign policy field for the ensuing year.

The chairman announced consideration of passport legislation as the next order of business. After discussion it was concluded to have the staff prepare a digest of pending passport legislation, and after this had been reviewed by the committee, the committee would then discuss what type of hearings, if any, were felt to be necessary on such legislation.

The committee then undertook discussion of Senate Congressional Resolution 17, favoring a convention of delegates from the Atlantic Democracies. On motion of Senator Long, seconded by Senator Sparkman, the committee decided by voice vote to arrange hearings on the measure.

The chairman announced the names of certain ambassadorial nominees as the next order of business. He asked the advice of the committee whether it should request the Department or not to make those presently at their post available for committee examination. On suggestion of Senator Sparkman, it was unanimously decided that their appearance not be requested.

The committee unanimously approved a motion of Senator Long that it report certain resolutions reprinting certain of the committee's documents.

After discussion, the committee unanimously concluded to hold hearings on Senate Resolution 94, relating to the recognition of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

An informal discussion was held about the submitted study from the Institute of Mediterranean Affairs on the Middle East.

For the record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[Whereupon the committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]

BRIEFING ON THE WORLD SITUATION

MONDAY, JANUARY 18, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2 p.m., in room F-53, United States Capitol Building, Hon. J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

Also present: Robert Amory, Jr., Deputy Director, and John Warner, Legislative Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency; and Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. St. Claire, of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. The members will recall that last year Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. McElroy,[1] Mr. Gates[2] and Secretary Dulles[3] met with us to discuss the general state of our relations with the rest of the world and our capacity to deal with potential military situations which might arise.

Those sessions were so helpful that I thought it would be a good idea to arrange similar sessions this year.

That is why we have Mr. Dulles, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, with us today, and why Mr. Herter[4] will meet with us Thursday afternoon. Mr. Gates and Mr. Twining[5] have not been able to meet with us at this time because of their heavy schedule.

Such a meeting may be arranged at a later time if members so desire. In any event, they will probably be able to meet with us when the Mutual Security Act is pending.

Mr. Dulles, it is a pleasure to have you with us today. I suggest that you proceed in your own way, and if you desire we will attempt to hold our questions until you have completed your presentation.

I would like also to submit to the committee the proposition that, having so many members and several new ones, we try to limit the first round of questions as we often do to 5 or 6 minutes, merely in order to give the new members a chance, and then, of course, it is open to everybody else. Otherwise you never get to the new members and they become very impatient with us.

---

[1] Secretary of Defense, Neil H. McElroy.

[2] Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates.

[3] Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

[4] Secretary of State Christian A. Herter.

[5] General Nathan F. Twining, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Dulles, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. ALLEN W. DULLES, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. **Dulles**. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you. I was planning this afternoon, on the basis of some notes that I have here, to concentrate on one main theme, namely where we see the U.S.S.R. going, the general direction of their policy and the implications of it.

I was first planning to outline some of our estimates in the United States Intelligence Board, of which I am chairman. That includes the consensus of views of the intelligence community.

I assume full responsibility for what I say, but it is based largely upon agreed estimates by the entire community.

I am going to deal first with what we feel is generally the Soviet foreign policy, then on the question of their capability for strategic attack on the United States, particularly the guided missile situation; then I will say a few words on the Soviet economy, and then on some of the critical situations in the world today.

SOVIET STRENGTH

Khrushchev [6] and the Soviet leaders are currently showing great confidence that they believe the trend of events is generally in their favor.

Their rate of economic progress, their scientific achievements, their growing missile capabilities, and their estimate of the political tendencies in the underdeveloped countries all suggest to the Soviets a certain favorable shift in the world power situation.

From this position of strength, or what they consider a position of strength, they feel able not only to engage the West vigorously on disputed issues—I mean politically, not militarily—when they wish to do so, but also to relax tensions when expedient without any imputation of weakness. That is, they feel they can make a concession more easily than Stalin could because they feel that the world generally recognizes their positions as strong. Therefore, a concession that they might make would not be attributed to them as having been made from a position of weakness.

However, we do not believe that the Soviet leaders, despite this confidence, would entertain the thought of deliberately initiating general war in the near future.

I am speaking of the next few years, maybe up to 5 years. I am not saying that they will do it after that, but I don't think I want to predict for the distant future.

On the other hand, we do not expect the Soviet leaders to seek a period of lasting détente and relaxation of tensions. They do not believe that a permanent accommodation with the West is possible. They do not expect to achieve anything in dealings with the West without some element of pressure on their part.

---

[6] Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev.

And finally, they undoubtedly fear that any continuing relaxations of tensions could be dangerous to the structure of their power, both within the U.S.S.R. and elsewhere.

In that connection it is quite interesting that these hard-boiled satellite leaders—people like Ulbricht[7] in Eastern Germany, the leader of the Bulgarians, to some extent Kadar[8] in Hungary and others—are somewhat uneasy about the extent to which Khrushchev has gone in relaxing tensions. It has worried them because they have to operate with an iron fist, and when they see him relaxing, it makes it more difficult for them.

The Chinese Communists are also clearly unhappy at the trend of events, and I will discuss that later.

POSSIBILITIES OF DÉTENTE

Thus in Soviet external affairs over the next few years, we expect that the swings of policy are likely to fall within a range which excludes on the one hand, deliberate assumption of serious and uncontrollable risks of general war, or, on the other hand, any abandonment of the concept of continuing struggle between two irreconcilable worlds.

Within that range, we expect to see elements of pressure and détente combined and varied as tactical advantage may suggest. By détente, I mean an improvement in overt, diplomatic relations.

I do not mean necessarily any letup in the subversive penetration or economic competition. Such a Soviet policy is characteristic of the whole history of communism.

The immediate outlook is that the Soviets will continue tactics of détente at least through the initial phases of the upcoming high-level negotiations, and there I am speaking of the summit conference and the President's visit to the Soviet Union.

They see these as opportunities to feel out the West for concessions. At the very least, Moscow sees these talks as Western recognition of equal status for Moscow. They probably also hope to lessen the urgency with which Western military programs are carried on. Beyond these negotiations—that is, beyond the summer—the outlook is less clear.

The Soviet leaders will still try to win concessions basically through negotiation. But the element of pressure and threat will probably become more pronounced. Berlin may reappear on the horizon as a serious issue, and the chances of miscalculation might be increased.

One of the key factors behind Soviet diplomacy lies in their view of their increasing power in the military field, particularly missiles. I understand, Mr. Chairman, you would like to have me give you a brief view of how we see the Russian missile picture.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

---

[7] Walter Ulbricht, Communist Party Secretary, German Democratic Republic.

[8] Janos Kadar, Communist Party Secretary and Premier of Hungary.

SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Mr. **Dulles**. Or rather, stated more broadly, how we see their military capabilities for strategic attack, missiles and other implements of war.

The Soviet capabilities for strategic attack against the United States and its major overseas bases are undergoing a major transition.

In the past and to some extent today they have rested primarily on the long- and the medium-range bombers with nuclear bombs, and some air-to-surface missiles.

The bomber force is now being supplemented by ground-launched ballistic missiles and missile-launching submarines, which will become a major threat.

The increasing ballistic missile capability will become the main element in the Soviet strategic threat over the years. During 1960 this will become a threat against industrial and population complexes in the United States—speaking now of what we call nonhardened sites—and by 1961 it will become a threat against our retaliatory power.

During 1959 the U.S.S.R. has made considerable progress in ballistic missiles.

The Soviet ICBM test-firing program has proceeded in an orderly manner and while evidence is still inadequate to judge the precise timing, we now believe that for planning purposes we should consider that by January 1, 1960—that was a few days ago—the U.S.S.R. had an initial operational capability with a few, say 10, series-produced ICBMs.

I have here a chart which gives the ICBM test program. There have been some 20—21, I believe, to be exact—successful ICBM tests, starting with the two in 1957, which I have testified to before, and the early series in 1958. We have also on that chart the Sputniks, and then later the Luniks and then in 1958 they had that test series of four.

Then for quite a long period the testing ceased. They were probably going back to research and development. Then beginning in 1959, and particularly in the latter part of 1959, you see a more aggressive program, although, as I will indicate later, it is not what we consider a crash program. Of those tests, as indicated there, four were long-range tests—that is tests of over 4,500 nautical miles, about 5,000 statute miles--and the other tests were to the shorter range.

The reason for the shorter range, about 3,500 nautical miles, was that on the Kamchatka Peninsula to which they were firing from their bases near the Caspian Sea, they have all the instrumentation necessary to monitor the tests. When you get out into the Pacific, it gets more difficult for them.

They have certain vessels of what they call the Siber class that have been publicized in the papers. We have known of their existence for a long time. Four of them are fully instrumented.

TESTS IN THE PACIFIC

They were out in the Pacific monitoring those two tests in the fall of 1959. They were not present out in the far Pacific for the earlier tests in 1959, and we are a little puzzled about those two tests.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Dulles, could I ask a question there?

Mr. DULLES. Certainly.

Senator MANSFIELD. When you refer to tests out in the Pacific, are you referring to the two, three or four tests that they carried on in the vicinity south of the Aleutians or south of the Bering Sea in the vicinity of the Aleutians?

Mr. DULLES. That's correct.

Senator MANSFIELD. And that is accurate information?

Mr. DULLES. Absolutely accurate, yes. That is completely confirmed. They were carefully monitored, and we know a good deal about the near vicinity.

We can't tell you exactly what the CEP [circle of error probable] was because we don't know what their aiming point was. But we know the general vicinity in which those two latter missiles fell.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Dulles, I want to apologize. I understand that before I came in it was agreed that there would be no questions asked.

Mr. DULLES. Just as you want.

The CHAIRMAN. I think a clarification of a point is all right. What I meant is asking general substantive questions.

Mr. DULLES. I would be glad to have any questions asked for clarification purposes—it would be helpful to me—or if there are any related points you feel I am not covering.

There have been, of course, some failures. I have on this chart only the successful tests. There have been about 15 to 20 percent failures, and maybe more because failures are hard to pick up. And may I say in this room that the monitoring of failures is much more unsuccessful than the monitoring of successes. They pretty well know we pick up their successes but they don't know what we get on their failures.

ICBM ACCURACY

We believe that the ICBM described here is capable of carrying a 6,000-pound nuclear warhead with a multimegaton yield up to 5,500 nautical miles.

The test area that they have somewhat staked out in the Pacific, or the tests they propose or announced that they are going to carry on in the upcoming weeks, are somewhat further than 5,500. It is nearer 6,700; is that correct?

Mr. AMORY. About 6,000 nautical miles.

Mr. DULLES. About 6,000 nautical miles, 6,700 statute miles. From the announcement, it looks as though they were proposing to use this for certain tests in connection with their space program, but it undoubtedly would have value and also may be connected with their ICBM program.

We have examined as carefully as possible the question of the ICBM accuracy, and we have done that in light of our own experience with the Atlas. We believe that certain of their techniques may be somewhat different from our own; the estimated CEP—and when I give figures here, I am talking about a radius.

That CEP is not an exact circle. It is an elliptical-shaped affair because of the fact that accuracy can more easily be gained from left to right and can be short and long.

Of course our estimate with regard to CEP is a very important part of your estimate, because every time there is a reduction of the CEP, it just means that each missile is that much more effective. Under operational conditions, we believe the CEP will probably be about 3 nautical miles initially, if they use radio-inertial guidance.

That is part radio and then inertial guidance. If they use an all-inertial guidance system, which they probably will introduce in the period from 1960 to 1962, it will probably have initially a CEP of about 5 nautical miles, which could be improved down to 2 nautical miles, in our opinion not later than 1963.

The radio-inertial CEP in 1963 would be somewhat better. The radio-inertial, while more accurate in our opinion and in our experience, is more vulnerable because you have to have antenna and things of that kind.

If you have the all-inertial system, you do not require that, so from the point of view of protection against surprise attack, the inertial is better but not quite as accurate.

But you can get more on that from those who know more than I do technically on that particular point.

There is some difference of opinion in the intelligence community as to this estimate of accuracy, since it is based on data that is far from precise as regards the actual Soviet testing program.

We still have this question under careful study.

SOVIET MISSILE RELIABILITY

In addition to the accuracy, the next important problem about a ballistic missile is its reliability. We estimate that the Soviet reliability from the time the missile is placed on launcher to detonation in the target area is about 50 to 65 percent initially, which would be improvable to 65 to 80 percent after about 3 years.

This again is a point on which there is some divergence in the community, and we have to judge largely upon our own reliability figures, and somewhat upon the reliability figures that we have obtained from monitoring their test programs.

There are some reasons to believe, and some proponents of the idea, that the reliability on a test—in a test program and in the R. & D. stage—may be greater than operationally, because if you send off missiles operationally, you have to send them off at a given time. You can't fuss around with them, and if a little part isn't working right wait and then send them off. So your reliability in a situation like that in the opinion of many would be better than operationally.

For delivery of nuclear warheads against land targets at medium ranges—and this would include most of our overseas bases—the U.S.S.R has had 700-nautical-mile ballistic missiles, and of course those of shorter range, for tactical as well as strategic purposes.

They have had them available for the past few years, and we believe that the 1,100-nautical-mile missile became operational in the Soviet Union in late 1958 or early 1959.

As regards their inventory of these intermediate-range missiles, we estimated at around 330 altogether as of mid-1960, 160 on launcher and about 400 produced.

We estimated that both of these intermediate-range missiles are in series production.

We believe that troops have been trained with both, and we have some evidence of their deployment in East Germany and possibly in the Soviet Far East. Up to the present time we know little about——

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one brief question there?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

MISSILE-CARRYING SUBMARINES

Senator GORE. Do you have any evidence of submarine firings or submarine firing capability of this intermediate missile?

Mr. DULLES. I am coming to that, Senator.

Senator GORE. Thank you. I beg your pardon.

Mr. DULLES. No, that's all right. I am dealing with the submarine program.

We know little about the deployment of ICBMs. We know that Khrushchev has boasted that they would be movable.

We have that as the highest priority, but we have not picked up any evidence on fixed ICBM bases, or for that matter movable bases, because there would have to be some sort of pad or fueling station even if they were on railcars, except of course for the two testing sites, about which we know a good deal.

The Tyura Tam missile range, from which they have shot these long-range missiles, and the Kapustinyar range, on which they have tested some 500 of the shorter-range missiles over the years, and on which we have pretty complete evidence since 1953.

Turning to submarines, a few conventionally powered Soviet submarines are not evaluated as probably capable of launching ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, although not as yet from a submerged position. One type of modified long-range submarine can probably carry two missiles, and they have a few of these—two ballistic missiles of a range between 200 and 350 nautical miles—and there is a newly constructed submarine class which was first identified in 1959, which might carry as many as 5 missiles of about 350-nautical-mile range.

Based on our understanding of their requirements and their technical capabilities, we estimate that in the 1961 to 1963 period, the U.S.S.R. will first achieve a weapons system combining a nuclear powered submarine with a 500- to 1,000-nautical-mile ballistic missile, capable of launching from submerged positions.

That is based on our estimate of their capabilities and desires, and not upon hard intelligence as to the missile, although we have some intelligence with regard to their nuclear reactors for submarines.

We believe that they now have a few nuclear submarines, but we have not actually identified them and do not believe they have been deployed with the fleet or used in the open seas.

It is our view that the Soviets, since they consider themselves behind us in nuclear submarine race, have not been at all anxious to say, "Well, we have one submarine" or "We have two submarines" in face of the fact that we have about half a dozen. Therefore, we rather think they are waiting until they have a respectable number—they may not have caught up to us, I doubt whether they have—and then say that they have been deployed and used with the fleet.

We have every reason to believe that they have reactors suitable for use in submarines. That comes in part from what we know about the icebreaker, *Lenin,* and we have every reason to believe that they consider the submarine a very useful weapon. Khrushchev in his speech the other day again emphasized that. While he thought surface fleets were obsolete, the submarine was of great value.

SOVIET BOMBERS

With regard to their long-range aviation, we credit what Khrushchev said. It conforms entirely to our own analysis of what has taken place, namely that they have practically stopped the construction of the heavy bomber and the medium bomber.

But we must recognize that as of today, with a ballistic power that is just growing operationally, they would probably consider that if they got into trouble immediately, they would look to their long-range aviation, because they have now in operational units about 1,100 of the Badger jet medium bombers, like our B-47s, and about 120 of the Bison and the Bear. The Bison is like our B-52. We have nothing quite comparable to the Bear. That is a turboprop heavy bomber. They are now turning that into a commercial plane. That is the plane that brought Khrushchev over here. It is that very long-range turbojet which they have. They haven't been building them for some time for military purposes. They are building a few Bisons—we believe about one or two a month—but it looks as though that is being phased out.

They stopped building the Badger some time back. Their long-range aviation remains best suited to operations against targets closer in than the United States—for example, in Europe.

Obviously if they used the Badgers they would have to use them on suicide missions because they couldn't go to the United States and back even with refueling. From the Arctic bases, refueled Bisons could reach U.S. targets on two-way missions, and the Bears could do so without refueling.

In about 1961 the U.S.S.R. probably will have a supersonic air-launched missile of at least 350-nautical-mile range, adaptable for use against land targets or ships at sea.

SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. STRENGTH

To summarize a bit, the Soviet rulers probably regard their present forces as capable of inflicting great damage on the United States and allied concentrations of population and industry, but incapable of preventing the nuclear devastation of the U.S.S.R. by the United States.

The future growth of Soviet intercontinental striking capabilities will be primarily a function of the development, production and deployment of ICBMs.

In the intelligence community we have analyzed the ICBM force goals which the Soviets might be expected to establish over the next few years. In the absence of evidence on Soviet plans and programs, this analysis is based on firm evidence of their capabilities and testing program.

It shows that the U.S.S.R. would probably estimate that in 1961 it would have its most favorable opportunity, through the rapid buildup in ICBMs, to gain certain military, political and psychological advantages over the United States.

After that time, our own missile build-up, particularly the planned increase in semi-hardened and hardened U.S. ICBM sites, would result in a very steep increase in Soviet ICBM requirements if they were to hope to knock them out.

Unless in about 1961 the Soviets should have a much larger number of ICBMs, or better accuracy and reliability than we now estimate for them, we believe that the inherent difficulties of achieving complete strategic surprise, and of timing ballistic missile and air attacks from widely dispersed launching bases against targets dispersed around the world, would prevent the Soviet from attaining what they would consider to be a decisive military superiority.

That particular language was written before we had Khrushchev's speech available, but you will note that in his speech he made a statement along somewhat these same lines, indicating the difficulty of attaining complete surprise, and putting it in general terms as applying to either the Soviet Union or the United States.

They would probably estimate that even if they did achieve surprise, they would still receive unacceptable damage through retaliation from our bombers on alert or undestroyed, semi-hardened and hardened ICBM sites, carriers and missile-launching submarines at sea, and any other bases they failed to neutralize, particularly our overseas bases.

They would probably continue to regard our retaliatory forces as threatening to inflict unacceptable damage on Soviet industrial and population centers.

"PREEMPTIVE CAPABILITIES"

As I have said before, the indications are that the Soviet ICBM program is not a crash program designed to provide a considerably greater number than we have estimated. But we believe it is designed to provide a substantial ICBM capability at an early date.

The goal is probably a force as large as they think necessary for substantial deterrent and a preemptive attack capability of considerable proportions. By "preemptive capability," we mean a capability to seize the initiative from an enemy who is believed to be preparing to attack.

This would be consistent with the present deliberate and orderly tempo of Soviet ICBM test firings.

This would be consistent with Soviet policy of maintaining various types of military forces to meet their strategic objectives, and their very great preoccupation with achieving their 7-year plan goals.

That means they have a lot of things to do at the same time.

The conclusion of the United States Intelligence Board—and on this we are unanimous—is that the present Soviet ICBM program would provide some 140 to 200 ICBMs on launcher in mid-1961. This would assume a total inventory of between 175 and 270, and a total production of some 225 to 350.

Senator **Lausche**. May I interrupt at this time?

Mr. **Dulles**. Certainly.

Senator **Lausche**. How many do they have now, according to your estimate?

Mr. **Dulles**. We estimate that now they have an initial operational capability of, say, 10 missiles. That does not mean they have produced only 10, but the others are in the R. & D., in their testing program, in reserve. That is taken as a sort of planning target against which our planners can operate.

And that is not based on hard intelligence. This testing program is hard intelligence; the exact number they would have is not based on hard intelligence, but an estimate of their capabilities.

PREDICTIONS OF FUTURE SOVIET STRENGTH

This production of missiles that I have estimated for 1961 could be accomplished in available plant facilities. They have the facilities. The bulk of their effort and problem would be in constructing launching facilities, activating and training ICBM units and providing logistic support for them.

It is a multiphase problem. It is, then, not only getting the missiles out of the factories, but having the bases from which to fire them, to train crews and so on.

The program that we have foreshadowed for them would require a vigorous effort. But we believe it could be accomplished by mid-1961, along with other Soviet military programs, without hindering their present plans for their industrial development and, as I said before, particularly their 7-year plan goals.

There is a fairly broad spread in our estimate of the trends in the Soviet ICBM force after 1961. We are not in agreement as to how they will proceed, and I am rather inclined to feel that it is crystal ball gazing to try to fix any very precise goals for future years.

However, for planning purposes, we have estimated that the Soviets would have from 250 to 350 on launchers in mid-1962 and from 350 to 450 in mid-1963.

The Air Force thinks that these figures are low and they would put them somewhat higher. Of course, these figures would involve the production of a considerable number in addition to those they would have on the launchers. Mr. Chairman, that completes the initial presentation on the military side. If you wish to ask any questions, I am passing now to the Soviet economy.

The **Chairman**. Perhaps we should take up the military questions before we go on.

Senator Green, do you have any questions on this?

Senator **Green**. Not now.

The **Chairman**. Senator Wiley?

ESTIMATE OF DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITY

Senator **Wiley**. I think you made a statement to the effect that one of these missiles carried a 6,000-pound warhead; is that right?

Mr. **Dulles**. We estimate that they could carry a 6,000-pound warhead, and that that would probably be the type of warhead they would put in the missile.

Senator **Wiley**. And how destructive would you say that was?

Mr. **Dulles**. That is a multimegaton weapon.

Senator **Wiley**. Would that destroy New York?

Mr. **Dulles**. It would do a great deal of damage to it. I think that the members of the Atomic Energy Commission would be more expert on that than I am.

Senator **Wiley**. I would like to get an answer from a specialist.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. It depends on how multi the megaton was, but a multimegaton atomic or hydrogen explosion would certainly not leave very much of New York City.

Senator **Wiley**. That's all.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Operational anyway.

The **Chairman**. John?

AMERICAN ICBMS

Senator **Sparkman**. Mr. Dulles, about a year ago Secretary McElroy, testifying before the Joint Economic Committee, said that we would have some ICBMs on the launching pad by July of last year; I think he predicted three at that time.

Now you say that Russia has 10?

Mr. **Dulles**. About 10.

Senator **Sparkman**. Do you know whether or not we have any?

Mr. **Dulles**. I have consistently taken the position that I should limit myself to testifying with regard to the Soviet Union.

Senator **Sparkman**. Yes. I thought it might be——

Mr. **Dulles**. And the members of the Defense Department will be before you and other committees to give you the information about our own programs.

I think it is better for me that we stick to that.

Senator **Sparkman**. Thank you. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

SOVIET MISSILE FAILURES

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Mr. Dulles, with regard to the Soviets' failures over the last several years, would you say that they have had a substantial number of failures in these various periods?

Mr. **Dulles**. I would say around 15 to 20 percent in this program.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Yes, but that begins only from 1957.

Mr. **Dulles**. That is when they started the ICBM program. That includes the entire range of testing in that program, and we believe it is unlikely that they have fired an ICBM that we have not picked up.

As I have indicated, it is more difficult with regard to failures, and they might have had a good many situations where they put a missile on a launcher and fussed around with it and decided it wasn't in good shape and put another one in there.

I don't call that a failure.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. For instance, a failure would occur when they put one on a pad and attempt to launch it and it goes to 10 feet in the air.

Mr. DULLES. That would be a failure.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, but is that also difficult to detect?

Mr. DULLES. Difficult but not always impossible.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse?

Senator MORSE. I have one minor question and one that I consider major.

RAILROAD LAUNCH SITES

My minor question probably falls in the suggestion you made about not discussing our own program. But I would like to know what Russia may be doing and what we might be able to do in regard to launching some of these missiles from railroad equipment.

Is Russia moving any on any of her railroad equipment, and could we on some of our railroad equipment in the Northwest, for example, rather than having a permanent dug-in base?

Mr. DULLES. I believe that is under very intense study, Senator, but I honestly don't know what the present feeling on that is in our technical circles. But Defense undoubtly can give that. As I mentioned, Khrushchev has boasted that he is going to make his ICBMs mobile, but as long as you use liquid fuels, you probably would have to have certain facilities at the place of launching.

You might have them fairly simple. You might have a railway line of, say, a couple hundred miles, and you might have two or three along that railway line.

We consider it the highest priority in the intelligence field to try to run that down, if it is a fact that they have already prepared some. We would expect that now they would be in the course of preparing those launching sites, whatever they may be.

Senator MORSE. My next question is a matter on which I think you can be most helpful to us. I would like to have your judgment. I mean no flattery when I say that once again your keen mind here this afternoon has provided us with another great seminar.

At one point in your paper—you did not touch upon this—is your appraisal of Khrushchev's disarmament pronouncements, his reduction of manpower.

Mr. DULLES. I have a section on that which I was coming to, Senator.

Senator MORSE. Then I will wait.

Mr. DULLES. This comes in right after the economic section.

Senator MORSE. I will wait.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Vermont?

SINO-SOVIET COOPERATION

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Dulles, you made no reference to the potential of Red China in the field of nuclear warfare. Are you going to refer to that later?

Mr. DULLES. We do not believe that they have any present potential, and we doubt that the Soviet Union has lend-leased or otherwise turned over nuclear missiles to them. We believe that over a period of time they could develop a nuclear missile. We have no information with regard to their working on a ballistic missile, and we have no hard information that the Soviets have turned over any missiles to them.

We think it is unlikely that they have turned over any long-range missiles. It seems possible that they might have turned over some short-range missiles with possible use against Formosa, but probably with conventional rather than nuclear warheads.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore?

FUELS TECHNOLOGY

Senator GORE. Mr. Dulles, your reference to the problems of liquid fuels in the ICBM leads me to inquire whether you have any information that liquid fuels are in fact being used, or if you have any information to rule out solid propellants.

Mr. DULLES. We believe, and on this the evidence is quite good, that they are using liquid propellants in their ICBM program. We believe, without having hard evidence, that they are working on solid fuels; but we have not had evidence that they have been used, at least in the ICBM program. Have we any evidence on the shorter range?

Mr. AMORY. Yes, on the 75- and the 150-mile missiles they are almost certainly solid fueled. There is some doubt about the 350's. But we believe the 700's, 1100's and ICBM ranges are still dependent on liquid fuel.

Senator GORE. The 7?

Mr. AMORY. The 700; they are sort of baby IRBM capability.

Mr. DULLES. The 700 and 1100.

Senator GORE. You are in doubt about the 350-mile?

Mr. AMORY. There is conflicting evidence on that.

Senator GORE. Of course that becomes a very important matter when you consider submarine use.

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Senator GORE. With solid propellants, submarines would have a far greater capability; is that generally correct?

Mr. AMORY. That's right.

Mr. DULLES. You will note that when we referred to missiles with submarines, we limited them to, I think, 250 to 350 miles.

But—and we had solid fuels in mind—with the idea that they later could develop the longer range missiles.

SOVIET SUBMARINES

Senator GORE. I was a bit surprised to hear your statement that the Soviets now have perhaps 2 or 3 nuclear submarines.

Mr. Dulles. They may have 2 or 3, because we have not actually detected them.

Senator Gore. Have you any knowledge of construction of reactors of this nature?

Mr. Dulles. We have a good deal of information with regard to the reactors that they use on the *Lenin*. I think you are familiar with that from Mr. McCone and Admiral Rickover.[9]

Senator Gore. Yes, I am; with modifications they could be used even in a very large submarine.

Mr. Dulles. We have also had some statements by Russian high-level technicians, and they have powerful nuclear reactors in submarines. We haven't been able to control that, but the man in question in the past generally has been reasonably accurate in his statements.

SINO-SOVIET COLLABORATION?

Senator Gore. One further question. This relates to the question asked by Senator Aiken. Would not a surprise announcement of Red Chinese nuclear and missile capability have a great psychological and political impact?

Mr. Dulles. I believe it would.

Senator Gore. Is it not entirely possible—I won't say probable—that the Soviets and the Red Chinese could be working in sufficiently close collaboration to make that possible even if with no more than one team that could assemble and fire one weapon?

Mr. Dulles. It is certainly technically possible. It is our estimate that, in the light of relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China today, it is unlikely. As I will indicate later, we are inclined to believe that at the moment, Russia does not want Communist China to do too much rocking of the boat, and we doubt that Khrushchev and the Soviet leaders would be willing to give—except under rigid controls, controls they felt they could maintain—this capability to the Chinese Communists today. We think it would be inconsistent with the general trend of their policies and their desire to exercise this measure of control over Chinese Communist aggressive foreign policy.

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, I raised that question for two reasons. One is that at the Geneva Conference, to which Senator Hickenlooper and I are Senate delegates, so far as I am aware the Russians have never once mentioned China. I personally asked Saratkin about it and he acted almost as if I had pulled a gun on him. And you will remember that when you asked Mr. Khrushchev something about Red China, he immediately broke into your question before you had finished and said, "I speak only for Russia. You know the map."

So this is perhaps a sensitive question, and I don't know how to interpret it. I see you are a bit uncertain about it.

Mr. Dulles. That is correct.

Senator Gore. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. The Senator from Kansas?

---

[9] John A. McCone, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; and Vice Admiral Hyman Rickover, director of the Navy's nuclear submarine program.

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Dulles, just following the suggestion made by the Senator from Tennessee as to the political effects and probably the propaganda effects of the firing of some nuclear weapon, an ICBM, by the Chinese, it might have a psychological and political effect in Russia should they do it.

Mr. DULLES. That's right. I agree.

Senator CARLSON. Following further along that same thought, I have just one question to ask. The Soviet Union has recently requested and notified the world that they are going to have additional space for testing some of these weapons.

U.S. TEST AREAS

Do we have an area where we have set aside as a nation a sufficient area to test any length weapons of this type, ICBM's?

Have we served notice on the world that we are going to use a certain area?

Mr. DULLES. No, not quite in the same manner. It has been done a good deal more informally, and I think the State Department could give you more accurate testimony on that than I can.

But as you know, we are testing ballistic missiles in the range which goes down the Atlantic off the coast of Africa, Ascension; and that I believe is considered by us to be an adequate range at the present time.

I understand that certain warnings are given to shipping. I believe it is of an informal nature rather than any formal political document.

I think that, in the matter, certain marine notices are sent out. Do you know about that? Others here may know. I don't know in detail. Of course, as you will recall, in connection with the atomic testing in the Bikini and the Eniwetok area, we did serve notice of a certain area where they might be danger of fallout.

Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Ohio?

SLOWDOWN OF BOMBER PRODUCTION

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes. With respect to the long-range ships of the Soviet Union, if I understand you correctly, you said that they have stopped the construction of heavy and medium bomber planes.

Mr. DULLES. They have stopped entirely the production of the Bear Turboprop, their longest-range plane. They have cut down the production of the Bison to one or two a month, and we believe they are in process of phasing it out. They have stopped the production of the Badger, which is the counterpart of the B-47. They are still producing the Badger and the Bear in commercial types—the TU-4 and the TU-104 that we see in the commercial fleets, that is.

Senator LAUSCHE. Doesn't that action justify the inference that they are going to rely more on missiles then from now on than on airplanes?

Mr. DULLES. We believe it does justify that, and I have so stated in earlier part of my testimony. I would point out, though, that their position is somewhat better from the point of view of missiles than from the point of view of aircraft.

With our overseas bases and Canada and Greenland and so forth, we have better opportunities strategically, I would say. I am getting maybe out of character because I am not a general or officer. We are in a sense nearer to Russia than Russia is to us; therefore, planes might be of more value to us than they are to them.

They have to start from a long way off, with all the disadvantages of coming over areas such as Greenland, Canada and so forth before they can reach our coasts.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes. Basically, then, the Soviet Union has decided that ultimately it is the missile that will be the effective weapon in warfare rather than the airplane.

Mr. DULLES. They have decided that, as I understand it, reading between the lines of Khrushchev's statement; in what he actually said, that comes out, and we believe that that is the truth.

SOVIET STRIKE CAPABILITY

But you will recall, and we also believe, that he considers the submarine with the complement of the ballistic missile as a very important adjunct to the ICBM, and that he considers the IRBM, the intermediate-range missile, to be of great use against our overseas bases. He also has used it on several occasions as a threat against our NATO Allies.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is your opinion concerning the dispatch with which they could strike and destroy the peripheral bases that we have surrounding the Soviet Union?

Mr. DULLES. We believe that the European bases, with the possible exception of one or two bases in Morocco, are within the range of the ballistic missiles that they now have operational, the 700-mile and the 1,100-mile missile.

Senator LAUSCHE. And do they have them in rather liberal quantities already?

Mr. DULLES. We believe that they have around 300. It is in the hundreds already.

Senator LAUSCHE. Have you any opinion as to whether or not they have the intelligence of knowing exactly where our bases are and that their launching pads and instruments are pointed at them now?

Mr. DULLES. I don't know about the latter, but we certainly believe they know where our bases are. That wouldn't require any great effort from the intelligence angle.

Senator LAUSCHE. One more question. Is there a point eventually reached in the development of the intercontinental and regional missiles where further inventories are not necessary because the available supply is already so great that total destruction can be achieved?

Mr. DULLES. I understand.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is, you pointed out they are developing more and more.

Will there not come a time when they will say there is no need of developing more "because we can achieve total destruction with what we have"?

Mr. DULLES. Senator, I feel that probably is a question that should be answered by our military people rather than by an intelligence officer, though, I might venture my own view that somewhere along the line you would reach enough. Laying aside the thought that improvements are always made and you might want to work over the missiles and so forth, I don't say one would stop in the research and development in the missile field; but I imagine if you had thousands of them, you would have enough.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. Yes.

Mr. **DULLES**. How many that is would be more for the military than for me to say.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. That is all.

The **CHAIRMAN**. The Senator from Idaho?

Senator **CHURCH**. Mr. Chairman, I don't have any questions now, not having had the benefit, due to my late arrival, of the earlier part of your statement; but if I could review that statement while you continue with the latter part of the statement, I would appreciate it. Do you have a section?

Mr. **DULLES**. I have it here. It isn't all spelled out. I think it would be quite intelligible though. I hope so.

Senator **CHURCH**. Thank you very much.

Mr. **DULLES**. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that you said it, but I understand that what I say is off the record as far as publicity is concerned. This is entirely a closed session.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Oh, yes, this is a closed session. None of this is to be made public. I certainly hope we won't have any leaks. I don't believe we ever have had any. I hope we won't have.

I missed the Senator from Montana who wasn't here. Would you care to ask any questions?

Senator **MANSFIELD**. Mr. Dulles, do you take the recent speech by Mr. Khrushchev [10] at face value?

Mr. **DULLES**. I am going to give a little analysis of it in a moment.

Senator **MANSFIELD**. All right, we will get it later.

COMMENTS ON KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH

Mr. **DULLES**. But I would like to answer that. I think it is probably the most interesting analysis that he has given us—kind of a "state of the U.S.S.R." message—for a long time. I have read it all with great interest. In fact, I think it would be worthwhile for as many of you who can to read it all, because the press reports, while quite full and reasonably selective, do not give the full impact of the message.

There is a great deal in it that I found of great interest and I would be delighted to send copies to each of you.

Senator **MORSE**. I think that is very important.

Mr. **DULLES**. I don't know that the committee knows. I might, however, put it in the record on page 10 of this particular transcript of the speech. After a reference to me and some of my recent statements, he says this:

> At the end of the last year, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee published a report prepared by the Commission for Economic and Industrial Research.

---

[10] In an address to the Supreme Soviet on Jan. 14, Premier Khrushchev proposed a reduction of 1,200,000 men from the Soviet army and an increased reliance on rockets and nuclear weapons for Soviet defense.

> This report states: By 1970 the Soviet Union will probably have a huge industry, comparatively stronger than now, and in some fields greater than U.S. industry. Not a bad description.

I did not add that. Those last words were added by Khrushchev.

Senator **Gore**. That is not untypical of his wit.

Mr. **Dulles**. I think one has to take what he says quite seriously. There are obviously quite a number of misstatements in it. I have been trying to analyze as to how to take Soviet statements, and I have reached this general rule of thumb. I am not sure this is shared by all my colleagues.

One, where Khrushchev makes a statement addressed to the Soviet people, he is not likely to lie about matters which are within the knowledge of a considerable number of his own people. That is, when he testifies about steel production or about things of that kind, a great many people in the Soviet Union know what the steel production is, and I think it would be counterproductive if he lies about it. When he talks about past history, he gives the Communist view of history, and that is of very little value.

And between these two extremes of statements to which I give little value and statements which we take very seriously, there is a rainbow of varying colors, and you have to sort of analyze each statement and say, "Did this go to the Soviet people or was this just for foreign propaganda consumption? Is this something the Soviet people knew? Is this a statement tinged with propaganda? Has this got the Soviet and Communist dialectic in it?" and so forth. So I don't think I can say yes or no to your question, Senator.

One has to analyze the whole business. But I think one should take a statement of this kind quite seriously and read it in a discriminating manner, as I have indicated. I got a good deal out of it that I consider useful from the intelligence angle.

THE END OF THE MANNED BOMBER

Senator **Mansfield**. The reason I asked the question was that I got the impression, from what you said in relation to the military capabilities of the Soviet Union, that you were agreeing more or less with what Mr. Khrushchev said a few days ago when he made his military boasts about the end of the manned bomber, the coming in of weapons, the creation of a new fantastic weapon, the dependence on submarines, and the decreasing dependence on surface vessels.

Incidentally, do you have any idea what this new fantastic weapon is?

Mr. **Dulles**. May I answer the first and then come to the latter?

I think you have gone further than I would go. He has decided for various reasons to stop building the bomber. I think he considers, as I said before, that they are not in as good a position as they might be to use the bomber. They have certain disadvantages that do not apply to us. A great many of his people know that he is not building bombers. Thousands of people that were working on bombers are no longer working on bombers. This is not the first time he has said that.

He has said this a couple of times before, and I think it is true. We have all the evidence that he is phasing out of the production of bombers. Therefore I take that statement as true; he wants to justify this change in the minds of his own people, after having put many billions into bombers, on the ground of the new weapon that is coming on. Therefore he builds up the new weapon and justifies his change of position.

We do not know what this new and horrendous weapon may be. I must say that a multimegaton nuclear weapon at the end of a ballistic missile seems to me about as horrendous as anything one could imagine.

We just don't know what it is.

Senator **Gore**. That could be described as fantastic too, couldn't it?

Mr. **Dulles**. It certainly could.

SOVIET TESTING FACILITIES

Senator **Mansfield**. Mr. Dulles, isn't it true that insofar as military missile testing is concerned, the base is at Tyura Tam on the Arctic Sea; and as far as missile space is concerned they're near Stalingrad somewhere near the Caspian Sea?

Mr. **Dulles**. No, all of the Sputniks and Luniks went from Tyura Tam. As far as we know they have not used Kapustinyar for any major space vehicle launching.

They have done all of that from Tyura Tam; isn't that correct?

Mr. **Amory**. The straight-up ones have gone from Kapustinyar like our rocket experiments that go up 250 miles, in which they have taken monkeys and other things.

Mr. **Dulles**. They have done testing in vertical space probes at Kapustinyar.

Senator **Mansfield**. There were missiles fired from Tyura Tam, two, three, or four in the area of the Aleutian Islands and the Bering Sea.

Mr. **Dulles**. That's correct.

Senator **Mansfield**. And was this missile testing program supposed to have been started last Friday in the area of the Central Pacific?

Mr. **Dulles**. That's right.

Senator **Mansfield**. That likewise will be from that general area?

Mr. **Dulles**. We believe it will be from the Tyura Tam launching pad, and that is a little over 6,000 nautical miles, 6,600 or 6,700 statute miles.

Senator **Mansfield**. And could this be connected either with military missiles or space missiles?

Mr. **Dulles**. According to the announcement, it appears to be connected with their space program. But it undoubtedly would have some bearing on their missile program. We are rather inclined to think that they have for the first time publicized this in order to prepare to publicize the hurling of a big, rather heavy mass into this area, so that everyone will know that they can fire a great big mass 6,000 or 7,000 miles into a particular area.

Senator **Mansfield**. They did this on 8 days' notice?

Mr. **DULLES**. Oh, yes, they have given us notice of it.

Senator **MANSFIELD**. Eight days?

Senator **GORE**. Mr. Dulles, if in fact this tests speed and accuracy, it has perhaps as much military as space value.

Mr. **DULLES**. It could be but I think for their own reasons in their announcements they attribute it to space.

MISSILE ACCURACY

Senator **AIKEN**. Isn't it probable that they will have submarines of ships located so as to pick up this missile and guide it to its target so that it will hit virtually on the target?

Wouldn't the fact that they hurl 3 tons or 5 tons that distance and hit directly on the target be horrendous to the world at large?

Mr. **DULLES**. Yes. It ought to be, because we have done it in not quite that large a mass, but it can be done.

Senator **AIKEN**. Do we know they can pick it up and shift its course if it is off course?

Mr. **DULLES**. We believe they have advertised this for the very purpose of doing something like this, to let us know for their diplomatic negotiations that if they want to put that on an American city they can do it.

Senator **AIKEN**. Are they going to have a couple of men in it or something of that kind?

Mr. **DULLES**. We would think that not absolutely impossible. At the present stage of the art, we would think it unlikely, but it is not impossible.

Senator **MANSFIELD**. I yield to the Senator from Ohio.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. Didn't Khrushchev say something about an 8,000-nautical-mile missile? Do you recall whether he said that in his speech?

Mr. **DULLES**. He has talked about a very long-range missile. I think he did talk about 8,000 miles. If they want to reduce the weight, they could send a missile 8,000 miles without any great difficulty.

SOVIET AIR ROUTES

Senator **MANSFIELD**. Now Mr. Dulles, if they fly from Tyura Tam, what airspace do they traverse after they leave the Soviet Union? Over what countries' airspace would this arc from that area come into the Pacific?

Mr. **DULLES**. They would fly over only their own airspace, except over the sea.

Senator **MANSFIELD**. What about Korea, China, Japan?

Mr. **DULLES**. No, it goes over south of the Kamchatka Peninsula. Mr. Amory will show you the general arc that it would go over.

Mr. **AMORY**. The great circle starts from here and just clears the northern part of Manchuria and comes out over this part of the Kurili Islands, skips the Aleutians and comes on its way down just about but not quite over Johnston Island.

Senator **MANSFIELD**. Could you point it out?

Mr. **AMORY**. Midway and Johnston are not on this map.

Senator **MANSFIELD**. Could you point out Tyura Tam on this map?

Mr. AMORY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. That is the general route of a missile going from Tyura Tam to the impact area. There is the impact area they have described and that would be the normal course of the vehicle. It wouldn't pass over anybody's territory except their own as we plot, but it might get off the track.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dulles, would you mind an interruption? We would like to welcome our new member. This is the Senator from Delaware's first meeting in this committee.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He commits his first error and goes over and sits with the Democrats.

The CHAIRMAN. His instinct leads him over there.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Dulles, would you answer this question?

LOCATION OF SOVIET TESTING BASE

Why is their base that far inside Russia? Why haven't they a base on this side of Russia, which means a shorter distance to the United States?

Mr. DULLES. This is only their testing base, Senator. You see, in their early tests they sent them up north over Kamchatka, because that is all instrumented there, and then they could have these missiles come down after 3,500 miles, and they would know where they came down.

So from the testing angle that is very important. When they want to test them further, they have these ships and the first four came down over there. But they have ships there. If they sent them from Kamchatka or Manchuria, they would come down toward the end of South America and they would have great difficulty. They would have to send their ships many thousands of miles further.

There is no use sending a thing out into the Pacific if you don't know where it lands. That is the reason they use the center of Siberia, and as much Russian territory as they can. But they run out of territory now and therefore they have this new area. And their four ships are on their way down to what we call the impact area now.

USE OF POLISH SHIPS

Senator MANSFIELD. These ships are Polish picket ships, aren't they?

Mr. DULLES. Polish?

Senator MANSFIELD. Polish picket ships.

Mr. DULLES. I don't think they are Polish. They are *Siber* class, a special class of Russian ships. I don't know that there is anything Polish about them.

Senator MANSFIELD. I understood they were Polish picket ships.

Mr. DULLES. They are specially equipped ships and there are four of them, and we believe they are built in the Leningrad area.

Senator MANSFIELD. It is true that this area the Soviets have selected is almost unpeopled. But it is an area which is surrounded almost entirely by American territory, either directly owned or held in trust under the U.N. or certain territories occupied or owned by both Britain and the United States, like Canton, Enderbury and other islands in the Phoenix group owned by Great Britain; is that correct?

Mr. Dulles. I believe that is correct.

Senator Mansfield. And the administration says that under the rule of the sea, what the Russians are doing is perfectly legal. That is correct, because we have been the foremost advocates of freedom of the seas. Now suppose the Soviet Union carried this freedom of the seas principle a little bit further and wanted to test within, well, 15 miles of the coast of California. Could we object?

Mr. Dulles. I think you are getting me out of the field of intelligence and into the field of politics, Senator.

Senator Mansfield. All right. That is all.

The Chairman. Gentlemen, I think we had better let Mr. Dulles go on.

Senator Mansfield. I just wanted to raise the question anyway.

The Chairman. I believe we have about exhausted this one for the moment.

SOVIET ECONOMICS

Time is fleeting. Will you go ahead to the economics?

Mr. Dulles. The Soviet 7-year plan 1959–65 calls for an annual increase in industrial production of 8 to 9 percent a year. This would give them 50 percent of U.S. production in 1965. They have about 40 percent now, or last year they did. That is assuming that the U.S. growth rate is at 4.5 percent. They would view this as a major success toward catching up then with the United States, but still, as I point out, they would still have only gone halfway.

We believe that they can meet these industrial goals, but we do not believe they will meet the goals they have set in agriculture, since agriculture remains the weak spot in the Soviet economy.

It is inefficient by any Western standards. Over half the total labor force is engaged in agriculture. In the United States, 10 percent of the labor force is engaged in agriculture, and we get a better production than they do. Their agriculture is still highly inefficient. A drought cut into their grain harvest this year, making it what Khrushchev admits to be the poorest total grain harvest since the new lands were brought under cultivation in 1954. In industry we also see the possibility of difficulties ahead, particularly in the years 1960 to 1962. In these years, competition for resources between military and civilian programs, both for machinery and for manpower, will be at a maximum. It may be that the plans that Khrushchev has just announced are in order to try to help meet that particular situation, and to reduce somewhat the military demands.

Khrushchev has undertaken an ambitious though feasible industrial development program. He has also undertaken a massive housing program, and he has promised the consumer a moderate but steady rise in his standard of living and the worker short hours.

These programs add up; they make more difficult the interrelated problems of manpower and mechanization.

In the next few years the normal annual increment of manpower to the labor force will be at a low point, reflecting the lowered

World War II birth rate. It is just now that that birth rate is affecting their newly oncoming manpower.

This undoubtedly is one of the reasons for the cut in their military forces, although they may have had other reasons such as economy for doing it.

It will take considerable doing to fill up this gap. They have a major campaign underway to increase the productivity of the present labor force through mechanization and automation.

These factors are different and difficult to measure. Our best judgment is that Khrushchev could, with some juggling of resources, meet his 7-year plan industrial goals, support his present conventional forces, build an ICBM force and other missile force consistent with our estimate, and meet his commitments to the Soviet consumer for manufactured goods but not for agricultural products.

With his reduced military requirements in certain fields, we believe that he could support this balanced program. One of the reasons for our judgment that his missile program is not a crash program is that he is caught on the hook of many dilemmas. However, if he wanted to go all out for missiles and give up some of these other objectives, he could do it.

But if he is going to do these other things and have a balanced program, in our opinion he can't put much more than we have estimated into missiles.

As to his speech, it had a tremendous play in the Soviet press and radio and even in Communist China. I won't go over the important points of the speech because you probably know them pretty well.

SOVIET MANPOWER

Going back to a question that was asked, we in the CIA are inclined to accept Khrushchev's statements both as to his present manpower strength in the Army, which is about 600,000 lower than we had been estimating, and as to his program for his military forces.

You will note, however, that he is not going to accomplish this overnight. It is going to take him 2 years to accomplish this reduction in the military forces.

Senator **Lausche**. May I interrupt?

What did you estimate the military strength to be? Did you say it is 600,000 less than you estimated?

Mr. **Dulles**. We estimated about 4,200,000, and then he has also 400,000 internal security forces, which have some military potential, although they are not designed for use in external military warfare.

Senator **Gore**. Right on that point, Mr. Chairman, could I ask a very brief question?

The **Chairman**. Yes.

Senator **Gore**. I wonder if the reduction in the military which he proposed was in some way related to or affected by the decentralization of the police force which he also announced in the same speech, or which I read about.

Mr. DULLES. That is correct. He has liquidated the remnant of the MVD,[11] which was the older Beria organization. That had been greatly decreased, and left with it was only a very minor increment of manpower with not very important functions.

What he has done here is quite largely a propaganda move, saying, "Boys, the Beria outfit has now been absolutely and finally and completely eliminated and is out of the way."

The KGB has taken its place, and is under the Presidium—under Khrushchev in fact. But it does not have quite the stigma of the old organization, because there has been a certain relaxation. There isn't the police suppression that there was in the days of Stalin and Beria. We don't think that this has great significance at the present time, except a propaganda significance, in view of the extent to which the MVD had been cut down in importance over past years.

Senator GORE. You don't think that it has a military potential such as our national guard and provincial police?

Mr. DULLES. I believe that the 400,000 that we estimate are in this police force, not the MVD but the KGB, could have considerable military importance in case of trouble.

They would be used to prevent any uprising in the country. They could be used for frontier duty. We doubt that they would have any offensive capability. They aren't so armed and equipped, but they could, on short notice, be turned into an additional military force.

As I indicated in going back to Khrushchev's speech, we have already accepted what he stated, that they have practically stopped the production of the bomber force. His statements with regard to missiles are not new. There was one rather moderate statement and an interesting statement which I referred to briefly before, in which he pointed out that even though anyone perpetrates a surprise attack, he is not likely to be able to knock out the enemy, and therefore must expect severe devastation in return. And he pointed out in this speech that Russia proposes to have a reserve supply of missiles, which would be available in the event of surprise attack.

He refers to a couple of special reserves that would be available so that they would be ready in case anyone attempted a surprise attack against him.

I don't know if there are any questions later on on the speech. I can give you more on that, but as time is going by I thought I would move over to the political situation in the Soviet Union.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, I have another appointment. I will have to leave. May I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, the Senator from Wisconsin?

UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE GOLD RESERVES

Senator WILEY. I understood you were talking on what you called the economic situation. What do you say about the unemployment and about the gold reserves, about the people's dissatisfaction or any other factors that might be part and parcel of unrest or the economic situation?

---

[11] Soviet Central Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Mr. **Dulles**. First of all on the question of unemployment, in view of the very wasteful use of manpower on the farms, and in view of this birth rate situation, meaning that the manpower is not coming along at the same rate as normally, there is at the moment no manpower shortage.

There is a demand for manpower and there is no reason for unemployment of the employables at the present time. Of course there are a lot of unemployables.

With regard to the gold reserves, we have no hard information. We follow quite closely their sale of gold from time to time on the world markets. We believe they have a gold production of around $200 million a year. In recent years they have been disposing of gold at somewhat that same rate, haven't they?

Mr. **Amory**. That and under.

Mr. **Dulles**. Slightly under $200 million a year. We would estimate that they may have a gold reserve of a billion or two. We just don't know.

Mr. **Amory**. Four or five.

Senator **Wiley**. Billion?

Mr. **Dulles**. Billion dollars worth. But that is pretty much guesswork.

Senator **Lausche**. May I say that that confirms exactly the figures that Bohlen[12] gave us last week, $4,500,000,000.

Senator **Wiley**. What about the people's dissatisfaction or satisfaction, or unrest?

Mr. **Dulles**. There is no general unrest. There are various areas where there is a certain amount of unrest, where there are racial problems. The standard of living has improved very slightly. There is a good deal of boredom.

That is one of the problems that they have in the Soviet Union, and among the intellectuals. You may have read this letter in the Washington Post that was also published in the London Sunday Times. It was a very interesting report of the view of an intellectual with regard to the Soviet system.

Senator **Wiley**. I referred to the subject nations, those that are enslaved.

Mr. **Dulles**. Oh, there is still the same unrest in those nations. It has been shown in Poland, particularly. The hope of freedom is still alive in those countries, and we don't see that there is much change except that since the Hungarian Revolution they realize it is very costly to have a military revolt.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I don't want to go into this at the moment but I think some time we might define what an intellectual is.

I don't know what an intellectual is.

The **Chairman**. That might open up a rather difficult subject.

Mr. **Dulles**. I am not sure whether that is the role of intelligence or not.

---

[12] Charles E. Bohlen, former U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.

KHRUSHCHEV'S LEADERSHIP

In the internal political situation in the Soviet Union, Khrushchev's position is unchallenged at the moment. He is at the peak of his authority and popularity. Some of his lieutenants, such as Mikoyan, exert considerable influence, but group rule or collective leadership no longer exists in any real sense.

Unquestionably, the current 7-year plan occupies an enormous importance in his mind. He sees the goals set out in the plan and the establishment of the U.S.S.R.'s position in the world as a guarantee of his place in Soviet history.

He obviously now thinks of himself more as a world statesman than as a mere political operator. While his style is far different from Stalin's, he is subject to the same temptations. For instance, he awarded himself a peace prize last year.

The developments at last week's meeting of the Supreme Soviet illustrate this element. For more than a year, he has spoken privately about a reduction in the police apparatus, going back now a little bit to the point that was raised. The abolition on January 13 of the Central Ministry of Internal Affairs, the MVD which, by the way, leaves the secret police KGB completely untouched—will help to confirm the views of the people that the Beria machinery has been destroyed.

Khrushchev unquestionably is stepping on many toes. He has probably disgruntled many of the military by his recent reductions. But he has the leading military people, Malinovski in particular, to go along with him.

The most interesting development in recent days has been the demotion of Kirichenko. He was a member of the Presidium, whom we had rated as No. 2 or No. 3 in the possible line of succession. He is a Ukrainian, very strong in the Party. He has been sent to the provinces and presumably will lose his position in the Presidium and disappear like those before him.

During the past year there have been a spate of removals at the next lower echelon. It looks now as though Presidium member Nikolai Belyayev will be removed or lose his job as the Proconsul in Kasakhstan. There have been some troubles there. The farm situation has not done well there, and he may be made the goat for this. There are some indications of factionalism within the ruling Presidium, but nothing that we feel is likely to hurt Khrushchev's commanding position.

The Moscow leaders are becoming concerned about what they call localism—that is the tendency of a local administrator to put his own area interests above those of the U.S.S.R.—and problems related to this are getting a little bit more serious.

But it was Khrushchev, of course, who carried out the decentralization of industry. But some of that is now coming back to roost from the point of view of a highly integrated state where the power resided at the top. So Khrushchev has been hoisted a bit by his own petard in that particular situation.

We have had reports recently—some of which have reached the press and rather amused me, because we hear it all the time—that Khrushchev didn't believe that his vast propaganda apparatus was generating sufficient popular enthusiasm for his programs, and he has ordered a revitalization of the propaganda machinery.

This problem is probably due more to popular boredom with the endless, repetitive, stereotyped political lectures, than to any loss of support for the regime. I think one of the interesting things to follow is the possible growth of boredom in the Soviet Union.

DEFECTORS

One point I would like to raise here is the question of defectors. It is quite interesting that we have received more defectors in 1959, that is those who leave for ideological motives—most of them—or for other motives, but who have certain intelligence potential.

We had 47 of them during 1959, 11 of them from the Soviet Union [Deleted.]

This was shortly after the military attaché of the Soviet Union in Rangoon tried to defect but was captured by the Soviets and returned for punishment to Moscow.

[Deleted] and his testimony gives the lie to the "Ugly American." He says that all these stories about the Soviet Ambassador and all the staff being so good and having all these contacts is all bunk, [deleted].

The others had no contacts, and he read "The Ugly American" with utter astonishment, and as indicated has given us a good deal about that. I must say I sympathize with what he had to say.

The **Chairman**. It is still a best seller, isn't it? They are making a movie of it now.

Mr. **Dulles**. I know they are.

[Discussion off the record.]

The **Chairman**. I agree with you. I think it is, too, for the record.

Mr. **Dulles**. Possibly the prize catch of the year from the point of view of defectors was a [deleted] authorities and later asked for asylum in the United States, which was granted to him. He has given us more and better information in [deleted] fields with regard to the Soviet Union than any other man that has come over to us. We have been getting from this group of defectors, [deleted] and others, extremely valuable inside information about what is going on in the Soviet Union and the satellites.

Just a word on Sino-Soviet relations.

THE STATE OF MIND IN THE SOVIET UNION

Senator **Lausche**. Would you mind summarizing briefly your impression as to what is going on based on the information that you got from the persons that defected, [deleted], and so on?

Mr. **Dulles**. I wonder if I could do that later, Senator. That would be quite a long time, and I would like to get the reports. We have had a great many reports from them. [Deleted], came over to us, with a vast amount of files, and most of the information we got from him and a good deal we got from [deleted] is of quite a highly technical nature with regard to the building up to their [deleted] who they use and how they operate, and it has been invaluable to us in that way.

[Deleted.]

Senator **Lausche**. My inquiry was intended to elicit information as to what the general state of mind is. It is a sort of followup on what Senator Wiley asked, but I will forego any questioning on it now.

Mr. **Dulles**. We have not gained a great deal from these people about the state of mind in the Soviet Union. It is interesting if you have an opportunity to read that letter which we believe is genuine that was published in the Washington Post, and previously published in the Sunday Times of London.

Senator **Lausche**. I read it.

Mr. **Dulles**. We think that expresses the view—maybe it is a small class—of a good many intellectuals in the Soviet Union.

I wish I could tell you that I thought there was general unrest there. I don't think there is. I do feel that they have to contend with this problem of boredom. As they are cutting down to some extent the hours of labor, people have more to do and fewer opportunities, some problem of what to do with their time. I think that is going to be one of the things that is going to be increasingly burdensome for them.

Their standard of living is increasing slightly, and I think that Khrushchev feels he has to increase it a good bit more and is going to exert himself during this 7-year plan to accomplish this.

SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY

The Soviet and the Chinese parties have been publicly quarreling about both domestic and foreign policies, and Khrushchev and Mao [13] apparently have come to have no great feeling of liking for each other. This has contributed to a perceptible drop in Communist influence in South and Southeast Asia.

Moscow resents Peiping's presentation of its great leap forward, of its commune program, and certain other phases of Chinese policy. Soviet spokesmen, including Khrushchev, have centered their fire on the commune program, although they have done it mostly privately.

They deny its theoretical correctness and its practical feasibility. The Chinese have centered their criticism of Soviet policies on Khrushchev's initiatives toward the West. When I say Chinese here, I always mean Chinese Communists. The Chinese Communists, who are unwilling to wait indefinitely to take Taiwan, are apprehensive that the friendlier United States-U.S.S.R. relations is not in their interest.

There has been an implicit criticism by the Chinese Communists of Khrushchev's soft tactics. They insist that any thaw should result only from unremitting struggle by the bloc and the defeat of the United States' war and aggression policy.

Khrushchev is obviously irritated with the Chinese and seems anxious to disassociate the U.S.S.R. from Peiping's hard line and to convince the West he wants an atmosphere of détente.

Moscow's propaganda treatment to the Sino-Indian border dispute and Peiping's quarrel with Djakarta on Sukarno's [14] action against the overseas Chinese had added fuel to the fire. Khrushchev has been making pointed remarks to the Chinese about the need for them to go along with his tactics. In obvious reference to China, Khrushchev said publicly in Budapest on the first of December: "If this or that country becomes conceited, this can only play into the hands of the enemy."

---

[13] Chinese Communist Party Secretary Mao Tse-Tung.

[14] President of Indonesia.

However, despite all these differences, we regret to tell you that we feel that at the moment what keeps the two countries, the two Communist allies together, has greater impact than all of these differences. We think they will try to put these under the rug as best they can, in order to continue for their joint purposes to present to the world a picture of at least outward unity.

We believe that these differences do persist, nevertheless.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my direct remarks. There are several crises that I might mention, but I think that the time is hardly available for them. However, we are giving careful attention to the situation in Iraq, which we consider a crisis. Anything might happen to Kassem[15] and if that took place, which might not be an unmitigated evil, you might have a period of semi-chaos in Iraq.

Laos, while better than it was some time ago, presents a certain number of difficulties, particularly because they are going to have an election this coming year under conditions where they are not really prepared for an election, and it is going to be very difficult to make contending anti-Communist forces get together to permit a common front against the Communists.

SITUATION IN CUBA

In this hemisphere the situation in Cuba has given us a tremendous amount of growing concern. We have been following this and trying to develop our intelligence, but all the intelligence points to the fact that Castro[16] is following a continually increasing anti-American policy; that he is trying to organize a Congress of what he calls "the hungry in Havana"—that is, a Congress of the underdeveloped states—which would be directed against the United States; that their fiscal and other policies are directed against us and against free enterprise; and that the Communists are gaining more influence in the government, although we do not yet feel that Castro has completely sold out to them.

In general we feel that we have a grave crisis right at our door. It is true that the policies that Castro is following may well be self-defeating in the long run, since it already has had and will have a continually detrimental effect on the economy of the country. He has lost support of the white-collar class, the bourgeoisie, but he has not yet lost the support of the great mass of the population. We think that he has less support than he had initially, and that there are the seeds of a growing disaffection.

However, we think that will take some time, because the worsening of the economy affects these people last.

---

[15] Abdul Karim el-Kassem, Premier of Iraq.

[16] Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

Their standard of living is low. It has decreased a bit, but still they are able to exist. Therefore, we feel that Castro probably would be able to maintain the support of a good many of the Cuban people for some little time, although we think he is losing slowly. That completes my direct presentation, Mr. Chairman.

SITUATION IN TAIWAN

The **Chairman.** On that last point of crisis, what is the situation in Taiwan? Do you have anything to say about that?

Mr. **Dulles.** At the moment, it is quiet. We are watching that very closely. There has been no movement of forces which would indicate the likelihood of an early attack on Taiwan. However, their forces are so disposed that they could mount an attack on a relatively short notice. We believe that Moscow is exerting its influence on the Chinese Communists to prevent any rocking of the boat in the Taiwan Straits area for the next few months.

We think that Khrushchev would not like to have that happen before the summit, as you realize the effect that might have on the United States.

U.S. INTELLIGENCE IN CHINA

The **Chairman.** Is our intelligence in China, do you think, pretty good?

Mr. **Dulles.** It is improving. I can say it is improving.

The **Chairman.** Do you have many so-called defectors in Hong Kong or in that area?

Mr. **Dulles.** There have been very few Chinese defectors. There have been a few. It is rather surprising that there have not been more. We had one that defected for a day in Bombay the other day, and then he changed his mind and went back. We had the same thing in Rangoon 2 or 3 weeks ago, a fellow that came over and said he wanted to come and then he went out and changed his mind. These may have been provocation attempts: it is very difficult to tell. There are of course, a continuing flow of refugees into the Hong Kong area, and some to the Macao area. Those are about the only two places that people can leave the mainland of China relatively easily in order to get out to the free world.

We have some indications of unrest in the areas bordering on Tibet—in Tibet of course there is still guerrilla warfare going on—and the Chinese Communists have not been able to liquidate that situation to their satisfaction.

The **Chairman.** Do you think this restraint that the Russians are exercising on the Chinese is temporary in nature, for the purpose of the summit?

Mr. **Dulles.** Well, I think it is possible that the motives that have apparently induced Khrushchev to bring a good deal of pressure to bear on Mao might change if Khrushchev felt he didn't get what he wanted out of a summit or other meetings of this kind.

He might say to Mao "Go ahead if you want. Try it out."

VIEWS ON PASSPORT LEGISLATION

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if I could ask you a question about another matter that you haven't directly answered and yet I think it bears on your work. Do you have anything to say about passport legislation?

Is there any evidence that the present situation is causing any harm to the interests of this country?

Mr. DULLES. Yes. I have some views on that subject.

There is no doubt that the relative freedom that Communists have to leave this country and go abroad and attend conferences in Moscow and so forth can be a disturbing element.

I feel that while maintaining the freedoms that we all want to see maintained, nevertheless some authority could be given so that some restriction could be put upon the uninhibited right to have a passport. I realize that you have a balancing of very difficult problems in that. We have a certain amount of information about this traveling abroad of American Communists.

They can go abroad and they can attend meetings in Moscow and in other places and then come back here and give the word to the Communist faithful in this country.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a serious problem? Do you think there is any evidence of concrete harm to us?

Mr. DULLES. I think it has potential harm, and if there are ways of stopping it, it would help protect our position.

ALGERIAN SITUATION

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us any comment at all about the Algerian situation and why the Communists have not recognized the Algerian Nationalists?

Do you have any reasons to explain that?

Mr. DULLES. Moscow is in a very difficult position there, because if they recognize the Algerian Nationalists, de Gaulle [17] undoubtedly would break relations with Russia, and they are trying to walk a tightrope, openly posing as a friend of France and rather secretly encouraging the Algerians and helping to some extent from time to time in arms shipment to Algeria, although we have no evidence of this recently.

I think they are playing the game of duplicity, but they want to maintain relations with France. Khrushchev is visiting Paris soon. I think Khrushchev wants to try to maintain the best relations he can with de Gaulle.

Therefore he has to deal under the table with the Algerians, and cannot give them open recognition. It is a tragic situation, and I regret to say in the last few weeks it doesn't seem to be getting better. We had hoped that there would be a turn for the better. That doesn't seem to have materialized.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any comment on the Berlin situation? Is there any development in that area that you could shed any light on?

Mr. DULLES. That has been quiet. There has been no change there. Certainly Khrushchev's statements in his speech indicate that he has not, in any sense, forgotten Berlin. He has kept that on the back of the stove, but he may bring it on the hot part of the stove at any time.

---

[17] French President Charles de Gaulle.

The situation is quiet in Berlin. The economic situation seems to be quite satisfactory. Mayor [Willy] Brandt is an able administrator. In general, I would say the situation in Berlin, from our point of view, is going along reasonably satisfactorily.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green, do you have any questions?

Senator GREEN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

PROPAGANDA IN THE SOVIET UNION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Dulles, on this passport matter which Senator Fulbright mentioned a moment ago, what propaganda value do you estimate there is in Russia or in the satellite countries when American Communists go abroad and make extravagent and inflammatory statements about the United States and our allegations, our ulterior purposes and our war-mongering, and all that sort of stuff?

Do you think that has propaganda value within Russia, among the Russian people?

Mr. DULLES. I don't know that it has very much there, but I think it does have a good deal in other neighboring countries. It has some in Russia, if it gets published in Russia.

You never can tell what is going to be published in Russia. But that probably will be published in Russia. I would say that on the whole, that had some unfortunate propaganda effects.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I recall some instances in some other countries where Americans who don't claim to be Communists, but who have had very close Communist associations at least, have made some rather extravagant statements about the United States as a war-mongering nation, and so on, and that has been used in these countries as proof by the leaders that the United States is bent on creating a war and warlike situations.

Mr. DULLES. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In order to convince their own people that the propaganda which they have put out from the top is true. That is, they attempt to prove it by the statements of American citizens who are there.

Mr. DULLES. If they are able to get abroad anywhere, they have a forum which they don't have when they are here. Nobody pays any attention to them here. They can't get into the press.

If they do get abroad, then they can get into the press, and can be picked up as you suggest by the propaganda orders of the Soviet Union, satellites and other countries, and by neutralists that don't like us.

The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator will yield on that point, the two authorities that Khrushchev cited were the Director of Central Intelligence and this committee. He used both of our statements for his own purpose—that is, a statement of the report here, and your statement.

There is an infinite capacity to take out of context anybody's statement, including your own.

Mr. DULLES. There is no question that you can say anything.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't have to go abroad to do that.

Mr. DULLES. To say that they have accomplished anything is likely to be reproduced in the Soviet Union.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Of course, there is a difference in taking those statements and twisting them somewhat and taking the very extravagent statements that some of the Communists may make, or what perhaps is more dangerous, some people who deny that they are Communists, but who serve the cause just the same.

Mr. DULLES. I agree.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In their activities.

I think that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. No further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Vermont.

SOVIET RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Dulles, do you think that close collaboration is going on between Latin American Communists and Moscow, or has there been some change in that situation in the last year?

Mr. DULLES. No, sir; I think it is still very close.

Senator AIKEN. Very close.

Mr. DULLES. And we have very good evidence of that. We have evidence that at the meeting of the Central Committee last February there were present in Moscow a large number of Latin American Communists, that they received instructions from high members of the Soviet Government, that they went back to carry out their programs, and they are doing so quite effectively.

We understand that they were told at that time in general, "Promote nationalism. Don't say you are connected with Moscow or that you have anything to do with the Soviet Union. Just promote nationalism and anti-Americanism."

That was the main theme they were given. I have no doubt that that has had its effect in Cuba.

They have had other regional meetings of Communists at which Soviet agents have been present. We are pretty well informed on those meetings, and there is no doubt that the Soviet Union and Communist China are being quite active in this hemisphere and are doing what they can to hurt us. The renewed activity of the Communist Chinese in this hemisphere is quite interesting.

Senator AIKEN. That bears out what I heard in Latin America.

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. There has been a playing down of preaching communism as such. There has been playing down of referring to Russia as the Communist country, but a tendency to point out the gains which have been made in Russia.

Also it seems to me that there is more of a tendency to play up China as the mecca of the Communist devotees, and some playing down of Moscow.

Mr. DULLES. That is correct.

Senator AIKEN. That is why I asked the question. And it also seemed to me that the Latin American Communists were very highly organized and were wielding an influence far out of proportion to their numbers.

Is that a reasonable deduction?

Mr. **Dulles**. Yes, that is quite correct.

Senator **Aiken**. It seems to me the headquarters was either in Montevideo or in Havana.

Mr. **Dulles**. Both.

Senator **Aiken**. Those are the two capitals of Latin America?

Mr. **Dulles**. They are active also in Mexico, where they have a strong Soviet Embassy. The Government of Mexico has been more active and aggressive in meeting their plotting than has been the case in Cuba—much more so than in Cuba—and somewhat more so in Uruguay.

Senator **Aiken**. And they have been active in Panama.

Mr. **Dulles**. They have been active in Panama.

Senator **Aiken**. Also undertaking to get some Panamanians recruited.

Mr. **Dulles**. That is correct.

The **Chairman**. Senator Mansfield.

SOVIET IMPERIALISM IN CHINA

Senator **Mansfield**. Mr. Dulles, I presume you have a pretty good historical section in the CIA. Could you tell the committee, based on the Nerchinsk Treaty of 1689 and other treaties entered into between the Manchus and the Czars, how much Chinese territory in those years was taken by Czarist Russia from the Manchu Empire?

Mr. **Dulles**. I can't answer that. Maybe Mr. Amory can.

Mr. **Amory**. The only substantial chunk is this piece here [indicating], the so-called Maritime Province, which was taken in the middle of the 19th century.

The Russians had been down in this area as they pushed out in the early 17th century. The Manchus were pushed back and actually defeated by the Chinese in a river battle just before the Treaty of Nerchinsk, which you mentioned.

But at the time it was taken, at the time of Nicholas III, this area here had only about 30,000 inhabitants. It was a barren, uninhabited land, and was never a part of the Chinese Empire. That is why today very little is made of it even by the Chinese Nationalists.

Senator **Mansfield**. Are you saying that on the basis of Nerchinsk and other treaties, no territory in that area west of Manchuria was taken by Czarist Russia from the Manchu Empire?

Mr. **Amory**. West of Manchuria you get into the Mongolian dispute. Mongolia has from time to time been under the same rule as the Chinese, but as you know now that is an independent republic more under the tutelage of——

Senator **Mansfield**. There are people in Siberia at the present time who are ethnologically allied to the Chinese.

Mr. **Amory**. Yes.

Senator **Mansfield**. The Mongols and others of that nature.

Mr. **Amory**. Yes.

CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION AS COMPETITORS

Senator **Mansfield**. The reason I asked the question is this: I am just wondering if the dissatisfaction which Mr. Dulles has pointed out, which now exists between the Soviet Union and China and may well increase in the future, as they become competitors instead of equals, it may well be that in that area you find this Chinese population growing. And you may reach the day, if you live long enough and the world lasts long enough, when the Soviet Union, to a greater degree than now, will be trying to shift toward more of an accord with the West, recognizing that perhaps its real enemy over the long run could be China.

Mr. **Dulles**. I would like to look up that back history. I am defective on that, but it is a very interesting point you have raised. I think we might study that and see whether it affords us any propaganda base.

Senator **Lausche**. The other day, when he appeared before several of us, Ambassador Bohlen said that the movement of the Chinese has never been northward but always southward. He further stated that the differences which now exist between the Chinese and the Soviets were similar to the difference that we had with the French; but he did believe that in the course of time there will be an impingement on objectives between the Soviets and the Chinese that might well ripen into discord.

Senator **Mansfield**. Of course, Frank, in answer to that statement——

Mr. **Dulles**. I would agree with that.

Senator **Mansfield** [continuing]. Keep in mind that the people in the area we are discussing were indigenous Chinese people, and that so far as wealth is concerned, it wasn't up there those days but down in Southeast Asia, and even in Indonesia, in Burma, and I think in a small part of the Philippines.

That is all I have to say, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. The Senator from Kansas.

COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA

Senator **Carlson**. Mr. Dulles, I spent a few days in Cuba in December, and as you have stated, I heard several folks, both Cubans and our American citizens, state that they didn't believe Fidel Castro was a Communist. But they had grave doubts about some of the top people he was using.

What does your intelligence show, for instance, about "Che" Guevera, who has been given charge of the agricultural reform program, and now the national banks, and about Raul Castro and Raul Castro's wife?

Mr. **Dulles**. We were inclined to think that "Che" Guevera, if he wasn't Communist, was so close to it that it is about the same thing.

His whole past history, his work with Arbenz,[18] indicates that he has been at least a tool of the Communists.

---

[18] Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, who was deposed as President of Guatemala by an armed revolt in 1954.

Raul Castro certainly finds the Communists to be his most convenient ally, and is working with them. Jiminez, who was at the head of the land reform for a time, is very much the same. We feel if those very close to Fidel Castro, many of them in most influential positions, were not actually Communists, they were at least playing the Communist game and were somewhat under Communist influence.

You don't carry cards much these days, as it is very difficult. You don't often run across a card-carrying Communist. Moscow has found that the idea of having cards and card-carrying Communists isn't very productive.

It is much better to have the Communist, but not force him to identify himself by being on a card index. It is very critical, the influence there in Cuba.

Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Oregon.

Senator MORSE. I have no questions. I just want to thank you very much for this briefing. It has been very helpful.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Tennessee.

Senator GORE. Mr. Dulles, I wish to make a very brief statement to indicate my own lack of conviction on a matter, a conclusion, and then ask a question.

ATTITUDES IN SOUTH ASIA

In a few weeks in the under part of Asia, I found a different pattern of attitudes and actions on the part of the so-called overseas Chinese. In Thailand, for instance, we were told that the Communist teachers and Chinese teachers were returning to the homeland, being indoctrinated, and that there was a close tie developing between the overseas Chinese in Thailand and the Communist Chinese.

In Vietnam President [Ngo Dinh] Diem has used authoritarian powers to bring about integration of the overseas Chinese with the Vietnamese population, with some considerable resentment on the part of the Chinese. I didn't go to Indonesia, but you have referred to the troubles there.

Is there any generalization that you can make with respect to the overseas Chinese, or is it, in fact, taking differing patterns?

Mr. DULLES. It is hard to generalize. I would say the situation varied somewhat from country to country. As you have pointed out, in Southern Vietnam Diem took pretty strong measures to integrate the overseas Chinese into the national life.

In Indonesia they have been or are being driven away from their holdings in the countryside and forced to go into the cities. The various local governments have had great difficulty because the Chinese have endeavored to maintain sort of a separate nationality and integrity, unity within a given country, which has been very difficult.

I believe that probably the majority of the overseas Chinese, in the past, looked to the motherland as a mainland, and have been going there more and more. I feel that in the last year, because of the commune development and certain other factors, the Chinese

Communists have lost a little of their appeal. I don't know how much, but they have lost somewhat their appeal in these countries.

It is a rather confusing situation. We believe that the remittances from overseas Chinese to the mainland have fallen off considerably, even from the United States to China.

That is partly because many of the people in the communes have written to their relatives abroad, "There is no use sending us money because we just have to turn it over. You had better keep your money."

CHINESE OVERSEAS POPULATION

[Deleted.] It is hard to tell how broad a pattern it is. It is still confusing with the Chinese overseas populations being a rather unsettling element in these various countries.

The problem is particularly acute now in Singapore where there is such a very large percentage of the total population, and I think one has to look at it more or less from country to country without attempting to establish a clear pattern for the whole area.

Senator GORE. Your statement somewhat bears out my feeling. I was unable to reach a definite conclusion.

I did have the feeling from the bits of evidence that I could pick up—and I wonder if you have any evidence to support it—that corresponding to this lessening of affinity with the homeland in some instances there was also a loss of confidence or hope or a tie with National Chiang kai-Shek's regime on Formosa.

Mr. DULLES. That has been true in certain of these countries. I am not sure whether that is true of the Philippines. I think there is a closer tie there. But I think that has been true.

There never has been a very close tie between the overseas Chinese and the Chinese on Taiwan. There have been individual cases.

After all, the overseas Chinese's heart has been pretty much where his pocketbook has been. He has been a trader; and where he can trade, there his interests lie. I think that has affected him a great deal.

I don't find any very deep loyalties to anything except their own domestic interests. There undoubtedly has been, on the part of some, some pride in the fact that the Chinese Communists have gained a certain amount of power and prestige in the world, and some of that has been lost by the recent rather outrageous behavior of the Chinese in Tibet, the Indian frontier, and with regard to Indonesia.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Williams.

Senator WILLIAMS. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche.

UNITED STATES-JAPAN RELATIONS

Senator LAUSCHE. This morning I received a rather lengthy letter from an organization in Japan complaining about the contemplated execution of the treaty with Japan, and in this letter it was stated that some of the head men in Japan who are advocating the treaty were former war lords.

The tenor of the letter was that Japan is trying to become a peaceful nation while the United States is doing everything to precipitate it into a war state.

Can you tell us what the situation in Japan is with reference to the division of thought concerning the relationship that ought to exist between Japan and the United States?

Mr. DULLES. I would think, Senator Lausche, that the sentiment expressed in that letter was the sentiment of the Communists and the left wing of the Socialist Party.

They have been very vocal. They have been pretty well organized. They created a scene when Prime Minister Kishi left the other day.

It is our information that the great majority of the Japanese leaders, their parliamentarians and their people, are still in favor of close relations with the United States and back the treaty. But there is a very vocal, well-organized and reasonably effective minority.

Senator LAUSCHE. Have any of my associates received a letter of that type?

Senator MANSFIELD. I have.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mine ostensibly was signed by an artist, a writer, and so forth.

Senator SPARKMAN. About 15.

Senator LAUSCHE. Fifteen, yes.

One further question, and this deals with your task in gathering intelligence.

INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

Can you tell whether there is a difference in the difficulty of you efficiently performing your job in the gathering of intelligence and the task of the Soviet people occupying a similar position? Is it simpler for them or for you?

Mr. DULLES. It depends on the country. It is far simpler for the Soviets to gain information about what is going on in the United States than it is for me to gain information as to what is going on in the Soviet Union, although that latter situation has been improving somewhat.

However, the Soviets still consider that secrecy and the security of everything relating to their military operations is one of their great assets, and they have no intention whatever of changing that.

They have no intention of letting us into areas of military importance. They made that perfectly clear at the Geneva Conference, on testing and on the early warning problem sometime back. I had several talks with Bill Foster when he came back, and they impressed that on him.

They had no intention to enter into agreements which would enlarge our access to what they consider their secrets.

In other countries I think that we do as well as if not better than they. I think we have more facilities in most of the free world outside the orbit than the Soviets do.

Senator LAUSCHE. My question is prompted by the statements contained in the report filed by the Washington Center of Foreign

Policy Research, which did a study of our United States strategic position. In this report it is repeatedly stated that the ease with which the Soviet Union gets knowledge of our Strategic Air Command bases, our missile bases, makes the task far simpler in advantageously utilizing the information.

Now one further question: Have any of your men read these reports that have been submitted to us—by the time the work will be completed there will be 15 in number? Do you know whether your intelligence——

Mr. DULLES. I think we have read all of them.

Mr. AMORY. Various ones of us; all of us have read the parts pertaining to intelligence.

Senator LAUSCHE. Have you formulated any opinion as whether these reports contain valuable information, usable by the Soviets which the Foreign Relations Committee has compiled?

Mr. DULLES. I think, Senator, we have to be very frank about it. There is a great deal that we do, and in a free country we must do, which gives helpful intelligence to the enemy. But I don't see any way of changing that without changing our whole situation.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then this question: Do you feel that helpful intelligence is given to the enemy by these reports which I have just mentioned?

Mr. DULLES. We have studied them in the office. I have not read them, so I would not want to address myself to particular reports I haven't read.

Senator LAUSCHE. You might have one of your men read the report filed by the Mediterranean——

The CHAIRMAN. The Institute for Mediterranean Affairs.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes. I have read that in the last 2 days, and when I got through I couldn't say anything else; if I believed the report, all of our allies were thieves and unworthy to exist as nations, and it is quite painful.

Senator AIKEN. By the way, the committee has not printed that report, have they?

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Senator LAUSCHE. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. On that point, has the CEIR Report, which is referred to there, been called to your attention?

Mr. DULLES. I know of it, but frankly, I have not read it, Mr. Chairman. I am sure that we have all of these reports, and they have been studied, and I will get hold of our people.

The CHAIRMAN. All of these reports are submitted, of course, to the State Department for any comment that they wish to make, and if they feel there is anything in it that shouldn't be published, and so on, I am sure the committee would consider that very favorably.

But I don't think any of this is classified material. I think it is available to any scholar who cares to go into it.

SOVIET ADVANTAGES

Mr. DULLES. May I reminisce on this? About 8 or 9 years ago when I first came down here, when Bedell Smith was director, we hired a group of very eminent professors at one of the leading institutions of the United States to look into all of the overt sources of information about the United States which were available to the Soviet Union, and, looking at it as though they were Soviet intelligence officers, to give us their conclusions.

What they produced was so dramatic that when then President Truman saw it, he ordered it classified and not disseminated.

I am not talking about these types of reports; but anybody who wants everything that the American press has published—the articles, all congressional and other hearings, all the columnists—and put this all together and try to distill out of it some results, is not going to be so very far away from the truth.

I don't see any way of meeting this in a free society. I don't think there is any end to it.

There are a great many indiscretions that go along that pain me very deeply. I think we give out too much information. I don't know how to stop it.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, in reading the reports, I found that all statements that were made were documented in statements made by public officials or by reports.

But what disturbed me was the fact that all of this documented information was assembled into one book; all that the Soviet Union has to do is look into that book, and there it will find complete documentation where the information can be located on an official basis.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know. I haven't read them all, but I would doubt that there is much the Soviets don't already know. They have about 30,000 people working on digesting all kinds of information.

Mr. DULLES. They have an extraordinary system. I testified before the subcommittee, and the Soviets spent pages of commentary, far more than anybody in the United States did. They have a very unique system, and I am inclined to think, Senator, that they pick up most of this.

These compilations may help them somewhat, but they have a very good system of doing it already, and they do it with a great thoroughness.

INFORMATION ON SOVIET MISSILE BASES

Senator LAUSCHE. To what extent do you feel that you are informed about the sites of the launching bases and other important military sites in the Soviet Union?

Mr. DULLES. We know a great deal about Tyura Tam and about Kapustin Yar, two test bases.

As I have indicated to you, we don't know about their other operational launching bases, if in fact they have already established them.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now the next question: To what extent is the Soviet Union misinformed or ignorant of our launching bases and our aviation sites?

Mr. DULLES. Of course, they know all there is to now about Cape Canaveral and Vandenburg.

The CHAIRMAN. Anybody can walk or drive into most of these strategic air bases.

Mr. **Dulles**. That is right.

The **Chairman**. There are no restrictions.

Senator **Lausche**. The point which I am trying to make also gives support to the proposition that by giving the indiscriminate right to issue passports to Communists, it has some strength, too.

[Discussion off the record.]

The **Chairman**. The Senator from Montana wants to ask another question.

EFFECT OF CONGRESSIONAL VISITS

Senator **Mansfield**. The one question I want to ask, Mr. Dulles, is this: What is the effect of the visits of Senator Fong and Congressman Inouye to the Far East this fall?

Mr. **Dulles**. I can't answer that.

Mr. **Amory**. It was all very laudatory. It was a constructive thing.

Senator **Mansfield**. I heard nothing but good about it.

Mr. **Dulles**. Yes.

Senator **Mansfield**. I thought you might have additional information.

Mr. **Amory**. Those are State cables.

Mr. **Dulles**. I saw nothing to the contrary. Everything was good. In fact, I think by and large the congressional visits abroad have been of great value.

Senator **Mansfield**. These two men especially, because in their persons they really represented us.

Mr. **Dulles**. Yes, I know them both.

ANALYSIS AND PLANNING

The **Chairman**. Mr. Dulles, there is one comment in the Brookings Institution Report that I wonder if you could comment on. It said:

> The principal need at present is for better servicing of the planners and decision makers by means of more comprehensive long-range analyses.

Would you care to comment on that?

Mr. **Dulles**. I don't believe the writer knew what we were getting then. We have now concluded a series of long-range statements based on all the intelligence that we have, and I think they are pretty good. Every year, we give the policymakers estimates of——

The **Chairman**. I don't think they were referring to you. They were referring to what is done with the raw material, as to the formulation of the policy; there isn't, I would say, a sufficient long-range analysis of the material they get from you and other places. I don't think that was directed at your office.

Mr. **Dulles**. I see. Well, all I can say is that I feel that our intelligence is continually getting more attention than it did in the past.

That is a question of building up confidence slowly and getting our reports better and getting them in a quicker and more timely way to the people. I think on the whole there has been a slow and steady improvement in that process.

The **Chairman**. Since you misunderstood what I meant to say, I want to read this paragraph, because I didn't mean to reflect on you.

Mr. **Dulles**. I understand.

The **Chairman**. This is from that same report. It says:

> The ability of the intelligence community to gather, analyze and distribute intelligence data systematically and expeditiously has improved considerably during the past ten years. The principal need at present is for better servicing of the planners and decision makers by means of more comprehensive long-range analyses.

It wasn't a reflection on your part.

Mr. **Dulles**. I understand.

The **Chairman**. It was on the next part of it.

Mr. **Dulles**. I am not sensitive, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. There are one or two little things here. I don't know that they mean too much.

THE SITUATION IN EGYPT

Could you comment a little more about the U.S.S.R. concerning Egypt? Do you have any views regarding this Aswan Dam situation, which apparently they are proceeding to go through with? Do you have any comment on that?

Mr. **Dulles**. In general, our relations with Egypt have improved. Nasser [19] has been quite alerted to the dangers inherent in communism, and he has suppressed any overt attempt by the Communists in Egypt to assert themselves.

The Soviet Union is going ahead with the first stage and maybe with latter stages of the Aswan Dam, and that will certainly have some influence on the situation. I don't think that Nasser, however, is going to change his general attitude because of the Aswan Dam work. I have a message here. Would you read that?

Mr. **Amory**. An agreement was signed this morning between the UAR and the Soviet Government on the second stage of the Aswan Dam. The U.S.S.R. will participate in this stage on the same basis as on the first construction and implementation which began on January 9. There has been an exchange of letters between Khrushchev and Nasser.

The **Chairman**. On the same basis means they are doing it all, doesn't it?

Mr. **Dulles**. It is hard to tell.

Mr. **Amory**. All the foreign exchange. It is the same ratio between the Egyptian and Soviet contributions.

The **Chairman**. One of these reports indicates that the Russian policy now is not to take over any additional land, but to strengthen the nationalism and the independence from the West and, in other words, to deny them from the West rather than to take them over as being the next stage.

Mr. **Dulles**. That undoubtedly is what they will try to do.

The **Chairman**. Is that consistent with your view?

Mr. **Dulles**. That is consistent with our view of what they will try to do.

---

[19] Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

The CHAIRMAN. That is consistent with what you said about France and Algeria.

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. They wish to encourage the nationalism of de Gaulle and Nasser. The fact that he doesn't line up with them in no way discourages them from pursuing this policy: is that right?

Mr. DULLES. And he will take aid anywhere he can get it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. He will take it from friend, potential enemy, wherever he can get it.

The CHAIRMAN. But in the long run, it has the effect at least from the Soviet point of view, of gradually alienating him from the West or making it possible for him to come more and more under the influence of communism. Isn't that true?

Mr. DULLES. Well, I don't know that it necessarily will.

The CHAIRMAN. That is their objective.

Mr. DULLES. That is their objective.

The CHAIRMAN. People wonder why they go on if he denounces them, but this is the explanation of why they go on with the dam; isn't it?

Mr. DULLES. Yes, I think it is, but I don't think that Nasser is going to be necessarily led along by the nose on this. I think he still is going to maintain a pretty independent policy.

The CHAIRMAN. But it is a long-term project. It is estimated to take 10 to 15 years, and Nasser may or may not be there. They still have their foot in the door.

Mr. DULLES. That is right.

PROSPECTS IN AFRICA

The CHAIRMAN. The way they are building the dam. This could apply to any of these independent countries in Africa. You didn't say much about Africa. Do you think that is an area which bears watching very carefully, and that it may cause us great trouble?

Mr. DULLES. I am talking now particularly about Central Africa. I think Central Africa may be the greatest problem we are going to have to deal with.

These countries are getting independence long before they are able to exercise independence. The situation in the Congo is going to become increasingly difficult. You have a situation of tribal war there at the present time.

There may be tendencies on the parts of the Congo to get away from this, particularly in the areas there where the copper developments have taken place. I hope to go to Central Africa this summer, because I consider it an area where our problems are going to multiply.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have people adequate to keep up with events in Africa?

Mr. DULLES. We have been doubling and tripling our representation, our people in Africa. It is not an easy area in which to send people.

[Deleted.] I am very glad you raised this, and am sorry I didn't mention it in my direct remarks, because I would not want to give the idea I don't feel it is important.

I think it is of vital importance, and it is extremely difficult. I am spending 10 times as much time on Africa as I did 3 years ago. I am making a major effort there because I think it is a particular area where, from the point of view of intelligence, we can possibly be of some help.

The **Chairman**. Do you have much difficulty in recruiting personnel to go to places like Africa?

Mr. **Dulles**. No, they go very willingly.

The **Chairman**. Do they?

Mr. **Dulles**. Yes.

THE VALUE OF EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

The **Chairman**. One other thing: Have you had any impression as to the value, for purposes of knowledge of these various countries, of our exchange programs? Has it been of any assistance?

Mr. **Dulles**. I believe in them thoroughly. I think they have been of great benefit.

There is a situation in Africa and in a good many of these countries where, of course, the level of education has been very low, and that is going to be one of the problems as to how we can help them supplement their whole educational apparatus and build it up.

The **Chairman**. That is one of the greatest needs, I guess.

Mr. **Dulles**. Yes.

Senator **Green**. May I ask a question?

The **Chairman**. Certainly.

Senator **Green**. Don't you find, in doing that, that you are in conflict with the other foreign powers that are represented there?

Mr. **Dulles**. Less and less, Senator Green.

Senator **Green**. Aren't you still greatly hampered, even if it is less and less?

OTHER NATIONS' VIEWS

Mr. **Dulles**. Take, for example, the Congo. Two or 3 years ago the Belgians felt they were going to hang onto the Congo, and therefore resented any action that the United States might take, and were suspicious of America because of the fact that they might be trying to support an independence movement.

I think that has gone. They realize that the handwriting is on the wall, and they are going to become independent. That is not true in all of the areas.

It is not true in the Portuguese colonies, and occasionally we have a problem with our British friends, because they worry a little about us in places like Kenya, Tanganyika, and other countries.

But on the whole there is quite a changed attitude, because it is realized that all of Central Africa is going to be independent over the next 20 years, and if we can do anything to help, we are more likely to be welcomed now than in the past.

Senator **Green**. Do you think the representatives of the great powers in general take that broad view you have just expressed?

Mr. **Dulles**. All but Portugal, I should think. I don't think the Portuguese want us around.

Senator **Green**. Do you think Great Britain does?

Mr. DULLES. There is a great change in the British attitude. I had long negotiations with them, and I know.

Senator GREEN. Since when? How long ago was this change?

Mr. DULLES. Well, I think it has happened really over the last year and a half or 2 years; a very great change.

Senator GREEN. Do you think it is true of the Netherlands?

Mr. DULLES. Well, they haven't any overseas possessions except Curacao. They have lost them, you see. They are out of Indonesia, and they have nothing in Africa.

We have the New Guinea situation over here, but that is quiet at the moment. I think that attitude is going to continue because, as I said, I don't think any, with the possible exception of the Portuguese, believe that they are going to hang onto these areas for more than a few years, so their attitude is changed toward the United States.

Senator LAUSCHE. The Portuguese are beginning to relent now, too.

Senator GREEN. Do you think the native African, as a rule—I am not talking about Africa as a whole because it varies a great deal, it is a big place—varies in his attitude toward foreigners, whether they are American, English or Dutch?

Mr. DULLES. No, I was talking in what I was saying about the attitude of the colonial or ex-colonial powers toward us, not the attitude of the natives.

Senator GREEN. I am talking about the natives.

Mr. DULLES. But I do think that the attitude of the natives in these areas is probably more friendly toward us by and large than it is toward the colonial power.

Now that is not saying very much. They are suspicious of us to some extent, too, but less so than they are of the French and British.

Senator GREEN. Wouldn't you say that as a rule the natives as a whole identify us with the other European powers?

Mr. DULLES. To some extent they do, yes; there is no doubt of that.

Senator GREEN. Isn't that unfortunate?

A GROWING OPPORTUNITY

Mr. DULLES. It is, but I don't know how one can help it. Our skin is of a certain color, and that is hard to prevent. But I do think we will have a growing opportunity in these countries, despite this lingering prejudice that does exist.

Senator GREEN. A growing opportunity. There is plenty of opportunity now. We don't lack opportunity. It is taking advantage of them.

Mr. DULLES. As the chairman suggested, it is not easy to find people. We can get our people to go, but that is only a drop in the bucket.

The CHAIRMAN. It is getting them to help you.

Mr. DULLES. That is it.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any more questions?

Senator GREEN. No.

The Chairman. This you have touched on. I don't know that it is worth exploring it at this late hour, but just a brief comment about the situation in Hungary, Poland, and East Germany.

Is that settling down into a state of hopelessness, do you think? Is there really little prospect of further uprisings in those satellite areas in Eastern Europe?

Mr. Dulles. No, I don't think that these people have given up the hope of eventually gaining freedom. It varies from country to country because of the opportunities.

In Poland, of course, the situation is somewhat more liberal as far as the government is concerned and therefore I think that the people in Poland have more hope.

In East Germany the government is bad, but the people expect someday to be a part of a united Germany, and that attitude is not going to change insofar as the great majority of the people is concerned.

Bulgaria, I think, is a satellite that is probably closest to the Soviet Union, and where there is the least likelihood of maintaining a desire for complete independence. I think it still remains in Poland particularly, in Hungary, and to some extent in Czechoslovakia. It is not quite so strong there because of the Slav connections with the Soviet Union. It remains in Rumania. Albania has a negligible quantity.

SITUATION IN YUGOSLAVIA

The Chairman. You haven't mentioned Yugoslavia.

Mr. Dulles. I haven't mentioned that. I don't consider that a satellite.

The Chairman. No, I don't either. I was just mentioning it.

Mr. Dulles. I think that the Soviet Union is making a very serious effort to improve its relations with the Yugoslavs, and is finding some response on their part.

But I think that Tito[20] proposes to maintain his independence, and he will go further toward the Soviet Union, but not beyond the point where he maintains his independence of action.

The Chairman. Is their economy progressing fairly satisfactorily?

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

Mr. Amory. They had a terrific harvest this year.

The Chairman. A big harvest?

Mr. Amory. They became a net exporter of a substantial quantity of wheat and corn.

The Chairman. Generally, their economy is all right?

Mr. Dulles. Better.

Mr. Amory. It has the fastest growth rate in Europe.

The Chairman. It has?

Mr. Amory. Faster than West Germany and some of those. Of course it starts from a very low base.

The Chairman. I see, growth rate.

Mr. Amory. It is a rather positive achievement they have made.

The Chairman. Are our relations continuing all right?

---

[20] Marshal Tito, President of Yugoslavia.

Mr. DULLES. Entirely satisfactory, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you still think that was a good investment?

Mr. DULLES. I still think it was a good investment.

Senator LAUSCHE. In Yugoslavia?

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

INDEPENDENCE IN THE UKRAINE

Senator LAUSCHE. You touched the satellite nations. What about the Ukraine? They are celebrating on the 22d of this month, I believe, their independence day, and they are circularizing the great desire of the Ukrainians to be free.

What is your intelligence on the Ukraine and the state of mind of the Ukrainians toward communism?

Mr. DULLES. I regret to say, Senator, that we don't find very much evidence of any separatist movement in the Ukraine at the present time.

There was a movement in the late 1940's and early 1950's. That was pretty ruthlessly crushed out, and we have not found inside the Ukraine any strong separatist movement.

We have no doubt that the Ukrainian people love their area, and so forth and so on. Potentially there may be something there, but there is nothing very activist at the moment.

Senator LAUSCHE. Does the same description apply to the Byelo-Russians?

Mr. DULLES. Yes, it does.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Mr. Dulles, we certainly appreciate your giving us all this time. You have done a wonderful job. I feel much better informed than I did 3 hours ago. You have been very generous and frank, and we appreciate it very much.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you for letting us come here.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JANUARY 19, 1960

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee proceeded into executive session at 12:20 p.m. in room 4221, New Senate Office Building.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Carlson, and Williams.

The chairman inquired if the committee wished to consider en bloc all nominations pending before it.

Senator Morse asked that the nomination of Livingston Merchant, to be Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, go over without prejudice.

The committee then voted, without objection to report the nominations of Raymond A. Hare, to be Deputy Under Secretary of State, John J. Muccio, to be Ambassador to Guatemala, Robert Bernard Anderson, to be Governor of the Inter-American Development Bank, Walter C. Dowling, to be Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, Walter P. McConaughy, to be Ambassador to Korea, John D. Hickerson, to be Ambassador to the Philippines, Edson O. Sessions, to be Ambassador to Finland, William P. Snow, to be Ambassador to Burma, Edward Page, Jr., to be Minister to Bulgaria, and John E. Wallace Sterling, to be a member of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[Accordingly at 12:25 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

BRIEFING ON THE WORLD SITUATION

THURSDAY, JANUARY 21, 1960

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:10 p.m., in the committee room, F–53, United States Capitol Building, Hon. J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, Senators Lausche, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Newhouse, Mr. Kuhl, and Mr. St. Claire, of the committee staff.

The Chairman. I guess you might as well start, Mr. Secretary. We are very pleased to have you this afternoon for our annual briefing. Goodness knows we need it. There are many things that I am sure you are going to clear up before we are through, but I think we had better start without delay.

Some members will come in, I think, pretty soon.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTIAN A. HERTER, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary Herter. Mr. Chairman, I welcome this opportunity today to appear before your committee to discuss with you and your colleagues a number of the problems that we are currently facing in our foreign relations.

Before turning to specific problems and developments, I would like to say this: Obviously, the most important aspect of our foreign relations lies in our relationship with the Soviet Union.

Since Congress adjourned in September, the President and Chairman Khrushchev have engaged in their talks at Camp David, and now there have been arranged an East-West summit meeting to take place in May, and the President's visit to the Soviet Union in June.

Such face-to-face contacts with Chairman Khrushchev offer an opportunity to probe further Soviet intentions. As such they become part and parcel of our continued probing policy.

In this period of probing and negotiation it is more than ever necessary that we maintain our strength and that of our allies. We must not let down our guard.

In this connection, while the proposals for the Mutual Security Program for fiscal year 1961 have not yet been set before you, nonetheless I wish to point out that this particular program is a most important and effective instrument in promoting and maintaining our own worldwide interests.

Affirmative action on these proposals is important to demonstrate that the United States will continue to assist in maintaining the military strength of the free world, and likewise continue to give urgently needed economic and technical assistance to less developed peoples. I cannot stress my convictions on this point too strongly, and will go into greater detail as such time as you conduct hearings on the program.

Senator **Wiley**. You are talking about economic assistance there?

Secretary **Herter**. Yes.

Since the Congress adjourned in early September, there have taken place a number of events of considerable importance in regard to our foreign relations, and I would like to run through them in brief form and then, perhaps, if you would allow me to finish with this very brief rundown, to take up such matters as you might want to go into in greater detail.

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S TRIP

I shall not discuss the President's trip, in terms of his extraordinary reception in countries; which he attributes not to himself as an individual at all, but to a feeling in areas of the free and uncommitted world that the United States is really an unselfish leader in the move toward peace in the world, and in assistance to countries which are trying very hard to increase their own standard of living. Perhaps the most significant part of his trip was in India, where he found that the sentiment of the Indians, who had prided themselves on being uncommitted peoples for many years, had changed considerably, largely because of Chinese actions, first in Tibet and then with regard to the boundary between China and India.

While on that trip, the President made a very special effort—without trying to negotiate at all—to carry out a suggestion that had been made to him by the chairman of this committee before he left, that he use his good offices, insofar as he could, to improve the relationships between Pakistan and India, relationships which had been very disturbing in that section of the world, and disturbing to the whole free world, because it had been very greatly embittered largely because of Kashmir, and because of certain boundary disputes.

I think that the President was able to help considerably. The principal boundary disputes between India and East Pakistan, and India and West Pakistan have now apparently been satisfactorily resolved to both sides.

The principal problem, that of Kashmir, has certainly been helped a great deal by the work of the World Bank in trying to work out the water problem, and also because of a common danger that has arisen, namely that of the Communist Chinese to the north, and the desire on the part of both India and Pakistan to be able to free their effective troops who have been facing each other largely on the Pakistani-India border for action if they are required as against Communist China.

Again in connection with India, there was the development of very real importance—the sending to India by the World Bank of what are known as the "Three Wise Men;" that is, Sir Oliver

Franks, from Great Britain, Mr. Dodge, from the United States, and Mr. Abs, from Germany to make an economic and financial review of the Indian picture for the Bank which, in effect, is utilizing its good offices as between different nations which are interested in the Indian situation, to try to help in allocation between the nations interested in the areas in which they can best help insofar as the Indian economy is concerned.

SOVIET ADVENTURISM IN IRAN

During the President's trip he had a long talk with the Shah of Persia, and I think that the most difficult situation there is not so much the relationship between Persia and Russia, which has been very acute—the Russians having carried on a continuous radio barrage against the Shah personally and the ruling family in an effort to stir up revolution—but the relationship between Iran and Iraq.

The obvious area of dispute between them is the Shatt al Arab, the river at the head of the Persian Gulf, which is the boundary between them, but in which, unhappily, the boundary line goes over to one side of the river and blocks the Iranians in one of the principal ports required for the export of their oil from the refinery at Abadan.

The Iranians are convinced that the Russians, in accordance with the practice adopted very often when they want to stir up trouble—not doing it directly themselves, but through the intermediary of another government—are trying to get the Iraqis to make an issue of this to a point where there may be an open clash. And the Iranians are very disturbed, and we are disturbed, because this may lead to an extremely serious situation.

We have been doing all we could to try to get them to negotiate this particular issue, but as there have been movements of troops to that area, so far the effort to get them into negotiations has been unsuccessful.

DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT

The other development in the Mideast area with which I know you are all familiar is that of the difficulties presented by the intransience of the Egyptians in letting Israeli shipping of goods go through the Canal.

There we had hoped a modus vivendi had been worked out by Hammarskjold,[1] who acted as an intermediary, which would allow the shipment of those goods in chartered bottoms that were not Israeli ships.

The conditions of that apparently had to do with actually conveying the goods to the consignee before the transit through the Canal. With the stoppage of the last ships, the Egyptians are taking the position that this was not a bona fide FOB arrangement; and that actual title to the goods has not been transferred to the consignee; hence they were Israeli goods going through.

Mr. Hammarskjold is in Cairo today, and as he was a pretty effective intermediary in this position before, we are hoping that he may be able to work out some type of arrangement which will not lead to a more serious situation there. It has been a very serious one, because the Israelis feel that this is almost the last step in the economic blockade of Israel, and that they may have to take rather violent action in regard to it.

---

[1] United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold.

In the Far East, I mentioned Chinese actions in Tibet and in India.

THE PICTURE IN LAOS

The picture in Laos has calmed down for the moment. A new cabinet has been formed. Elections are scheduled for the 25th of April, and we are hopeful that the constitutional processes in Laos can be carried on.

However, we are dealing there with a situation which is still a very difficult one in that in the whole country there are not many people to choose from to put a government together. There are a good many jealousies, and the Pathet Lao, who certainly received logistical support from North Vietnam and from the Vietminh government, are making life very difficult for any government at all.

Constant agitation is going on. The situation is a little better than it was 3 months ago, and there has been no indication of any activity on the border recently.

The internal government is showing greater strength than it had before, and we are hopeful that this new cabinet change, while it left the former Prime Minister Phoui[2] out of the picture—and, incidentally, he had been a very able man, a strong-minded man—it looks as though we will have a chance at least of holding through until these elections in April.

UNITED STATES-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY

The other most significant development since September, of course, has been the signing of the treaty with Japan, on which I understand Mr. Kishi[3] briefed you here very recently, and which will be coming before you for ratification before long. That treaty is one that we feel amounts to a very real step forward.

Mr. Kishi has had his internal troubles in the negotiation of that treaty. He has had some trouble in its ratification, but he has a pretty strong hold in the Diet, and it looks as though the ratification might come by April in Japan if their schedule carries out as it is now laid out.

IMPLICATIONS OF KHRUSHCHEV'S VISIT

In Europe, probably the most important development has been the Khrushchev trip here, and the facts that I mentioned of the Western summit coming in May.

We have no illusions with regard to the Khrushchev visit here. Mr. Khrushchev, certainly in the spoken word and in his actions, has changed his tune with respect to the United States considerably from what it was before. But there are moments when he returns to his blustering and rather threatening attitude. Until at a conference table we actually get down to brass tacks on the settlement of some of the outstanding issues between us, we will not know whether he is still the same intransigent individual with whom we have had to deal in the past. I do not think the President or anyone in the administration is overoptimistic as to what may come from a settlement.

---

[2] Phoui Sananikone resigned as premier of Laos on December 30, 1959, during an attempted coup. Prince Souvanne Phouma was appointed premier in August 1960.

[3] Japanese Premier Nobusuke Kishi, who would resign from office on July 15, 1960 as a result of intense opposition to the United States-Japanese mutual security treaty.

On the other hand, there is no question that the avenue of direct conversation has now been opened, and because of the nature of the individual—his vanity, his insistence on maintaining the position that in Russia he is the man clothed with the power to make deals with other nations—it is a healthy thing, we think, to be able to meet him face to face.

PROSPECTS FOR THE SUMMIT

In preparation for that summit conference, we have set up among our Western allies certain working groups.

There is one which is meeting on Monday to deal with the question of disarmament, to try to put together a Western position for the disarmament conversations which will begin in the middle of March.

Undoubtedly, that will also be a probing operation up to the time of the summit, but with those conversations beginning it may be possible to isolate from the very outset certain problems that would be worthwhile to have discussed at the summit. But until we know what the attitude of the Russians may be, other than as indicated by the statement of Mr. Khrushchev to the United Nations, it will be very difficult to tell whether or not any of those problems can be isolated.

As you gentlemen know, the proposal he made at the United Nations is a very far-reaching proposal, with an extraordinary provision in it that a little disarmament requires only a very little inspection. We have more and more inspection as more disarmament takes place, and complete inspection when everybody is completely disarmed: that is his thesis.

There is no provision as to what happens in the world when everybody is disarmed, and it looked in its preparation as though it were essentially a propaganda document.

On the other hand, the Russian did put in a proviso that if the West was unwilling to accept that proposal as it stood, they would be willing to isolate individual matters and discuss those to see if a beginning could be made in a small way. My guess is that the most we can hope for is that a beginning might be made. Certainly from our point of view, if we could make a beginning which, again, would indicate the degree of good faith in which they want to enter these negotiations, it would be very helpful.

There is another subcommittee that is working on the Berlin and German problem. There they tried to put the Western positions together. It is not going to be very easy because certainly until after the elections in 1961, as long as Chancellor Adenauer is the titular and actual leader in Germany, it is going to be very difficult to do much negotiating because the Germans want to maintain the status quo exactly as it is without any shift whatsoever.

They might be willing to agree to a plebiscite in East Germany if the conditions were properly laid out on that.

That seems to be a condition that certainly up to now the Russians have been in no mood to accept or even consider, so we cannot be too optimistic as to how far that matter will progress at a summit meeting.

The third question is one of a rather vague nature which the French have proposed, and that is East-West relationships.

We have agreed on a working group in Paris to try to define a little more precisely what the French have in mind. They have told us in rather general terms that what they would like to discuss with the Russians are the question of controls of arms shipments into Africa, reciprocal propaganda in each other's countries, interference in each other's internal affairs, and matters of that kind.

But they have not been made precise, and until we have this working group try to investigate a little more closely as to what they have in mind, we will not know just how fruitful a line this may become for discussion at the summit.

THE FUTURE OF NATO

The other matter of considerable concern in Europe has been the condition of the NATO Alliance.

As you know, since you adjourned there was a meeting at the Ministerial level in Paris of the NATO Allies, and there was also a meeting of General de Gaulle, Chancellor Adenauer, Mr. Macmillan [4] and the President to discuss not only the NATO Alliance, but also preparatory work for the summit meeting.

The most difficult problem that we had to face in connection with the NATO Alliance was the attitude of the French with respect to three matters.

The first had to do with the withdrawal of a considerable portion of the French fleet in the Mediterranean from NATO command.

The second and perhaps the most serious of the lot was their unwillingness to have their air force, even that part of it stationed in Germany, under joint command, insist on its remaining as a separate French unit to be commanded by the French alone and not to be integrated or in any way coordinated with the NATO command.

The third is their unwillingness to allow any stockpiles of nuclear weapons to be set up within France unless they were to have not only the sole determination as to when they were to be used there, but a voice in using nuclear weapons anywhere in the world by any power.

The first of these difficulties has been partially resolved, but not entirely.

It looks as though the fleet, as a coordinated part of the Mediterranean operation, can be restored to a state of command that would make it a useful if not integral part.

The second one, with regard to the unified air command, is under discussion between General de Gaulle and General Norstad [5] now—largely, I think, as a result of the intervention of the Prime Ministers and the President—and we are hopeful that that one may work out.

---

[4] French President Charles de Gaulle; West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer; and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan.

[5] General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe of the NATO forces.

On the question of the nuclear position of France, I do not think there is anything much to hope for until the French have actually made their own tests and perhaps begin to feel that they can become a nuclear power on their own, in which case their attitude may change.

But as a result of the French attitude, many of the NATO powers were wondering whether it was necessary for them to do their full share of maintaining their strength in NATO, and we had some pretty rough going.

However, when we got through we had agreed that NATO was not going to disappear, and could not disappear overnight, and that it is, perhaps, the most vital alliance in the whole free world today. It is the key to maintaining peace in Central Europe, in that all of us had better reconsider selfish positions there, and do our very best to hold it together.

We made it very clear on our part that the better economic position of many of the European states made it only natural that we feel that they should carry a larger share of the burden.

And that, on the whole, was pretty well received, and conversations will be beginning very shortly to see how the burden can be spread better.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN EUROPE

One other development of considerable importance came out of a communique that was issued by the Chancellor, Prime Minister, President de Gaulle and President Eisenhower on the subject of some of the economic problems in Europe.

An ugly situation had developed between the six and the seven, so-called, the economic alliances of two groups that was pretty bitter.

In addition to that, this particular feud was getting to a point where it was really threatening the NATO Alliance. We were concerned about it, because we felt that, if that kind of economic rivalry of the two strong groups grew up on the continent of Europe, with England, of course, belonging to the seven, there might be a compromise reached whereby they would all come together to the detriment of the United States. That was a development that we did not anticipate with any pleasure at all, and we got this resolution adopted by the four, and put out in communique form, to call a conference of some 13 nations with a view to seeing what best could be done in this economic situation.

Doug Dillon [6] went over about 10 days ago on our behalf and chaired this meeting of the 13 nations, doing, I may say, an excellent job.

Three subcommittees were appointed. One to deal with this six and seven problem; one to deal with the question of the reorganization of OEEC,[7] or of the creation of some similar body on a consultative basis, in which the Canadians and we might be included; and the third, for a committee to consider what the great industrial nations of the world might best do to supplement each other's efforts in connection with underdeveloped nations.

---

[6] Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon.

[7] Organization for European Economic Cooperation.

That is a very desirable thing, because there is no mechanism for discussing that, and no mechanism for really encouraging those nations whose economic situation has improved tremendously during the past few years of taking their share in a problem that I think all of us agree is a very serious problem today.

DEVELOPMENTS IN AFRICA

I jump quickly to Africa where there have been very significant activities within the last few months.

As you know, four African nations will become independent in 1960, Somalia, the Cameroons, Nigeria, and Togoland.

Nigeria is much the biggest and most important of those. It is the largest country in population in Africa, some 35 million, and has a pretty stable and pretty able government.

Somalia is in great disarray. It does not really know where its own borders are. There is an effort to create a larger Somalia. They want to take a large piece out of Ethiopia. They even want to go down into Uganda and take a piece of that, and yet this is going to become an independent country with a very uncertain form of government.

The Cameroons, as you may have read in the paper today, is having tremendous internal difficulties and they are, perhaps, as symptomatic of what is going on in Africa today as any country you can find.

The great surge of the underdeveloped peoples in various sections of the world has taken a form in Africa where the surge is not necessarily a revolt against the colonial powers that have had the full responsibility, but is often a battle between tribal elements completely unrelated to the colonial administration, or completely unrelated to a new administration that may be set up within those countries. But this surge is all heading toward one thing, and that is independence.

It is moving very much faster than anybody thought it was going to.

Senator **MORSE**. Mr. Secretary, you said it all hangs on one thing.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Independence.

Secretary **HERTER**. Independence is the one thing that is moving with great rapidity; that is the one common denominator all the way through—the desire for independence.

The French have in their community of states 12 entities. Two of them—Western Sudan and Senegal—have now federated into the Mali Federation, and that will undoubtedly declare its independence in 1960.

Madagascar is likely to declare its independence, and then there are some seven or eight others which, when they see the example of these two, will undoubtedly want to become independent, which they can do under the confederation agreement with the French that was voted on last year.

MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

This movement, of course, presents very real problems for us from the point of view of the makeup of the United Nations. The very first thing that a newly independent country wants by way of establishing its importance is membership in the United Nations.

But here there would be some eight countries, entirely aside from the ones whose names I just gave you, which would become independent. But in the British Colonial Empire—not Africa alone, but other possessions in their Colonial Empire—there are still 37 entities that will be looking for their independence. Thus, we have about 50 new nations in the making, and with the United Nations having jumped from 50 to 82 in the last 10 years, it looks as though there would be 125 or 130 in the next 10 years. Whether or not the charter of the United Nations can stand the kind of strain that undoubtedly will take place when you get a very large grouping of these smaller nations ganging up against the richer nations, nobody knows.

Nobody knows whether it will make a very unwieldy type of governmental body, particularly with the Security Council unable to fullfill its function because of the Russian veto.

ALGERIAN SELF-DETERMINATION

In Algeria there is little that we know other than what is appearing in the press. What is coming out of the meeting in Paris today, we do not know. We heard of the reaffirmation that General de Gaulle made to allow the self-determination of the Algerians. But the Algerians have not yet sent any representatives to talk with the French.

They are at an impasse on one thing, and that is that the French will not talk to the Algerians except on the basis of a cease-fire, and they will talk to Algerians if they have been elected to office and are not self-appointed revolutionary leaders.

On the other hand, the Algerians will not talk cease-fire unless political guarantees are discussed at the same time, which would bring about in the near future elections to make this self-determination promise a reality.

In Latin America we have some real difficulties.

THE CUBAN SITUATION

The Cuban picture has been deteriorating, principally because of the pretty irresponsible actions on the part of Fidel Castro, and the fact that—not all, but nearly all the men with certain degrees of experience in his cabinet have been replaced, and a group of pretty revolutionary-minded individuals have taken their places.

Perhaps the most significant of those was Che Guevera—who was not a Cuban at all, but an Argentinian and a revolutionary in Guatemala, a soldier-of-fortune who went to Cuba—was put at the head of the Bank of Havana.

Only yesterday Castro made a very bitter attack and made unwarranted attacks on the United States. They were of such a serious nature that I think we will be asking our ambassador to come back and discuss with us what proper measures should be taken.

He will, of course, have to protest those statements, because not only were they of a violent nature, but they were very insulting, to our ambassador—who is one of our finest and most liberal individuals, and who went to his job with every intention of trying to help the good elements of the revolution, in which there was a very large part now on the outside—insulting to the Vice President of the United States and to the American people generally.

This is a situation that is giving us intense worry.

We have a strong proclaimed noninterference policy, but the kind of incitement that Castro is arousing against American citizens in Cuba may lead to a dangerous situation from the point of view of the Americans who are there. They are there in good faith, and it worries us very much.

The other one is in Panama.

THE UNITED STATES IN PANAMA

As of this moment the scene is comparatively quiet, but there are elections coming in Panama in May, and it looks as though all the elements in the elections are unanimous in at least one thing: they want us to allow them to fly the flag in the Canal Zone and they want us to carry out certain provisions of the 1956 treaty. We were partly in error in not having carried them out sooner or more completely; hence we have a clear mandate now to square away our treaty obligations with our treaty performance.

The flag issue is a very difficult one. It is one that has been put up to us in a formal note by the Panamanian Government. It is one we have under active consideration, and in which there are a great many different points of view.

I have not yet received a recommendation to pass on to the President. I have discussed this matter at some length with our Latin American Division.

I think you are having a hearing on that matter. I think the House is, at least very shortly; so I will not go into further detail on that, except to say that this also is disturbing us.

The third thing which is disturbing us is the fact that the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which is scheduled to be held once every 5 years, was scheduled to be held in Quito on the first of February.

The first crack in that came when the Peruvians, who were having serious border troubles with the Ecuadorians, announced that unless the Ecuadorians settled the border matter before the conference, they would not go to the conference. That was the first one.

The second one was that the facilities that were being built in Quito to take care of those who arrived at the conference could not be finished, and they had quite a battle with the labor unions to see if they could get them finished. It now looks as though that won't be finished until May, but there are a good many questions coming up at that conference that it would have been very good to have aired in a full Inter-American meeting, so I am sorry that it has been postponed.

It would have been very useful for us to get the feeling of the other Latin American countries as to the developments in Cuba.

From the little that we can gather from the different capitals, Latin America is not at all happy about the behavior of Mr. Castro, and is seriously worried lest this may turn into a straight Communist-dominated administration in Cuba.

THE TREATY ON ANTARCTICA

Finally, just two matters: One, since the Congress adjourned we have signed a treaty on Antarctica.

It is a very interesting treaty, whose genesis came from the fact that the Russians were doing a lot of scientific exploratory work in Antarctica, the real purpose of which a number of nations were very concerned about, particularly Australia and New Zealand.

They are doing a certain amount of oceanographic work, which made those countries suspect they were looking for possible hideouts for submarines in Antarctica; and frankly, we were puzzled as to why they wanted to spend so much money in their scientific work in a part of the world that we felt they had no direct interest in.

For 18 months, on our initiative, conversations took place among the 12 nations that have been associated in the geophysical work in Antarctica during the Geophysical Year of 1959, to see if it would be possible to at least make a beginning in this world with one area where no armaments could be brought in, and no one could use it for military purposes, where, if it were used for scientific purposes, all the scientific data obtained by one country or another would be shared with the others.

We explored for some time. Our greatest difficulty came, curiously enough, not with the Russians but with the Argentine and with Chile, both of whom had staked out claims that overlapped in that section of Antarctica, where there is considerable terra firma during a part of the year, and where there are actually some people living on the peninsula that stretches up close to the Straits of Magellan.

FULL RIGHT OF INSPECTION

That treaty was negotiated in some week's time. It is unique in one respect, and that is the question of inspection.

Any nation that is a partner to that treaty has the full right to inspect every bit of scientific work or activity of any party belonging to any other nation in the whole of Antarctica, and that means inspection right down to the last piece of scientific instrumentation to make certain that there is no hidden motive from the point of view of armament or otherwise.

That was accepted by the Russians; it was accepted by all the other nations and at least we have a piece of the world under this agreement that, if the words of nations are worth anything, is going to be a neutral area in which scientific work can be carried out without fear of military implications.

To my mind, it is an extremely good treaty. Of course, the details of it will be coming before you, and that will be before you for ratification before long.

Finally, if I may, I would like to say just a word on passport legislation.

PASSPORT LEGISLATION

With, I think, the last of the court decisions with regard to the rights of the State Department to control to some extent the travels of individuals leaving this country whose records we feel it would be very detrimental for us to have travel as American citizens, we feel that legislation is very badly required.

The Wiley bill, which I think will be before you, as well as the bill that was passed by the House last year—I did want to say that we in the Department feel that it is very important that that might be given consideration.

Last year there were still a good many matters in review before the courts, and I don't think it ever came before this committee for hearing. We hope very much that it will this year.

That is probably too long a rundown, but I tried to cover the principal areas of the world in the developments since last we met.

Senator WILEY. Do you think that hymn they used to sing, "All Quiet on the Potomac," would be appropriate? [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. That is a very interesting statement, if it is not a very pleasant prospect, but we are not surprised at that. We are all aware that you cannot change the character of it.

I have one or two questions, and then I will ask the members to call on you for questions.

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

You are probably aware that a few days ago the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen Dulles, spent nearly 3 hours before this committee.

Among other things, he informed the committee that the Soviet Union possesses a formidable ballistic capability. He was asked specifically about the Soviet Union's presumed three-to-one lead in CBM's but he said nothing that would have reassured anyone on this widely discussed point.

In this morning's newspaper we find Secretary of Defense [Thomas S.] Gates suggesting the talk about the missile gap[8] has been greatly exaggerated.

He bases his observation on revised intelligence estimates, and he observed further that when his predecessor, Mr. Neil McElroy, testified to a 3-to-1 ICBM gap last year, he was operating on the basis of what the Russians are capable of doing.

On the basis of what surely must be the same intelligence, one of our most respected intelligence officers seems to arrive at a different view then does the Secretary of Defense, and I wondered if you could enlighten us a bit and remove some of this confusion that seems to have arisen.

Secretary HERTER. Mr. Chairman, I cannot give you a clear-cut answer to that.

---

[8] On January 19, testimony of Defense Secretary Thomas Gates before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee was released for publication. Gates denied that a "missile gap" existed between the United States and the Soviet Union, and stated that new intelligence estimates did not project Soviet superiority in ICBMs. Also on January 19, Gates told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the United States would be able to retaliate sucessfully against any Soviet sneak attack.

The intelligence community makes estimates from time to time, which are submitted to us, and among the estimates that they have made—and which have been revised from time to time—have been those not alone of capability, which is one thing, but of strength and intention to increase the strength.

I suspect that the variation that has occurred is between the intelligence estimate of capability. We know that the Soviets have developed booster strength far ahead of ours.

We have concentrated in our missiles program on as great a distance as the Russians, but with a smaller payload, and we did that deliberately when we first began our missiles program because we felt that we could send the same impact with a smaller payload that would be just as great as theirs would be with a much larger payload.

The question of what they have put into mass production is, at best, guesswork.

Mr. Khrushchev made some statements of his own that he had just visited a plant of mass production which has already turned out 250 rockets. He did not say what size they were, whether they were ICBM's or IRBM's, or what type of rockets they were.

The intelligence community, I think, is in full agreement that they cannot have any such number in hand at the present time.

The intelligence community keeps reviewing these matters, and I think they have felt, knowing what the manufacturing difficulties of ICBM's are, that while the capability is there to produce large numbers, the actual numbers that have been produced are not as great as they estimated a year before. That, I think, is based largely on our own experience in the difficulties of mass production.

CONFUSING STATEMENTS

The **CHAIRMAN**. It is very confusing to me——

Secretary **HERTER**. It is confusing to me, sir. I made exactly the same inquiry that you have asked of me this morning, because I had seen Mr. Dulles' testimony, and I sensed there was a difference in evaluation of the two things.

I cannot pretend to be an authority on this subject. Certainly the intelligence community has been asked to keep working on this continuously. They have to operate, as you know, from rather meager information.

The **CHAIRMAN**. On the contrary, Mr. Dulles gave the impression that he was quite confident of his information, much more so than usual.

He mentioned some defectors that we had seen, and he had charts to show that they had launched a number of these missiles, and so on. I thought he had much greater assurance, that he knew what he was talking about; he gave me that impression.

He may be wrong, of course, and he kept referring to the intelligence community. He certainly is a major part of it.

What I am confused about mostly is this concept of the Secretary of Defense that there is some new standards by which he measures this. It is sort of like saying this difference between a 1940 dollar and a 1954 dollar.

He has revised the basic approach to this, which confuses me. Why has he done that?

Secretary HERTER. Sir, I cannot give you the answer to that. I think that the basic difference is in an estimate of capacity. We might well estimate our own capacity for battleship building——

The CHAIRMAN. You mean manufacturing capacity?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, manufacturing capacity.

The CHAIRMAN. Not explosive capacity.

Secretary HERTER. That is right; manufacturing capacity, mass production.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, would you yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator SPARKMAN. The thing that puzzles me about that is this: Mr. Dulles certainly is not basing his estimate on any potential. He talked about what they had on the launching pads.

The CHAIRMAN. What they already shot.

Senator SPARKMAN. What they shot, and how many they had on the launching pads ready to go. Now, I just do not see how there could be any difference.

Senator LAUSCHE. I thought he answered my question of the intercontinental missile by saying that they had 10 available for firing.

Senator SPARKMAN. On the launching pads, that is exactly what I am saying. He gave the specific number that they had ready to go like that.

Secretary HERTER. That I would not quarrel with at all. I do not think that Secretary Gates would quarrel with that.

Senator SPARKMAN. But here is the thing about it.

Secretary HERTER. It is a question of the estimate from there on out as to what they have available now.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is right.

I asked Mr. Dulles this question, and he very properly declined to answer; in fact, I really did not expect him to answer. I asked him how many we had on the launching pad.

Now, just about a year ago, Secretary McElroy, testifying before the Joint Economic Committee, said that we would have 3 on the launching pad by July 1, 1959.

When July 1, 1959, came along, I believe the testimony before the Armed Services Committee was that we did not have any; and I am not sure we have any yet, but it looks like we could get some comparison between those two.

MILITARY EVALUATIONS OF THE SOVIETS

The CHAIRMAN. And, Mr. Secretary, I may be misinterpreting, reading something into this that may not be there, but he seems to bring into this assessment his evaluation of the intentions of the Russians. Is he going to undertake to decide whether the Russians are good people or bad people? Is he going to supplant the State Department in evaluating what our policies are and what the evaluation of our political intentions as well as military intentions are? I do not know how you would separate what the evaluations are, and this disturbed me very much.

I am not at all sure that I like the idea of the generals taking over, the idea of accommodating their defense plans to their idea of what the Russians are likely to do—and when I say "likely to do," I did not interpret that to mean as to how many plants they have or how much that capacity is, but what they were likely to do as a matter of political decision.

Isn't it possible to interpret that in his statement?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, I think that is possible, and I think that is the only basis on which we can act.

The CHAIRMAN. But you are the one, if anybody is, to tell us about that, not Defense.

Secretary HERTER. We are most concerned about it, naturally.

The CHAIRMAN. You are the most concerned.

Secretary HERTER. And we are seriously concerned about it.

THE BALANCE OF POWER

We have been concerned about missile development for some time, because there is no question that the offensive power and retaliatory power between our two countries is conditioned very largely by the missile strength which, in turn, will be taking the place of the manned bomber strength.

We have studied this question very seriously, because we are concerned that we are going to have great missile strength, both in the Minuteman field and in the Polaris field, but that, like all of these things, the timetable does not work out as it seems to, because we find something better or something has gone wrong; there always seems to be delay. But there is one thing that we are convinced of: What we now have, we feel we have a real superiority in. But a real superiority does not mean a great deal on either side.

The important thing is that both sides be sufficient so that starting a full-scale nuclear war is going to be unprofitable to either side. That would seem to be the condition at the present time, and I think it will continue to be.

I doubt very much that the Russians are going to build up sufficient missile strength in the so-called gap period of the next 2 or 3 years to feel that they can launch an offensive—even a surprise attack—on us, without having to receive such punishment that it would be completely unacceptable.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I do not quarrel with that too much. I hope it is true, but I do submit that this apparently conflicting testimony is very confusing to those of us who try to understand it, and I can imagine what it is to the country.

On the one hand, last year McElroy and Mr. Dulles and others told us that we had a pretty serious situation here.

If we are going to do our duty properly over here, we have to know. If it is not very serious, everybody can relax and forget about it.

If we can rest on Mr. Gates' assessment that the Russians are not as mean as we thought they were, and we should not be disturbed, that is going to make difficult a lot of our policies, and I think it is very disturbing to have what looks like quite a different approach. I am not sure that it is. But he sees a new way of judging, if I understand it, a kind of new standard by which you evaluate these relative strengths, and that is what really distrubed me seriously about our going to that.

Secretary **Herter**. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest this: I have not had a chance to see Mr. Gates' testimony, and I have seen only what appeared in the press.

The **Chairman**. Yes.

Secretary **Herter**. I have only just had a chance to look at Mr. Dulles' testimony, and have not had a chance to study that.

I was puzzled by what appeared to be a different basis of evaluation between the two.

The **Chairman**. Yes.

Secretary **Herter**. And if you would give me a little time, I would be very glad to submit a paper to the committee to see if it could reconcile these two things.

The **Chairman**. I think it would be very useful to reconcile it and assure us a bit.

Senator Green, do you care to ask questions?

Senator **Green**. I would like to ask a couple, if I may.

I am limiting it to that number because I know there are others who want to ask questions.

RED CHINA AND THE BOMB

About a week ago, on January 11, the U.S. News and World Report carried an estimate by Hong Kong experts that Red China would explode an atomic bomb in 1961 or early 1962.

I thought I would ask you for your comments on that.

Secretary **Herter**. I have seen no intelligence evaluations of that whatsoever.

We have no direct information that there is even a scientific laboratory in China working on this. We have heard rumors of it. We do not know where it is, and we have nothing specific on the subject.

Senator **Green**. But you always trace down these rumors, I suppose.

Secretary **Herter**. We do our very best. Hong Kong, of course, is the home of the greatest number of rumors in the world.

Senator **Green**. Yes.

Secretary **Herter**. And also the source of the best information that one can get out of Communist China today, better than the diplomatic missions in Peking, a good deal better.

Senator **Green**. Which of the two do your correspondents furnish you with?

Secretary **Herter**. Well, we have to do a good deal of weeding out, but we have our very best people in Hong Kong trying to weed out what appears to be genuine from rumors.

Senator **Green**. I suppose you have them in numbers that are feasible for that purpose.

Secretary **Herter**. I think so, sir.

Senator **Green**. If Red China gets the bomb, can we afford not to recognize its Government or include Red China in arms control talks?

Secretary **Herter**. I think that inclusion of Red China in arms control talks or commitments is inevitable. If really meaningful decisions are made by the other powers that are discussing disarmament, obviously the rest of the world cannot disarm and leave China exactly as it is.

In fact, the Russian proposal put specific limitations on Chinese arms and Chinese manpower in the proposal that was made at the United Nations.

NORMALIZATION OF UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONS

So I think they have come to recognize the same thing. But that does not necessarily involve recognition.

Senator **Green**. Well, on what does recognition depend, if you can define it?

Secretary **Herter**. Well, sir, on actual exchange of diplomatic missions.

Senator **Green**. Oh, yes.

Secretary **Herter**. But that is a physical aspect of it.

Senator **Green**. That is a quibbling of words. When are we going to recognize China?

Secretary **Herter**. I would say, sir, when it is in our national interests to do so.

Senator **Green**. Yes. But what would be satisfactory information to enable you to do so?

Secretary **Herter**. The Chinese are still outlaws as far as the United Nations is concerned.

They were declared outlaws by the United Nations, and have never done a thing to purge themselves of that accusation.

Senator **Green**. Well, is the United Nations or the United States going to determine it?

Secretary **Herter**. No, I am speaking merely of some of the things that are on the record against the Communist Chinese.

Senator **Green**. Yes.

Secretary **Herter**. Insofar as we are concerned, they have publicly declared that they are going to take Formosa, with which we have a treaty of alliance, by force of arms, which is a constant threat of war.

Insofar as the signed agreement they reached with us on releasing American citizens in China is concerned, they never have lived up to that.

Even yesterday, Jacob Beam, our Ambassador to Poland, spoke to Mr. Wang, one of the sources we use for contact with Red China. He raised the question again and was told it was not proper to raise it in that place, and that they would decide in their own way whether to release them or not. That is against their signed word.

None of those things recommend themselves to us as a very good steppingstone toward friendly recognition.

Senator **Green**. Which puts it very mildly.

Secretary **Herter**. In the same vein, their actions in Tibet and in India have not been a recommendation.

The **Chairman**. How many prisoners are still included?

Secretary **Herter**. Five. The sixth, Bishop Walsh, disappeared, and we cannot find him anywhere.

CONDITIONS FOR RECOGNITION

Senator **Green**. Are there any conditions which China could meet or would meet that you would accept as a basis for recognition? What could China do to obtain recognition that would be satisfactory to the United States?

Secretary **Herter**. It could purge itself of a number of things.

Senator **Green**. Have those ever been enumerated to China?

Secretary **Herter**. I think China knows them well enough. I do not know that they have ever been enumerated.

Senator **Green**. Have they ever been enumerated to China?

Secretary **Herter**. I do not think they have, but I think you could name them. I could name a number of them. The first one is the Chinese alliance with North Korea. That is one where China was a party to that war.

Neither of them lived up to the armistice agreement. In complete violation of every step taken by the United Nations, neither of them have lived up to the agreement that a plebiscite would be held, properly supervised, in both North and South Korea.

With regard to the Formosa question, as long as they are threatening to take by force of arms—and they just say they are biding their time for the proper moment to do it—that is not a very friendly thing. And certainly as far as the violation of their written agreement on these American citizens is concerned, they would have to purge themselves of that.

Senator **Green**. Has the basis of recognition ever been discussed between the two nations?

Secretary **Herter**. Not that I know of. As far as I know it never has.

Senator **Green**. What would be the proper way of building such a basis?

Secretary **Herter**. If you ask me, sir, I would like to see the first step come from them, not from us.

Senator **Green**. That is all; thank you.

The **Chairman**. The Senator from Wisconsin?

Senator **Wiley**. In relation to that matter, you know, Mr. Secretary, that the Senate and the House have spoken definitely against recognition or allowing them to become a member of the United Nations.

But, be that as it may, a former Ambassador to the Philippines, I think, was in here just recently, and among other things he said that recognition of Communist China would throw the whole Orient into the Chinese orbit. He was undecided as to the advisability, he said, unless conditions change—and he meant change in their rulers and in their philosophy, and so forth—he would not be in favor of recognition.

THE DETERRENT MACHINERY

But I wanted to get back to this matter of capabilities. Have you read the article of Hanson Baldwin in the New York Times?

Secretary **Herter**. No, I have not.

Senator **Wiley**. Well, if you are going to read these other things, you had better read that because he is recognized as an authority, and he agrees pretty much with the President's position that the matter of deterrence is a matter in which we are not in second place.

There may be one or two matters where we are not right up to the top; for instance in the matter of boosters—not in relation to intercontinental ballistic missiles, but in relation to getting things on the moon and so on—we have not developed a booster like the Russians.

But I just saw the other day that France told us to get our missiles out of France, so we must have missiles there; we must have missiles in Britain; we must have them in Spain; we must—what do they call them, the 250-, 500-, 750-mile missiles; is that it?

Secretary **HERTER**. Yes.

Senator **WILEY**. That is part of the deterrent machinery that I thought they were talking about.

AID TO EGYPT

There is one question I want to ask because I think we are all mighty interested in trying to find out what the reaction of the Department is in relation to Egypt now.

We see that the Kremlin is arranging to add additional money to building the second stage of the Aswan Dam, and we have made arrangements through one of our organizations, as I understand it, to make a contribution for some purpose.

My question is this: Isn't it all right that we permit the Russians to go ahead and spend some of their money down there to build up this territory that will provide an area for raising grain for the hungry Egyptians?

Isn't there some way we could work together with the Russians to do the thing that we apparently want to do separately?

Secretary **HERTER**. Some time ago I had a long talk with Mr. Eugene Black [9] of the World Bank on this question of the Aswan Dam.

The Egyptians has talked to him and the Germans had talked to him with regard to the Westerners picking up the tab for finishing the balance of the Aswan Dam.

As Mr. Black outlined the picture, one of the reasons that the World Bank would take it into consideration in the first instance was that the total cost of the project is estimated by their engineers as about $1.3 billion; it is a colossal investment.

He said that the bank had studied the matter very carefully. As you may recall, at one time before it withdrew its support for the project it studied the possibility of the utility of doing it piecemeal in these various stages that have been discussed, and came to the conclusion that it was a complete waste of money unless the matter were carried through the final stage, which was the hydroelectric development and the irrigation that went with it and that that was probably a 10-year operation.

He had recently been asked by the Germans, who were thinking of financing this very second stage that the Russians have now agreed to finance—which is about $100 million—and he said that he was unwilling from an engineering point of view to start in on what had been done by the Russians if they were not willing to carry through themselves.

---

[9] Eugene R. Black, President of the World Bank.

He said that we could not necessarily trust their engineering skills or the quality of the workmanship, and I think the Russians are finding very great difficulty in the initial stages now because they are not finding the labor that they required, nor do they find it is going to cost as little as they thought it might cost, even in its initial stage.

His conclusion was that it was very much better for the Russians, having undertaken to do this, to do it all the way through.

He said that there would be very little purpose to be served. They have gotten the credit now for financing the Aswan Dam. If we took the biggest part of the load, which would be nearly $1 billion to finish after the second stage is done, we would not be given credit for doing what they are doing on the first part, and they would not be willing to put in enough money to make that a useful project.

ALTERNATIVE PROJECTS

It is true that other projects are being studied by the Bank in Egypt. There is one that offers much less expense, very real possibilities. It is a curious project, and it would mean cutting a ditch from the Mediterranean into the El Alamein depression.

At one point cutting through that ditch would flow some of the waters of the Mediterranean through a canal with a 450-foot drop at the end of it into the depression, which is below the level of the Mediterranean. They could develop in that way hydroelectric power for Alexandria and Cairo at much less expense then the Aswan Dam, and very much faster. From the preliminary study made by the engineers, apparently the evaporation formed by the lake at the depression would be sufficient to take care of the incoming water so the whole Mediterranean would not be running into the desert, as long as you could keep control of the size of the canal running through there.

I mentioned that in confidence as one of the engineering projects that the bank is discussing, and feel it would get help to the Egyptians much quicker and much more effectively than the Aswan Dam, which they do not think the Russians will finish.

Senator WILEY. Are we in on it, the Bank?

Secretary HERTER. They are studying it.

Senator WILEY. They are studying it?

Secretary HERTER. Studying it.

Senator WILEY. Nothing definite, then?

Secretary HERTER. No.

Senator WILEY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, just for the record, I do not think I would like to let it pass that Mr. Black withdrew that offer.

DULLES WITHDREW ASWAN DAM OFFER

It is well known that Mr. Dulles withdrew the offer. Mr. Black was a subsidiary matter in that Mr. Black had agreed to make the loan on the assumption that we would put up our part and Great Britain would put up its part, the two being about $200 million. He was going to lend $200 million, and the withdrawal did not originate with Mr. Black at all.

This Government withdrew its assistance which automatically put the Bank in a position——

Secretary **Herter**. I think you are correct in that statement.

The **Chairman**. There is no doubt about it. We went into this at great length. I do not think you were Secretary at that time, of course.

The other point is that it is not $1 billion left for Russia to pay. There was only $400 million of foreign exchange necessarily out of $1.3 billion. The balance was to be paid by Egypt out of her own local funds for local labor, and I do not think that this means that the Russians are undertaking—if it is a similar project, which I think it is—more than $400 million. This would have been the foreign exchange cost if that original project we had proposed had gone through.

Secretary **Herter**. I think it has been upped now on the estimates, but not by a material amount.

The **Chairman**. It may have been. But it is not quite as big a burden on the Russians. That is spread over 10 years, as ours would have been.

We were going to give $150 million spread over 10 years, which would have meant $15 million a year and is not as much as we had given them many years.

I think this was clearly on the record. We went into that fairly closely, and this committee issued a report on what we found. I do not think there is any doubt about that.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I thought it was $50 million.

The **Chairman**. It was $100 million, and the British $50 million. That was a grant, the equity which we might give, and that was over a period of from 10 to 12 years; and then the Bank was to lend $200 million, which was a repayable firm, sound, hard money loan that was estimated to take care of the foreign exchange requirements. This meant primarily the machinery necessary to build it, plus the generators, and so on. But all the labor and local costs were to be borne by the Egyptians spread over that same long period.

Well, I do not want to argue about it. I think I know what I am talking about on this, and I just wanted the record to show that Mr. Black did not withdraw that. I do not want to get Mr. Black involved in any argument, but I am distinctly of the opinion that Mr. Black did not initiate it, and was perfectly willing to go along with it, and was greatly surprised when our Government withdrew.

The Senator from Alabama.

Senator **Sparkman**. Mr. Chairman, I will remind the chairman that he made quite a comprehensive discussion of this on the Senate floor.

The **Chairman**. That is right.

Senator **Sparkman**. You made a very fine analysis. It was not long after that that I was talking with Colonel Nasser, and he referred to your speech and told me that he had read it very carefully.

Senator **Wiley**. Did he say our chairman was a special pleader for him? [Laughter.]

Senator SPARKMAN. He did not say that, but he said he had done a fine job.

The CHAIRMAN. He did not say I was inaccurate in my facts, did he?

Senator SPARKMAN. He did not discuss that, but he showed he had read it in full.

Senator WILEY. Did he say that he had told the truth for once? [Laughter.]

Senator SPARKMAN. With emphasis on the "for once"? [Laughter.]

ENGINEERING ABILITIES OF THE RUSSIANS

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, while we are on this Aswan Dam and the other project, this other project sounds to me like a very interesting one. But of course, it does not seem to me to be fully comparable to the Aswan Dam because the major benefit from the Aswan Dam would be the reclamation of land, irrigation, whereas this would be only the power side of it.

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Another thing, I was interested in what you said about the engineering ability of the Russians.

You know, during the adjournment of Congress there was a committee of Senators—and perhaps House members. I am not sure—who went to Russia, representing the Committee on Interior, I believe it was. My understanding is that they came back greatly impressed with the engineering feats that they had seen in Russia, that some of the great dam projects of the world are located on Russian streams, so I was just a little surprised to hear that point raised.

Secretary HERTER. Well, perhaps I had been unfair to Mr. Black. I was recalling his conversation, and I do not want to put him in the middle of this at all.

Senator SPARKMAN. Of course not.

Secretary HERTER. Also I was recalling his conversation when he spoke of our having withdrawn, speaking of the bank, and——

Senator SPARKMAN. I know; I have talked with him about it, and I know he has told me that in taking it up by stages we could not fit it in very well.

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. He has told me that.

SOVIET ICBM'S

I do not want to go back to this missile gap or so forth, but I have been looking at Mr. Dulles' testimony. I do not want to belabor the point, but while it is fresh in our minds, I might say that he said this:

> The conclusion of the United States Intelligence Board—and on this we are unanimous—is that the present Soviet ICBM program would provide some 140 to 200 ICBM's on launchers in mid-1961. This would assume a total inventory of between 175 and 270, and a total production of some 225 to 350.

And then later on he gave this definite number of 10 at the present time on their launching pads, and gave the number that they had test-fired—I believed he said they had test-fired 15. He said they felt they were quite accurate on the 15, and that they were close to certain of the 10 now on the launching pads.

I do not care about discussing that further, but while I had this before me I wanted to tell you about that.

Secretary **Herter**. Yes.

PANAMA: FLYING THE FLAG

Senator **Sparkman**. One little thing: You said something a while ago in talking about Panama about the flag incident.

I believe I heard over the radio, or read somewhere, that one solution for this difficulty with the Republic of Panama was that they were about to agree to fly the Panamanian flag side by side with the American flag over the Panama Canal area.

We had not made any such decision as that, had we?

Secretary **Herter**. Not at all; no, sir. As I was saying earlier, I have not even a recommendation in front of me at the moment to present to the President.

Senator **Sparkman**. I noticed you said that, yes.

Now, the House committee today reported out a resolution, I understand. Are you familiar with that resolution?

Secretary **Herter**. I am not sure which one. There were two different ones.

Senator **Sparkman**. Well, they reported out a resolution that, as I understand it, seems to say that there should be no departure from the treaty features with Panama unless it was agreed to by treaty, ratified by the Senate of the United States.

Secretary **Herter**. I know that in testimony before the House committee, representatives of the State Department have said that we would be taking or recommending no action in this matter without consultation with them.

Senator **Sparkman**. Yes.

I was a little taken aback when I heard about the resolution that had come out, but I believe it said the committee reported it out unanimously, and it should be taken as an indication of how the members of that committee have reacted to it.

SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTS

Now, I want to ask you one question about the Soviet Union and its nuclear test proposals.

The U.S.S.R. describes its attitude on the nuclear test ban treaty as holding that since an absolutely foolproof detection system is a manifest impossibility at the present time, the nuclear powers should settle quickly for an imperfect arrangement and make improvements as future scientific discoveries dictate.

What propaganda advantage, if any, does the U.S.S.R. gain on a global basis from this at least superficially logical position?

Secretary **Herter**. As you know, they have taken a position all the way through that it was everything or nothing—a complete ban, underground, a high altitude, in the atmosphere, and so on.

The greatest difficulty we have run into all the way through has been the question of finding what would be an even adequate inspection system for underground testing, and that is where we have had the greatest difficulty in trying to get agreement between our scientists and the Russian scientists.

Today we are forwarding—it will not be presented in Geneva until Monday—a project or a proposal on underground testing. We take an entirely new yardstick from the point of view of what we think can be inspected and what cannot be inspected. It is a yardstick that is measured not by kilotons of explosion, but by what existing seismic instrumentation reads as a 4.75 explosion.

It is a rather technical thing, but on all seismic instruments it is the same thing.

There is a disagreement between the Russians and us as to how you would translate that into the strength of the explosion. But at that level, we feel that the seismic recordings can give enough evidence as to whether this is an earthquake or an explosion to warrant its being considered a doubtful matter, to which an inspection team could then be sent to verify whether it was a violation of an agreement or not.

PROBLEM OF INSPECTIONS

We have been unwilling to agree to a cessation of tests in an area where we know there cannot be any reliable inspection. That has been our greatest difficulty, because we have always taken the position that until there is greater confidence on both sides, you cannot expect our Russian friends, with impunity to test underground with small explosions which we cannot discover, not to go ahead and do it. I think that the testimony of all our scientists is to the effect that if the Russians could do that with impunity, it might well give them a national security advantage that we could not afford to accept without reserving to ourselves the right to do the same thing.

We would like to reach a comprehensive ban. We would be perfectly willing to and we would be glad to, but we are plagued with the difficulty of having to come up and testify before you—if you had to ratify the treaty—that we could not guarantee there was any inspection system.

Now, with this so-called threshold agreement or proposal which we are making, we are proposing that we continue jointly to try to make better the seismic equipment, which we think can be done.

It is an art that nobody thought much about until the issue arose that the seismic instrumentation has been used for years around the world largely to test the size of earthquakes, and nobody has been interested in it otherwise.

We think that can be done, and we are perfectly willing to bring that threshold down as the instrumentation is perfected, until we get down to a complete test cessation.

I do not think they will attempt this again because they want this area taken on face value, and it puts us in a very difficult position if we have to come up here and ask you to ratify, when our scientists would admit that we do not have the instrumentation today that can guarantee this could be monitored.

PRIORITY LOANS TO INDONESIA

Senator **Sparkman**. I have a question about the Development Loan Fund. I suppose within a few days Mr. Cutler [10] will be before the committee and this will be gone into rather fully.

But I am informed that a representative of the Development Loan Fund has told the staff of this committee that the Department of State has instructed the Fund to give a higher priority to loans to Formosa than to Indonesia.

Would you explain the reasoning behind this order of importance?

Secretary **Herter**. No, sir. I had never heard of that priority being set up, and I would not want to comment on it without finding out the reason for it.

There is this possibility. I know that when Mr. Dillon came back from the Far East only recently, he was tremendously impressed by the progress that had been made in the Island of Formosa.

Today, with the exception of Malaya, Formosa has by far the highest standard of living of any Asiatic nation, including Japan. It is considerably higher than Japan, and the progress they have made in recent years has been quite extraordinary from the point of view of their internal development.

Now, it is possible that the influence of that inspection trip was responsible for this, but I cannot tell you for certain.

Senator **Sparkman**. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. The Senator from Iowa.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Mr. Secretary, I would like to get your view, if I could, on the progress of the nations in Asia.

PROGRESS IN ASIA

I just went through there this fall—South Asia and Southeast Asia—and certainly there are some changes going on there. I wonder what your feeling is about whether or not those countries, or a number of them, are really making progress, or are marking time, or are going backward. What kind of an evaluation would you put on the developments there?

Secretary **Herter**. We got the impression that they are making progress. They practically all started from a very low level. In their newfound freedom, there is tremendous instability as far as their government structures are concerned.

There have been a number of changes in a good number of them. The general impression is that they are all making progress. It sometimes is misleading to feel that this is going to be a permanent thing, because there have been a series of years, as I am sure you realize, when the rice crop has been exceptionally good and that, of course, tells very heavily in the prosperity, particularly of the band of states running from Vietnam through Thailand and Burma.

On the whole, we felt that progress has been made, but it is slow.

Certainly, from the point of view of maintaining the freedom of those nations, we have made a very large investment, both to try to keep them all of a piece from a military point of view and, second, from the point of view of trying to move them a little upward in the scale.

---

[10] Robert Cutler, who became executive director of The Inter-American Development Bank on February 2.

We have made a tremendous investment there; and one point that was touched on a moment ago—namely, the recognition of Red China—is likely to set back that situation considerably because in all of those countries there are large numbers of offshore Chinese who have been watching very carefully to see which way the cat was going to jump, so to speak. But my impression is that we have made progress.

Senator Hickenlooper. Well, roughly, I can just give some of my impressions by way of amplification, having been down there 2 years ago to most of these same countries, and then before that, I had an opportunity for a little sizing up of the development. I personally think that a substantial amount of progress is being made there, especially in the last 2 years.

Secretary Herter. And will likely——

Senator Hickenlooper. It seems to me, having been down there 5 or 6 years ago, and then having been down there 2 years ago, and then having been down there the last fall, it seems to me that like any other project that starts from scratch, there is a long period of time when you do not seem to be doing anything; you are just milling around, and racing your motor, treading water, or something; but I think there is definite evidence that there is some realistic activity in Pakistan.

Now, I was not in Pakistan this fall, but I have talked a great deal about it there. Certainly in my view there is a very encouraging attitude and program in Vietnam. The situation has a long way to go, but based on 5 years ago when we went in there—when there was utter chaos and hundreds of thousands of refugees coming in and no program, no local training or ability to take care of this situation—to see what they have done now is to me somewhat surprising.

Indonesia, I think, is a very uncertain volatile spot.

There are lots of reasons for that, which I will not go into now. In some ways Indonesia may be hopeless, but I think there are a lot of reasons to believe that it is not necessarily a hopeless situation.

INDIA: A REASSESSMENT

Certainly India has been jolted to its sock heels and, for the time being, I think India is taking a reassessment of its laissez faire, neutralist, relax-and-enjoy-it, philosophy that they have had for some time. There are movements in India now of some considerable strength demanding that a more virile and vigorous approach to the government and to their local economic and political problems be taken.

Frankly, I came back from this trip much more encouraged than I was 2 years ago.

Secretary Herter. I am delighted to hear that.

Senator Hickenlooper. I think the fruit is being born of a lot of difficult situations down there, and we have made some mistakes down there, certainly, in many places.

We made mistakes in this country, but I got the definite impression this fall that we are going to see the start of the payoff.

Whether it translates itself next year and the year after into continued progress or not, I do not know. But at least they are much better off, and the concept of what they want to do is a little more understandable down there than it was a couple of years ago.

I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Montana.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask one or two questions.

CONSULTATION IN FOREIGN POLICY

One, what are your views on the proper role of the opposition in the field of foreign policy? Let me lead up to that by saying that apparently there were no consultations this year prior to such important foreign policy moves as the decision to go to the summit, the decision of the President to engage in personal diplomacy, the decision to renew atomic testing, and so forth. It is perfectly all right. That is legitimate.

But I raise the question now because of the fact that in a sense there will be a break in the government next January when a new President, either a Republican or Democrat, comes in, and in the interests of continuity in foreign policy.

Secretary HERTER. As you know, I am a strong believer in consultation.

The question of the practicality of consultation is much more difficult to work out. When you speak of the President's personal diplomacy, as far as I know in the travels that he has taken, he has never yet raised a single issue from the point of view of trying to negotiate something on his own responsibility.

The only time in his last trip that something was set up before him before he got there, but to be settled by him with the King of Morocco, was the question of the bases.

[Deleted.]

PERSONAL DIPLOMACY

Secretary HERTER. But the personal diplomacy has been really just to talk and let everyone who wanted talk to him about anything they wanted to talk about, so it would be very hard to consult about that in advance.

From the point of view of Camp David, the field was wide open for discussion on substantive matters. I think we have told you that the President found Khrushchev absolutely adamant on this question of maintaining the sword of Damocles on Berlin, and he would not talk about anything else.

We had an agenda of matters that we wanted to discuss and things we had been at odds on, and when the curtain fell on that, so to speak, I tried to substitute talking with Gromyko on some of these. But he took an obdurate, adamant position that only the two top men could discuss these, so we never discussed it.

On the summit there seem to be only two matters that we are in agreement on that might be discussed, and on those we are trying to develop an allied Western position at the present time.

We will be only too glad to consult with you when we can see what we can do from the point of view of putting our own friends together on disarmament and on the German-Berlin situation; those discussions are just beginning now.

Senator **Mansfield**. Mr. Secretary, I want you to understand that I am not finding fault with what has been done by the administration because that is their responsibility, and they have acted as any administration should have.

I am just looking ahead to this break which is going to occur next year, and asking this question in view of the continuity of foreign policy to cover that break when it does occur.

Secretary **Herter**. Well, you have raised a very difficult problem that I imagine every administration at the end of its career must face.

After July when the nominees of the two parties have been determined, the voice of the administration as such, speaking for this country, except in an emergency, will be very minimum, inevitably so, because all attention is focused on either one of the two that may be carrying the responsibility from then on.

So up to and after the President's visit in Russia, there will be a number of conferences going on and as I said, we will be only too glad to consult with you.

I know of only one of these conferences that I think will have a continuity where it might be very important from a political point of view to have someone allied with it is the disarmament talks. Those, I think, will go on for years. That would be my impression, and I think it is a very valuable thing to have as many people know the detail or the background of those as possible.

BRIEFINGS OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

Senator **Mansfield**. Now, Mr. Secretary, you will recall that President Eisenhower—in 1956, I believe—did make arrangements for Adlai Stevenson[11] to be briefed by the CIA on a confidential basis at certain periods of time.

I hope that, if that procedure is followed again this year, serious consideration will be given to having some high official in the State Department do the briefing instead. I think it would be more beneficial.

But those are questions I raise only because of the change which will occur, and there is nothing political or personal in raising them.

Secretary **Herter**. May I just say one word there? A good many years ago—before Mr. Marcy was with the committee, when Wilcox was with the committee—I think that a high State Department official briefed regularly, once a week; but the committee members found that was too often.

Senator **Mansfield**. Too many caucuses.

Secretary **Herter**. They were too busy, and did not show up very much, but if the committee wishes us to do so we will be delighted to resume that practice.

---

[11] Democratic Presidential nominee in 1952 and 1956.

TESTING ON THE HIGH SEAS

Senator **Mansfield**. Mr. Secretary, under the international law governing the freedom of the seas, can we carry on experiments of various kinds within sight, say, of Vladivostok? And, in turn, can the Soviet Union carry on testings of various kinds within sight of San Francisco and Los Angeles or other American cities, just so they are outside the 3-mile limit?

Secretary **Herter**. Well, that is a problem that has not been resolved internationally in any way.

I do not think that there has ever been any international agreement from the point of view of the high seas.

There has always been the theory of the high seas being available to everybody, and this question of warning with regard to danger in a given area because of testing is something entirely new.

I think we are the first ones who have done it, because we have had a range that we tested our missiles on. That runs, as you know, across the line of the West Indies, right off the tip of Africa.

If today we sent an Atlas, for instance, the same distance that the Soviets sent this last one—which we could do—it would land in Africa, so obviously we are not going to be trying. We have to direct the route, unless we went from the west coast, straight down the Pacific.

There is no agreement on this. I am hoping one of these days there will be agreement.

Senator **Mansfield**. But does not the area of the high seas cover, in general, the area outside the legal offshore 3-mile limit in this country?

Secretary **Herter**. Yes. Internationally that is still recognized, in spite of the fact that many countries have declared 12 miles or better.

Senator **Mansfield**. And three, 200 miles, in South America.

Secretary **Herter**. Yes, Ecuador has.

Senator **Mansfield**. In other words, the area any nation can set aside at the present time, based on precedents and custom, if not in law, is unlimited.

SOVIET TESTING IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

Now, how do we control and regulate these matters so that these tests, if necessary, can be carried on, but that the welfare of people can be looked after, damages paid, navigation routes kept open, both on land and in the air and other questions which come into this particular proposal considered?

Of course, you know what I have in mind is the Russian testing in the Southern Pacific.

Secretary **Herter**. Sir, I hope that someday we will be governed by international agreement, and I am hoping that the kind of testing—and particularly the kind that we did—which was terribly important from the point of our own security at Eniwetok and places of that kind, might be regulated.

I hope we never have to go into any high altitude or atmospheric testing again. But then it was not of so much importance whether it was land or sea. It was a question of the cloud and where the cloud went, which was much more imporant than setting off an area of the seas, because the minute you cover the sea with a poisonous cloud you are doing something much worse than dropping one shell into the ocean at long distance.

Senator MANSFIELD. That is true.

But what I am getting at, Mr. Secretary, is that there ought to be regularization, so that the rights of all nations could be protected, and that a monopoly, so to speak, could not be undertaken by two or three, as has been the case to date.

Secretary HERTER. That is right.

Senator MANSFIELD. Then I would hope that this matter could, on our own initiative, be brought before the United Nations, and that something could be done to bring into effect what we both hope could be accomplished.

Mr. Dean said yesterday that as far as the sea is concerned, that is being considered. That resolution was passed by the group of nations which passed on these conventions and the protocol referring the matter to the United Nations as far as the land is concerned. It appears to be the primary emphasis which is over in Geneva. I would hope that some way could be found to cover the whole area of land and water so that these matters could be settled, and some degree of regularization brought about.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Vermont.

CASTRO'S INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Secretary, is any Latin American country considered friendly to the Castro government in Cuba today?

Secretary HERTER. No. Well, I say that with some reservation.

When the Santiago Conference took place last year in September, when I was there, the Venezuelan Government was playing very closely with Castro.

Senator AIKEN. They have gotten over that, have they not?

Secretary HERTER. I do not think they have been very happy. You remember when Raul Castro tried to go to Venezuela, they would not give him entry there, but I know of no other.

Senator AIKEN. I was there at the time.

Secretary HERTER. On the other hand, there is a real fear in many of the South American countries that the same type of revolution may take place in their country—what they call the mystique of the Castro revolution—and I think there is great nervousness about it.

Senator AIKEN. I was present there the day President [Romulo] Betancourt sent word to Raul Castro that he would not be welcome, and I got the impression they were washed up with some of the other countries, too.

THE QUITO CONFERENCE

When will the postponed Quito conference be held?

Secretary HERTER. We do not know. It is in the hands of a special committee of the OAS to consider now.

There is a committee of nine which will recommend to the whole OAS as to when the conference should take place.

Senator **Aiken**. In the meantime will Peru and Ecuador continue their efforts to settle their troubles?

Secretary **Herter**. Yes, I hope they will continue to.

Senator **Aiken**. They would like encouragement.

Secretary **Herter**. Peru bought a couple of battleships and cruisers in the meantime, but it does not help the picture at all.

Senator **Aiken**. Have they bought two?

Secretary **Herter**. Yes.

Senator **Aiken**. They had only one.

Secretary **Herter**. Yes. They never told us a word about the second one they were going to buy.

Senator **Aiken**. They did not tell their own government. Why should they tell you? They have earmarked funds for the navy down there, and they do not consult the rest of the government.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Where did they buy it from?

Senator **Aiken**. England, two of them.

The **Chairman**. Were they old?

Senator **Aiken**. I do not know how old they were. They paid a good price for them, $20 million.

Secretary **Herter**. They have to be reconditioned.

Senator **Aiken**. They may be.

Secretary **Herter**. I do not think two of them have been delivered. One of them may have been.

Senator **Aiken**. That is one reason I hope you will strengthen Mr. Betancourt's hand as much as possible, because he is trying to keep that country going.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Wasn't he a great supporter of Mr. Castro's?

Senator **Aiken**. I do not mean Betancourt, Beltran.[12]

Secretary **Herter**. Beltran.

Senator **Aiken**. Betancourt was the past tense.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. How about the Governor of Puerto Rico?[13] He was down here telling what a great fellow Castro was.

Secretary **Herter**. He is a very disillusioned man.

Senator **Aiken**. They all are.

Then a couple of years ago President Kibitschek[14] had a proposal to make for an all-American Conference to strengthen the economy of Latin America. Is that out now?

Secretary **Herter**. Nobody knows exactly what it is. That has been the great difficulty.

Senator **Aiken**. I was asked about it.

Secretary **Herter**. Operation Pan America. He is still very keen about it, and I do not think anybody knows what it will result in. But his hope was that it would develop into their getting more money.

Senator **Aiken**. But setting up the Inter-American Bank has put a crimp in that proposal.

Secretary **Herter**. That has been a definite step toward meeting what he had in mind, but he is still talking about it. We are having the hardest time getting him pinned down, but I am hoping that when the President goes down on this visit, Kibitschek will tell him just what he has in mind.

---

[12] Padro Beltran, Premier of Peru.

[13] Luis Munoz-Marin.

[14] Brazilian President Juscelino Kibitschek.

He keeps using the phrase all the time, and we are not sure how much it is economic and how much it is political.

Senator AIKEN. He is a good talker.

Secretary HERTER. I think what he wants is for us to give a greater priority to South America.

Senator AIKEN. They all say that. When the Secretary of State makes a speech if he would say, "South America," once in a while in the course of the speech it would be a great help. They just feel neglected.

I have no more questions.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Oregon?

Senator MORSE. I have a couple of Latin American questions, Mr. Secretary.

POSTPONEMENT OF THE QUITO CONFERENCE

What Latin American country first proposed postponement of the Quito conference?

Secretary HERTER. I think it was Ecuador itself.

Senator MORSE. Ecuador itself?

Secretary HERTER. I think it was Ecuador.

What happened, sir, as I recall it from our point of view, is that I had agreed to go, and I was trying to get the day firmed up. We kept trying to get a specific statement as to whether they would hold it and whether they would plan to hold it even though Peru refused to go, and at first they said they thought it would have to be postponed until the 15th of February.

Then they found their own internal difficulties, with an election coming up in May, in not being able to get facilities ready. They wanted to postpone it until July, and the Organization of American States was unwilling to accept a date without a general consultation. They may go back to the first of July and try to hold it.

Senator MORSE. I do not know in what order they followed suit, but is it not true that after Ecuador suggested the postponement, support for that suggestion came from Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, Chile, Brazil?

Secretary HERTER. I think that they were all so worried about what was happening in the Caribbean area that they felt it might be desirable to postpone it and see if things calmed down more.

Senator MORSE. The reason I give the listing that I just did was that in my study tour in those countries last November and December, in each place either the Foreign Minister or the President, in conference, obviously was on Ecuador's side with regard to this matter, and it disturbed me very much.

I never discussed the matter with them. I did not feel that was my prerogative. I did try to find out why they felt the way they did.

Although there was mention of the facilities that were not ready, they would mention that with a smile and say, in effect, "that is our out."

But the interesting thing is that they thought we ought to be looking for an out, and I could never find out why Ecuador had been so successful in getting the top men in foreign policy in those countries to urge the postponement, because I did not think the boundary dispute between Peru and Ecuador, important as it was, was the controlling reason. I was wondering if it was because of this proposal in regard to the dictatorship question, which they discussed with me wherever I went and which might be the reason they thought they ought to postpone that for a while, because it was pretty hot.

Secretary HERTER. Certainly in Venezuela this is a very strong feeling there about the dictatorship. It is a hangover of the battle of Trujillo[15] and for some inexplicable reason Trujillo has stopped his propaganda against the Cubans. We do not know what happened. But lumped in that are Somoza[16] in Nicaragua, and Stroessner[17] in Paraguay.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Pardon me; I might suggest that fellow dictators don't fight each other too much. They recognize a fellow dictator.

CUBA'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

Senator MORSE. I want to say, Mr. Secretary, I was very glad to hear you say that you asked our Ambassador in Cuba to come back for consultation, not only because I think you ought to be consulted, but, Mr. Secretary, because of the psychological effect, because for what it is worth—you know these things much better than I do—I think it is important that we get across to these Latin American countries that we are not going to stand by and take all these insults without our acting within the framework of proprieties, but within our rights.

If you keep asking the people "How long are you going to take that?" You will get that from the president of a country or his foreign minister or at a cabinet meeting that they raise it, because there was this great disillusionment I found all over Latin America.

The President of Chile[18] took great relish in telling me that when this Cuban group flew in, he said, "You know, we just vaccinated them and sent them back home. They didn't even have landing papers." He is a rather taciturn man, you know, and a great man, but on this one he completely relaxed and laughed, and he said, "We fixed them."

He said, "When the plane landed," he said, "we took them into quarters at the airport. We vaccinated them and sent them back to Cuba."

The CHAIRMAN. What did they vaccinate them for?

Senator MORSE. Because under their rules they had not been vaccinated.

The CHAIRMAN. Smallpox?

---

[15] Gen Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, the Dominican Republic dictator, who in August 1959 sponsored an unsuccessful invasion of Cuba.

[16] Luis Somoza Debayle, President of Nicaragua, son of assassinated President Anastasio Somoza.

[17] Gen. Alfredo Stroessner, leader of the military coup that overthrew President Federico Chaves, who succeeded Chaves as President of Paraguay.

[18] Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez.

Senator **Morse**. I quess smallpox or some tropical disease. They let them sleep for a few hours, and sent them back home.

But this psychological matter, I think, is a very important thing, recalling this Ambassador for consultation, because I think now we have most of these Latin American countries on our side on the Castro matter, and permit the reference because it involved Senator Hickenlooper and Senator Aiken and Senator Sparkman and me. I was the first one who spoke out immediately after Castro started his bloodbaths, with a speech on the floor of the Senate, and these other Senators said something to the same effect. I was surprised at the number of people who knew of everything we had said here on the floor of the Senate about Castro's regime, and how right we had proved to be, and how wrong their first impressions were. I think we need in Latin America to pay more attention to the psychological symbols that have so much weight with them.

THE SUGAR QUOTA PROBLEM

One further question: What do you think our policy should be in regard to this sugar quota problem that is about to be on our doorstep when we come to negotiate it, in view of our long-established problem that we do not try to discipline a people for the wrongdoings of their leaders but, at the same time, with the increasing demand you are going to get from these other Latin American countries that have sugar problems, too, and are friendly to us. They say to me, and I am sure to all others of our Government, "How can you justify not giving us a larger quota and maintain a quota with a country that is doing the things to you that Cuba is?"

What is your answer to that going to be?

Secretary **Herter**. Well, sir, I think that the bill we are recommending to the Congress would leave the question of punitive action in connection with the quota with the administration.

It means that we would have to take the punitive action if it were taken. It would be fine if the Congress is willing to determine a policy on this, but an inflexible policy is a pretty difficult thing to maintain, and the minute you get into a quota as such and try to find a level of a quota, I think you would have a very difficult time.

There are two lines of approach on that:

One, of course, we are paying the American price for sugar, which is 2 cents above the world price, so today we are actually making to the economy of Cuba a contribution of over $150 million a year in the sugar we are buying from them; and that is one element in the quota agreement.

The second is that the quotas, as they are fixed for the different countries, are usually somewhat below the actual demand in the respective countries. And then there is the question of how you decide the balance over and above that, should these anticipated shortages develop, inability to supply. Cuba has already asked, you know, that they be given a much larger percentage of that, and I do not see that they rate it, because we have our own sugar growers asking for that.

But the difficulty there is your yearly turnover. I do not know, but I should think it would probably be desirable not to make the agreements for too long a period of time again.

Senator **Morse**. Thank you; that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. The Senator from Kansas.

THE TIME FOR STERNNESS

Senator **Carlson**. Mr. Secretary, I endorse Senator Morse's thought that the time has about arrived for just a little sternness. I think it might have a very great psychological effect, not just in Cuba.

I spent some time, and I went into this sugar situation in Cuba very thoroughly, and I know it is a delicate problem. The question is whether we are going to handle it with sternness or whether we are just going to kind of play along with them.

The New York Times correspondent, Mr. Phillips, took over the New York Times office in Cuba in 1931. He passed away or was killed in a car wreck a few years ago, and his wife is now in charge of the New York Times office.

She has written a book. She was with 11 different governments in Cuba, and she reviews our U.S. policy and the policy of other countries. Whenever we have acted with a degree of sternness we have gotten along better with them, and this Castro thing, I think, now is just getting out of hand.

I visited with the top people down there. I am delighted that Ambassador [Philip W.] Bonsal is coming back, and I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we have a luncheon for him some day that fits your schedule, and that we really visit with him.

In my opinion we are fortunate in having him in Cuba. He speaks the language fluently. He has come up from Bolivia, and he is a real ambassador as far as our country is concerned. He knows the problem of the people and, as a matter of fact, when we visited with their Secretary of State, who is called the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Bonsal complained about Castro's speech the night before, which started at midnight and concluded at about 4:20 in the morning. He inquired of the Foreign Minister, who said that was for local propaganda, but I think it is going far beyond that.

DELAY SUGAR ACT

I have two recommendations on the sugar act.

So far as one is concerned, I am on the Committee on Finance, and I will not vote for more than 1 year. I know they want 3 years, and I think regarding the final agreement, as far as the Senate action is concerned, that congressional action should be delayed as long as possible.

Many things can happen between now and——

Secretary **Herter**. The expiration date is September, I think.

Senator **Carlson**. But Congress will have to act this session. My point is that we should delay this until the very end of the session, if possible. That is all.

The **Chairman**. The Senator from Delaware?

Secretary **Herter**. Might I make one comment in connection with that Castro speech? It was a particularly objectionable one yesterday or the day before.

One of the things he complained of most bitterly was the traitors in Cuba who applauded Bonsal when his picture appeared on the screen on his return to Cuba.

The CHAIRMAN. What is so insulting? He has already said everything in the book. What did he say yesterday?

Secretary HERTER. He insulted us and criticized every Cuban who applauded when the picture of Bonsal appeared on the motion picture screen.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche is next.

Senator LAUSCHE. I will yield to the junior member of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. You are next in order.

TITO AND CASTRO

Senator LAUSCHE. What is motivating Tito in the report that he has accepted an invitation to visit Castro?

Secretary HERTER. I have no idea; but Raul, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, had been to Yugoslavia recently.

He has invited the Yugoslavs, among others, to come to a meeting in Havana of the underdeveloped nations. I do not know what the purpose is, but it does not sound too good. Why Tito should have joined in with that I do not know; I cannot tell you.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, it strikes me that Tito ought to recognize that in spite of what Dulles said the other day, if it had not been for our dollars, the Slovenes, Croatians and Serbs would have driven Tito out of there by now.

Now, his acceptance obviously came before this speech of yesterday. But from my standpoint when Tito's request for aid and further money comes before us, if he is going to cohort with this man Castro in the face of what Castro is doing, I will want to take a look at what we are going to give to Tito.

But the motivation which you see is this visit that Castro's brother made over there?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. Secondly——

Secretary HERTER. Second, he wanted for a long time to be invited to come to this country.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Secretary HERTER. And we have not felt it desirable.

Senator LAUSCHE. That would be the second question. If he goes to visit Castro he will be longing for an invitation from us. I am not going to ask you what you are going to do on it, but that undoubtedly will arise.

THE SITUATION IN LAOS

Now this: I read a story by Lucas in the Scripps-Howard papers that if there was an election in Laos, there will be a landslide victory for the Communists, and I understand you to have said that there will be an election here in May or so.

Secretary HERTER. It is scheduled for the 25th of April.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is your appraisal of the political thinking of the people there?

Secretary **Herter**. I do not know because the different sections of the country are so different. There is very little relationship. One of the problems there is actually the relationships of the villages, and in the two northern villages, the Pathet Lao, where they exist, I think undoubtedly the Communists would carry that.

Whether that would carry further down—the Communists are working very hard propagandawise—whether it would turn out to be a Communist victory, I do not know.

There are three factions. There are the conservative factions, and what are called the young Turks, the military factions, and then the Communists.

Senator **Lausche**. I do not like to predicate my questions on newspaper columns, but this man Lucas [19] also says we spent $150 million in Laos, and there is no evidence of any progress having been made with that money.

Secretary **Herter**. That, I think, is extreme. Some progress has been made. I think it is the most difficult spot in the world.

We have a big investiment there, but it is the gateway right now to Southeast Asia, and if it goes Cambodia will go with it in no time at all; Thailand is ready to fall down. Whether the Vietnamese can hang on is something else again, and we have been really working against terrible odds.

I can, perhaps, give you a funny illustration of how difficult it is in Laos.

I saw the British Ambassador when I was in Saigon 2 years ago, and I was asking him how he liked it. He said, "It is all right, but it is awfully expensive for Her Majesty's Government to keep me here."

I asked why, and he said, "Because it costs me 300 pounds a year to get my hair cut." There was not a single barber in the whole of Laos. He could not get his hair cut. It is actually as primitive as that. When our missions go out there they actually do not have room enough in the capital to put them up.

It is a very primitive country, and hard to get about. The road systems are miserable, and one of the things we are going to move on, I hope quickly, is to try to get a better relationship of the different sections.

U.S. MISSILES INVENTORY

Senator **Lausche**. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to make the observation that in the 13 months I have been on this committee, I have been listening with great attention to what the relative strength of our country is on the missiles inventory. Mr. Secretary, in spite of the study I have made of it, I find myself in complete confusion in trying to relate the situation, and I think there ought to be clarification of this thing.

There is only one thing that I have clearly in mind now, that they have 10 intercontinental missiles on the launching pads. I thought these figures which the Senator from Alabama read dealt with the interregional missiles, but you read them too——

---

[19] Anthony Lucas of the New York Times.

Senator **Sparkman**. No, the other figures I read deal with the ICBM projected to the middle of 1961. Ten are ready now, that is 10 on the pads. That does not mean they have just made 10, because there are some back in reserve and some still in the development stage.

Senator **Lausche**. I, of course, clearly understand the arguments made that a combination of all of our strength pitted against a combination of theirs gives us a superior position.

But in trying to analyze the relative strength as intelligence shows it on these ICBM's and IRBM's, I am in confusion. Maybe that is the purpose.

The **Chairman**. You are not alone. There are other people, too, so you need not be proud of that.

Senator **Lausche**. That is all I have.

The **Chairman**. The Senator from Delaware.

Senator **Williams**. Mr. Secretary, I am a new member of this committee and I will just ask two short questions.

The first is in line with what the Senator from Oregon and the Senator from Kansas suggested. How long would the Castro regime last if we stopped all economic help to him?

Secretary **Herter**. That is a very hard question to answer.

Senator **Williams**. Has it been considered?

AMERICAN BUSINESS IN CUBA

Secretary **Herter**. Yes. It has been considered and, of course, last year when we did not take the excess of sugar, the Russians took it right away. They did not pay the price we paid for it, but they paid the world price for it, and I think that is a threat they are holding over our head.

On the other hand, one thing has disturbed me a good deal in trying to find out the extent to which American interests, as such, have already been injured by the actions of the Castro government, I find that in their system of trying to put interventors into American property, whether they be ranchers or sugar properties, when they actually put these people in, sometimes they act like perfect gentlemen, and sometimes they throw the superintendent out on his ear and take over his house and start tossing everyone around.

But actually, out of, let us call it, an investment of $1.5 billion, only about $6 million have actually been expropriated. Nobody knows whether they are going to continue this process or whether they are going to build collectives.

The **Chairman**. Say that again. A billion and a half, and only $6 million has been so far expropriated?

Secretary **Herter**. Expropriated.

The **Chairman**. I thought it was more than that.

Secretary **Herter**. Yes, it is very curious, and yet so many of these properties have interventors there. They do not know what to do when they get there, and they all vary over there because there seems to be no single program; but all told, no more that 200 people in Cuba have received property under this act. It looks like it is much more a working toward collectives, where nobody gets ownership of the property, and where the state takes over, and where there is a collective or cooperative, whatever they want to call it, that works it. The land is not actually distributed at all, but still with large holdings, rather than it does like a real land reform act, and that is a very discouraging thing, because that is the Soviet pattern entirely.

Senator **Williams**. How important is that $150 million subsidy we are giving to the Cuban Government?

Secretary **Herter**. Very considerable.

Senator **Williams**. Is it very substantial?

Secretary **Herter**. I think their revenue from the sale of sugar is about $600 million a year, of which about a million and a half tons—I think we take a considerable portion of their crop.

Senator **Williams**. You say Russia buys it. Does she need it?

Secretary **Herter**. Yes, I think Russia has been able to use it. She bought 300,000 tons last year.

PANAMA TREATY OBLIGATIONS

Senator **Williams**. One other question, if I may. If I understood you correctly, in discussing Panama you said that part of our problem arose from the fact that we had not lived up to our treaty obligations. Would you care to just discuss that a little bit?

Secretary **Herter**. Yes. Under 1956 treaty two provisions were made that the Panamanians were very sensitive about.

One had to do with a provision with regard to our commissaries and PX's. Another was to the effect that whenever or wherever feasible, purchases would be made in Panama or the United States. In other words, the purchases would not be imported from somewhere outside to be sold in our commissaries.

The Defense Department will admit that it has not lived up to that. They like New Zealand beef better than Panamanian or American beef, and they could buy it cheaper, so from the point of view of our living up to what we had signed in the treaty and from the interpretation, I would give it in plain English; we had not lived up to that.

UNITED STATES-PANAMA BUSINESS

The other thing was in our PX's. We were selling all sorts of luxury goods, watches, refrigerators, and things of that kind at a price below what a Panamanian distributor ordinarily could sell it for. They felt we were carrying on the type of business in the Canal Zone that was to the detriment of the economy of their own country, and we agreed not to do that.

Now, we have agreed to sell nothing with a value of over $50 in the PX. But it affects PX's all over the world, where we have had somewhat a subsidy for our armed forces.

Senator **Williams**. Are we complying with the terms of our treaty today or are we still just negotiating in that?

Secretary **Herter**. No, we are having a hard time.

There was another thing; we own the railway that goes across the Isthmus, and we agreed to move the terminals at both ends.

The one at the Colon end has been in a very bad area from the point of view of industrial development, and the one in Panama City was right opposite the Government houses. They asked us to move it, and in the 1956 treaty we agreed to do it, and we have never done a thing about it. That was another sore point, and they kept building up these sore points one by one. I think we have been negligent and slow, in carrying out what we said we would do.

Senator **Williams**. I appreciate your frankness in admitting that, but I wonder if it would not be well for us to correct it because it has been my experience that it is the little things that really cause you problems more so than the major things.

Secretary **Herter**. We are doing it just as fast as we can.

We have another problem. For instance, we have a very large dairy herd in the Canal Zone that belongs to the Panama Canal Company, and that dairy herd produces all the milk for the Americans, and a good many of the Panamanian workers there.

The Panamanians have said they will produce milk of as good quality in their country and sell it to us if we stop staying in the business of competing with them; but until they can show they can produce good milk we do not and we will not get rid of that.

They resent one thing. They resent the Canal Zone's being run by a company which they claim makes a lot of earnings from Panamanian people through retail trade that has nothing to do with the running of the Canal as such, and that has been one of their chief grievances.

Senator **Williams** That is all.

Secretary **Herter**. I am not saying anything derogatory to the Defense Department, and they will admit the same thing; we are trying to work out exactly the same things now.

RUSSIANS' PURCHASE OF SUGAR

Senator **Carlson**. Would you give me half a minute on the Russians' purchase of sugar? That is a very sore point down in the West Indies, particularly, and all these countries where we have quotas.

We pay Cuba about 5.65 cents for sugar; the world market is 3 cents or a little better.

They sold to Russia for 2½ and the others—the Dominican Republic and Haiti and Puerto Rico—those countries are really mad. And when I visited with the Minister of Commerce who handles this sugar for Cuba I told him when he comes before our committee he had better have an answer to that, because they say that Cuba is trying to force them out of the world market and destroy their production because of costs, and that is an interesting thing.

The **Chairman**. We subsidize them enough that they can afford to do it.

Senator **Carlson**. We are doing it, and they say that we are destroying the market or the production of sugar in other countries.

Senator **Sparkman**. What is his explanation to you?

Senator **Carlson**. He said, "We had a surplus here and we want to get rid of it."

Senator **Morse**. I found it one of the touchiest subjects I ran into in my trip with any of the other sugar-producing countries. I do not think we are giving sufficient consideration, may I say most respectfully, to the reaction of our Cuban sugar policy with respect to our friends in other sugar countries.

ARMS SALES BETWEEN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA

One other point, if I may, Mr. Chairman, to ask the Secretary about. I also ran into the question of what representations are you making, if any, to Great Britain and Germany, who are offering to sell arms in Latin America. Great Britain was even going to enter into an arrangement with Castro for some jet bombers.

I ran into criticism of this particularly in Chile. I was there immediately after the announcement by the Chilean President of his disarmament program, and they are very much concerned about the British selling cruisers to Peru. There was some talk then that even the Argentine might get some cruisers, and my question is, have we made any representations to our allies abroad that before they enter into such agreements it might be well to have some consultations about the effect of their policy on our relations with Latin America?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir; we have had a good many talks with them, and in this Cuban matter of the Hawker Hunter planes that were to replace some planes earlier bought by the Cubans from the British, we ran into real difficulties. The British did not give in until I had had an exchange of three very personal letters with Selwyn Lloyd telling him how damaging it would be if they begin selling arms now to the Cubans.

But this is one of the most sensitive things that there is—telling a nation not to sell arms to another nation—because it seems to be one of the great symbols of sovereignty that you buy arms and sell arms. I suspect that Mr. Castro has gotten some small arms from Italy, but the Italian Government claims it knows nothing about it.

It probably would not interfere with their arms manufacturers if they had sold them, and we have a very unpleasant situation where there is always this alternative. They can always go to Poland or Czechoslovakia, and buy arms, and buy them a lot cheaper than we can supply them; and that is not a traffic that we are keen to see develop.

In Chile they have made the most constructive move from the point of view of pulling the Latin Americans together to stop this futile arms race that is going on, and I just hope they are successful in that.

It is a ridiculous thing. The Brazilians bought an old flattop from the British.

The Chileans, you may recall, wanted a couple of submarines, and under our Ship Sales Act, I think we gave them a couple of submarines, but they did not have money enough to recondition them. Now they are considering reconditioning the second one, and are doing it only because the Peruvians have a couple of cruisers. It is a silly business that is going on.

BLACK MARKET OPERATIONS IN THE U.S. MILITARY

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, there is one question you have not mentioned, but you made a comment about the PX in Panama and Senator Williams a statement that he thought so often these little things have an influence all out of proportion to their importance, with which I agree. It seems to me that we brushed this Turkish situation over the black market operation by our soldiers under the rug rather unceremoniously, so unceremoniously that I got letters from my own constituents protesting that the Turks mistreated our boys.

Well, the best information I got there was a widespread and very large black market operation going on right in our own military—I mean, run by our military.

Have you seen the reports on that?

Secretary HERTER. No, I have not seen the detailed reports, but I kept getting the Ambassador's comments.

The CHAIRMAN. This seems terrible—with one of our best allies.

Secretary HERTER. Well, I think they have been pretty severely punished.

The CHAIRMAN. I have not seen any evidence on it, and to the contrary I get letters that our boys are being mistreated when they are engaging in the most flagrant manner. It was very large; it was not peanuts, but tens of thousands of dollars, and it seems to me the Army should really discipline them.

This can destroy all the things you build up with hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of aid if this kind of thing goes on on such a big scale.

Secretary HERTER. Well, you can remember the time when our GI's were in Europe that a cigarette was worth a lot more than any cash that you had in your jeans.

The CHAIRMAN. That was during the war, and is unavoidable. But you know what they were doing here; they were buying these lira at the black market price and then supplying them to our own soldiers at the regular price, and pocketing the difference. It was a highly organized business, with deposits in Switzerland. Some of the sergeants in our own pay offices, and so on, had two or three Swiss bank accounts, and it was on a big scale. A lot of colonels were doing it right up to their ears, and it seems to me disgraceful that the Army should be permitted to do that; and apparently, so far as I know, nothing has been done to them except that we complained that the Turks take too long to prosecute.

I think we should apologize to the Turks rather than complain about taking so long to prosecute.

DIFFICULTIES WITH DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that we could ask the Defense Department for a list of what they did.

I am reminded of the fact that we got the black market operation in currency in the Philippines and in that area about 5 years ago, and it would take only rather severe disciplinary action. Much to my surprise, one of the fellows ended up in the Veterans' Administration, employed at a higher salary.

The CHAIRMAN. In that respect, I wrote to the Defense Department as long ago as the 22d of October, and they did not answer my letter.

I was at home and I was not here to get right on it every day until when, in December, 2 months later, I got an acknowledgement saying that they had gotten the letter, and were sorry it was delayed, but they did not have any duplicating machinery in the Defense Department and did not have enough copies to go around, and they were sorry they could not send me one. Wasn't that about what they said?

Mr. MARCY. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. The most absurd letter I ever saw. Imagine—the Defense Department cannot duplicate a report, and we wrote them 2 or 3 hot letters; I have written 4 or 5 letters, and we finally got part of the report on a secret basis.

We did not get the conclusion. We got only a statement of facts, but they then pleaded presidential immunity to furnishing the conclusions of the report.

This report was made by a man named Carroll. We never have gotten that. They just refused to submit that on the grounds it was a privileged executive communication and, of course, when they do that we really cannot do anything about it.

But I have, if you would like to see it, the statement of the facts.

My goodness, they are bad enough. I think it is terrible. I think the State Department, as a protector of our foreign relations, ought to discipline the Defense Department, if you can find a way to do it.

You ought to see that they really take it seriously. I thought that was one of the most flagrant cases that I have seen.

Senator WILLIAMS. In all fairness, I do not think the State Department officials were involved in the instance here, but it does have an effect on our foreign relationships.

Secretary HERTER. Our consul in the part of Turkey where this was going on was very seriously disturbed about it, and the Ambassador went down several times trying to see what could be done from the point of view of getting out of the way the trials and the boys who were involved.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, I know you really do not have any weapons to use on Defense; I do not know what the President ought to do but to really make them clean that up. This is a disgraceful thing which has gone on in Turkey, and I believe it is going on in every country where there is a difference between the black market rate and the official rate.

Secretary HERTER. We have had awful trouble with it.

The CHAIRMAN. In Spain it is bad.

Secretary HERTER. Regarding civilian employees, last year we had to issue an order to make uniform the practices of civilian employees—whether they be ICA [International Cooperation Administration], Agriculture or State—in handling things of that kind because there were a good many countries in which you could have a second-hand automobile sent over from this country and sell it right there for much better than a new car price.

The CHAIRMAN. They do that, too.

Secretary HERTER. And they do that with a lot of household goods.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary HERTER. And we had to stop even the auctions that took place when people left because of the terrific prices they were getting. It became an almost integral part of their sustenance, and they were counting on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Well, it seems terrible to me. In this case there were a number of colonels—I mean, high-up officials. They were not just sergeants. There were several; I'm not sure if the commanding officer is in here, but it was about that. There were a number of them.

ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION ON QUEMOY AND MATSU

There are one or two things that I wanted to ask you for the record here in view of Secretary Brucker's[20] statement on Quemoy and Matsu. This matter keeps coming up.

I wonder if you could say anything to the committee to clarify the position of the Administration, from your point of view.

Is it the same as Mr. Brucker's?

Secretary **HERTER**. As far as I know it is exactly the same as it was from the time the Senate resolution was passed. The President has to make a determination, and that determination is based on whether or not an attack on one of those islands is part of a move on Formosa as a whole; and as far as I know the situation is still the same.

The **CHAIRMAN**. That is not the same as what Brucker said. He made the determination that you have drawn the line, and no matter what, come hell or high water, you were not going to withdraw from that.

Secretary **HERTER**. I do not think he consulted the Department. We have never made a commitment of any kind on those islands.

Actually, though, from the point of view of a tactical situation, the Red Chinese have made the situation much easier for us because they explained very carefully that their attack on those islands was just a steppingstone toward taking Formosa. They had almost resolved the issue by their own statements. But the President has never made any finding on that at all.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Have you examined or considered the wisdom or unwisdom of voluntarily giving them up, with the very clear understanding of everybody that this is not giving up Formosa but is just because of the very close and difficult situation? Has that ever been considered by the Department?

Secretary **HERTER**. No, we cannot give away somebody else's property.

The **CHAIRMAN**. You gave the Taishan Island away; I mean, in effect, you vacated them.

Secretary **HERTER**. Those two little ones.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Yes. But they were also in there. They are quite similar. I do not believe they were even as close as Quemoy. We did an evacuation of them.

Secretary **HERTER**. The Taishan Islands up to the north of Matsu?

The **CHAIRMAN**. Yes, they are being close to the shore.

The only reason is a practical matter, the extreme difficulty when you are—what is it?—only a stone's throw across there.

Secretary **HERTER**. Quemoy, yes; the Matsu group are quite far out.

---

[20] Army Secretary William B. Brucker pledged on Jan. 19 that the United States would protect the islands of Quemoy and Matsu from invasion by the People's Republic of China.

The **Chairman**. The one that is particularly right up against the shoreline.

Secretary **Herter**. That is Quemoy.

The **Chairman**. I am not advocating it, I am asking you whether you considered whether or not it would remove a vulnerable spot—vulnerable from our point of view—very difficult to supply, and also a more tempting target for them, if it would not easily—if we did it voluntarily—I can understand backing out when they start shelling. I just wondered——

Secretary **Herter**. Well, they still shell from time to time. It is somewhat irregular.

The **Chairman**. I wonder whether you considered that to be a wise thing to do when you are not in a hot scuffle with them. I was just thinking more of the matter of your own protection, if it is such an exposed spot, that if you gracefully withdrew, for whatever reason you can think of. Maybe you can think of one; it would strengthen the position on the rest of them. I do not know.

Secretary **Herter**. The Chinese Nationalists have reduced some the number of their troops in Quemoy, but they still have a very large number.

The **Chairman**. I thought they had an awful lot there.

Secretary **Herter**. Actually we reinforced them with bigger guns, so the strength of Quemoy is greater today than it was when the shelling began.

The **Chairman**. What is the distance? I have forgotten. Isn't it only about a mile or two?

Secretary **Herter**. From Little Quemoy and the Harbor of Quemoy, it is almost in the harbor.

The **Chairman**. That is what I thought.

Senator **Sparkman**. Right at the mouth of the harbor.

Secretary **Herter**. Right at the mouth of the harbor.

SOVIET VS U.S. ECONOMIES

The **Chairman**. One last question. I am not sure that you can testify about this, although Mr. [Walter] Lippmann is such a well-known and respected columnist. I would like to know what your advice would be, you having been a member of the other body up here. You can appreciate the legislative responsibility as well as the executive, and I would like to have your comment on this.

This is a quote from yesterday's column. It says——

Senator **Morse**. What columnist?

The **Chairman**. Mr. Lippmann. It says:

> The Soviet economy is half as big as ours, but it is growing twice as fast. This means that this year's increment of increase is about $12 billion in the U.S.S.R., and about $15 billion in the United States. But, and this is the crux of the matter, the U.S.S.R. will use most, if not all, the $12 billion increase for national purposes, for armaments, for productive investments, for foreign aid, and for national education. We, on the other hand, are acting on the Eisenhower principle, and are spending a greater share of our $15 billion increase for private purposes, for the making of consumer goods, and of the factories and facilities connected with the making and using of consumer goods. That is why the national power of the Soviet Union is forging ahead of the national power of the United States.

I would like any comment on it, and if you would, what do you suggest we do about it?

Secretary **Herter**. With the general thesis that we could put a good deal of our wealth to better uses, I would agree.

The **Chairman**. You would agree?

Secretary **Herter**. Yes, I would agree. On the other hand, how to do it without a form of regimentation in this society that would not cost a great deal more, I do not know.

Once again, you have the same problem as to whether you are going to maintain States' rights or siphon off extra purchasing power by Federal taxes or let the States do it. If you take the field of education, I think all of us would agree that the educational facilities are not adequate in this country.

Should it be the Federal Government that does it? For years the States' rights feeling has been such that this is something the States should do and the Federal Government should not interfere.

The **Chairman**. Not in the Senate. The Senate passed twice by a 2-to-1 majority a very good bill. The first one was sponsored by your predecessor, Senator Taft. I was a minor co-sponsor of it in 1948, so it has not been unanimous about this at all.

The House got it all balled up. I just wanted to keep the record straight, because I was for it.

Secretary **Herter**. This is not a reflection on the other body.

The **Chairman**. It is a reflection, but this is an executive session, so it does not go out of the room. It is a reflection on them, but that is one of these activities.

But go ahead. I did not mean to interrupt you, but I wanted it clear that it is not unanimous. I know there is a difference of opinion, but Senator Taft sponsored that bill. I was very glad to be a cosponsor. But go ahead. What else?

Senator **Carlson**. Senator Williams just handed me a little note reminding me that that was this terrible 80th Congress.

The **Chairman**. That is right. That is the best thing they did. [Laughter.]

Well, it was not that 80th Congress. That included the House of Representatives.

Senator **Carlson**. Oh, yes.

The **Chairman**. Go ahead, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary **Herter**. I think the most difficult problem facing this country is that if we once feel that the threat of the nuclear bombs has been minimized by a stalemate or by agreement, then there is no question in my mind that the Russian system of forcing a regimentation and forcing the manpower of the country to operate in the directions that a planned economy has worked out may well put us in a competitive situation where we really have to tighten our belts. That is going to be an extremely difficult thing to do from the point of view of ways and means.

There is no simple answer to it at all, and unless you are going to get into the business of very high taxation in the Federal Government, and again the setting up of a colossal bureaucracy running the lives of our people——

DEFENSE SPENDING

Senator **Lausche**. Mr. Chairman, I read one of the reports prepared by one of the special agencies on this subject, and it is a very illuminating one. From it I concluded that in the Russian system they are able to siphon off huge sums of money through the dictatorship's investing it in heavy equipment and government defense.

In our system there are two methods of doing it. One is voluntary adoption of a sacrificial course of conduct by the citizen; the other is an involuntary acceptance of it through the government's siphoning it off by taxation. I have come to the conclusion that the time is at hand that we ought to provide the money for the defense, and tax right now.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what I wanted to appeal to the Secretary——

Secretary HERTER. The money for the defense may strengthen us in a relative position, but money for defense will not produce the type of strength that we need from the point of view of disciplining ourselves. It will deprive us of things, but it will not necessarily divert our earning power to better things for our youth. Unfortunately, it is an unproductive thing.

The CHAIRMAN. The point I wanted to get at, of course, is that I was very pleased that you agreed about the allocation priorities as they have developed in this country, and that they are not a contributing factor to our national strength, but I hope you will take this in the spirit it is offered.

I am not trying to be critical, and certainly not in a meeting of this kind, but if he would make it clear—he has the ear of the people—as clear as he is capable of making the need for it, I think it would be the greatest thing he could do.

When we come——

Senator LAUSCHE. The need for what, if I may ask?

The CHAIRMAN. The need for the allocation of greater of our resources for national purposes, just in the words of this article, rather than consumer goods. He says:

> That is why the national power of the Sovet Union is forging ahead of the national power of the United States because they are putting their money into productive investments, foreign aid, national education as well as armament.

Armament is only one item, but the educational thing here, they are spending, according to the best report I saw—and there is some variation in the amount—approximately 8 percent of their GNP on education, and we are spending about 5.

That is a considerably higher percent of their available wealth on education. It is still, of course, less than ours.

They are spending as much with less than one-half as much GNP as we have—estimated at 40 percent by Mr. Dulles—on armaments, which means relatively twice as big a sacrifice on it, because we have twice as much to do with.

I was just thinking that what we lack in the Congress to do things about it, even if we want to, is the sense of urgency.

I submit the President does not impress on the country—he is about the only one that can really do it—the seriousness of this aspect of our whole national conduct. I think he does not ask the American people to do enough.

Senator LAUSCHE. How would you have him do it, if I might ask you. How will the Americans do it?

The CHAIRMAN. I can think of a number of ways. One would be education.

I think he knows in the long experience we have that the States are not doing it, and many of them cannot do it. There is no way at this late date to revise the tax base of our local school districts that I can think of.

Many of these poorer States, of course, are doing far above the national average. That is just one. People disagree on that. But I can think of another one.

In this field of labor-management relations, I think he could well take the opportunity when steel profits were the highest in history, and so on, to suggest some new form, such as that tried out in Michigan, for increasing the income of the Government for the national purposes.

I do not think anybody feels there is any need to do it; that is the trouble. I do not believe the country feels conscious of what this says, and you agree with what this says——

Secretary HERTER. I do.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. That this is a problem.

Secretary HERTER. I made a speech along somewhat the same lines not very long ago.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would get the President to make the same kind of speech.

Secretary HERTER. Well, he did it in his budget message.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I do not think he did it in his budget message.

Secretary HERTER. But finding the answer is something else again.

Senator LAUSCHE. If you put more money into these things which you mention, where would you take it from?

The CHAIRMAN. It would have to come out of the gross national product of the country. It would have to be through taxation.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then I agree with you; taxation is the only way you can do it.

The CHAIRMAN. I was thinking they ought to examine the new tax that Michigan has. I do not want to take the Secretary into any further matters.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I suggest to you that one of our men look into the report filed by the study agency which says that, given the figure, we are graduating 100 percent more out of our colleges than the Soviet Union, but when they get through they have engineers and scientists. We do not have them now, and I infer from that that if we are graduating 100 percent more, undoubtedly our school facilities are far greater than theirs.

The CHAIRMAN. I never have seen any such figures. I saw a statement the other day that they have twice as many engineers as we have.

Senator LAUSCHE. They have; that is true.

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JANUARY 26, 1960

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee proceeded into executive session in room 4219, NSOB, at 12:15 p.m.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Sparkman, Morse, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Williams.

Senator Morse stated that as the result of his correspondence with Secretary Merchant, he would have no further objection to voting in favor of his nomination. Accordingly, the nomination of Livingston T. Merchant as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs was approved for report on motion by Senator Sparkman, seconded by Senator Aiken.

The nomination of Foy D. Kohler, to be Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; Tyler Thompson to be Ambassador to Ireland; G. Frederick Reinhardt to be Ambassador to the UAR and Minister to Yemen, were approved for report unanimously on voice vote.

Senator Green moved, seconded by Senator Hickenlooper, that the nomination of Robert Cutler to be Executive Director of the Inter-American Development Bank, be reported. Senator Morse made a short statement in reference to the nomination, and Senator Williams asked that a letter be had from Mr. Cutler, in his future official capacity, as to the extent of the liability of the U.S. Government in the event that the Bank's bonds, which may be sold in this country, are defaulted. Accordingly, Mr. Cutler's nomination was approved for report.

The committee also approved the nominations of Dennis A. FitzGerald to be Deputy Director for Operations of the ICA, and of Ward P. Allen and 119 others for promotion in the Foreign Service.

After discussion, the committee concluded to postpone consideration for a few days of the proposed committee report on the Near East by the Institute of Mediterranean Affairs.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m. the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JANUARY 26, 1960

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee proceeded into executive session at 4:55 p.m., in room F–53, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, and Hickenlooper.

Executive I, 86th Congress, First Session, being the Agreement on Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materials (Florence Convention) was unanimously approved for report.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[There being no further business, the committee adjourned at 4:57 p.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1960

United States Senate,
Subcommittee on the North American Regional Broadcasting and Mexican Broadcasting Agreements of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met in executive session in room F-53, Capitol, at 4:05 p.m.

Present: Senator Morse (chairman) and Senators Church, Aiken, and Carlson.

Senator Morse reviewed the subcommittee's consideration in the past of the two agreements, noting the interest taken in them by the Daytime Broadcasters Association. He suggested that if the subcommittee approved of both agreements, that it first send a letter to the Federal Communications Commission asking the Commission to appreciate the fact that throughout the subcommittee had given every fair consideration to the complaints of the Daytime Broadcasters, and that on the basis of that record, that the Commission will be cognizant of the services the Daytime Broadcasters render the country and assist in any way it can such Broadcasters under the policies laid down under the Agreements.

The suggestion was adopted unanimously, whereupon on motion by Senator Church, seconded by Senator Carlson, the Agreements were, on voice vote, unanimously recommended for report by the subcommittee to the full committee.

The chairman voted the proxy of Senator Lausche in favor of the motion.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The subcommittee then adjourned at 4:15 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Sparkman, Morse, Long, Lausche, Church, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

John J. Grady, nominated to be Deputy Director for Management of the International Cooperation Administration in the Department of State, appeared on his own behalf.

Senate Concurrent Resolution 17, "Favoring a convention of delegates from the Atlantic democracies looking to a greater cooperation and unity of purpose," was announced as next in order. Mr. Ivan B. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and Senator Estes Kefauver appeared to participate in a general mark-up of the resolution. After the resolution had been considerably amended, the chairman instructed the staff to prepare a clean bill and circulate same among the members in the next few days, with the hope of voting on it in the next meeting.

Senator Morse then reported the NARBA and Mexican broadcasting agreements and moved they be approved for report, which motion was adopted unanimously.

George V. Allen, Director, U.S. Information Agency, then testified in support of the so-called Beirut Convention, Ex. V, 81-2, "An Agreement for facilitating the international circulation of visual and auditory materials of an educational, scientific, and cultural character."

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[At the conclusion of his testimony, the committee adjourned at 12:55 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLICS AFFAIRS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 4 p.m., room F–53, Capitol.

The full committee was invited.

Present: Senator Morse (subcommittee chairman), and Senators Green, Long, Gore, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Williams.

Attending were Philip W. Bonsal, Ambassador to Cuba, Joseph S. Farland, Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Lester D. Mallory, and others.

The subcommittee and the committee were briefed on Caribbean Affairs, at the conclusion of which the subcommittee adjourned.

No record was kept of the proceedings.

89-432 O - 82 - 8

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1960

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m., in room 4221, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Mansfield, Gore, Church, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

On motion of Senator Gore, seconded by Senator Green, the committee voted to report the nomination of John H. Grady, to be Deputy Director for Management of the ICA, favorably.

On motion of Senator Hickenlooper, the committee unanimously voted to report Ex. V, 81-2, "An agreement for facilitating the international circulation of visual and auditory materials of an educational, scientific, and cultural character" (Beirut convention).

Senate Concurrent Resolution 17, "Favoring a convention of delegates from Atlantic democracies looking to a greater cooperation and unity of purpose," was next in order. The chairman laid before the committee a clean bill prepared by the staff at the instance of the committee, and in the form of an original joint resolution.

After discussion, Senator Church moved that the joint resolution be reported, as amended, and the committee members, on roll call, answered to their names, as follows:

YEAS	NAYS
Senator Sparkman (by proxy)	Senator Green
Senator Humphrey (by proxy)	Senator Mansfield
Senator Morse (by proxy)	Senator Lausche (by proxy)
Senator Long (by proxy)	Senator Wiley
Senator Gore (by proxy)	Senator Hickenlooper
Senator Church	Senator Aiken
Senator Carlson	Senator Williams
Senator Fulbright	

So the joint resolution was reported, 8 to 7.

The committee next considered House Joint Resolution 283, "To authorize participation by the United States in parliamentary conferences with Mexico." After discussion, Senator Mansfield moved, seconded by Senator Wiley, that the resolution be reported. The motion carried on voice vote.

During the discussion, on question by Senator Wiley if the committee had a quorum, the chairman pointed out that nine members had been present "a moment ago" and that under the committee's practice, he intimated that the presence of a quorum was presumed established once it had been attained.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[There being no further business, the committee adjourned at 12:10 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1960

United States Senate,
Subcommittee on State Department
Organization and Public Affairs of the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in the committee room, F-53, Capitol.

Present: Senator Mansfield (chairman), and Senators Green, Morse, and Aiken.

The chairman announced that the subcommittee had met to consider the recommendations made in the recent report made on Latin America by Senator Aiken.

Those present who were invited to comment on same were Roy R. Rubottom, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, accompanied by Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Vance Brand, Managing Director, Development Loan Fund, Lynn U. Stambaugh, First Vice President, Export Import Bank, William B. Macomber, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, and Walter Sauer, of the Export Import Bank.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[At the conclusion of their comments, the subcommittee adjourned at 12:15 p.m.]

CUBAN AND CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—The Eisenhower administration viewed gravely the signing of a commercial aid agreement between Cuba and the Soviet Union on Feb. 13, 1960. This first Soviet pact with Cuba followed a stormy month in which Fidel Castro denounced American threats to amend the 1934 Sugar Act (by which the United States had been purchasing Cuban sugar at higher than world prices), and proclaimed that his revolution had released Cuba from American domination. President Eisenhower recalled U.S. Ambassador Philip Bonsal, but insisted that the United States would not intervene in Cuba's internal affairs. Under the terms of the February 13 pact, the Soviet Union agreed to purchase a million tons of Cuban sugar a year for the next 4 years, and to provide $100 million in credit to enable Cuba to acquire industrial machinery and materials. There were also rumors that Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan had offered to sell Soviet military aircraft to Cuba. In March, President Eisenhower approved a plan for the Central Intelligence Agency to begin training Cuban exiles for a possible invasion of Cuba and counter-revolution against Castro.]

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 3:10 p.m., in the committee room, room F-53, United States Capitol Building, Hon. J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, Senators Green, Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Long, Lausche, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Williams.

Also present: Senators Smathers and Dirksen.

Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, and Mr. St. Claire of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. I have called this executive session meeting to give an opportunity for the discussion of the situation that has arisen in Cuba, or I should say, developed more ominously within the last 2 weeks.

I have invited Mr. Bonsal, our Ambassador to Cuba, Mr. Hill, our Ambassador to Mexico, Mr. Rubottom, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and Mr. Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

Mr. Rubottom, I guess you should perhaps lead off, unless you or Mr. Bonsal have any other view, and give us some statement and then if we could proceed by having a general discussion on this subject.

Our only purpose here is not relative to legislative matters but for a briefing and information of the committee.

I also invited the Senator from Florida because he just recently returned from a long trip to that area, and he has for many years exhibited a very keen interest in all Latin American affairs. I thought perhaps he could give us some information from his point of view.

Do you have a statement, Mr. Rubottom?

Mr. **Rubottom**. I don't have a prepared statement, Mr. Chairman but I would like to address myself to the problem if I could.

The **Chairman**. Mr. Ambassador, why don't you sit here, gentlemen. We hope to elicit some understanding of this situation. I am speaking for myself now. I am more disturbed than I was by the surprise visit of Mr. Mikoyan to Cuba. Go ahead, Mr. Rubottom.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROY R. RUBOTTOM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY HON. PHILIP W. BONSAL, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO CUBA; HON. ROBERT C. HILL, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO MEXICO; AND HON. THOMAS C. MANN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

Mr. **Rubottom**. Mr. Chairman, I think in discussing the problem of Cuba we are discussing one of the most difficult and perplexing problems which the United States has ever faced.

I would like to say at the outset that I think many Americans, if not most Americans, realized that there was room for some change, indeed perhaps for some social and political revolution in Cuba. Obviously this was Cuba's own affair, the timing and the method of bringing this about. But the very warm welcome which this revolution received when it was successful a little over a year ago and the personal reception which was accorded to Mr. Castro when he came here in April, invited by the National Editorial Association—without any prior consultation with any member of the Government, I might add—certainly indicated, I think, the frame of reference both in heart and mind with which the American people looked at this revolution.

Almost from the very beginning the efforts of the United States as a government and more and more as a people with all sectors of national life to cooperate with this new government, leaving aside the Cuban people, have been frustrated. Where we have extended the hand of friendship, we have been met with either outright rejection or coolness or aloofness, and indeed we have been rebuffed, I think to a greater extent than any time that I have seen us endeavor to work out a relationship with a Latin American government.

U.S. REJECTED MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA

In formulating policies toward a government like the Cuban Government, I would like to mention some five or six alternatives which we could have adopted. First, we could have considered direct intervention by United States military forces to assure that there would be the establishment of a government in conformity with United States concepts of traditional Cuban-U.S. relations.

It seemed to us that this would play into Communist hands by creating a Hungary in reverse. It would violate our inter-American and international commitments. We have renounced the use of force in the Caribbean. We have examples elsewhere in the world where we have renounced the use of force as a solution to problems; and the experience in the mid-20th century of industrialized nations taking military action in nationalistic underdeveloped areas has not been a very happy one, witness the Germans in Yugoslavia, the French in Indochina and Algeria, the Dutch in Indonesia and the British in Cyprus and Malaya.

Another course of action that we might have adopted would have been unilateral economic and/or diplomatic sanctions such as immediately attempting to cut the Cuban sugar quota, or the severance of diplomatic relations or the imposition of new tariffs, or banning U.S. tourism to Cuba and other such measures.

We believe that this also would have been against our best interests. In the initial stages such action might have actually strengthened Castro's anti-American radicalism by reeling nationalistic and patriotic sentiment around him, by contributing to the harm of the middle classes economically and giving a further pretension for the liquidation of the anti-Castro forces. And one of the hallmarks of our policy, Mr. Chairman, has been to avoid building Castro into any more heroic proportion than he has in the eyes of the people, however improperly he may have assumed that proportion, and to cause his downfall if it comes—and it seems inevitable to come from his own mistakes and misdeeds rather than any pushes that we might give him.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you say you thought his downfall was inevitable?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. Yes, sir, I really think that is.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you develop that thought later?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. I will undertake to, yes, sir.

Even at a later stage, assuming that these unilateral sanctions that we might have taken became successful, it would enable the Communists to exploit the chaotic conditions which are sure to result and might well force the United States into some overt intervention of the kind that I mentioned in the first course of action.

The United States would have had to shoulder the blame for any economic havoc that might have resulted as a result of our action and we eventually might have had to furnish substantial economic aid to any successor government, and borne the onus of being charged with the return to the big stick in the economic policies.

A third course of action that we might have taken is to have organized economic and diplomatic sanctions through the Inter-American system.

This would have been difficult a few months ago. I think we are rapidly approaching the time where this might be possible. There is one point to bear in mind, however, and that is that if Castro were to topple tomorrow either through force within Cuba or through some other force that might come along, the scramble for power there would be chaotic and bloody, and it might be that the next government would be just as radical or even more radical, and just as anti-U.S. or more so, than the present government.

So you would have a result similar to discarded alternatives one and two. A fourth course of action that we might have followed would have been—without intervening—to countenance or encourage efforts by elements associated with the old regime now in the United States, the Dominican Republic or Cuba or elsewhere to take over in Cuba.

At present it seems highly improbable that such elements could master sufficient force and following in Cuba to be successful. Even to make the attempt, however, it would be necessary for the United States to overlook violations of its own laws and international commitments and to wink at similar violations of the inter-American nonintervention treaties in other Caribbean countries, with the result that we might be charged with failure to live up to our nonintervention obligations, undermining the principles which we have sought to get Castro to live up to, especially at the Santiago Conference.

Moreover, if such a government were to be installed by these former associates of the Batista regime, it would probably have to be a military dictatorship with substantial U.S. diplomatic, economic and military assistance.

So we would be back at least in the position of being charged with helping to reinstate a military dictatorship, and again Communist propaganda could make the most of that position.

REMAIN PATIENT AND DEFEND U.S. RIGHTS

Five, as an alternative, would be to remain patient, to avoid precipitate action, but firmly defend our rights and advance the concepts of political and economic freedom which we share with democratic elements in Cuba and other nations of the free world.

Now this policy underscores our commitments to nonintervention and offers hope to the friendly and democratic elements in Cuba and in exile which are becoming alarmed at the Socialist, Communist and anti-U.S. trends in Cuba, and are also casting about for ways to rectify the situation.

This course of action avoids any action which permanently would injure the Cuban people or U.S. prestige; at least, it is best calculated to do that. One of the main elements of our policy has been to encourage the moderate anti-Castro forces, and at the proper time to enable them if they want to stand up to the government, to do so.

A sixth alternative, which I won't develop because it is one that obviously we are not going to follow, would be to remain aloof entirely from the Cuban situation and practice patience and forebearance and nothing more—a policy of complete restraint and silence.

I think, from these half dozen suggestions that I have advanced it is pretty clear that we have undertaken to follow No. 5, and I would like to develop just a few of the cardinal points under this No. 5.

First, to allow the Cuban people the time necessary to insist on a government which will restore the friendly and harmonious relations that have existed for decades.

ANTI-CASTRO SENTIMENT IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Second, to concentrate on a subtle effort to help ripen the anti-Castro feeling in the hemisphere, and I think that this has been notably successful. The Santiago Conference was a major part of this effort and the Cubans suffered the ignominy of being held up to ridicule in the eyes of the hemisphere at that meeting.

They also suffered the ignominy of being unsuccessful in their efforts to intervene in the affairs of their neighbors in the 3, 4 or 5 months prior to August. They are also suffering the ignominy of seeing their efforts to have a conference of underdeveloped states—which was scheduled for first April and then May and now at some indefinite date in the summer—to be turned down by practically all of the Latin American countries and other countries throughout the hemisphere.

We have seen as a part of this operation the results of the efforts of a task force which has been working for a year to crossplay editorial comment and to otherwise bring the full weight of the informational media against this Castro effort, assuming that he was not going to respond to reason or to the efforts made to negotiate successfully our problems with him.

We now see the newspaper La Prenza, in Argentina, calling the Castro government a dictatorship.

We see El Piez, a leading newspaper in Montevideo, calling the Castro government a dictatorship. We saw President Lopez Mateos—as Ambassador Hill can verify—when he was in Rio de Janeiro saying he deeply regretted that the Castro government was not following constitutional paths.

For the Mexican President that was a fairly strong statement, I submit. We, I believe, have gotten to a point of a ripening process in the opinion around the hemisphere of the governments and the other informed people—not to overlook the public, because I saw the reaction of the public in Chile at the time of the Foreign Ministers meeting, and it was a very noteworthy reaction, and an encouraging one at the time. They see Castro in his true light, as the threat which he represents to the hemisphere.

MAINTAIN FRIENDSHIP OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE

Another point that we have attempted to carry out under this policy is to avoid actions that would be injurious to the Cuban people. We are trying to walk the very delicate tightrope of keeping the spotlight on Castro and those around him, and making them responsible for what they do and don't do; at the same time we try to keep this reservoir of friendship which we believe is still existent in the hearts and the minds of the Cuban people.

We have also attempted to avoid direct association with the Batista or the Trujillo elements[1] which are, generally speaking, discredited in the hemisphere. We have insisted on fair treatment for the United States in Cuba, and I must confess that up untii now we have been disappointed in that effort.

But going back to our first publicized note of last June, a subsequent note in July which was not made public, the very strong statement in October, another statement in November, and a still further statement in January which you know about, we have made it clear that we reject out of hand their assertions that the treatment they are according U.S. investment in Cuba, and especially their offer to reimburse our expropriated owners, most of them up until now have only been intervened, but expropriation is clearly just around the corner, that means that they have offered to reimburse them is utterly unsuitable, unacceptable, these 4½ percent 20-year bonds. I think that as it has dawned on the Castro government that we are going to stand firm in defense of this and other principles, and that we are not going to recede one inch, they in turn have in desperation looked around and have taken the hand of friendship of the U.S.S.R. in the visit of Mikoyan.[2]

---

[1] Gen. Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar, who was overthrown as Cuban dictator on Jan. 1, 1959; Gen. Rafael L. Trujillo-Molina, dictator of the Dominican Republic, who was assassinated in 1961.

Now in this ripening process, Mr. Chairman, which has speeded up beyond anybody's imagination of a month ago, it probably is helpful to bring the hemisphere to grips with the Cuban problem through the Caracas resolution, through the economic sanctions that might become necessary or any other thing that we want to do to have them play this string out, and to extend this hand of friendship—the one that they have refused to extend to us—to the Russians.

It is clear in the telegrams that are coming in from Cuba now that the Cuban people and certain of the labor union elements are beginning to question the wisdom of this agreement which was announced last Saturday night, because they recognize that a relatively high-cost production item such as sugar is there, where it costs them about 4 cents a pound; if they sell it for 3 or 2.9 cents a pound, unless they can sell sugar to the United States—which is now in the position of being the aggrieved party as a result of the way they have acted—they can't hope to break even.

So I submit that critical though the situation is, that it is a classical situation that probably has to get somewhat worse before it can get any better.

And I really believe what has happened in these past few days is going to help get the situation better in the long run.

THE U.S. RESPONSE

Another thing that we must do in carrying out this policy, and which we have undertaken to do, is to defend the United States without undue emotion or loss of dignity against the unwarranted verbal and published attacks against the nation, against its leaders and against its institutions.

If I could insert this, sir, I would like to express my appreciation to the members of this committee and to their colleagues, both in this Senate and on the other side of the Capitol in the House of Representatives, for the way they have accepted this problem and dealt with it, because it hasn't been easy.

It certainly has been extremely difficult for us, and I know it has been difficult for you. On the whole I would say that there has been the greatest statesmanship shown by you people and your colleagues in dealing with this difficult problem which I am outlining here.

Another point I would like to suggest we must carry out in this policy is to continue to demonstrate our adherence to the policy of nonintervention and our conviction in the durable worth of the inter-American system.

---

[2] Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan, who visited Cuba from Feb. 4 to Feb. 13, 1960.

Now someone might say, "Isn't that a contradiction?"

How can you plan to defend yourself in the light of present Cuban actions if at the same time you are going to adhere to the policy of nonintervention?

Well, it obviously takes two countries, I think, to carry out a policy, and I spoke in an off-the-record meeting yesterday to the Pan American Society in New York. I am not going to bore you with repeating any of my detailed remarks. But I reasoned out loud with these businessmen and others who are in the Society to show that principles can be reconciled with foreign relations problems, and that there is not any inevitable clash or contradiction when we defend our own legitimate interests with principle, because I think that the public—around the hemisphere and elsewhere in the world—will recognize that whatever actions we take, it doesn't have to be an invasion by the Marines or something like that, in defense of our interest. If it becomes necessary—and it looks as if it probably will be—it will not clash with our nonintervention policy.

And finally I would like to stress the necessity, which we are undertaking to carry out, of getting the U.S. side of the story to the Cuban people, who we think are still basically friendly to us.

This is going to be more and more difficult. The Diario de la Marina, which is the only relatively free newspaper which is left there, is in a very difficult situation. I think it expects that, because it published our Embassy's statement following the agreement of last Saturday announced by the Soviet Union, because it has published editorials right along attacking the role of communism in Cuba, and because it has analyzed objectively the effect of this commercial agreement along the lines that I mentioned a while ago, it is in serious straits. And if that paper should be forced to close its doors—and there have been rumors that this might happen—there would be very little left in the way of open publications there.

There certainly is not very much left in the way of radios. But I think that there is also evidence already that radio stations from outside of Cuba are penetrating this curtain which they have attempted to draw as far as the press is concerned, and I can assure you that no stone is being left unturned to try to get the truth of the U.S. position and our feeling toward the Cuban people and the problem which has been created for the Cuban people by Castro, across to the people. I don't want to go beyond this, because I think this lays at least a framework, Mr. Chairman, for the discussion.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. I think for orderly procedure we should hear from the others.

Do you have anything to add, Mr. Bonsal?

Mr. Bonsal. I thought Mr. Rubottom covered the ground very thoroughly. I do think that in considering the Cuban situation we should also have very much in mind the basis for revolution which has existed in Cuba and which Mr. Rubottom mentioned.

It is a fact that we are very much concerned with such aspects as anti-Americanism, the insults we receive, the treatment which our private enterprise is receiving there, the Communist infiltration, the negotiations with Mr. Mikoyan. That concern is shared, I think, by a great many people in Cuba, including a good many supporters of Dr. Castro, a good many people who do support him but for variety of other reasons.

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IN CUBAN HISTORY

And if you look back at Cuban history over the past 20 years through the eyes of, say, an average intelligent Cuban, you will see that there are a lot of other elements in the situation which contributes to this man's strength, and which, because a great many other alternatives have been tried out and failed, give him a position in the national life that you probably couldn't understand unless you knew something about this particular background.

I don't know to what extent you want me to go into that. But it is an important element in an understanding of why people support Castro in spite of these things that give us so much worry and concern.

The **Chairman**. I think you might briefly touch on it. I would hope you would come to what you think might be done under present circumstances.

Mr. **Bonsal**. I would be glad to speak briefly about the background. Politically speaking, of course, beginning in 1940 Cuba has had 3 terms of democratically elected presidents, and about 7 years of dictatorship.

The democratic regime was started out under very good auspices with a new constitution, with what was hoped would be a general liberalization form of political life. All of those hopes were pretty much frustrated.

I don't want to say there weren't a great many distinguished, honest public servants in the employ of the Cuban Government and in Cuban politics, but the general impact on Cuban public opinion of these democratic regimes, particularly the last two, which were headed by people who have been flaming reformers about 20 years before, was very disillusioning and frustrating. Politics was a matter of very small groups. It was a matter of tremendous corruption. The amount of corruption, let's say in education, was perfectly fantastic—in public works also. Many of the reports on that today are exaggerated and inflated, but even allowing discounts it was a very bad situation.

CUBAN UNEMPLOYMENT

From the economic point of view, you had this situation. You had a certain segment of society, not a very large one, living very comfortably and in some cases very graciously. You had an increasing unemployment which has been estimated—these are estimates which are very hard to verify—at perhaps 350,000, which in a population of 6 million is quite a heavy unemployment.

You had partial unemployment in the sugar industry, which is a very seasonal industry. And, incidentally, in considering this Russian deal, you might consider that while it is perhaps true that Cuba is selling sugar to Russia at below cost, it is probably true, nevertheless, from the point of view of the average Cuban workers and the trade unions, that you can estimate that this deal will mean 2 weeks' more work per annum for each worker in the sugar industry, and that is a very important element in the picture. And may I say, speaking personally, that if that picture from the Russian point of view could be supplemented by action on our part which would deduct a week or 10 days' work from the average Cuban sugar worker, I think they would be very happy.

Anyhow, this economic situation of unemployment, of inability to use the country's human resources in spite of all sorts of very praiseworthy attempts to introduce any industries, was one of the seriously frustrating and disillusioning aspects. Taking sugar, for instance, the amount of sugar exported from Cuba in the 1950's probably averaged not more than the average amount exported in the 1920's, although the population had doubled. This is due to the various restrictions in our market and in the world market.

They probably sell us as much sugar today as they did in the 1920's, although our consumption has gone up tremendously. That is all a matter of our policy, of our decisions taken for reasons of our own national interest; nevetheless, it does have a serious impact on their thinking.

They felt that the reciprocal tariff arrangments were working very much against them, that the tariff which they had granted us prevented them from protecting their own industries and from diversifying their own agriculture, all in the interest of our own exports.

This is a debatable question. I merely mention it as one of the things that they were feeling. Agrarian reform has been an aspiration in Cuba for many years, and was incorporated in the constitution of 1940. Nothing was done about it. There was another aspect of the situation, of course, which in the growing nationalism, the growing spirit of xenophobia you might call it, which characterizes small countries in our areas was of great concern.

FOREIGN INDUSTRY IN CUBA

It was the degree to which major industries were under foreign control. In the case of sugar 10 years ago American industry investors controlled 50 percent of production; that has diminished and it is down now to about 30. We own and manage the two major public utilities—electric power and telephone—and I think we do a good job of it. Now we and the British own and manage the oil refineries, and there are other elements of foreign ownership.

We have very important mineral interests, some of them acquired under conditions which in many countries have been altered in favor of the country where the mineral resources are owned. All of these situations building up—that is, the political, the social, economic and the purely economic—are the things which give Dr. Castro his tremendous support.

It is not so much this anti-Americanism or the communism aspect. It is these basic elements with which people are concerned.

And I think the background is important to bear in mind as illustrating why so many people in Cuba support Dr. Castro fanatically, and why a great many of them perhaps don't give the importance to the anti-American statements and the Communist infiltration which we quite properly give them.

They are looking at a somewhat different sort of picture. Dick, is that more or less in line with your——

Mr. **Rubottom**. I think the chairman did ask if you had any thoughts as to the ultimate work out or solution there.

The **Chairman**. On the current situation, in view of this do you have any further suggestions beyond what Mr. Rubottom has said?

DEFINING THE U.S. POSITION

Mr. **Bonsal**. I think our major effort at this time should be in the direction of clarifying, defining the situation regarding the United States private interests.

I think we should give a top priority to the question of determining in each case as it comes up whether a basis exists for a diplomatic claim—that is, that there is no direct settlement possible if such a basis exists—and we should press that claim as strenuously and strongly as possible with the Cuban Government, trying to get them to agree to our point of view or to a satisfactory settlement. We should then make a maximum effort to find some way by which any remaining disagreements—and I am sorry to say that I believe there will be a considerable number of them—can be submitted to some sort of other international procedure.

I do not know what that other international procedure would be, but I think it is important that we give thought to that, that we devise something, and that we then determine our policy on the basis of whether or not the Cuban Government will accept a reasonable international procedure for the settlement of those claims.

I think our primary attack at present should be in that direction.

Mr. **Rubottom**. Mr. Chairman, we have an assistant legal adviser in the Department now who is working full-time on these claims matters with our director of Caribbean and Cuban affairs and me. We also have a lawyer who is experienced in these matters who is now in the Embassy in Havana and is working on these matters. I conferred today with the legal adviser, Mr. Hager, who is in constant contact with the attorneys for these firms whose interests are affected.

My opinion certainly is that we have no reason to be sanguine or optimistic about being able to negotiate any fair settlements.

The evidence is mounting all the time that they are just going to continue this highhanded action and that we may have to look to whatever means might be available; and I think there are quite a number, because this has been a very one-sided picture that the Cubans have presented about these benefits which are very meaningful to them in our economic relationships. If they want to play the game this way, we may be forced to play the game the same way in order to protect our own interests; we do have to protect our interests and make crystal clear that no country can do what it is attempting to do to our private investments with impunity, because the effect of that would be very damaging elsewhere.

The **Chairman**. We have the Ambassador from Mexico. I thought since he is at the seat of what we hear in the press he is the center of much Communist activity that emanates from Mexico City, and because of his knowledge of Latin America he might have some observations to make.

Do you have any contribution to make Ambassador Hill?

Mr. **Hill**. Mr. Chairman, I have no statement on the situation.

CUBAN AND SOVIET EMBASSY CONTACTS IN MEXICO

I have listened very carefully to what Secretary Rubottom and Ambassador Bonsal have said. We have the largest Embassy and the Soviet Union has in Mexico the largest Embassy in Latin America.

There is a good deal of traffic between the Embassy and Cuba. It is causing us considerable concern. The Cuban Ambassador goes to Cuba for consultation and when he returns he goes immediately to the Soviet Embassy for consultation with Ambassador Besegan. I am impressed with the fact that the liaison between the Cuban Government and the Soviet Embassy is rather complete so far as Mexico is concerned. But I have no general statement.

I would be very glad to answer questions about Mexico.

The **Chairman**. It also was because of what knowledge you might have with regard to Communist activity in this area that I thought you might be a source of some information, because this ultimate infiltration of the Communists is the danger which perhaps is the greatest of all. I have no doubt that if it wasn't for that, the economic pressures and so on would build up and lead to much better restraint on the Cubans.

Mr. Mann, before I ask for questions do you have anything at this point to add on the picture as presented?

A DECISION ON THE SUGAR ACT

Mr. **Mann**. Mr. Chairman, I think I can be of most help in terms of what our plans are regarding the Sugar Act. This is something that we will have concrete.

The **Chairman**. It will be very appropriate if you give that now and then we will ask some questions.

Mr. **Mann**. As you know, we can't postpone it and I don't say we should, but I simply note that we must take a decision about the Sugar Act this year in this session of Congress, and very soon because there won't be the session for as long as usual this year.

In approaching this problem, our view has been—if I don't reflect Dick Rubottom's views he will correct me—that we are faced with two dilemmas.

One is to do nothing, to extend the Act, which will mean a subsidy of roughly $250 to $300 million a year for the next 23 months, and which might be interpreted in other Latin American countries as encouragement of irresponsibility, and which in my judgment would weaken our position in Venezuela and in other parts of the hemisphere which are threatened with social movements capable of going to the same extreme that Castro has led his followers to in Cuba. So I feel very strongly that we should avoid anything which smacks of appeasement and encouragement to this government, not so much because of what might happen in Cuba—because I agree with Mr. Rubottom that the days of this regime have to be numbered—but because of the effects which it would have on left-wing elements in the other American republics.

On the other hand, I think that we have to be equally aware of the dangers of the other extreme. If we conduct ourselves in such a way, and above all if we base our reasons on political grounds and if by our own acts and words and deeds we convict ourselves of intervention in the internal affairs of Cuba, I think that we make it easier for Castro, like Peron did so successfully a few years ago, to wrap the flag of nationalism around him.

It would strengthen him in Cuba, and if it isn't done very expertly and very carefully it will rally support throughout the whole hemisphere to Castro because of the very strong feeling based on history in all of Latin America, on this problem of intervention.

In this connection, to emphasize this last point before I leave it—I don't know whether Dick will agree, because we have both been so busy we haven't had a chance to talk over things for the last 3 or 4 days—no matter what we do, if we take any affirmative action whatever, it is very likely that we will be accused of violating the charter of Bogota by economic aggression and intervention. And everything that we do not and in the future ought to be with an eye on what statement we make in defense of any charges that may be brought against us by Castro.

He is a very emotional man. He is capable of almost any charge and of almost any action at this time.

AVOID A CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE

This has led us to the conclusion that the best course would be to avoid, insofar as is possible, Congressional debate on whether or not we should impose sanctions and try to overthrow Castro, and to give the executive branch the power to reduce quotas whenever in the President's opinion this is necessary to ensure an adequate supply of sugar in the American market or otherwise to serve the national interest.

The advantage of this procedure would be that if we decide to take a cut in the quota, if Congress gives authority to take the cut and if the President decides to do this, we can very carefully phrase the reasons for our action in such a way that it will be at least partially acceptable in the rest of Latin America.

Senator **Mansfield**. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question there? Isn't it true that the Sugar Act has until December 31 of this year to run?

Mr. **Mann**. That is correct.

Senator **Mansfield**. Then it would be the next President who very likely would have to exercise responsibility if it was given to him by the Congress.

Mr. **Mann**. I think within a week the executive will send its recommendations to the Congress about an extension of this act, and one of the recommendations would be that this power be given to the President immediately.

The **Chairman**. Have you finished?

Mr. **Mann**. I could talk along this line a long time. I have finished this point, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Then if I understand it, within a week you will send your recommendations, and in the meantime you hope that Congress will not engage in too much debate which might cause or give Castro a reason for making propaganda, so to speak, against us; is that correct?

Mr. **Mann**. Yes, sir. I didn't mean to imply that I was suggesting any kind of gag rule; what I meant to say was that when this bill is considered by the Congress, if the debate could be on economic grounds rather than on political grounds, this would make it easier for us later on to take effective action against Castro and to maintain a position of that kind against what is almost certain to be widespread criticism throughout the hemisphere and at home.

The **Chairman**. Senator Smathers, I understand you have to leave in 10 minutes.

Did you want to say anything while you were here to the committee?

Senator **Smathers**. I would appreciate it and I won't take more than 5 minutes.

The **Chairman**. I understand you have to go to the White House.

IDENTIFY WHICH SIDE CASTRO IS ON

Senator **Smathers**. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief. As an individual who has followed this area very closely for a long time, I have no criticism for the policy which has thus far been outlined by Dick Rubottom and Mr. Bonsal as to what we have done up to now.

I think we are eminently correct in making it important that we identify which side Castro is on and separate him in the minds of everybody all over Cuba and Latin America from being the great liberator and benefactor and democratic advocate.

However, I have just finished this trip. Senator Morse was down there. Senator Aiken has been there. They can supplement or disagree or whatever.

I am sure they will have some contribution to make.

OTHER COUNTRIES ATTITUDES

I have just also talked with the presidents of 10 countries, and while I went to each one of them with our local Ambassadors and sat there and said, "Mr. President, we have a real problem with Cuba and I for one would like to know whether you would have any recommendation or would you make any recommendation to us as to what we should do about Cuba."

And I was in each instance advised indirectly and sometimes directly that what they said was not for quotation. But our Ambassador was there and he probably reported this. I hope that he has. But without exception, every one of them said, "You have a tough problem and the time has come to deal with it firmly, and the time has come when you must step up and gain the self-respect from these other people of Latin America which you are rapidly losing today.

"There is no question that now Castro has joined up with the Communists, and we are worried about it. We who believe in orderly government, we who are democrats who believe in the preservation of certain property rights, we who recognize that much more needs to be done within our country but nevertheless believe in orderly government, feel this fellow is a threat to us."

Less than a week ago, even Romulo Betancourt, who is a great liberal, said to me, "When Castro came down to Venezuela the other day, I left town. I refused to see him. He is a threat to the orderly processes of democracy in this country and all over."

My own conclusion from talking with these people is that rather than lose prestige and respect of these people by acting firmly, we are going to gain respect, because they are looking for leadership. And what has them completely confused, it seems to me, is the fact that we have adopted a policy of hoping that somehow this cancer would fall by the wayside. I have explained to them, just as Dick has explained to us here, that it was for purposes of identifying this man, but that from this point on they cannot understand a policy in which we deal in a friendly fashion with our admitted enemy, and which we give them better treatment and a better arrangement than we would give to Brazil. Brazil was the first country that, when Castro said, "I want you to send a representation to Havana and meet with us and the underdeveloped countries," said, "We won't have anything to do with it." El Salvador said the same thing. Peru, of course, is very excited about it and they do not understand why we are continuing to follow what amounts to a soft line.

TAKE A FIRM POSITION

Gentlemen, I think that wherever we have demonstrated in the past that we will be firm, once it is clear who the opposition is—whether it is Greece, Korea, the Mideast, Lebanon or the Far East—we will come out on top. We have not been accused except by our enemies who accuse us anyway of being Yankee imperialists and so on.

President Allesandri [3]—and I am delighted President Eisenhower is going to see him—he summed it up best and this is very confidential. Our Ambassador Howe [4] was sitting right there. He said, "I can tell you this. Right now people are confused as to what you people really stand for. You are supposed to be a great democracy, and yet in effect you are helping establish a great communistic dictatorship and there is no question about it. That confuses us."

I said, "Well, suppose we did exercise some strong action against him. Is it not a fact that we would lose many people over Latin America?"

He said, "You never want to mistake the fact that the people who are responsible in this country and throughout Latin America are your friends. Don't let them down. The people of the left extreme Communist or socialist persuasion are against you anyway, and they are going to be against you under any circumstances. You cannot have everybody for you."

I think the time has come when you must take a reasonably firm position.

And so, gentlemen, just before I leave I would certainly say that my observation is that the time has come. I don't think we can look at Cuba as we do some of these other countries.

---

[3] Chilean President Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez.

[4] U.S. Ambassador to Chile Walter Howe.

Cuba is 94 miles from Key West. It controls the Panama Canal. That government has already run one invasion against the Panama Canal. It has already run an invasion against Nicaragua and one against the Dominican Republic and is waiting anxiously to run one against Haiti.

COOPERATE WITH THE OAS

Therefore, I don't think we can afford to sit back and let this man get arms and munitions from the Soviet Union which at that time will require that we take some very strong action.

That is the kind of thing that we ought to try to avoid and in my judgment we ought to start avoiding it today by beginning to say Mr. Bonsal is not going back to Cuba; further, by having the President say that he thinks even tourists should stay out of there because of the attitude of that Government's being unfriendly toward the American people.

At the same time, I think we could take all our intelligence reports and turn them over to the Organization for American States; on that point, I completely agree that we should follow that course at this time.

Let the Organization of American States see that that Government is in fact controlled by the Communists. Then you can adopt that Caracas resolution which Secretary Dulles put through, which required the joint action against any Communist-controlled government in the Western Hemisphere and we will be in business.

I think that everybody in that area of the world would welcome it, and I felt for certain that they didn't want any more of this policy of hope, recognizing that we did have to have it up to the point where we could identify who the enemy was.

CASTRO'S FALL IS INEVITABLE

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Senator Smathers. I will ask one question and then I will go around the committee. You said, Mr. Rubottom, that you thought the demise of Castro was inevitable. On what do you base that?

Mr. **Rubottom**. I base it on the belief that there are enough moderate Cubans of courage and intellectual, honesty and devotion to the spiritual side of life, which is certainly anti-Communist, that when the mask is fully removed from this man, as it is rapidly being removed, they are not going to stand still and permit him to ruin the country. We do have some evidence that there are quite a number of Cubans who are already beginning to feel that way.

The **Chairman**. Senator Green, do you have a question?

Senator **Green**. Yes. I would like to ask this question. It seems to me that we are faced with a very difficult decision, and that is whether the executive department is going to take action in view of this very complicated situation so that the Congress can avoid opposing the administration. But it seems to me that if the administration does not take any action, you can't blame the Congress for expressing its views. I think that we are faced with that dilemma. It is very difficult, I admit, for the executive department to decide what action to take, but it seems to me that it is its province. If it doesn't take any action, it can't blame the Congress for expressing its views, and they may be ill-considered and not well-founded because it hasn't the sources of information which the executive department has.

But I don't think you can expect the Congress to let things drift just because the executive department doesn't take a definite position.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Do you wish to make a comment on that other than what you have said?

Mr. **RUBOTTOM**. If I could say so, Senator Green, I respectfully submit that the policy of Castro up to now has not been a policy of idle drifting.

It has been a policy coldly calculated when it became perfectly clear that this man met none of the tests when these principles that we use to conduct our relations with Latin America were applied to him. We are in the process of exchanging data which was called for under the inter-American system and which was referred to by Senator Smathers with our friends in Latin America; and we have telegrams coming in which certainly bear out in considerable measure the estimate which he just expressed about the attitude of at least those 10 countries which he visited.

Now this is part of the job that has to be done. There is a delicate matter of timing the tactics that are carried out.

I repeat something that Mr. Mann said a while ago. There is certainly no suggestion on our part that the members of the Senate not say what is on their minds and hearts on this or any other problem.

But I am fully aware of the point that you make. I realize that it is up to us to demonstrate that the problem is being handled in an adequate way, and one which does defend the United States interests. I think we have up until now, and we shall certainly undertake to do so in the future, including the short-term future.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Senator Wiley, do you have a question?

THE "HAVES" AND THE "HAVE-NOTS"

Senator **WILEY**. I am sure I am not in any position to give any advice, but after listening to Ambassador Bonsal, I wonder if this trouble in Cuba is after all a matter of the haves and the have-nots.

Mr. **BONSAL**. There is a good deal of that, yes, sir.

Senator **WILEY**. If that is the case, of course you have that all over South America too.

Mr. **BONSAL**. You do.

Senator **WILEY**. And if that is the basic problem, the action we take must of course be taken with that in mind; otherwise we will be accused and will be giving a tool to the Communists, of simply standing with the haves against the have-nots.

That seems to me the one factor above all that we have to consider. Now I think the Senator said something about sugar. As I remember, the bill is coming up to extend the Sugar Act.

Mr. **MANN**. Yes.

Senator WILEY. All right, and that would mean that we would pay, if we extend it, some $200 million more into the coffers of Cuba than if we don't extend it; is that right?

Mr. MANN. That is correct.

Senator WILEY. Of course, that immediately goes to the question of what becomes of that money? Do the have-nots get the benefit of it?

Mr. BONSAL. The money goes into payment for the sugar, payment for all the costs of producing the sugar, the labor and so forth.

If they didn't have it, wages would go down, dividends would disappear, profits would be absolutely nil, and the Cuban ability to buy goods in the United States would also drop by that much.

Heretofore, generally speaking, with few exceptions, Cuba has bought more in the United States than we have bought in Cuba.

That is made much of in a demagogic way down there. It is very much to their advantage and very much to ours.

CANNOT AFFORD TO LOSE GOOD FRIENDS

Senator WILEY. The reason this comes to my mind is that Senator Smathers said, as I recall, that some of our good friends also are sugar producers, and they don't like the idea that they are not getting in on the deal. Now that is another factor that has to be considered in this matter of extension.

We can't afford to lose some good friends for somebody that isn't so good. All those are factors that you follow, and the State Department will have to resolve. I don't know what we can do up here. We can listen to your wisdom, but after all, under the Constitution you are spearheading foreign relations, and I certainly appreciate what has been told me today.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I would like if I may to make one statement. If the executive is given the power to cut the quotas, I don't want to leave any impression that this power will not be used. The executive department is unable to do anything about the sugar quota at this moment. It will continue to be unable to do anything about it unless it is given the authority by Congress.

Senator LONG. We would give you the power tomorrow if you would ask for it.

Mr. MANN. We are sending up some recommendations within a week. I simply wanted to say that the important thing, if we take action along this line, is that we justify it on economic grounds and not on political grounds. And in my judgment we do have sound economic grounds for beginning to reduce our dependence on Cuba for sugar. We get 94 percent of all of our imported sugar, which is a large amount of sugar, from two countries—the Philippines and Cuba—for historical reasons. What made sense a few years ago in terms of reciprocal advantages in this arrangement no longer makes as much sense.

Senator WILEY. Where would you cut that to, 80 percent, 70 percent?

Mr. MANN. This we haven't decided, sir.

Senator WILEY. Let's take an example and then follow through.

Mr. **Mann**. Hypothetically I think we might talk about 15 or 10 percent.

Senator **Wiley**. Cut?

Mr. **Mann**. Yes.

The cut might be taken in successive stages. You don't have to do the whole thing at one time.

Senator **Wiley**. How would that affect the have-nots?

Mr. **Bonsal**. I would like to say one thing to that.

Assuming that we and the Russians are engaged in a contest for the hearts and minds of the Cubans, if the Russians are going to buy more sugar and we are going to buy less, we place somewhat a handicap on ourselves in this.

SUGAR AS AN ECONOMIC FACTOR

Senator **Long**. The Russians are buying it below the market price. They are buying it at 2.9. We are buying it at 4.5, aren't we?

Mr. **Bonsal**. That is right, 5.5.

The **Chairman**. Senator Sparkman, do you have any questions?

Senator **Sparkman**. Yes.

You talked about the reduction of the quotas. Is the price level fixed in the act or is there any flexibility in there?

Mr. **Bonsal**. The act is operated so as to maintain a reasonable price level.

Senator **Sparkman**. You say we pay 5.5?

Mr. **Bonsal**. Yes.

Senator **Sparkman**. Is that fixed in the act?

Mr. **Bonsal**. No.

Senator **Sparkman**. Is it a kind of parity formula?

Mr. **Mann**. It is the result of the act.

Mr. **Bonsal**. The domestic price results from the operation of the act, from the regulation by the Secretary of Agriculture of the amount of sugar that can go into consumption in the United States; isn't that correct?

He is the expert.

Mr. **Mann**. What the consumption is and by regulating the supply of sugar in the domestic market, you do that automatically.

Senator **Sparkman**. The only point I am trying to make is, could there be a variation of the price rather than of quota?

Mr. **Mann**. If we cut the sugar quota, there are three ways in which it could be handled. Hypothetically assuming a 10 or 15 percent cut in the Cuban quota, you could allocate this to the other countries. This is one way you could do it. If we allocate it to other countries, I think we ought to recognize that this is a permanent allocation and that the only way Cuba could ever regain the degree of preference which it has now would be to give it a large share in the growth so that over the period of years it would come back up to the present limit.

Another way you could do it would be to simply have the CCC [Commodity Credit Corporation] buy sugar on the world market for 3 cents and sell it on the domestic market for 6 cents and turn over the profit to the U.S. Treasury.

This has a great disadvantage. This would meet one problem but it creates another problem which I think is enormous, and that is that you would get the same reaction throughout all the sugar exporting world that you get to a tariff or a quota.

It means at that time that the man who grows the sugar in Mexico and Peru and Haiti and in other places doesn't get the full price for his sugar, that he is in effect paying a tax to the U.S. Treasury. This has more political connotations.

Still another way it could be done would be to issue import licenses to domestic refineries, as we do in the case of oil.

There are different techniques that could be used and you would get different results, depending on which technique you use.

THE SAME EFFECT AS A HIGH TARIFF

Senator LONG. How could you call that a tax? All you are doing is buying sugar and selling it. What you are talking about giving a fellow on quotas would make the fellow rich.

He is selling at 50 percent above what anybody else pays for it—in fact, 100 percent above the price.

Mr. MANN. If you do a CCC purchase you have the same economic effect as a very high tariff. The difficulty is that the equivalent of the tariff would apply not only to Cuba but to all of the other sugar exporting countries. I daresay that is a difficult problem.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is the only way you can affect the price through the handling of quotas?

Mr. MANN. No, in the old days before the Sugar Act we used to have a tariff on sugar.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, but I am talking about with the Sugar Act in effect. Take the 5.5, is that what you say it is?

Mr. MANN. The U.S. market price—there has been some confusion on this—is roughly 6 cents.

Senator SPARKMAN. Roughly 6 cents.

And for the sugar we get from Cuba, then, what do we pay?

Mr. MANN. The Cuban gets 5 cents because you have to deduct about a half-cent for tariff. It is exactly one-half cent that they have to pay, and you have to deduct another cent for freight and handling charges, so the Cuban gets 5 cents instead of 3 cents.

Senator SPARKMAN. The price we pay him is not in any sense a set price. It is set by economic forces.

Mr. BONSAL. Yes.

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir. It is really set by the price in this country.

Senator SPARKMAN. I mean economic forces so far as domestic sugar is concerned.

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, suppose instead of the Congress' acting on this act right away, we delayed a while and didn't let it be known what we were going to do. If it has until December 31 to run, why the rush of doing something on it?

Mr. MANN. I feel that for two reasons we ought to act and act now. One, I think you get a psychological benefit out of indicating that we are prepared to take action if necessary. This is all we have to say at the moment. We don't commit ourselves at this moment by requesting this authority to actually use it. Two——

SOMETHING TO HOLD OVER THEIR HEADS

Senator SPARKMAN. You are telling us, then, that the extension of it will have a condition that is not in there now. In other words, giving the executive the right to cut quotas?

Mr. MANN. That is what in essence the recommendation is.

Senator SPARKMAN. So that will be something that we will hold over their heads?

Mr. MANN. I think Castro would certainly say this; the second reason is that I would hate to assume the responsibility for giving our large degree of dependence on Cuban sugar, of saying——

Senator SPARKMAN. Are we actually?

Mr. MANN. Oh, yes, we are very heavily dependent on Cuban export.

Mr. BONSAL. One-third.

The CHAIRMAN. What percentage? You said 94. How much from Cuba alone?

Mr. MANN. Cuba is 71.2 percent of our foreign supply.

Mr. BONSAL. But of our total consumption.

Mr. RUBOTTOM. One-third of our total supply.

Mr. BONSAL. About one-third of our total supply.

Mr. MANN. 71 percent, one-third of our total consumption.

Senator SPARKMAN. In other words, we have a real stake in getting the Cuban sugar.

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. It is not altogether to their advantage.

Senator LONG. For the difference of a half-cent a pound we can produce it all in this country.

Mr. MANN. In time.

Senator LONG. In Louisiana people talk about selling rice; we could convert all our rice acreage to sugar. We could just tell them to do it and they would do it in short order.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now you told about the opinions of these different officials and some of the things they said.

Did they say those things openly?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. Yes, the ones I referred to.

Senator SPARKMAN. And are we in communication, in touch with them constantly regarding this problem?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. We are not working it simply on an unilateral basis? We are working in close contact and collaboration with the American states?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. Yes, we are.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BONSAL. Senator, we have worked in Havana very closely with our Latin American colleagues, and I would like to second what Mr. Rubottom has said about this understanding of our position.

Their approval of our position so far. That phase of this has been very gratifying.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

A POSSIBILITY OF REPRISAL

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I am just wondering about some of the other elements of competition here. Take an illustration, Guantanamo Bay and the installations there. That would be an area of at least attempted reprisal, and I take it we would not be driven out of Guantanamo Bay very easily. If we took certain action against the Castro Regime he might in desperation take action there which might precipitate a rather bad situation.

Mr. **Rubottom**. The basis of our agreement is one of indefinite tenure in which both sides would have to agree to a change in the treaty, if I am not mistaken, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. **Bonsal**. That is correct.

Mr. **Rubottom**. It is not one in perpetuity but it is one of indefinite tenure. They would have to negotiate with us.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I am not talking about orderly procedure and diplomatic minuets. I am talking about precipitate action of the erratic fellow with a beard.

Mr. **Rubottom**. I don't think they have the forces to carry out that kind of an attack.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Certainly they don't have the forces to carry it out successfully if we want to stand up to them, but I am talking about if they start it as propaganda value, and the fighting that might go on there.

Mr. **Rubottom**. Without attempting to speak for the Defense Department, which obviously should have a voice in this kind of discussion, I have on previous occasions and just recently when this question came up stated my opinion that we wouldn't budge from there under these circumstances, and that we would be prepared to live with the circumstances and the after effect.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I am assuming that we wouldn't budge from that situation, but I was just inquiring into some of the possible difficulties we might get into.

Now, don't misunderstand me. I certainly lean to the side of being quite firm in this thing, and expressing ourselves in various ways that are open to us. But I was just trying to canvass some of the results that might happen otherwise.

Mr. **Rubottom**. One weight in the scales which must not be overlooked is that there are about 2,500 Cuban employees on the base, and if they undertook to force us out or to renegotiate the treaty in such a way that would make it undesirable for us to stay there, assuming that it were done that way, it would have a very adverse economic impact in that area.

Obviously this man hasn't acted on a reasonable basis anywhere else so he might act with reason in this case.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. That is the point. Now there are one or two other situations which I would assume might conceivably arise.

Suppose he became in desperation rather precipitous about his so-called land reform and expropriation and everything else and took over these properties—whether it is land of local land holders or American interests—and divided that up among the so-called have-nots. Most of them are have-nots because they have never had the desire to have anything particularly, but to divide it up among them.

Once you get the omelet in the pan you can't unscramble it, and although the Germans say it would not be so difficult, I am afraid it would be; it is one of the difficulties that would confront Germany as to how to unscramble.

Once people get hold of these things, how are you going to unshackle them from that seizure?

AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM

Mr. RUBOTTOM. On the negative side there are two points to remember in this agrarian reform program. One is that it never has been contemplated that the individual would be able to transfer to their heirs the property that they were supposed to get under this redistribution program.

This flies right in the face of the incentive system that normally prevails in the operation of property anywhere, and I think was one Achilles heel.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't quite follow you on that. I understand what you said but I don't see where it fits into this.

Mr. RUBOTTOM. I think if the agrarian reform program had been carried out on the basis that was first contemplated and you had had a redistribution of unused lands among people who would pay something and would have something to show for their labor that they could pass on to their families, you might have had a viable system that could attract some support somewhere.

But that has not worked out.

Furthermore, instead of dividing the properties among individual families, except for a very few dozen or at the most a few hundred cases, most of these properties are now being operated as collectives or cooperatives.

So you are not getting the kind of distribution that you talked about that you would have to unscramble later.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Mr. HILL. Mr. Chairman, may I ask Mr. Rubottom a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Mr. HILL. Does the Department attach any significance to the report that came from Mexico City that Raoul Castro has in his possession now a decree signed by Fidel Castro to take over Guantanamo Bay when they consider it appropriate?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. We attach importance to it.

Mr. HILL. I meant as to its reliability.

Mr. RUBOTTOM. Just in the same way that we have to consider all these things as important. I would not be surprised if they were to take some action at almost any time.

I think that whatever inhibiting factors that have existed in the past are probably less and less a factor in the consideration of this problem.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In connection with the preferential treatment which we give them on sugar, suppose we said we will be on the world market price, I mean just forget this quota system, which would be the open market theory, and put them on the same basis as everybody else.

Or suppose we modified it to the point where their preference was nowhere nearly so great. Then do you agree that it would be difficult to get back on the basis upon which we operate now after that?

Wouldn't that cause difficulty?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. Yes, Mr. Mann has already referred to that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I wondered if you didn't agree.

Mr. RUBOTTOM. I agree that it would be difficult to turn the clock back.

As you make revisions in sugar purchasing policies it is awfully hard to turn the clock back.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield?

SUGAR PURCHASING POLICIES

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Mann, do we give preferential treatment to Peru, Mexico, and other foreign countries which operate under the quota system in the importation of sugar in the matter of price?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. They get about the same as Cuba does in that respect.

Mr. MANN. They get exactly the same as Cuba does.

Mr. BONSAL. Probably half tariff.

Mr. MANN. They get the same price, but there is, in addition to a quota preference for Cuba, a tariff preference which is very small.

Cuba pays, I think, 50 cents per hundred pounds and the rest of them pay 62.5 cents per hundred pounds.

Senator MANSFIELD. Generally speaking, it is about the same.

Mr. MANN. It is a very small factor, yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Ambassador, you went to Havana, I understand, with the desire to get along with Mr. Castro, to understand him and if possible to guide him on the right path, the path of responsibility.

In response to the statement made by Mr. Mann that the President is going to send down a request next year that the executive be given the power to suspend the quota, were you consulted?

Mr. BONSAL. I suppose I was generally familiar with the thinking here. Yes, I was up here in December.

Senator MANSFIELD. Do you agree?

Mr. BONSAL. Well, yes. I think of course if I were back in Cuba it would cause me a tremendous amount of difficulty. It is already being described as potential economic aggression and so forth. But I do agree that it is the thing we should do at this time.

MAKING AN ISSUE OUT OF GUANTANAMO BAY

Senator MANSFIELD. Speaking of difficulty, you are use to it now, aren't you?

Just as we withdrew our offer of support for the Aswan Dam and Mr. Nasser then took over the Suez Canal, do you think it is possible that Mr. Castro may do what is implied here, try to take over Guantanamo as a counter-measure?

Mr. BONSAL. I think that he may make an issue of Guantanamo and he may by that cause us a considerable amount of grief there, but I think our position is very solid from the point of view of the treaty. Our position is also extremely solid in light of the present international situation, in light of our obligations toward our own security and the security of the hemisphere and the free world, and I think that a solid stone wall position on Guantanamo, if they try to do something about it, would have support throughout the hemisphere.

Senator MANSFIELD. You mentioned a treaty which you say is quite solid.

You also have a 5-year Sugar Act extension still in effect which supposedly is quite solid until December 31 of this year.

That is why I make the comparison.

Now, Mr. Secretary, what do you think about the timing of the request by the administration to give the President this power to suspend the Cuban quota in relation to the President's trip to Latin America beginning, I believe, next Monday?

Is there any danger that there might be repercussions which would be harmful to the person of the President as a result of this?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. A great many things that we have or have not done have been weighed with this particular consideration in mind.

I think that we ought to be able to phrase the proposed legislation in such a way as to give any reasonable person an interpretation that we don't contemplate taking punitive or political measures, but that we would base whatever action might be taken on economic grounds.

I would be inclined to think that it would not raise the possibility of serious risk insofar as the President's trip is concerned.

If it got bogged down until he got back I wouldn't raise any objection to that, either.

Senator MANSFIELD. That is important, the question of timing.

CASTRO'S POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS

Now one more question. Mr. Rubottom, you raised the possibility that if Castro falls, we have to look forward to the type of individual who might replace him and who under present circumstances might be worse.

Do you think that is a valid argument?

I believe you said something to that effect in your opening statement.

Mr. RUBOTTOM. Yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. Who follows Castro?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. Yes. I wasn't particularly arguing for anything, but I think it is a valid consideration in any analysis of this problem.

Senator MANSFIELD. A valid possibility?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. And is it your belief that if something were to happen to Castro right now, people like his brother Raoul and Che Guevera might take over and really might push them into the Soviet orbit to a greater extent?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. I think there would certainly be an effort; we already have the evidence of Castro having had, I think, the almost unequaled lack of respect for his own people to say that he put the mantle on his brother in the event anything happened to him. He did that about a year ago.

Senator LAUSCHE. Publicly?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken?

Senator AIKEN. Had you considered at any time that a Castro successor might be somebody quite favorable to the United States? Do you regard that as an impossibility?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. Unfortunately, sir, nothing that Castro had said or done up until now has led me to believe that we can expect that in the near term, as he has gained a greater foothold. There is no question that he has had a foothold with his people. Instead of moving into an electoral process where he might go through the norms that are commonly accepted here in the Americas of establishing a popularly based government, he seems to have gotten further away from that and he had made rather repeated sneering remarks about the possibility of elections—how the people there don't want them, don't need them, and are not prepared for them.

Now under the present trend, it is rather difficult to foresee an immediate successor who would be a person favorable to the United States.

But there are Cubans both inside and outside Cuba who are reasonable people, who I think are dedicated to the same principles that we are, and who I think could be counted on to try to carry out an orderly, disciplined, responsible role there as leaders in government.

They have been certainly ignored up until now.

Most of those people who were with him at first have gone.

POSSIBLE TAKE-OVER BY THE COMMUNISTS

Senator AIKEN. Castro's government is now hand-in-glove with the Communist group. Do you think he would be liquidated by his friends and would he have anything to say about choosing his successor?

Isn't there a possibility that he would be liquidated by friends of the United States rather than friends of Russia, if he is hand-in-glove with them now?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. It is quite possible that such people, fanatical or otherwise, might undertake to do that, but I think with the power in the hands of Che Guevera, Raoul Castro and this crowd right now, a difficult transition period would ensue.

Senator AIKEN. There is no question about that. But it also seems that if and when he is finally liquidated from his present position in one way or another, there is an outside possibility at least that he will be liquidated by people who would prefer to get along with the United States.

Incidentally, that seems to be the only solution that our friends in South America had to suggest on the situation.

Mr. RUBOTTOM. The liquidation would have to go beyond Fidel.

Senator AIKEN. I think so, yes; but it went beyond Batista, too. Probably it is well to be pessimistic, but I would throw up my hands and say it is impossible to have a successor to Castro who would not be more friendly to the United States than he is.

One other thing that has not been mentioned: We have been getting mail on the Cuban situation, most of it on one side. But hardly any of it has been coming from American businessmen—possibly friends of those who own property in Cuba who were worrying about confiscation.

AMERICAN BUSINESS IN CUBA

Have you been hearing from the American businessmen, Mr. Mann? And I refer to those who regard Cuba as their marketing area.

Are they prepared to and can they easily find markets elsewhere to take the place of the very large sales which they make there, whether those sales are money or merchandise or commodities? What do they say?

Mr. MANN. Yes, I haven't talked to all the traders or investors, but the traders, especially the rice people——

Senator AIKEN. I am not referring to investors.

I am referring to our exporters.

Mr. MANN. Yes, they are concerned, the ones that I have talked to, especially those who export rice, Cuba is our biggest customer in rice exports, and it takes about 10 percent of our total rice crop, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. How much last year?

Mr. MANN. The figure that I have here, Mr. Chairman, is between 150 and 200,000 tons. Quite apart from everything we have talked about, one of the policies of the predecessor to this goverment, and also Castro, is to make Cuba self-dependent on rice so that they won't have to import any more rice. Just as soon as they are able to grow enough rice to take care of their own consumption, I believe that we have to expect that they will cease to be our biggest customer and probably will cease to be even anywhere near the most significant.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Mann, They have been following that program for some time. Can you tell us about how fast the American market for rice in Cuba has been falling?

Mr. MANN. It has been a slow and gradual thing, with ups and downs. If they have a good crop, they have a licensing procedure which they shut off and on and we don't get to export.

If they don't have enough, they buy whatever they need.

HIGHER BARS ON AMERICAN IMPORTS

Senator AIKEN. Isn't it also true that the other sugar producing countries—particularly Brazil—that are so hopeful for some of Cuba's allotment have been putting up higher bars against imports from the United States? Even Venezuela is already offsetting the imposition of quotas on oil by restricting the importation of American cotton and tobacco, eventually planning to be self-sufficient.

Mr. MANN. I don't think that the tobacco thing is related entirely to oil. The government relates it to oil.

Senator AIKEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MANN. But I think that this is part of a phenomenon occurring all over the world where nations like to conserve foreign exchange especially in good stuffs, by raising everything they can.

I think this program—which was launched before we ever talked about the sugar quotas is really independent of it, although it may be related to it in propaganda in some way. But I think it is separate economically.

Senator AIKEN. And then there is the difficulty in Brazil, which is excluding imports as fast as they can. I believe Brazil has the largest surplus of sugar of any country today, unless it is Cuba. They are shutting out imports just as fast as they can get along without them.

Mr. MANN. They would be happy if we would pick up a $300 million annual balance of payments deficit to buy more. Brazil is shutting back for a different reason. This is to conserve foreign exchange.

Senator AIKEN. I would want to hear from some of our businessmen to make sure that they could readily find markets elsewhere.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hill, did you wish to comment on that?

THE COMMUNIST THREAT

Mr. HILL. Mr. Chairman, I think one question that remains unanswered and is of extreme importance and exceeds the commercial aspects of the transaction is the following: Is Cuba moving toward the Soviet orbit or is it already there?

Now if it is already there, we are in serious trouble. If they are moving toward the Soviet orbit, perhaps there is still time.

Now to some of us who were in Latin America and watched Guatemala develop, we are of the impression that what Arbenz[5] accomplished in 6 years in moving in the direction of the Soviet Union, Mr. Castro has accomplished in 13 months, and I think that is the issue.

The CHAIRMAN. You consider he is already in the orbit?

Mr. HILL. I consider he is well on the way. The destruction of the school system and the military, the imposition of the secret police, the activity of known Communist sympathizers which are within the cabinet are very serious matters.

Now we sit just a few miles from Cuba and Mexico, and intelligent Mexican observers are of the impression that they are moving at a very rapid rate to the avenue of no return. Now if that is true, the riptide from Cuba that will sweep through Central America, the Caribbean and possibly Mexico affects the security of the United States.

The evidence that the Army attaché, the Naval attaché, the Air attaché, [deleted] in Mexico have confirmed the observation that they are well on the way, and I think that is a problem of serious concern to all of us.

Senator AIKEN. We want the solution, Mr. Chairman. What is your solution? You have given us a first-rate problem.

Mr. HILL. The solution is up to the Department of State, and the Congress, Senator.

Senator AIKEN. I thought that is why we had you here this afternoon.

---

[5] Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, who was deposed as President of Guatemala by an armed revolt in 1954.

Mr. HILL. One solution is to submit the evidence of known communism to the Organization of American States, and let's determine whether it is or is not true that they are moving into the Soviet orbit. And let the Latin American countries take the responsibility off our shoulders, because they are involved in the security.

Mr. BONSAL. Yes, let's have the Mexican Government submit this evidence to the Organization of American States. That is a good way out.

Mr. HILL. Mr. Bonsal, you are well aware of the judicial relationship between Mexico and the United States. You say that in jest. You don't say that with judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood from the Secretary that they are submitting this very evidence to the——

Mr. RUBOTTOM. We are submitting it to the various countries—which is of course the first step that you have to take before you call a meeting of any kind under the Caracas resolution or for any other purpose—so you can have some advance information as to where you are going when you do call the meeting.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you agree that this is the proper procedure, that they be informed of everything?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Of everything we know, with a view toward invoking the Caracas resolution; is that correct? Do I understand that correctly?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. That is certainly one of the steps that can be taken and might very well and should be taken shortly.

CASTRO'S VISIT TO VENEZUELA

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me one thing ought to be cleared up and that is whether anybody got the impression that any of the Castros have been in Venezuela recently. It is my understanding that it was months ago that Fidel went to Venezuela and it was, I believe, on the 3d of November that President Betancourt sent word to them that they wouldn't be welcome if they came.

Mr. BONSAL. That is my understanding.

Senator AIKEN. I didn't know if somebody had the impression they had been there recently.

They haven't so far as I know.

Mr. BONSAL. That's right.

Senator AIKEN. Because it was about the 3d of November.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They did go through quite an Indian dance of rejoicing, didn't they, between Betancourt and Fidel?

The CHAIRMAN. That was a year ago.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There was great comradeship there.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Oregon.

Senator MORSE. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Delaware?

EXTENSION OF THE SUGAR ACT?

Senator WILLIAMS. In the light of so much uncertainty as to what we should do, has any thought been given to extending the Sugar Act for just 1 year, along with the authority for the President?

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir. The Sugar Act, if it is extended for a period of 1 year, will be in force until December 31, 1961. That is 13 months from now.

Senator SPARKMAN. You mean 23 months.

Mr. MANN. Yes, 23 months, practically 2 years.

The total value of the premium, meaning the difference between the U.S. price and the world price, is around $125 million a year.

This means that the extension would automatically extend this premium to the total of $250 million for a period of 2 years, and the disadvantage, in my judgment, is that it might be interpreted abroad as a sign of indecision and weakness on the part of the U.S. and encouragement to radical elements in other countries to follow.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If the Senator will yield.

Senator WILLIAMS. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would like to clear up this 2-year business. Is it 2 years from next December?

Mr. MANN. This is 1960. As I remember, the act expires on December 31, 1960. If you extend the act for a period of 1 year, it will be 1 year from December 31, 1960.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then it is just a 1-year extension.

Mr. MANN. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In other words, the law is in effect from now to December 31, 1960.

Senator SPARKMAN. It would have about 23 months to run from this time.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. From this particular time?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I want to raise this question also.

If we pass a law changing that act, could we be successfully accused of reneging on a contract which we have which runs until December 31, 1960?

Mr. MANN. Not in my opinion. This is not a contract or an agreement. It is an act of this Congress, and everybody knows that Congress is free to amend its legislation or change it at any time.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is there no treaty?

Mr. MANN. No, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Or agreement of any kind, with Cuba?

Mr. MANN. No, sir.

Senator LONG. That is just one place where we reserved our right to act.

Mr. MANN. On the quota preference, there is no treaty.

Senator SPARKMAN. It is the same as the wheat agreement, then. That is a treaty isn't it?

Mr. MANN. Yes, but this is quite a different can of fish.

Senator SPARKMAN. I realize now that it is. I was under the impression that it worked in the same way.

Mr. MANN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Long?

Senator LONG. You answered the first question I had and that is how much in dollars and cents this sugar premium payment is worth to Cuba, $125 million a year.

Mr. MANN. At present prices.

A TARIFF ADVANTAGE

Senator LONG. How much do you think that tariff advantage that they give us on rice is worth?

Mr. MANN. The figure that I have is 35 to 40.

Senator LONG. It is 35 to 40 what?

Mr. BONSAL. Million dollars.

Mr. RUBOTTOM. Isn't that total sales, Tom?

Mr. MANN. We are talking about premiums only.

Mr. RUBOTTOM. Is the premium worth that much?

Senator LONG. It couldn't conceivably be that. You could buy all the rice for that price.

Mr. MANN. Excuse me, that is total sales. The other is premiums. The 225 is premium.

Senator LONG. That is what I had in mind. They are getting $125 million premium from us.

Mr. MANN. Yes.

Senator LONG. Now how much premium are we getting from them for that rice?

Mr. MANN. I don't know.

I can give that figure to you, but I don't have it at the moment. It is a small amount.

Senator LONG. I guess it wouldn't exceed 5 percent of what we would get selling it on the world market.

Mr. BONSAL. It is enough to keep our competitors out, the advantage we get is enough to keep potential sellers out of the Cuban market.

Senator LONG. If we just undertake to estimate what we would get for the rice, if we weren't selling it to Cuba, if we are talking about sugar, if we sold it on the world market—that is not a great amount of rice, is it?

They are buying rice for 6 million people. We are not selling them all their rice are we?

Mr. MANN. Practically all of it. It is about 60 percent of our total rice exports and about 10 percent of our domestic crop.

We do have rice in surplus.

The CHAIRMAN. Before everybody leaves, may I interrupt?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am coming back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to say this is an executive session and I thought everybody understood that. Be careful of what you say about what the plans of the President are. I don't think we ought to talk too much about it. This is an executive session.

A TREMENDOUS RECIPROCAL TRADE ADVANTAGE

Senator LONG. I will await your report on how much it is worth, but it would appear to me that we have a trade concession that is worth somewhere in the vicinity of $3 billion and we are given them a premium that is worth $125 million.

Mr. BONSAL. But Senator, we have an awful lot of other ones. We have preferential treatment on all our exports to Cuba.

We have a tremendous reciprocal trade advantage. That is one of the things they are worried about, one of the things that prevents them from protecting industries and diversifying agriculture in ways they would like to do.

I am not saying which way the balance of advantage is, but there is a good deal of argument here. The Cubans came up here about 6 years ago and put up a terrible argument for a change in the basic reciprocal tariff arrangements, and they had some pretty potent argument.

Senator **Long**. It seems to me we ought to make a computation and I would like to see it.

The **Chairman**. Senator, because I am from a rice state I want to interject here that there isn't any world market for rice that we can command. If they don't take it, it will go to CC. It is not just the premium. It is the fact we have a market.

Mr. **Mann**. That is correct.

The **Chairman**. I can't quite figure it that way.

Mr. **Mann**. The proof of this is that we dispose of rice under Public Law 480.

The **Chairman**. Yes, there isn't any free market for rice.

Senator **Long**. I understand that, and I am glad to get that in the record. Arkansas might have difficulty doing it, but as far as Louisiana is concerned, all that rice acreage in Louisiana could be planted in sugar cane if they will let us do it, if they give us acreage allotment to do it and we can come within half a cent of meeting what Cuba is getting for the stuff.

The **Chairman**. How about the beet sugar people? This whole act was inspired to benefit the beet people. Louisiana would be all right, I think. They are the only one and politically I don't think you have enough votes up here to disturb these Western beet sugar men.

Senator **Long**. It may sound like I am but I am not concerned about this Cuban situation to sell more sugar from Louisiana.

As far as we are concerned, we produce sugar or rice or anything we can. We are getting along pretty well and we are getting people off the farm—thank the merciful Lord—and getting them into something else which is necessary all around the country. We are increasing per capita income rapidly, more rapidly than any state in the nation in the last 10 years. We are not complaining too much. We are far below the average but we are improving.

The point I had in mind is that it seems to me that if we will just get up our tally sheets on how much these trade concessions mean, this is a prime example where we are holding all the trumps.

Yes, we might lose a few tricks, but in the main this is one place where from an economic point of view we have the trump cards, and if we wanted to use them we could.

STRATEGIC VALUE OF OVERSEAS BASES

Oddly enough, in the conversation going on here, I have heard the State Department many times being accused that they are the soft ones; but from what I have heard here it seems to me like the State Department at this time is acting tough and the committee is fearful of the consequences of taking action. With regard to Guantanamo Bay, is that really essential to our Navy?

I know that our Navy operated over in the Mediterranean for a long time without a single base over there. I went over there as a member of the Armed Services Committee and made a fight against their getting into Naples because my reaction was that all they were going to do would be to spend a fortune over there so they could enjoy the Island of Capri. When I was on the Island of Capri, every officer in Naples had a villa in Capri. I gave a Senate report that contended there was no conceivable reason for the Navy to be at Naples except to enjoy the scenery.

Now does the Navy report they have to have Guantanamo Bay?

Mr. MANN. I defer to Mr. Rubottom.

Mr. RUBOTTOM. I think it still has strategic value, but not the value it had originally.

However, I think in addition to the strategic value you are referring to we also have to take into account the prestige factor and the respect for the U.S. factor which would be involved in the event there were any demands made regarding it.

Senator LONG. The point is, Mr. Rubottom, I know what it may mean and Bill Fulbright perhaps knows what it means to have the Army close a base on you.

If you think they are doing you a favor to have a military base in your state you just wait until they close it down. I can recall that there was an effort by the Army to get a firing range in Louisiana. All kinds of citizens meetings took place and all sorts of pressure was brought about the matter. Then the Army decided they were going to close the base down one of these days and the same people who had been organizing mass meetings were ready to give them the whole place in order to keep the base open.

My guess is that the situation would be similar if that happened to Guantanamo Bay. Is there some logic to that situation, that the economic consequences to them would be far more harmful than what we could lose?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. I referred to that earlier. I think that is a factor that has caused them to move very slowly in any consideration of what they might do.

However, they have not responded with reason or in what would by anybody else's judgment be their own best interest to a number of problems, so there is certainly no reason to assume they are going to respond with good sense to this problem.

We have to be prepared, I think, for them to make a move that might seem to be contrary to their own interests.

Senator LONG. I have looked at that big British base on Bermuda, a great big tremendous thing built to meet specifications of about the 16th century, and a big white elephant over there that nobody has any use for. Those things were built back in the days when the Navy might need a coaling station about every 500 miles and you would move a little way and load up on coal again.

Nowadays these ships can pick up enough fuel to go halfway around the world without refueling, and my guess is that that is really not basic to our defense requirements and that we can get by with the other bases we have.

I was just curious to know how much it is worth to us.

WHY NOT LET CONGRESS INITIATE THE SUGAR QUOTA?

Now about this authority to reduce the quota, if the Department thinks that is a good idea, why is it really necessary that the President ask the authority at all?

Why not just let Congress initiate it? We are going to have the Sugar Act down here soon. Why shouldn't somebody offer an amendment to the Sugar Act, and give the President the authority?

Mr. MANN. This is what I said very badly in the beginning.

Senator LONG. Frankly, I have been thinking about it for the last 6 months. It seems to me that I couldn't get any automatic cut of Castro's quota; but if I could get an amendment in there and give the President the authority, he might decide to use it.

Mr. MANN. This is what I was trying to say at the very beginning.

As important in Latin America as what you do is how you do it. You have this whole history of intervention where Mexico loses a third of its territory, and this thing is absolutely emotional and explosive. And anything you do to Castro on political grounds will make it much more difficult to do anything.

This is what I fear above all things—that we won't be able to act at all.

If the Congress throws this open to debate, I would guess that it would be very difficult to keep the legislative history from reflecting that the intention of Congress, if it took action against Castro, was for the purpose of overthrowing him or punishing him or bringing pressure to bear, whereas if you let the Executive do it, we would justify this on economic grounds which I can describe to you if you would like. But you would reach the same end and it is a whole lot easier to get to the objective if you go the economic route.

Senator LONG. It seems to me that if it is desirable we could give you the same legislative history that you are seeking for the Executive to make.

It occurs to me that it might be to your advantage to do it that way. As one who is interested in this matter, I can assure you that my interest in it can be kept completely on an economic basis.

It doesn't have to be on the basis of doing something to Castro, but I don't have to be the one to offer this amendment.

Mr. MANN. How can you keep Mikoyan and communism and Guantanamo Bay and all these things out of the debate? This is the problem as I see it. It would subject you to the same kind of misunderstanding that the State Department is so accustomed to because it phrases its actions in——

Senator LONG. Now this question came up about Peru, Mexico, and others.

The fact is that as far as those countries are concerned, they are getting only a tidbit compared to the amount of quota we are allowing Cuba, aren't we?

Mr. MANN. Yes.

Senator **Long**. Mexico wants a larger sugar quota. Do you recall what the relationship is between how much we allow Mexico and how much we are letting Cuba have right now?

Mr. **Mann**. I don't have the breakdown.

Mr. **Hill**. Fifty-five thousand tons.

Senator **Aiken**. Against 5 million.

Mr. **Hill**. Three million four hundred thousand.

Senator **Aiken**. Has Mexico got a large surplus?

Mr. **Hill**. Yes, about 500,000 tons.

Senator **Aiken**. Brazil has about 3 million.

Mr. **Mann**. Brazil doesn't share. Brazil is not eligible under the quota.

Senator **Long**. How is Mexico getting along with the United States these days?

My impression is that we are doing about as well as we ever have, aren't we?

Mr. **Hill**. That is the impression, I believe, isn't it?

Mr. **Rubottom**. I would certainly agree with that.

Mr. **Hill**. They are a good friend of the United States.

Senator **Long**. There is a country where the relationship is just about as warm as it has ever been.

They get 55,000 tons against 3,400,000 tons for Cuba.

Mr. **Hill**. You be the Ambassador to the country and try to explain it.

Senator **Long**. I didn't have to be Ambassador for it to occur to me. My reaction just sitting down there in Louisiana during the recess was, how in the world do we explain to somebody who is our friend and trying to help us with all our world problems that they get about 1½ percent of what we are doing for a fellow who seems to be out to cut our throat from ear to ear.

The **Chairman**. Will the Senator yield?

I want to remind him that it wasn't always that way with Mexico. When they expropriated the oil property there was a period very similar to this. They haven't always been so friendly.

This is a rather recent development.

Senator **Long**. But there is also this to be said. I am not pleading Mexico's case, but I am using that as an example. There is also to be said for Mexico that the administration recently amended—the Congress didn't do it—their oil quotas to give Mexico, Cuba, and Canada a benefit that they don't give other countries. Mexico and Canada have a larger quota on the basis that those countries are adjacent to this country and if worst comes to worst, we could get strategic supplies from them. We couldn't get it from somebody overseas and we found a way to do it without discriminating on the most favored nations provision, just on the basis that anybody who could deliver through a pipeline could go ahead and deliver whatever he delivered in the past.

AN ELITE CORPS

One other point occurs to me, and that is—it is more a question for the Armed Services—shouldn't we be training some kind of an elite corps of Spanish-speaking citizens in case we need them if there is trouble in Central or South America?

Mr. HILL. I defer that question to Mr. Rubottom.

Mr. RUBOTTOM. I think that who is going to or who should do it is a matter that can be left for the right time and the right place and the right consideration.

Senator LONG. I recall—and I have followed this—during World War II there were groups of refugees, probably the best trained group that went into action for this country, that numbered 1,500 men.

They pulled out the 3d Division at Ansio which had 18,000 and which had been taking quite a kicking from the Germans. This little outfit of 1,500 proceeded to give the Germans the worst of this whereas the outfit of 18,000, which should have been regarded as a good outfit, had actually been getting the worst of it all over the place. But this little service force were just fellows who loved to fight and they were the very best you could find.

Now you made this statement; you referred to getting the U.S. side of the story to the Cuban people. Now I am with you on that. I think that that is very important. But now there are all kinds of trouble going on, and there is not a single newspaper down there that we can count on to tell our side.

The Canal company, just out of its operating revenues, could make a loan or just donate the money. There are a thousand ways it could be done; the CIA could put up the money to start a little newspaper down there. I could think of a number of able journalists who could in short order run a good newspaper, instead of having to rely upon people not giving us a break at all, because every politician down there has his own newspaper which is a subsidy for his political party.

He loses money on it but that is to propagandize the public in his favor. It wouldn't cost a lot and my guess is it might wind up making money, if in the Canal Zone, the Department or someone else would move to get a newspaper. But if he would do that, if it is run by our standards at all it would be a lot better than the papers down there and my guess is you could get at least some of our side across to those people.

We are not getting across to the Panamanians either.

Mr. RUBOTTOM. I think there is quite a bit of merit in your suggestion. We are getting some material. They are two English language newspapers in Panama, but I must say it is a pretty difficult job to get anything.

Senator LONG. My thought is to publish a Spanish or Spanish and English newspaper, bilingual if need be. General Potter started this thing of just putting a little slip in the pay envelopes of his employees, so at least he gets 50 words into the country about the American side of the argument. A little newspaper that published good news I think might lose $50,000 doing it; but if we did, my guess is we might save ourselves $50 million someday.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche?

MUTUAL DEFENSE IN LATIN AMERICA

Senator **LAUSCHE**. Mention was made of some compact which we have with countries of the Western continent which makes mandatory their aid to each other in the event of a Soviet or Communist aggressive act. What is the identity of that compact?

What is it called?

Mr. **RUBOTTOM**. You are referring, I believe, to the Caracas resolution of 1954 which specifically pinpoints the threat of international communism as something which would call for action on the part of the inter-American system through a meeting or consultation of foreign ministers.

Then behind that you have the 1948 Bogota charter and the 1947 Rio treaty, which established in the legal record the basis for united action. In the event of an attack on one, we would all go to the other's defense.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. Does that mean military attack?

Mr. **RUBOTTOM**. It doesn't have to be. The real treaty foresees primarily a military attack. However, the inter-American meeting at Caracas which adopted the Caracas resolution is not restricted just to military attack on countries.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. Have you construed what has been done as a violation of the Caracas resolution?

Mr. **RUBOTTOM**. That judgment has not been arrived at yet.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. You speak of unilateral sanctions that ought be avoided, and say that what can be done is to sever diplomatic relations, increase tariffs on——

Mr. **RUBOTTOM**. No, sir, I didn't suggest that. I beg your pardon.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. I know you didn't. You identified certain plans, and you included some of these things in those plans.

Mr. **RUBOTTOM**. Yes, sir.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. Now which of the plans does this request come under where you are asking us to give the President the right to terminate the quota of the Cubans?

Mr. **RUBOTTOM**. I would say that fits under a very sturdy defense of our own interests in Cuba, which is one of the points that I stressed.

TRADE RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA

Senator **LAUSCHE**. We are thinking of reducing the quota. What other things could we do that would conform to the principle that is involved in reducing the quota?

Mr. **RUBOTTOM**. Well, Cuba has certain benefits just as we have benefits in all trade. We have exchanged preferences with each other, and they have been more or less equalized down through the years.

We had first a bilateral trade agreement with Cuba. Then we have an agreement under the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], with Cuba.

Now they have expressed dissatisfaction with this relationship, and it is very unsatisfactory to us because they recently have unilaterally imposed restrictions on our trade through exchange controls and are seeking to renegotiate these treaties in order to try to raise tariffs.

So if this dissatisfaction continues, I think that there is quite a bit in the way of economic negotiation or effort to negotiate that we should undertake to protect our interest. And if they don't want to negotiate, then we would be justified in accordance with these treaties to take whatever unilateral action we have to to protect our interest.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. Yes. Now what do you expect will be the results of this withdrawal or reduction of quotas? How will it apply to help solve the problem? I have my own ideas, but I would just like to learn what your thinking on the matter has been.

Mr. **RUBOTTOM**. Tom, would you like to address yourself to that?

Senator **LAUSCHE**. Let's assume this fails. What is your next step? How would it operate? Where do you expect to get your results?

Mr. **MANN**. I would say that Castro has promised the people of Cuba a sort of manna from heaven. Everybody is going to have an easier life with less work. In the long run, I think the thing that will be his biggest political difficulty will be when the people of Cuba realize that austerity and hard work and production instead of speeches and demagoguery are the only answer to their problems.

And I would propose, too, that if a decision is made to cut the quota—and I want to make clear the President hasn't made any decision except to ask Congress for the power—it would signify that the United States is capable of reacting when it is unfairly attacked, and would accelerate this process that I have just spoken of.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. That is in conformity with my own thinking. But I fail to see how you reconcile it to the principles which also were enunciated by Mr. Rubottom that we don't want to do anything that will hurt the Cuban people. This is intended to affect the economy and thus to bring adverse opinion on Castro; is that correct?

Mr. **MANN**. Well, sir, I don't believe that you can make an absolute distinction between Castro and the people who elect him and support him and follow him.

It seems to me that when the nation supports a government which follows a policy of this kind, it is inevitable that somebody has to pay the price.

CASTRO'S REACTION

Senator **LAUSCHE**. Now have you thought out the probable steps that Castro will take?

My assumption would be that he is not going to just take this. He will come up with some ideas of his own. I am forming this judgment on the basis of my analysis of his thinking. What is he likely to do? What do you expect would be his reaction if it is adverse?

Mr. **MANN**. Retaliation against the U.S. in terms of trade. I am not sure how important that would be, but he would attempt to retaliate in trade and would probably turn to Russia and other places for more aid and assistance.

Mr. **Bonsal**. There is perhaps one supplementary thing on that. The sugar labor unions have asserted that if there is retaliation through the quotas, they will take over the American sugar mills.

Mr. **Rubottom**. Also the American utility companies there, practically speaking are now intervened, which means that the prerogatives of management and so on have been largely assumed by Cubans, will probably be completely intervened and might be expropriated. We have the nickel mine at Nicaro which is government-owned; we have the Freeport sulphur interests at Moa Bay which has a $150 million investment. They are now able to export their ore only on a short-term basis without a permanent arrangement that is satisfactory. Here again, though, you would have to assume that Cuba might do something contrary to its own interest.

They earn quite a lot of dollar exchange from the sale of nickel ore, and refined nickel.

Senator **Lausche**. You think that they may expropriate with greater speed then than they have until now; is that your view?

Mr. **Bonsal**. Well, I think that might be a first reaction. I would hope, however, that perhaps wiser counsel might prevail. I can only tell you what they threaten so far, what the talk has been. I am hopeful that if it is demonstrated to them that they cannot unilaterally change the fundamental bases of our economic relations through their actions and expect us to just sit back and do nothing about it, perhaps it will act as a brake and slow down.

The evidence is to the contrary so far as what their reaction would be.

SOVIET INTERFERENCE

Senator **Lausche**. Have you tried to think out how Russia might come into this even more than it is in now, after we cut the quota? What more could Russia do than it is doing now?

Mr. **Rubottom**. They could undertake to sell arms, for example, which they have not really started on any big scale.

There is no evidence of any Communist arms coming in in any appreciable quantity. That is one thing.

We have had an arms embargo virtually on the entire Caribbean area. They could more openly embrace this government than the Mikoyan visit.

At this stage they don't even have diplomatic relations, for example.

They might establish an embassy there. That may be in the immediate short-term future, anyway.

Senator **Lausche**. Is Russia selling arms to any of the other South American Caribbean nations?

Mr. **Rubottom**. No.

Senator **Lausche**. Is there any treaty among the American nations in South America that deal with the sale of arms by a Communist country to the Western Hemisphere?

Mr. **Rubottom**. No. However, I think it is certainly implied as one of the tests that you would apply as to Communist influence or Communist domination even in a government under the Caracas resolution, which I talked about earlier.

Senator LAUSCHE. If they began selling arms, would that be strong evidence of justification for calling into effect the Caracas treaty?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. Yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Will the Senator yield? Western Europe is selling plenty of arms to the Latin American States.

Isn't that true?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. I am not saying that in defense of Russia, because I'm against all of them arming those countries against each other.

CASTRO'S COMMUNIST CONNECTIONS

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask Mr. Rubottom this: When did it first begin to dawn on the State Department that the Communist connection was becoming acute and dangerous?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. I think we have always been aware of the possibility that it would emerge as a threat. Fidel Castro's own background has a number of black pages in it which have not been successfully explained. Raoul Castro was known to have gone to Czechoslovakia and probably to the Soviet Union. I believe he went in 1953—or maybe it was a little later—and stayed for a number of months.

Che Guevera was with him in the hills. The Argentine is a very dubious character who was with the Arbenz regime in Guatemala at the time that it was cooperating with and finally becoming Communist-infiltrated and Communist-run. So there has been the threat that the Communists would move into a position of greater responsibility and influence than they had earlier from the very beginning.

There were many moderates, of course, who were around the government and who also had some influence in the beginning. They were more of a counterweight than they are now.

The moderate base is largely gone.

Senator LAUSCHE. When did your judgment become formed on the need of taking this action? Has it just been building up gradually?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. It has been a gradual buildup. My personal judgment—and I suppose these are all personal with individuals—has been pretty firm that we were going to have serious difficulty with Castro, that he was running contrary to the American interest in the hemisphere, and that he was going to do something that definitely played into the hand of the Communists. It made little difference whether he was a Communist, because he was trying to create instability and to break down the traditional relationships in the hemisphere.

This began about last January, at the end of the month, or in February, when we began to get increasingly alarming notices about his——

Senator LAUSCHE. Insults?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. About his supporting these interventionist activities in other countries; and by April he had made his first play against Panama.

Then others were entrained.

CAREFULLY BUILD A CASE

Senator **Lausche**. The action that we are taking isn't in conformity with the Caracas resolution, but it is because you have been in contact with all of the Caribbean and South American nations.

Mr. **Rubottom**. Yes, sir. You can't openly call for a meeting of that kind without having a very carefully built up case. You don't want to run the risk of having an argument fall flat, and you have to have opinion in Latin America, informed and governmental opinion at the top, as well as public opinion that supports the governments, to recognize that the time has come to move into a course of action of this kind when you do move into it.

Senator **Lausche**. Am I correct in this: That you are convinced that unless we take action, that the esteem—whatever it is—that we have among the Caribbean and South American nations will be gravely impaired?

Mr. **Rubottom**. I think the time has come yes, sir, when we must move, and move rapidly. And I think that this ripening process in Latin America has reached the point where we can do that to avoid any loss of prestige.

Senator **Lausche**. The day he began his mass executions I knew he wasn't any good, and I was sick when I heard arguments about how we should abstain and act disinterestedly. Maybe logic and treaties required it, but I was convinced that any man who would indulge in circus trials was completely devoid of those qualities that go to make up a man who believes in liberty and justice.

I heard arguments in this room about refraining from stepping in or doing anything. That is all.

AMBASSADOR BONSAL'S RETURN TO CUBA

The **Chairman**. Ambassador Bonsal, are you planning to return to Havana?

Mr. **Bonsal**. I am up here at the disposition of the President and the Secretary.

I am waiting for instructions.

The **Chairman**. You are waiting for instructions.

Mr. Secretary, do you know what the plans are?

Mr. **Rubottom**. In all honesty, I haven't discussed this with the Secretary in the last few days because I have been out of town and all day today, for example, I have been involved with you and others here on the Hill. But I don't know of any plans for the Ambassador to return in the short-term future.

The **Chairman**. So at the moment we keep the status quo.

Mr. **Rubottom**. Yes, sir.

The **Chairman**. It might be wise not to return until there is some clarification. I am not trying to commit you, but there is a possibility.

Mr. **Rubottom**. That certainly is a possibility. One thing, of course, that we can't overlook is that the Ambassador's own honor and integrity in carrying out his responsibilities there has been impugned.

The **Chairman**. That's right.

Mr. **Rubottom**. By that government.

The CHAIRMAN. I would think that in itself is sufficient justification for taking a rather dissident view of his activities if you are looking for reasons.

I would think returning without any apology or without anything else would not be wise, unless something develops to justify it.

One other question I want to ask.

IF CUBA PURCHASES SOVIET ARMS

Have you considered what our policy would be under this agreement of $100 million of credit if they should buy MIGs? Have you thought about what you would do?

Would that be a reason to try to invoke the Caracas resolution?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. I can see the possible invocation of the Caracas resolution without reaching that point.

The CHAIRMAN. Before that?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But that in itself would definitely?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. That would be a clincher, so to speak. But I think that we have to consider whether under that treaty or by some other means they are going to get arms from the Soviet Union or the Czechoslovaks or some other part of the Soviet bloc.

I think it is a real likelihood.

Senator LAUSCHE. I didn't hear the chairman's question. Was it if with this $100 million credit they began buying arms?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mikoyan was asked at a press conference whether they would supply Migs under this credit. He said well, if they want them we would.

Are there any other questions?

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I don't see how the Caracas resolution interferes with the Government of Cuba's buying arms anywhere in the world.

How would that affect a possible shipment or sale of arms, say, from a country in Western Europe or from a country within the Soviet bloc?

Mr. RUBOTTOM. As far as the countries of Western Europe are concerned, we have used considerable influence and I think we are prepared to use more, Senator, to get them to refrain from shipping arms.

Senator MANSFIELD. But if they wanted to, you couldn't stop them.

Mr. RUBOTTOM. If they really wanted to and our influence was not sufficient to get them to stop, we couldn't really stop them, unless we perhaps made a statement of some kind which I am coming to in just a minute.

I think we could make clear, if need be by public declaration, that we wouldn't tolerate Soviet arms coming into an area if we wanted to; and the Caracas resolution envisaged a series of steps, beginning with a withdrawal of Ambassadors, perhaps a severance of diplomatic relations, economic sanctions, and if necessary, military sanctions.

Senator MANSFIELD. Against whom?

Mr. **Rubottom**. Against the country that is believed to have its government under the domination of international communism.

Senator **Mansfield**. Now suppose that it was a country which was not under the domination of international communism and it wanted to buy arms from the Soviet Union or a nation within the Soviet bloc.

How would the Caracas resolution apply there?

Mr. **Rubottom**. Well, I think that if they set out to buy any considerable amount of arms, there would be an immediate review of any decision that might have been taken shortly before that it wasn't under the domination, because there is no rhyme or reason in accordance with inter-American tradition and in accordance with the political realities today for a government in this hemisphere to buy arms from the Soviet Union.

UNILATERAL RATHER THAN MULTILATERAL ACTION

Senator **Mansfield**. What I am getting at is this: Insofar as I have been able to define and interpret the testimony today, the Caracas agreement really doesn't apply.

What does or will apply will be unilateral action on the part of this country alone; is that correct?

Mr. **Rubottom**. I think——

Senator **Mansfield**. Insofar as the Sugar Act is concerned, that is the weapon that we are considering using now. That is the weapon which the President wants in his hand so that he can manipulate the quota system to Cuba, is that right?

Mr. **Rubottom**. Yes, sir, but we would undertake to do that on an economic rather than a political basis.

I will admit it might be difficult.

Senator **Mansfield**. True. Now are we acting unilaterally or in any way in concert with the other countries of Latin America either individually or through the OAS?

In other words, do they know what we are going to do? Do they approve or are we just stepping out on our own in doing this?

Mr. **Rubottom**. Right now, we are in I would say direct consultation and our Ambassadors are furnishing information to the other governments in this hemisphere about our concern over this Communist advance in Cuba. We have not consulted with them about the possibility of some new kind of sugar legislation, because you are involved there with something in which they all have their individual interests and I think it is very difficult to get an objective judgment from others. We ought to be capable of determining what would be in our best interest.

CONSEQUENCES OF UNILATERAL ACTIONS

Senator **Mansfield**. I agree with that, because that is why we are acting unilaterally. But the thing that worries me is, what is going to be the effect on the rest of Latin America if once again we act unilaterally?

For example, we have Ambassador Hill here. Just how close in contact are we with the Mexican Government vis-a-vis the Cuban situation?

Mr. **Rubottom**. Well, we regularly have sent down policy information statements that would enable him or his staff to take up with the Mexican Foreign Office and others the latest developments. We have sent some out, I think, even since he has been here in the last 24 or 48 hours, as a matter of fact, based on this weekend development. He came up here this weekend just at the time that this announcement was made, and that is as far as the commercial agreement with the Soviet Union is concerned. So in addition to what the Ambassador does we have other channels of direct communications—of which he is aware, of course—with the Mexican Government.

MEXICAN NATIONALIZATION PLANS

Senator **Mansfield**. Has Lopez Mateos in recent days made a statement to the effect that he favored expropriation or nationalization?

Mr. **Rubottom**. Of what, sir?

Senator **Mansfield**. Of whatever it would apply to—holdings of foreigners in another country.

Mr. **Rubottom**. Lopez Mateos, the President of Mexico?

Senator **Mansfield**. Yes.

Mr. **Rubottom**. If he has I haven't heard of anything.

Senator **Mansfield**. The reason I raise that—I should have brought the clipping with me—is that I read something in a newspaper. Maybe Bob knows something about it. I just want verification or denial.

Mr. **Hill**. It has been rumored that when Lopez Mateos visited Venezuela, he urged Romulo Betancourt to nationalize the oil industry similar to the nationalization or expropriation which Senator Fulbright was referring to a short time ago.

I have seen no verification from the Embassy in Caracas that it is true. I talked with the director of Pemex at dinner the other night and he told me yes, such discussions did take place, certainly at my level. There has been reference in the newspapers which has been verified by responsible officials that Mexico will now offer technicians to Venezuela to assist them and that Mexico will purchase oil from Venezuela. So there is activity, but it needs further verification. But what is happening in Mexico is that in the oil industry, they are watching Cuba and their ability to rape American firms without compensation with a good deal of interest.

And Mr. Pauley from California allegedly has just come in with a very large series of wells—three, I believe, in Santa Ana off the coast of Mexico—and he has already been notified, "We want to buy you out. We are going to declare your contracts invalid."

So there is activity in the area that you are talking about, and, once again, that is the riptides that come out of Cuba.

If they see them getting away with taking the property in Cuba it will happen not only in Mexico but in other Latin American areas.

Senator **Mansfield**. Is Lopez Mateos going from Venezuela to Cuba?

Mr. **Hill**. He has returned to Mexico. His trip is over. He has been criticized by the extreme leftist and Communist elements in Mexico because he refused to go to Cuba.

Now when President Lopez Mateos visited Washington at the National Press Club he stated he did not consider Castro or the Cuban Revolution Communist-inspired or that Castro was a Communist.

But as Secretary Rubottom has pointed out, after he has had a chance to look at Cuba and to observe the goings on and to talk with his foreign minister and other ministers of his Government, when he arrived in Brazil, interpreted by us he turned his back on the situation in Cuba as not living up to the ideals and purposes of the revolution.

Senator **Mansfield**. That is all.

The **Chairman**. Any other questions?

Senator **Smathers**. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

USING THE CARACAS RESOLUTION AGAINST CUBA

First, back to this Caracas agreement. Do we not have at least some friend in Central or South America who would be willing to invoke the provisions of the Caracas convention if we supplied them with all the intelligence information that demonstrated that the Communists do control Cuba? Couldn't they bring it up and we could somehow invoke the operation of all the countries against Cuba?

Is that not possible?

Mr. **Rubottom**. I think that that would be possible. We have had some rather encouraging indications, as a matter of fact, from one or two countries just in the last few days that would lead one to believe that they might be willing to do that.

Actually, what we would undertake to do, I think, would be to have a number of countries under the terms of the Caracas resolution. In order to take the action foreseen—those four, five or six points which I mentioned earlier—you need a two-thirds vote, which would be 14 out of 21, 13 besides ourselves; and I think we would want to line this up pretty thoroughly before we encourage any one or two countries to do it, so that we could consider and foresee the outcome.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Mexico never joined the Caracas declaration, did they?

Mr. **Rubottom**. I believe they did, didn't they? They never have ratified it.

Mr. **Hill**. No, sir. Do you remember the night we talked about that, Senator?

Senator **Smathers**. But actually, is that not the better way to proceed in this matter?

Mr. **Rubottom**. It certainly is, and in many of these elements involving political problems as delicate as this, you certainly have to have some Latin Americans who will do the advance work.

Senator **Smathers**. Now in accordance with this idea that this is the best way to proceed, I presume that you people are making available to the other governments this intelligence information we have, which may or may not be a lot better than theirs, I don't know; but certainly you are making available to them all the intelligence we have?

Mr. **Rubottom**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Smathers**. With respect to the Communist control.

The very fact that Cuba buys arms from the Soviet Union is not the only point that makes it sufficient to draw the conclusion it is a Communist-controlled government. That is just another piece of evidence.

Mr. **Rubottom**. That is right.

UNDER THE DOMINATION OF COMMUNISM

Senator **Hickenlooper**. On that point, if the Senator will yield. It isn't sufficient, is it, under the Caracas declaration to show that the government is Communist?

Mr. **Rubottom**. It has to be under the domination.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. It has to be under the domination of a foreign power, so you have to go further than show that they have merely a local Communist government and philosophy.

Senator **Lausche**. Is it under our policy that we allow people to choose for themselves their type of government except that we don't allow forcible intervention or domination?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. This is under the Caracas declaration. I happened to be at the conference at Caracas and had some part in it—not much but a little. It is my recollection—I haven't reviewed it recently—that before it can be really brought into effect, it has to be shown not only that it is Communist; communism isn't the issue, particularly, although it is inherent and implicit in the whole thing.

It has to be shown that the country is under the dominion of a foreign power.

And of course it was Communist-directed and oriented. The resolution was directed at communism and so on. So it would have to go further to show that it was merely a local Communist government which was not dominated by Russia or the Iron Curtain bloc.

The **Chairman**. In that connection Mikoyan's activities would be very good evidence as to the relationship.

Mr. **Bonsal**. It would be, Senator, but I don't believe that you could prove to the satisfaction of either the people of Cuba or most of the other governments of the hemisphere that the present Cuban Government is Communist-dominated.

The **Chairman**. You couldn't?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. You couldn't. You mean Russia?

Mr. **Bonsal**. No, is even dominated by the local Communist Party.

CASTRO HAS ALIENATED LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS

Senator **Aiken**. Is there any Latin American government that is generally sympathetic to the Castro government today?

Mr. **Rubottom**. I believe that they have pretty well alienated all over.

Mr. **Bonsal**. Even in Venezuela they are in the doghouse now.

Mr. **Rubottom**. I think the Honduran Foreign Minister has just gone over there, but ostensibly he is going to talk up to this man. I don't know whether he will or not. Isn't he going, the Honduran? We are trying to dissuade him without intervening.

Senator **Mansfield**. Haven't Nicaragua and Cuba once again agreed to exchange ambassadors?

Mr. **Bonsal**. Yes.

Mr. **Mann**. Mr. Chairman, may I say something about this multilateral approach to the Cuban problem? I was with Senator Hickenlooper at the conference and there we had documentary evidence that the Government of Guatemala was under the domination of Russia. In spite of the prestige of this government—and Mr. Dulles was totally committed—for 2 days the issue hung in the balance of whether we had a majority of votes. I just want to throw this word of caution in: There is no way for the United States, in my judgment, to escape its responsibility in facing up to this Cuban thing; and we should very carefully decide whether we want to submit this to majority vote because they all belong to the same family, and they are not going to be anxious to pick our chestnuts out of the fire.

They may applaud in the background, but to get them to vote and take the lead is quite a different thing.

CHOICE OF WORDS

Senator **Long**. Mr. Mann, if that is your purpose why don't you just say that in your declaration rather than come in with this canard of putting this thing on economic grounds? Why not just say that in our national interests we think we ought to take charge of this sugar quota?

Mr. **Mann**. All I can say is that this is something on which I don't attempt to rationalize, but it is just as important how you do something as what you do. If you say we are doing this to put pressure on Cuba, you raise the specter of intervention. If you say we are doing this to protect our own consumers, it gives them an out, and you don't run into this emotional conflict.

Senator **Long**. It just seems to me it is a matter of saying, "Look, we were giving Cuba this 3,400,000 tons a year as a historic matter of economic aid. Now there is no law requiring us to do that, and in view of the way things are going, it doesn't look to us like there is any particular point in doing it."

Mr. **Bonsal**. There was a strong reciprocal advantage there, Senator.

We did it because we wanted to help Cuba; there is no question about it. But we did it because we wanted Cuba to be able to buy our products, and historically they bought more from us than we bought from them.

It is a mutually beneficial arrangement.

Senator **Smathers**. But have they not backed out now?

Mr. **Bonsal**. The point I am making is that they have threatened in some ways, and in other ways practically destroyed some of these bases of reciprocal advantage; and the whole thing is now subject to review.

But historically there is a reciprocal benefit and a reciprocal advantage.

NO RECIPROCAL BENEFIT

Senator **Smathers**. Is it not a fact that, for example, Castro said, "We shouldn't even buy American chewing gum," and is it not a fact that in all his tirades over the course of time he has said, "We should not buy anything American"? And is it not a fact that if he follows the course he has set out for himself, it is just a case of time until he doesn't buy anything from us?

So there is no reciprocation.

Mr. **Bonsal**. That has no reciprocal benefit.

Senator **Smathers**. So I think we are kidding ourselves to talk about a reciprocal basis. There was reciprocity, but that has disappeared.

Mr. **Bonsal**. There is much less of it now.

Senator **Smathers**. He is solidly against us.

Mr. **Bonsal**. There is less of it now, and when he stops buying our lard or rice or many other things that he buys from us there will be no reciprocity.

Senator **Smathers**. Are you worried at all about the fact that in the other countries, just like Lopez Mateos has probably indicated, he may take over some of the oil companies, some of the leases which operate in Mexico? They have already done that with some of the others, but this thing is containing us. Would you not agree that if Castro is successful in finally expropriating all these lands, eventually it is green light for every other man in South America?

Mr. **Bonsal**. I think there is that phase. I think there is another phase, too. We obviously have to protect our private investment to the extent that we can because it is one of our great weapons of foreign policy among other things—I mean American private investment abroad.

Senator **Smathers**. How are you going to protect it?

PROTECTING PRIVATE INVESTORS

Mr. **Bonsal**. You have a dilemma here. On the one hand, if you take rough and immediate unilateral measures to protect your interests, what you do is to get other underdeveloped countries in the present state of exacerbated nationalism and chauvinism which I think is going to last through our generation. You get them rejecting American private investment and favoring private investment from other areas.

Senator **Smathers**. Do you know what? I want to disagree with you 100 percent on that premise and I want to tell you why. I respect your view but I think it is entirely erroneous.

My observation is that in the first place, you compare the amount of capital that is moving into these other countries as compared with the capital which the United States has, and that is infinitesimal compared to ours.

Once you let the American businessman know that he can invest money in Brazil or Mexico and that is his own government is not even going to protect him, then what happens?

We stop investment and those countries are hurt, and they know it.

Mr. **Bonsal**. Yes.

Senator **Smathers**. Every economic minister that I talked to within the last few weeks said, "The one thing that worries us about this Castro business is that it hurts us all because people from the United States are not going to come and put their money in when they think that it might be expropriated."

They are not at all certain that this isn't happening all over South America. So one of the big arguments in favor of escrowing certain of this sugar money is to say to private investors, "Your own government is going to give you some protection in this matter."

Mr. **Bonsal**. Senator, I am strongly of the opinion that we should give them protection. I am merely arguing against preventive or pressurizing methods. I am arguing for the rule of law in these matters. I am arguing that when we have a case of this kind, we (a) do the best we can through diplomatic means when our legal people have decided that we have a case to get direct satisfaction, and (b) that we endeavor to have recourse to some other international procedure of arbitration to get justice for our people.

SKEPTICAL OF RESULTS OF NEGOTIATIONS

Senator **Smathers**. But Mr. Ambassador, don't you agree we have come to the point—has there been anything that Fidel Castro has said in the last 6 weeks that would make you believe he is going to recognize any authority other than that of the Soviet Union or him?

Has he done or said anything that would make you believe that?

Mr. **Bonsal**. They have expressed basically a willingness to negotiate on these expropriation cases. I think we have to do that before we decide what measures we can take.

I am skeptical, pessimistic about the results of the negotiation.

Senator **Smathers**. All right, you are pessimistic. I am not only pessimistic, I am satisfied that nothing would happen.

Is it not a fact that they have appropriated land and refused even to give to the people a certificate of former ownership?

Mr. **Bonsal**. There has been very little formal expropriation as yet. We have had in a limited number of cases arbitrary takings; that is perfectly true. But I think that we will be in a much stronger position with these countries which you have visited if whatever we do is done after we have exhausted whatever resources there may be in diplomatic negotiation and in international procedures, rather than before. That is the argument I was trying to make.

Senator **Smathers**. Let's look at it very frankly. If we followed that, how many years would that take to exhaust all the diplomatic negotiations?

Mr. **Bonsal**. I don't think it would take very long under present circumstances, sir.

Senator **Smathers**. What course would you follow, just very specifically? What would you do?

Mr. **Bonsal**. I would take up each of these cases and say, "Look, you offered so much and this fellow says he ought to get so much for this, that or the other reason; we think he ought to get more.

"Will you review this case?" They would probably say no.

Then we say "Will you submit it to some kind of a third arbitration"?

Senator SMATHERS. And in the meantime—I don't mean to try to be overdramatic—the situation worsens, first with respect to our own dignity. It is a diminution of respect of the other countries in the area for us, because I have never seen this in my own life, and I don't think anybody else has—a situation where when a man has a moral right he doesn't stand up and speak, and finally being willing to stand for it, even if necessary on a tough basis. That man is better off in the long run than the man who keeps bowing, retreating, and backing off. What I am greatly concerned with here is the time limit. If Castro gets this $400 million and he starts buying arms and munitions from the Soviet Union, we must remember he has already run one attack on Panama, has he not, and he was repulsed.

He has run one on Nicaragua and one on the Dominican Republic. When he gets arms and munitions the next time—and with $400 million he is going to get it—then the day is going to come, sir, where it is not a case of who owns what little piece of property; but the next time he runs an attack on Panama, this time with jet airplanes and all the rest, what is the U.S. going to do then?

They can't sit there then. It has gotten out of the hands of the diplomats. That day is going to be the tough day, and it is coming just as sure as we are sitting here, unless we start right now to somehow squeeze this fellow out.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask a question?

GREEN LIGHT TO EXPROPRIATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask one? I want to clarify this question about the green light to expropriation. Did I understand that Mr. Mateos was recommending to Venezuela that they expropriate?

Is that correct or did I misunderstand?

Mr. MANN. I didn't make this statement; Mr. Hill did. And it is my understanding that he probably did, and this would be consistent with Mexican doctrines. It would not be surprising. Mexico still celebrates as a national holiday the date on which it took over.

The CHAIRMAN. Is Cuba giving the green lights or is Mexico?

Mr. BONSAL. We got the riptide from Mexico, too.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to get it straight in the record.

Is it true to the best of your knowledge that Mateos has recommended to Betancourt that they expropriate the American oil properties?

Mr. HILL. It is alleged that he has made that recommendation.

We have no confirmation coming to Mexico City from Caracas. It has been in the newspapers.

The CHAIRMAN. In Caracas?

Mr. HILL. It has been in the newspapers in Mexico.

The CHAIRMAN. It can be verified, can it not?

Mr. HILL. Of course it can; but you see this only happened a few days ago, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is rather significant.

If that is true. I thought we were just celebrating the great friendship with Mexico.

Mr. HILL. That is the point. You allow this cancer to continue in Cuba and it just encourages nationalism in other countries.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean that Mateos was inspired in this by the Cuban experience?

Mr. HILL. They have watched this situation in Cuba and have been watching it since Castro lived in Mexico and lived with a known Communist. He was arrested with Communist identification in his pocket, and they see Castro go back to Cuba and get away with raping the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to get this straight. You say if they see Cuba get away with it they will move.

You mean now the Mexicans will move.

Mr. HILL. That is what I am saying.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean they will expropriate all that is left?

Mr. HILL. In certain restricted fields like oil.

The CHAIRMAN. They have already expropriated the oil.

Mr. HILL. Yes, sir, but there are independent oil companies from the U.S. operating under a contract negotiated with McGill Allemagne. There is Mr. Pauley, Mr. Neville Penrose from Fort Worth, Mr. J. Taylor from Amarillo and I understand around 50 small independents, and despite McGill Allemagne's agreement for their oil drilling privileges in Mexico there are those nationalists in the Government that see the opportunity to once again break that contract with oil drilling companies from the United States.

Senator LONG. You have companies mining other things besides oil down there, haven't you?

Mr. HILL. We have the sulphur problem. You are familiar with it because I believe the interests from your state are very worried.

COMPARISON TO CZECH SITUATION

Senator LONG. Might I just raise this question? The most sensible thing I have seen the State Department do the whole time I have been on this Foreign Relations Committee was to go over there when the Czech Government started seizing all our property and somebody had enough brains to seize that steel mill they had on order over here and sell it to Argentina. They said, "Here is $9 million," and distributed the $9 million among the Americans who got the worst of it when this Communist government took over their property. And that is what we are doing now.

I regret to say the Claims Commission didn't distribute the money as well as it should have but at the same time we are doing it.

Now if you just said to any good businessman, "We will just seize Cuba's sugar quota and turn it over to you. You just go ahead and buy this sugar on the world market and sell it at the American price and make what Cuba has been making out of it." It would take only 10 years to get back everything on the profit that could be made by anybody who had possession of the Cuban sugar quota that Cuba has with this country.

Now that is our law. This fellow made a speech the other day, bragging that America is not doing Cuba any favor about this sugar quota. He made a speech to the Cuban people saying they are bound by law and can't help themselves.

They have to do this whether they want to or not.

If you want to show them in short order that they can't win on this deal by nationalizing the property, all you have to do is take over Castro's quota and you will make enough money with which to reimburse these Americans for what they lose. And if I might say so, you could do the same thing with Venezuela's oil quota if she wants to seize American investments down there.

Just turn that quota over, let somebody buy it on the world market and sell it in this market. Mr. Sterling Cottrell is over in Hawaii as adviser to the chief of the Pacific Command on how to conduct themselves in all these foreign countries. Somebody told me that he was a very highly regarded person in the State Department. Do you know him, Mr. Rubottom?

Mr. **Rubottom**. Yes, sir, I do.

STOP EXPORT-IMPORT BANK LOAN

Senator **Long**. He was telling me that when he was in Brazil, Brazil was refusing to cede us the base rights for which we had paid, and in fact decided to terminate it. They had applied for a loan from Export-Import for a whole lot of airplanes to have airlines all over Brazil flying American equipment.

So he put the stop order on their Export-Import Bank loan, and the aircraft companies put all the pressure on him telling him not to let go of this thing saying he was hurting American interests and hurting Brazil worse than us and so forth. The position was that we ought to get it understood that we are doing business on a reciprocal basis.

We are just not going to take a beating and still hand out with one hand while being bitten on the other one.

He stood his ground and got the thing settled in a month. If we don't stand our ground this is going to happen to investments all over Central and South America.

The **Chairman**. Gentlemen, it is 6 o'clock. I am worn out and I guess everybody else is. We have to call a halt to this.

Senator **Lausche**. Just one question.

GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY

Are you putting this solely on the basis of trying to help our own economy because you have no treaties upon which you can rely and because there is no principle in our international policy that warranted our stepping in when a people have decided to choose a Communistic form of government?

What international principle justifies us in stepping in?

Mr. **Mann**. We have a commitment reaching to the very foundation of the good neighbor policy made by Cordell Hull in 1932 that we would not intervene in the internal affairs of another country.

The word "intervention" in the inter-American system means that no government may pressure another government either by military force or by economic sanction to do something against its sovereign will.

This is what intervention means. You can't use force to force Cuba to do something, but what we are trying to do is to avoid running headlong into that obstacle.

Senator **Lausche**. That is what I thought.

Mr. **Mann**. And to make it clear, which is that acid test that must come out of all of this thing, that this kind of irresponsibility doesn't pay. This should be our objective, in my judgment. This doesn't pay. I would subordinate the question of when we get compensation—whether it is this year or next year—because this is going to be a very difficult thing even in this country, because we are going to be accused of going back to the big stick policy, and the good neighbor policy is out the window. Down in Latin America the danger is that if we don't conduct ourselves right we are going to arouse fears of such importance that we won't be able to carry out any kind of a policy; so we are trying to select the grounds on which we fight.

The **Chairman**. I don't want to be accused of being another Hungary.

Mr. **Mann**. Exactly.

Senator **Smathers**. If we don't stop Cuba quick we will really have another Hungary because they are going to move on Guantanamo and when they move on Panama then you have had it.

Mr. **Mann**. When you were out of the room I said just what you are saying now.

The objective is the same.

The **Chairman**. Thank you all very much for coming and I appreciate the time you have given us.

I think it has been very informative to everybody.

The committee is adjourned.

Thank you all.

[Whereupon, at 6:05 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE DEPARTMENT
ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 2:20 p.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Senator Mansfield (chairman), and Senators Green, Aiken, Capehart, and Hickenlooper.

The chairman submitted a proposed draft of a report on the Vietnam situation which had been prepared for the subcommittee by the staff.

After consideration, discussion, and amendment of the draft, it was decided to send it to the Government Printing Office for overnight printing of a clean draft.

For record of proceedings, see the official transcript.

[Accordingly, the subcommittee adjourned at 5:30 p.m.]

DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. RELATIONS WITH OEEC

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. Theodore Francis Green presiding.

Present: Senators Green, Sparkman, Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Church, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, Carlson, and Williams.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Newhouse, George Denney, Jr., and Betty Goetz, of the committee staff.

Senator **GREEN**. The meeting will please come to order.

The members of the Foreign Relations Committee are convening informally this morning to discuss with Under Secretary of State Dillon negotiations which he has been carrying on with several countries of Western Europe.

After Mr. Dillon has completed his statement and answered questions which members may wish to put to him, we will hear from Mr. Philip Farley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy. Mr. Farley will discuss the status of our negotiations on the banning of atomic tests.

Mr. Dillon, will you please proceed in your own way?

STATEMENT OF THE HON. C. DOUGLAS DILLON, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. **DILLON**. Mr. Chairman, I asked for this opportunity to come and talk with the committee, both to report briefly on what has been happening and in particular to consult informally with the committee and get any views which the committee may be prepared informally to give us regarding composition of foreign powers of this new organization which is contemplated to take the place of the OEEC [Organization for European Economic Cooperation].

At our meetings in January when 18 member countries of the OEEC and the two associate members—which are the United States and Canada—met both in the regular OEEC meeting and an ad hoc meeting as representatives of the 20 governments, in which meeting the United States and Canada were at an equal position with the other members, three things were decided.

One was to set up a committee of the 20 governments plus representatives from the Commission of the Common Market to meet and try to work out some answer that would ameliorate the row that was going on between the six and the seven, the common market and the free trade area.

Our concern in that was that this row was quite serious, leading to political problems, and also there were real dangers that the two groups might make some sort of arrangement with each other that would neglect the interests of third parties, including the United States, and there would be further discrimination against us.

That danger, I think, has been fully averted.

The two groups are now talking to each other and the meeting of the special group to consider what can be done to improve their relationships probably will take place near the end of this month in Paris.

There is nothing particular to report except that it does not involve anything on our part except meeting the effort and attempting to get both groups to reduce their tariffs in return for compensating reductions by the other group, which does not include the United States.

I think we are making a certain amount of progress in that regard, although it is too early yet to know what will definitely come out of this. Whatever they do will be subject, of course, to further negotiations next year when the regular tariff under GATT[1] takes place, and in those, the United States would also take part.

GATT NEGOTIATIONS

An interesting thing here that we foresee and hope that when these GATT negotiations take place, or as a part of them there will be something a little new from the point of view of the United States, is that there will be certain trade concessions made by the European countries to each other which will then, under the GATT formula, be made on the most-favored-nation basis to all others, including the United States, and will be made, in effect, to the United States without any compensation action being required in those particular fields by the United States.

In the past when they have had these meetings, we have been the one big trading power; so practically everybody has made arrangements with us and then they have been multilateralized to others so others have gotten benefits in that way.

This time for the first time, there are two very strong trade blocs which have an interest in making arrangements with each other which they now agree should be multilateralized. So it looks like we will stand a good opportunity of getting a certain amount of—and I hope considerable—benefits, at this next negotiation without having to do very much ourselves.

The second decision that was taken was to proceed with the formation of a development advisory group, the purpose of which was to discuss methods of raising money for developmental purposes.

The basic purpose stated, quite frankly, was to get increased resources for development.

Our idea is that by showing Germans and Italians—but particularly the West Germans—the means and mechanism that we and the British have developed, we can lead them to making more funds available for development in useful ways. They have the capacity.

---

[1] General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

They now recognize that they should do this though they have not yet worked out the ways and means with which they want to do it. I think they can do it by constitutional process.

Now, that first meeting should take place here in Washington early in March.

OEEC FULFILLED ORIGINAL PURPOSES

The third decision was that the OEEC as such has largely fulfilled most of its original purposes.

Now, this in particular was originally set up to serve in connection with the Marshall Plan to help with the distribution of our aid to European countries which were members. That was one reason that at the original time we did not join the OEEC. That was the main reason.

When the Marshall Plan came to an end, the OEEC took on another job which was that of working toward freedom of trade in Europe first, and they were very helpful in getting rid of quotas among the European countries.

Since the last year, those currencies have become convertible and discrimination against other areas by the member of the OEEC as a group is no longer justified and has largely disappeared. The process is disappearing very rapidly.

This trade function is largely becoming a thing of the past. Since then they have been doing an increasing amount of consultation just on general economic policies of all the member governments. This we think is very useful. This kind of general consultation is very important, because with the renewed strength of Europe, it is vitally important that we and the Europeans know and concert our economic policies to put our best foot forward in world economic affairs.

In particular, more attention has to be given by us on a cooperative and joint basis to the problems of the less developed areas, and everyone seems to agree that this would be a fine idea.

COMMITTEE TO STUDY OEEC PURPOSES

The decision was taken to appoint a group of 4 people. They had to have a small group who would act as a committee to study the organization of OEEC and to hear from all the governments concerned, and to try to come up with a report and presumably some sort of draft charter that would suggest what new organization there could be in which the United States and Canada could take a full part to carry out these remaining jobs, sort of serving as the economic clearing house between Western Europe and North America.

This committee of Ambassador Burgess was appointed by the United States and he is the chairman. There are representatives from England, France, and Greece on it.

The British supposedly represent the economic interests of the outer seven, and the French of the six, and the Greeks, the countries that are not members of either of those organizations.

This group has been hearing the opinions of different governments and organizations and is due to complete that process sometime early in March, and then sit down and try to draft a report that would go to governments early in April. Then there would be a meeting of officials of the governments toward the end of April, at which they would use the document prepared by this group as a working paper to try to work out the details of an agreement that would later be submitted to ministers for final signature, if all goes well. After that it would go to the various parliaments for approval.

Now, the reason we particularly want to consult with you about this today is that the United States has not yet made its presentation of this group of four. Most of the other countries have done so, and we are coming along toward that end. Our presentation is scheduled for next week.

We want to talk with you before that goes in. It will be somewhat general in nature and will not be at all binding because when officials of the 20 governments meet to study the report of this small group at the end of April, they are all completely free to start anew on negotiating an agreement. They are not bound by anything. These are only working papers to give them something to start from.

Nevertheless, we did want to talk particularly about one question. I outlined to you our views of the general use of the organization which is concurred in by everybody that has been heard so far, all the European countries and Canada.

OEEC DECISIONMAKING AUTHORITY

The one problem that I particularly wanted your views on is this: The OEEC, in the 12 years of its existence, has had a power called decisionmaking authority. This is something that the governments of Europe have come to think as important, and they are unanimously in favor of continuing a similar authority in the new organization.

We have emphasized that we think this should be primarily for consultation purposes and in this consultation the Europeans—some of them—felt that maybe we were trying to weaken the organization and make it less useful than it would otherwise be.

This decisionmaking question, we think, is largely a semantic one. The word "consultation" in French is rather weaker than it is in English. That is one problem, and I think the way the Europeans have handled this decisionmaking thing would be of interest.

Decisions can be taken only by unanimous vote, and so in the first place anyone can dissent.

Second, whenever a country didn't want to dissent and prevent action from being taken, but nevertheless didn't want to have a part in the action, there was a provision that the country can declare that they are not interested in a particular decision and that decision then will not apply or have anything to do with them.

The third requirement is that any decision that is taken will be binding on the country only after it has been confirmed in accordance with whatever the constitutional processes of the country concerned may be.

As a result of the actual practice here, a number of countries have used this considerably to avoid being tied in any way to the decision. The only area where this really has amounted to anything has been in decisions of the type that I mentioned earlier when they were getting rid of these trade barriers where they would try and agree by such and such a date they would remove so many quotas.

What happened was that the countries that could do that went into the agreement and the others that couldn't do it would not be interested in the thing and they wouldn't remove their quotas until they were ready.

NO ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY

We feel that it would be very difficult to reach a satisfactory agreement on this unless we can make some agreement with the Europeans that will meet their concern.

On the other hand, we are clear that we don't wish to obtain any additional executive authority or power by joining this organization over what we now have, and so we are trying to work out some language that would carry on somewhat as in the past the OEEC and would make this very clear.

We would think that in any action by the Congress in ratifying or accepting membership in this organization, there should be clear expression that there was no additional grant of authority to the executives by the fact that they had joined this organization.

We do not think it has much to do with trade, so that will be minimized and all we really will be talking about will be this business of the general economic policy.

I think that is the broad outline of what I had to say. I would be delighted to answer questions and also to get expressions of informal views from the members of the committee that could help us in our first presentation of our broad position to this committee before next week.

Senator **GREEN**. Thank you very much.

ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION

May I ask whether the administration has taken any position in this last matter?

Mr. **DILLON**. The administration as such?

Senator **GREEN**. Yes.

Mr. **DILLON**. We think we haven't as far as any foreign country is concerned. We are trying to.

Senator **GREEN**. I mean here at home.

Mr. **DILLON**. At home, we think we have to, as I said, work out with these European countries something as I described that will meet their requirements and will allow some sort of decisionmaking authority to exist.

We think that would be much preferable, but it should state clearly that we get no extra power. And it would be our intent, if it ever involved trade or anything of that nature, to say that we would stand aside and we are not interested in that particular decision.

We have not, Senator Green, come to the conclusion which will probably take some time as to exactly how that article should be worded. The detail of the wording of such an article will be a subject of negotiation and worked out over a period of time.

Senator **Green**. Have you taken up these negotiations with the nations one by one, informally, and is that the idea?

Mr. **Dillon**. The nations, one by one, informally have come to this committee of four and presented their views as to what a new charter should be like; and then after this is finished, the committee of four goes into session and writes a draft of the new charter which serves as a working paper for a further conference of officials who will then have something on which to start negotiations.

COMMITTEE OF FOUR

Senator **Green**. Who is this committee of four?

Mr. **Dillon**. It was set up by this meeting in January. They picked a representative of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Greece.[2]

Our representative is Ambassador Burgess, who is our Ambassador to NATO and who is also chairman of the group.

Senator **Green**. Is it hoped that those four may agree on something and therefore make a formal report?

Mr. **Dillon**. That is right.

Senator **Green**. And that will end the matter?

Mr. **Dillon**. That will be a formal working paper of the formal meeting of the 20 governments to consider.

Senator **Green**. Thank you very much.

Mr. Wiley, do you have any questions?

Senator **Wiley**. I am sorry that I was delayed for the first part of your remarks, Mr. Secretary. But I have in front of me the subject developments in U.S. relations with the OEEC.

Now the thing that comes to my mind is, is this a modification of the present OEEC?

Mr. **Dillon**. This would be, in effect, a modification and an expansion.

OBJECTIVES OF THE OEEC

The United States and Canada are associate members of the present OEEC. That organization was originally designed to achieve the recovery of Europe, and since that has taken place, it is our feeling and also that of the European countries that it should now be modified and changed in its objective to assist in fulfilling worldwide obligations and responsibilities in the economic field.

We think that one of the big helps will be that it will serve as a means whereby we can get better cooperation and larger-scale cooperation from European countries in handling the problems of development, and that we will get more from them and not have to do much ourselves.

---

[2] The committee consisted of W. Randolph Burgess (U.S.), Sir Paul Gore-Boothe (U.K.), Bernard Clappier (France), and Xenophan Zolotas (Greece).

Senator WILEY. I think that is a very clear explanation of its objective. The purpose from your statement, as I get it, is that you are now going to really redraft the charter, if you call it such, of the OEEC, and instead of making it an instrumentality for us to pay all the bills, you want them to come in and pay part of them. Is that it?

Mr. DILLON. That is about it. That is correct.

The original charter contained a lot of items or articles having to do only with the reconstruction of Europe and how they would handle United States aid and that sort of thing, which is all of the past and has nothing to do with the organization any more.

Senator WILEY. Your testimony this morning, then, went to what you might call the mechanism as to how to accomplish this if it can be accomplished.

Mr. DILLON. That is correct.

Senator WILEY. And those details are simply submitted to us with the ideal that you think they are the appropriate mechanism, but the real objective is to get unified action on a larger scale than even Europe.

Mr. DILLON. That is correct. We would hope that in the case of the development advisory group—that part which is dealing specifically with the funds for development—Japan would be associated with that and in that way we would be able to coordinate Japan's efforts in this field with the European efforts.

Senator WILEY. How far have you progressed?

Mr. DILLON. Well, as I said, we have come to you here before we have really progressed, before taking any substantive steps.

We are due next week to make a presentation on behalf of the United States to this group of four who were drawing up the first working papers for a further meeting of the 20 governments which will take place toward the end of April. We wanted to consult with you and get your views at that time rather than at this time before we have taken any steps.

HELP CARRY THE LOAD

Senator WILEY. Well, again I think your objective is good. But from what we have been reading, some of our good friends that were the beneficiaries of our so-called help are rather reticent in coming in the taking up the ball or helping to carry the load, and this now is to see if you can't get them to help with that. Isn't that it?

Mr. DILLON. That is a very practical way of saying it.

I find an increasing recognition on their part of the necessity of their joining with us in this effort.

Every time you talk to them—and so many months have gone by—you get a greater understanding, and I think this will help. This provides a mechanism to do this on a continuing basis.

Senator WILEY. One other question, Mr. Chairman, and that is, are you going to come forth with a new child from OEEC and are you going to submit that to us when it is in final shape?

Mr. DILLON. Depending on the final shape of the document, it will depend on how it should be submitted to the Congress.

At the moment, we are thinking it would not have to be a treaty as such, but it would be submitted for the joint approval of the House and the Senate.

Senator **Wiley**. Well, not a treaty, but if it is simply an organization of the executives of the nations without conferring any additional power or discretion—particularly discretion on the utilization of public funds—I don't see any particular need of our getting it. But if it is advisable, I would be very happy to see it.

Mr. **Dillon**. It would have to come to Congress to authorize the expenditure of public funds for our share of the costs of the Secretariat, and that sort of thing.

The total cost of the Secretariat might be $2 million or $3 million a year, or something like that. Our share would be one-third, or something in that general order.

PROCEDURES AND LEGISLATION

Senator **Wiley**. Well, then, I understand that if and when this occurs and your organization is perfected and you have your Secretariat, then if it is a question of additional money for some of these needy nations throughout the world, that has to come back to us.

Mr. **Dillon**. Oh, yes. That wouldn't have any part in this.

This comes to you through the mutual security bill every year.

Senator **Wiley**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Green**. Mr. Sparkman?

Senator **Sparkman**. Yes, Mr. Chairman, very briefly.

Mr. Dillon, I was going to ask you the same question about the treaty, but as I understand your answer to Senator Wiley, it is to the effect that this new arrangement that is contemplated would not call for a treaty, but would call for some kind of enabling legislation.

Mr. **Dillon**. That is right.

Senator **Sparkman**. To be submitted to both Houses of Congress.

Mr. **Dillon**. That is right.

Senator **Sparkman**. And there is no treaty contemplated in connection with it at all?

Mr. **Dillon**. No, not at the present time.

Senator **Sparkman**. Now, you said something a while ago that made me a little curious. You said the French word for consultation was weaker than our own word.

Mr. **Dillon**. The French word is the same word, but the implication in French, it could mean sort of a sewing circle.

Senator **Sparkman**. What is the French word?

Mr. **Dillon**. Consultative.

GATT AND THE TRADE BALANCE

Senator **Sparkman**. Now, one other question with reference to GATT. I gathered from what you say that the shifting of the trade balance may work some advantages for the United States, insofar as GATT is concerned.

Mr. **Dillon**. That is what we certainly hope, and it should. That is what we are telling the European countries every day.

Senator **Sparkman**. Of course, you are aware of the fact that in the past we have had a good many objections from some segments of our economy because of the fact that we were adversely affected by things that were done in GATT, even while we are not a member of GATT.

That is right, is it not; we are not a member?

Mr. DILLON. We are not formal members. We sit there and we join with them.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do we support GATT?

Mr. DILLON. I guess we do, but the support is very little. They have an organization of about half a dozen people.

Senator SPARKMAN. GATT is really a United Nations establishment, isn't it? Didn't it grow out of the United Nations Act and become effective upon the agreement to it by a certain number of member nations?

Mr. DILLON. I don't think so. I know there are some 37 or 38 countries that now are part of it and have agreed to its general rules, but I don't think it is a subsidiary organ of the United Nations.

Senator SPARKMAN. I believe Senator Gore has served as one of our representatives to GATT. Maybe Senator Gore could tell us about it. I am not clear right now on the setup.

Senator GORE. I am not certain either, Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. We will look that up.

I will ask Mr. Marcy if he will do that.

Mr. DILLON. We will furnish it to you.

Senator SPARKMAN. If you would do that.

Senator GORE. I am under the impression it originated in the United Nations.

Mr. DILLON. We are a full member of GATT, for whatever that means.

Senator GORE. What do you mean by full member? It has not been approved by Congress.

Mr. DILLON. It was nothing that ever needed that.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is what has me puzzled. How did we get into it?

Mr. DILLON. We will give you this in a memorandum, as I said, but I still have the feeling that it was a United Nations action that became effective upon a certain number of nations subscribing to it. And a certain number did subscribe to it without the United States being one of them; our real attachment to GATT grows out of the effect of the agreements reached in GATT.

Senator SPARKMAN. Affecting certain nations with which we have reciprocal trade agreements?

Mr. DILLON. That is correct, because the only agreement in GATT that really binds us are these reciprocal trade agreements.

Senator SPARKMAN. Those that tie in with our reciprocal trade agreements?

Mr. DILLON. That is right.

GETTING RID OF DOLLAR DISCRIMINATION

Senator SPARKMAN. And, of course, I think it certainly would seem true that with the shifting of the balance of trade, GATT might at long last prove helpful to us, rather than detrimental as some segments have complained about in the past.

Mr. **Dillon**. They are using GATT very effectively now in getting rid of this dollar discrimination against us, these quotas, because that is against these rules and we have the combined pressure of the whole organization.

Senator **Sparkman**. Again, that grew up as a result of the shifting of the policies and trade.

Senator **Gore**. Will you yield?

Senator **Sparkman**. Yes.

Senator **Gore**. As a matter of fact, do we not think it is already a very beneficial agency, and that our participation in it, though not yet approved by Congress, has been helpful to the United States and to international trade as such?

Mr. **Dillon**. I think it has been most helpful to the United States in international trade as a whole, which is of great interest to us, and it is becoming increasingly helpful directly to us in such things as getting rid of these quotas.

I think that in this next negotiation, by extending to us benefits of agreements between those two big blocs, we will not be a party to it, but we will get the benefit of it.

Senator **Sparkman**. I will remind my friend Senator Gore that I am limiting it to certain segments of our power and economy.

I was simply pointing out that even as related to them, the chances are it will shift the benefits until it will become beneficial to us.

Senator **Gore**. Well, I have looked in on two sessions of GATT in Geneva. My observation in both has been that its principal benefit with international trade arose out of the fact that a nation which undertook unduly restricted and unduly selfish action was hard put to justify it at this council of many nations. Indeed, the record of GATT shows that as a result of the difficulty of nations in presenting and sustaining and defending their position on some extreme position, a number of those extreme positions have been rescinded.

Mr. **Dillon**. That is right.

Senator **Gore**. So its principal benefits, Senator Sparkman, from my limited observations, appear not so much to be the accomplishment of the black-and-white written agreements, but rather this informal pressure of consensus of nations.

Senator **Sparkman**. Establishment of orderly international trade, would you say?

Senator **Gore**. I think so.

Senator **Sparkman**. That is all.

Senator **Green**. Mr. Aiken, any questions?

WESTERN EUROPEAN INVESTMENTS

Senator **Aiken**. I missed the first 10 minutes of your discussion, Mr. Secretary. I have been noticing lately in the Sunday papers that the bonds for the World Bank are nearly all being bought by investors in Western European countries today, and of course the guarantee for those bonds rests to a considerable extent with the United States.

I was wondering what the general effect of that was going to be on our economic affairs.

I believe those bonds sold for 4⅞, something in that vicinity.

Mr. **Dillon**. Five percent.

Senator **Aiken**. And we guaranteed them up to $6 billion or more, and they are going to benefit from them.

Does Western Europe have large amounts of money to invest in that today?

Mr. **Dillon**. Reasonably large. Last year, actually the World Bank sold more bonds in Western Europe originally—I mean issues in deutsche marks, Swiss francs, and so forth—than they did in dollars, and they do raise the money directly in the European markets in very substantial amounts.

It has been true, however, that Western European private investors have also invested in dollar bonds of the World Bank which have been sold in the United States, and I think, from what Mr. Black has said, that you are approximately correct that they had bought in the American market for private accounts about half of those bonds that have been sold.

I don't know what happened—particularly in the last issue—whether it applied to that or not. This is a way in which European funds indirectly are made available to the World Bank for developmental purposes.

Certainly, our guarantee is behind that in case the World Bank should fail to meet its obligations, but there is no indication that it would, and the obligation is also behind these other member countries, which obligations are much stronger and much more valid now than they were a few years ago when there was economic strain.

For instance, the German obligation to back up the bonds is probably just as good as ours. It isn't as big, but it is just as good.

I don't think that this has any particular effect. I don't think it is a bad thing at all. It is a way of mobilizing private European funds for developmental purposes, and there isn't any other easy way to get those private funds.

SOVIET TRADE COMPETITION

Senator **Aiken**. Another thing that has concerned me perhaps in a general way has been the discussion which even amounts to an uproar over potential competition from Russia in the economic markets of the world.

As I understand it, Russia has done a considerable amount of trading in the form of barter, and I would say Russia has been getting the best end of the trade in most instances. But wherever I have been and I have found that the American industries were losing their markets, they were losing them to Western European competition rather than to Russian competition.

Now how far is that going?

We are losing markets even to our own people who have relocated in Western Europe, and some of them tell me they are actually in pretty stiff competition with themselves right now.

Is this trend going to continue, and what will the upshot of it be?

The reason I am thinking this out is that it seems to me we have to insist that Western Europe share the costs in some of these underdeveloped countries.

Mr. **Dillon**. Well, we are. I think the whole thing about our exports is that certainly the type of things that we export has not yet been affected to any great extent, if at all, by Soviet competition. I think that is something for the future.

Certainly, it is there potentially, but they haven't exported consumer goods, things of that type, yet.

The problem is twofold. It is a very important problem. We have been giving a great deal of attention to it in the executive branch as a result of our balance of payment situation, and I would expect that sometime in the not-too-distant future we would have some proposals on this to make to the Congress.

INCREASING U.S. EXPORTS

Our idea is that it is vitally important to do everything to facilitate and increase our exports. That will involve a more aggressive attitude on the part of our own private businessmen for exports which they had gotten over the habit of having because exporting was too easy in the years right after the war, and also because our own market here took all their products and they really didn't need to do this.

It will also involve certain actions by the Government to facilitate and promote exports; a more aggressive attitude on the part of commercial attachés; more interest in this by our diplomatic representatives abroad, more or less paralleling the attitude that the West German or British diplomatic missions or commercial attachés take regarding their exports.

We think that in this way we can substantially increase our own exports.

Senator **Aiken**. Well, much of the competition that the United States produces now is generated by American concerns that have relocated in other fully developed, well-to-do countries. Do you think that we need any further incentives or encouragement or guarantees for our interests in this country to migrate to these other countries such as is contemplated by certain proposed legislation? I think it is in the House right now.

Mr. **Dillon**. Not at all. The administration's position has been quite clear on that.

We do favor extra incentives and help in lesser developed areas. That has not been very great. In fact, it has been very small, and even with the incentive, we would not expect it to be too great.

We do think this would help in the development process, take some of the load off governments and inject private enterprise, which is basic to our free system, into this effort.

On the other hand, when this bill went to the House, they rejected that part of it and broadened this to cover investments everywhere, which would include investments in Canada and Western Europe.

The administration has not been in favor of that because it is not necessary, and this is probably going on. I don't think investment abroad is necessarily a bad thing, but it has been going on at such a big rate that it certainly doesn't need any extra stimulation.

Senator AIKEN. Well, we don't encourage them to relocate in some other country where they might make more money than by staying at home.

Mr. DILLON. Not at all.

Senator AIKEN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GREEN. Senator Mansfield?

Senator MANSFIELD. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GREEN. Mr. Gore?

Senator GORE. I do have one, Mr. Chairman.

TRADE AND AFGHANISTAN

Mr. Secretary, during a trip to the Far East last fall I became aware, much more so than I had theretofore been, of the Russian economic drive into Afghanistan.

Afghanistan's economic intercourse with the outside world has traditionally been through Karachi, which is by all odds the nearest port. But I was informed that because of Russian subsidy on freight rates and other concessions—perhaps unprofitable to her connections, measured on the profit and loss basis—now about 60 percent of Afghanistan's economic intercourse with the outer world passes through or to the Soviet Union.

Is that generally correct?

Mr. DILLON. Yes, that is correct. It is a real problem.

We have been aware of it for some time and have tried to do two things to meet the situation. One was to promote better understanding and an agreement on trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan which has been achieved, and an agreement signed and ratified by each country which provides for a free port in Karachi and then goods moving in transit across Pakistan to Afghanistan.

To facilitiate that, it was also necessary to improve the transit arrangements, and we have under the Fund for Asian Economic Development made funds available to improve the road system in Afghanistan down to the Pakistan border, and to improve in Pakistan the immediate rail connection to that road.

This is a project that is now underway, but even in spite of that, that should help. But also in spite of that, the Soviets, by subsidies and by improving their own transportation network and by building several roads into Afghanistan from the Soviet Union, have created the situation.

Senator GORE. Well, it seemed to me that the Soviet efforts almost amounted to economic integration of the Afghanistan economy into theirs.

Mr. DILLON. That is right. They are very much dominating the Afghan economy, and this is, I would say, a typical example of how, by economic means, they are attempting to draw Afghanistan so close to them that in effect they will not be able to continue in an independent line.

We know that the Afghan rulers and people want to continue independent, but it seems they are going to have a real problem as this economic connection with the Soviet grows so close.

Senator GORE. I found the Pakistan Government quite aware and concerned about this, but I was disturbed to find Mr. Nehru[3] with a bland attitude toward it. He said to me that no nation wanted peace more than Russia.

---

[3] Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.

Well, going back to your statement that this was typical, I agree that it is.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA

Suppose the economic relations now established with Cuba follows this critical route.

Has our Government given consideration to the consequences?

Mr. **Dillon**. Naturally, we are thinking very seriously about them.

When I said it was typical, I meant it was typical of what the Soviets were aiming at and trying to do. I don't think that they have accomplished anything as significant in any other country, and I don't think they can make the same relative effort in very many countries at the same time.

Certainly in the case of Cuba, Cuba is very far from the Soviet Union and although the purchase of a million tons of sugar a year is very considerable, Cuba has been selling something in the neighborhood just under 3 million tons a year to the United States.

Our economic relations with Cuba have always been and will continue to be much more important than their relations to the Soviet Union. But how we are going to handle this problem—which is not only a problem for us, but for all the other American states—if the present attitude of the Cuban Government is continued, is a very difficult problem.

Senator **Gore**. I took it you meant by describing this as typical—and I accepted your meaning—that the Soviets, once they embarked on an effort of economic penetration, did not hesitate to pay a heavy economic loss to themselves if in the end they were gaining economic penetration and bringing the economy of the target country into dependence upon economic relations with the Soviet Union.

Mr. **Dillon**. I think that is correct.

Senator **Gore**. And, of course, this was not achieved by one step in Afghanistan. There was a beginning, and I was only pointing out that Russia had not made a beginning in a country within our own hemisphere.

Mr. **Dillon**. That is correct.

Senator **Gore**. And I hope, of course, that they will not be successful following this pattern, but I must agree with you that Afghanistan is somewhat typical of their efforts and plans.

Mr. **Dillon**. That is right.

Senator **Gore**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Green**. Mr. Capehart?

BOND GUARANTEES

Senator **Capehart**. Yes, I have a few questions.

No. 1, Mr. Dillon, are the bonds that are sold in European countries for foreign currency still guaranteed by the United States?

Mr. **Dillon**. In the same way that the Europeans guarantee the bonds that we sell here. It is a joint thing.

Senator CAPEHART. Our overall guarantee is up to $6 billion and covers those bonds as well as dollar bonds?

Mr. DILLON. That is correct.

Senator CAPEHART. Regarding this new organization that you are working on, let me see if I understand correctly what you are trying to do.

Do I understand that you are going to try to get 20 nations to subscribe for X amount of stock or bonds or funds in a new organization to loan money to backward countries of the world?

Mr. DILLON. No, sir. This is merely a new organization and will not have any funds and will not be an operating agency.

This will be an agency in which we consult about economic policies, including economic policies toward underdeveloped countries. But the actual carrying out of the policies will be through the World Bank.

Senator CAPEHART. Then it will be just a talking organization?

Mr. DILLON. That is right.

Senator CAPEHART. Purely conversational.

Mr. DILLON. That is right. They do have, and may continue, some small operating programs.

They have presently a rather modest technical assistance program in certain specific areas for their member countries only, and I think that is all they would continue. These were only the member countries who were the less developed ones—specifically Greece, Turkey and Sardinia in Italy.

Senator CAPEHART. Then this will not particularly help backward countries, will it?

Mr. DILLON. We think it will because through our work in this organization, particularly in the subgroup on development which will be part of the organization, we will get better coordination and be able to promote larger sums of funds from the European countries.

Senator CAPEHART. It isn't quite clear to me. In other words, how will you be able to sell more bonds, for example? The World Bank will be able to sell more bonds to them and they can thereby secure more funds to loan to backward countries; isn't that so?

Mr. DILLON. Not necessarily, but specifically we would hope, through this, to get the Germans to make more funds available to India for her development plan.

In the past, we have tried to do this only by ad hoc meetings. In other words, when we had a problem, someone would go over to the Bank and talk to them. It is not effective.

The idea here is that it would be a continuing forum for consultation on this.

Senator CAPEHART. Now, you have an organization of 20 states.

Mr. DILLON. That is correct.

FUNDS FOR BACKWARD COUNTRIES

Senator CAPEHART. And let us say that someone else feels that a given backward country ought to have $50 million in loans.

What will you do? Will you have a meeting of the 20 countries and decide which country is going to be willing to loan this $20 million?

Mr. DILLON. This development advisory group, which was also set up at the January meeting on an interim basis, and which we think would become part of this permanent organization when it is set up, consists of only I think 8 countries now. It does not have all the 20.

In other words, the idea is that only the countries who are able to make funds available would be in it. There is no sense in having the Greeks and Turks decide how to give more money to someone else when they are on the receiving end.

So this group is where we would sit and meet. I don't know just how it would develop.

Originally we don't intend that this would be a place that would decide that we should give more priority to Latin America than to the Africans. But we do think it is a place where we would say we in the United States feel that you, Germany, can make more funds available for development than you have in the past year. We would say we think the funds you have been making available are on too short a term. You are making loans repayable in 3 and 5 years, and that really isn't helpful. It means someone else has to pick it up at the end of that time. We think you have to find a mechanism to make it effective later on.

Here is the way we do it, and here is the way the British do it. We would say to the Germans, "Come along and help us," and the Germans would want to do this and would welcome this sort of consultation.

Senator CAPEHART. Well, then, it is not a new bank, not a new organization to loan money, but merely an organization to sit down and talk.

Mr. DILLON. That is correct, except for the possibility of such slight things as conducting a small technical assistance program in member countries.

I think they also have a very small program of research in the atomic energy field.

AID FROM OTHER NATIONS

Senator CAPEHART. Now, does any one of those countries at the moment have an organization such as the Defense Loan Fund, ICA, and are they loaning or giving any money to these backward countries?

Mr. DILLON. Well, in large measure, but not in the same way that we do, the French are making very substantial funds available to black Africa, the areas of the French community there, and to some which are independent and some of which are becoming independent, and some that are still within the French community.

Their contribution to that area is in the percentage of the GNP.

Senator CAPEHART. All of it in grants?

Mr. DILLON. All in grants.

Senator CAPEHART. Could we have then for the record an example, if you have it exactly, of how much that has amounted to in the last 10 years?

Mr. DILLON. It is greater than the percentage of the GNP. It is greater than what we have been doing.

Senator CAPEHART. Aren't they colonies?

Mr. DILLON. They were.

Senator CAPEHART. Weren't they obligations of France, the same as Puerto Rico and Guam, and so forth?

Mr. DILLON. You could say that is correct, but other countries have not lived up to it the same way.

Senator CAPEHART. My question is: What countries have made grants available in the nature of the Development Loan Fund to countries in which they are not colonies of that country?

Mr. DILLON. The British are making increasing amounts available. They started at about $100 million. This last year it was something over $200 million, and their estimate for 1960 is about $350 million.

Senator CAPEHART. For that sort of thing, the same as the Development Loan Fund?

Mr. DILLON. Yes.

Senator CAPEHART. Can we put a list of that in the record?

Mr. DILLON. Yes, we do have it.

Senator CAPEHART. Well, then, there is going to be no money involved, no corporations involved, no new banks, no finance companies, no institutions.

Mr. DILLON. That is right.

Senator CAPEHART. It is to be purely conversations or merely accomplished at meetings from time to time?

Mr. DILLON. Yes.

Senator CAPEHART. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GREEN. Mr. Lausche?

PURPOSE OF OEEC

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Dillon, what was the purpose of this organization, under its present composition? That is, is it to cooperate to reestablish the economy of Europe?

Mr. DILLON. Yes, sir, it was set up at the time we first announced the Marshall plan, and it was felt that the best way to decide where the funds should go—to, say, Italy or France or England—would be for the European countries to get together and sort of work out what they thought jointly were the priorities; and then they gave those to us and in negotiating with us, helped in deciding this.

Senator LAUSCHE. It was a sort of consulting group and reached a judgment and recommended to us where the greatest good could be done by giving economic aid.

Mr. DILLON. That is right. Otherwise we would have had the burden of deciding, "We like you better than the other country."

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, earlier in your presentation you said that many of the nations that have thus far submitted their papers suggest that there be a power granted to this newly proposed organization to make decisions that would be binding on the member nations.

What types of decisions are embraced in the present thinking of the papers, for example?

Mr. DILLON. Well, they have in the past made all sorts of decisions, and some of them are rather small.

They would say that they would decide that member countries should furnish statistics on a certain subject. They decide that their Secretariat should undertake a study of something.

In the past they have often made decisions, as I mentioned, on the subject of trade liberalization, when they were trying to liberalize their trade within Europe and get rid of these quotas.

That has largely finished and I don't foresee much that would happen there.

They have, in a few cases, made decisions to join together to make some loans to individual members in balance of payments difficulties. That has taken place in the case, I think, of Turkey and more recently Spain, and we were associated with those efforts in both cases.

Now, that would be the type of decision.

ABSTENTION FROM VOTING

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, under the present provisions of the charter, one dissenting vote would defeat the effort to make a decision.

Mr. DILLON. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, then, if a member was desirous of cooperating but did not want to be bound by the decision, would he abstain from participating?

Mr. DILLON. Yes, the phrase they use is that he is not interested. It is the same thing as an abstention.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, is it this subject of decisionmaking that is concerning you in acquainting us with what is contemplated?

Mr. DILLON. That is correct; that is the main thing. I think the rest of it is easy.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you feel someone might say we are surrendering to this agency a part of our sovereignty?

Mr. DILLON. Yes, or something of that nature.

Now it is not our intention to do that at all.

Senator LAUSCHE. Thank you.

Senator GREEN. Mr. Williams?

THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

Senator WILLIAMS. I just have one question that I was going to ask you.

As I understood it, you said the reason that GATT had not been approved was that the executive branch had never considered it to send it up for ratification. Is that correct?

Mr. DILLON. It was never sent up.

Senator WILLIAMS. I was under the impression that Congress, at least on one occasion, had been asked to approve it and the committee refused to take action on it.

Mr. DILLON. I am not aware of it. It may be true way back. I knew that was the case in the OTC.[4] If that had been approved, there would have been a certain enforcement arm of GATT.

Senator WILLIAMS. And Congress rejected it.

Mr. DILLON. They refused to take action on it.

---

[4] Organization for Trade Cooperation.

Senator **Williams**. That was my understanding on it.

Mr. **Dillon**. So that never came into existence. There is no such thing.

Senator **Williams**. To a certain extent, Congress had refused, as I understood it.

Mr. **Dillon**. The OTC was not acted on. It never came into existence, so GATT has no enforcement agencies.

Senator **Williams**. They are the only questions I had.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Green**. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the committee proceeded to other business.]

STATUS OF GENEVA TEST SUSPENSION NEGOTIATIONS

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 11:30 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. Theodore Francis Green presiding.

Present: Senators Green, Sparkman, Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Church, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, Carlson, and Williams.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Denney, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Newhouse, and Miss Goetz, of the committee staff.

Senator **GREEN**. Secretary Dillon has just left. He had some other business that took him away.

Our next witness is Mr. Philip Farley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy. We are anxious to hear you, Mr. Farley, and you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF PHILIP J. FARLEY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DISARMAMENT AND ATOMIC ENERGY

Mr. **FARLEY**. I should like to express on behalf of the Department of State my appreciation to this committee, and to its Subcommittee on Disarmament, for your continuing and constructive interest in the Geneva negotiations for the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests.

We have studied with care the past suggestions of members of the committee. We continue to solicit your suggestions and cooperation, for the Geneva negotiations are of central importance to both the short range and longer range objectives of U.S. foreign policy.

Mr. Chairman, because the committee has not discussed this matter in full session before, I have a prepared statement which attempts to review quite broadly what has happened in the past.

Senator **GREEN**. I suggest you leave a copy for each one of us, and you may give us a summary. We may have to go back again to the floor very shortly.

Mr. **FARLEY**. Fine. I think it might be of particular interest, Mr. Chairman, if I would go briefly through the first section, which deals with the way these negotiations began. The objectives of the United States in entering into them are in the main still valid, and may serve to refresh our memories of something that has perhaps been lost in the very long negotiations which have now gone on for some 16 months, and in which there has been a great deal of both technical and political detail which has, on occasion, served to obscure the purposes.

So if I might, I would like to present this material.

Senator **Green**. Well, proceed in that way.

Mr. **Farley**. Fine.

ORIGINS OF CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS

The present Geneva negotiations had their origins in early 1958, in a period when general disarmament negotiations had reached a dead end. The Western Four Power proposals of August 29, 1957 had not evoked any Soviet interest, and in the U.N. General Assembly in the fall of 1957 there was flat failure in the effort to establish a negotiating body to resume disarmament negotiations. A new road had to be found to carry forward our persistent quest for progress toward arms control.

The first important decision in the chain of events which led to the nuclear test negotiations was, I think, taken by the President on January 9, 1958. He directed an ad hoc working group made up of representatives of the President's Science Advisory Committee, the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct three related studies on nuclear testing. The studies were as follows:

(a) A study of the losses to the United States consequent on a total suspension of nuclear tests at specific future dates.

(b) A symmetrical study of the losses to the Soviet Union that would accrue from cessation of nuclear testing, using the same hypothetical dates.

(c) A study of the technical feasibility of monitoring a test suspension, including the outlines of a surveillance and inspection system.

These studies, which dealt in very substantial detail with pertinent technical considerations, were completed near the end of March 1958. On the basis of detailed comparisons of technical losses in weapons technology that would result to the United States and the U.S.S.R. from a cessation of tests, it was concluded that the Soviet rate of improvement from continued testing after 1958 was likely to be greater than that of the United States. This was due to the inferior Soviet position as of the end of 1958.

On the basis of an analysis, both of our own national capabilities for detection and identification of nuclear tests and of those of a hypothetical international control network, the study also concluded that adequate monitoring of a nuclear test cessation appeared to be technically feasible. The outlines of an international control system were described.

PRELIMINARY DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES

In April 1958, President Eisenhower, in two letters to Premier Khrushchev on April 8 and April 28, urged joint technical studies to consider control requirements for various measures of disarmament. "For example," he said, "why could not designated technical people agree on what would be required so that you would know if we violated an agreement to suspend testing and we would know if you should commit a violation. Studies of this kind are the necessary preliminaries to putting political decisions actually into effect . . . I re-emphasize that these studies are without prejudice to our respective positions on the timing and interdependence of various aspects of disarmament." In short, we were not prepared to reach a decision to negotiate separately on nuclear testing until Soviet willingness to accept the technical requirements for control had been carefully explored.

TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS

After further diplomatic exchanges, a technical study of control requirements along the lines the President had proposed was agreed upon. It got underway on June 30, 1958. The U.S. delegation was led by Dr. James Fisk, now President of Bell Laboratories.

After some initial unsuccessful Soviet maneuvers designed to introduce a political commitment to nuclear test cessation into the technical meeting, the experts settled down to serious technical discussion. By August 22, they reached agreement on a report describing and evaluating the technical aspects of a control system on the basis of the best scientific information available at that time.

It seemed to us then, as it does indeed in retrospect, that the agreement marked a significant advance and important precedent in the long and arduous road of getting the Soviet Union committed to the kind of scientifically based controls that are indispensable for progress in disarmament. It was an important "first" in detailed and objective technical discussions between East and West on the concrete problem of controls in the disarmament field.

In July of 1958, as soon as it became apparent that our objective of serious joint technical considerations of the control problem was in large measure being achieved, further study and planning was undertaken both within the government and in consultation with the United Kingdom to consolidate and carry forward the area of agreement that seemed to be emerging. Proceeding from the U.S. technical report that had been completed in March, study now centered in particular on the broader policy objectives involved in proposing political negotiations on a nuclear test cessation.

U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES

The ultimate U.S. decision to seek an agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests derived from a number of reasons which I enumerate because they remain, in my view, cogent in the formation of our policy today. The principal purposes, in brief, were the following:

(a) To demonstrate the responsibility of the U.S. approach to nuclear matters, and thus to combat the image of the U.S. as a military-minded nation, indifferent to world fears about nuclear war and world hopes that some means might be found to cope with the threat of modern arms.

(b) To attack the "Nth country" problem and limit the development of independent nuclear weapons production capabilities, which would place in a larger number of hands the capacity to trigger a nuclear war.

(c) To break the 12-year disarmament impasse by taking an immediately practical first step that might make subsequent steps come more easily.

(d) To begin to penetrate the Iron Curtain and force Soviet acceptance in practice of the idea of international control.

(e) To demonstrate to the world, as well as to the Soviet Union, U.S. willingness to seek sound agreements with the U.S.S.R., and to probe the sincerity of Soviet professions of a desire for relaxation of tensions.

(f) To freeze the status of Soviet nuclear weapons technology, insofar as possible, while it was still behind ours.

(g) To counter a partially successful Soviet propaganda drive which enabled it to pose as champion of peace on this issue, and to forestall an unequivocal U.N. call for test cessation with or without controls.

(h) To remove the strains in free world solidarity caused by the strong views of such states as Japan, India and the United Kingdom, for example, on the testing issue.

(i) In achieving these objectives, at the same time to dispose of the "fall-out" issue which was stigmatizing the nuclear weapons on which we relied for defense and deterrence.

THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS

Against a background of such considerations as these, the President proposed on August 22, 1958, the day following the completion of the experts' report in Geneva, that the three powers which had tested nuclear weapons—namely, the United Stated, United Kingdom, and Soviet Russia—join in negotiations for a controlled suspension of nuclear weapons tests and the actual establishment of a control system on the basis of the experts' report. The President's statement also contained an announcement that, in order to facilitate the detailed negotiations, the United States was prepared, unless testing was resumed by the Soviet Union, to withhold further testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a period of one year from the beginning of the negotiations.

The General Assembly session then underway had provided an occasion for us to consult the French Foreign Minister, whose country has been represented at the experts' meeting, and to ascertain that he was satisfied with this way of proceeding.

Consequent upon this Presidential statement, together with a similar, simultaneous statement by Prime Minister Macmillan, the current Geneva negotiations got underway on the day we had proposed, October 31, 1958. The objective approach and common methods of the Soviet and Western scientists appeared to have bridged the gap between the positions of the two sides on major technical aspects of inspection and control. Negotiations could begin with a firm agreed technical basis and get directly to the equally difficult and unprecedented task of drafting treaty language.

DIFFICULTIES IN REACHING AGREEMENT

Mr. Chairman, the balance of my statement goes on to describe the two facets of the negotiations which I think perhaps have been the most striking.

One is the very long, drawn-out, arduous task of actually hammering out an agreement on the organizational arrangements and roughly three-fourths of the treaty articles which would incorporate the substance of the agreement into a binding international treaty. While there are a number of matters which have been resolved, there are a number of others in which disagreement still remains. Those are identified and discussed.

The other aspect of the negotiations has been the emergence of inadequacy in the initial technical basis, the finding of our experts and the Soviet experts that we were indeed able to control a suspension of nuclear weapons tests. I describe somewhat more briefly the efforts which were made to get the Soviet Union to discuss the new facts which did call the technical basis into question, the only partially successful efforts to get them to discuss and accept the implications of this, and the course of action which we have just recently taken because of their failure to accept the technical implications.

That is, namely, our introduction of the concept of a phased treaty, which provides by steps beginning with the kind of testing which can now be controlled and which jointly would engage us, the Soviet Union and the other participants in research to solve remaining problems of control, and thus enable the treaty to be extended to the full area of nuclear weapons testing.

Senator **Green**. The balance of this statement deals with that subject?

Mr. **Farley**. Roughly. I would be glad to go through it, or take up questions now.

Senator **Green**. We would have at this point in the record your complete prepared statement printed.

[The complete prepared statement of Mr. Farley is as follows:]

STATEMENT OF PHILIP J. FARLEY BEFORE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE—FEBRUARY 25, 1960

I should like to express on behalf of the Department of State my appreciation to this Committee, and to its Subcommittee on Disarmament, for your continuing and constructive interest in the Geneva negotiations for the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. We have studied with care the past suggestions of members of the Committee. We continue to solicit your suggestions and cooperation, for the Geneva negotiations are of central importance to both the short range and longer range objectives of United States foreign policy.

I propose in this brief introductory statement to deal in rather broad terms with three general topics.

First, U.S. objectives and initial steps in getting the negotiations under way,
Second, what has happened in the course of the negotiations, and
Third, where we stand.

I. Background and U.S. Objectives

The present Geneva negotiations had their origins in early 1958, in a period when general disarmament negotiations had reached a dead end. The Western Four Power proposals of August 29, 1957, had not evoked any Soviet interest, and in the U.N. General Assembly in the fall of 1957 there was flat failure in the effort to establish a negotiating body to resume disarmament negotiations. A new road had to be found to carry forward our persistent quest for progress toward arms control.

The first important decision in the chain of events which led to the nuclear test negotiations was, I think, taken by the President on January 9, 1958. He directed an Ad Hoc Working Group made up of representatives of the President's Science Advisory Committee, the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct three related studies on nuclear testing. The studies were as follows:

(a) A study of the losses to the United States consequent on a total suspension of nuclear tests at specific future dates.

(b) A symmetrical study of the losses to the Soviet Union that would accrue from cessation of nuclear testing, using the same hypothetical dates.

(c) A study of the technical feasibility of monitoring a test suspension, including the outlines of a surveillance and inspection system.

These studies, which dealt in very substantial detail with pertinent technical considerations, were completed near the end of March 1958. On the basis of detailed comparisons of technical losses in weapons technology that would result to the United States and the U.S.S.R. from a cessation of tests, it was concluded that the Soviet rate of improvement from continued testing after 1958 was likely to be greater than the United States due to their inferior position as of the end of 1958. On the basis of an analysis both of our own national capabilities for detection and identification of nuclear tests and of those of a hypothetical international control network, the study also concluded that adequate monitoring of a nuclear test cessation appeared to be technically feasible, and the outlines of an international control system were described.

In April 1958 President Eisenhower, in two letters to Premier Khrushchev on April 8 and April 28, urged joint technical studies to consider control requirements for various measures of disarmament. "For example," he said, "why could not designated technical people agree on what would be required so that you would know if we violated an agreement to suspend testing and we would know if you should commit a violation. Studies of this kind are the necessary preliminaries to putting political decisions actually into effect . . . I re-emphasize that these studies are without prejudice to our respective positions on the timing and interdependence of various aspects of disarmament." In short, we were not prepared to reach a decision to negotiate separately on nuclear testing until Soviet willingness to accept the technical requirements for control had been carefully explored.

After further diplomatic exchanges a technical study of control requirements along the lines the President had proposed was agreed upon and got under way on June 30, 1958. The U.S. Delegation was led by Dr. James Fisk, now President of Bell Laboratories. After some initial unsuccessful Soviet maneuvers designed to introduce a political commitment to nuclear test cessation into the technical meeting, the experts settled down to serious technical discussion and by August 22 reached agreement on a report describing and evaluating the technical aspect of a control system on the basis of the best scientific information available at that time.

It seemed to us then, as it does indeed in retrospect, that the agreement marked a significant advance and important precedent in the long and arduous road of getting the Soviet Union committed to the kind of scientifically based controls that are indispensable for progress in disarmament. It was an important "first" in detailed and objective technical discussions between East and West on the concrete problem of controls in the disarmament field.

In July of 1958 as soon as it became apparent that our objective of serious joint technical considerations of the control problem was in large measure being achieved, further study and planning was undertaken both within the government and in consultation with the United Kingdom to consolidate and carry forward the area of agreement that seemed to be emerging. Proceeding from the U.S. technical report that had been completed in March, study now centered in particular on the broader policy objectives involved in proposing political negotiations on a nuclear test cessation. The ultimate U.S. decision to seek an agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests derived from a number of reasons which I enumerate because they remain, in my view, cogent in the formation of our policy today. The principal purposes, in brief, were the following:

(a) To demonstrate the responsibility of the U.S. approach to nuclear matters, and thus to combat the image of the United States as a military-minded nation, indifferent to world fears about nuclear war and world hopes that some means might be found to cope with the threat of modern arms.

(b) To attack the Nth country problem and limit the development of independent nuclear weapons production capabilities, which would place in a larger number of hands the capacity to trigger a nuclear war.

(c) To break the 12-year disarmament impasse by taking an immediately practical first step that might make subsequent steps come more easily.

(d) To begin to penetrate the Iron Curtain and force Soviet acceptance in practice of the idea of international control.

(e) To demonstrate to the world as well as to the Soviet Union U.S. willingness to seek sound agreements with the U.S.S.R. and to probe the sincerity of Soviet professions of a desire for relaxation of tensions.

(f) To freeze the status of Soviet nuclear weapons technology, insofar as possible, while it was still behind ours.

(g) To counter a partially successful Soviet propaganda drive which enabled it to pose as champion of peace on this issue, and to forestall an unequivocal U.N. call for test cessation with or without controls.

(h) To remove the strains in free world solidarity caused by the strong views of such states as Japan, India and the United Kingdom, for example, on the testing issue.

(i) In achieving these objectives, at the same time to dispose of the "fall-out" issue which was stigmatizing the nuclear weapons on which we relied for defense and deterrence.

Against a background of such considerations as these, the President proposed on August 22, 1958, the day following the completion of the Experts' report in Geneva, that the three powers which had tested nuclear weapons, namely the United States, United Kingdom and U.S.S.R. join in negotiations for a controlled suspension of nuclear weapons tests and the actual establishment of a control system on the basis of the Experts' report. His statement also contained an announcement that in order to facilitate the detailed negotiations the United States was prepared, unless testing was resumed by the Soviet Union, to withhold further testing on its part of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a period of one year from the beginning of the negotiations. The General Assembly session then underway had provided an occasion for us to consult the French Foreign Minister, whose country had been represented at the experts meeting, and to ascertain that he was satisfied with this way of proceeding.

Consequent upon this Presidential statement, together with a similar simultaneous statement by Prime Minister Macmillan, the current Geneva negotiations got under way on the day we had proposed, October 31, 1958. The objective approach and common methods of the Soviet and Western scientists appeared to have bridged the gap between the positions of the two sides on major technical aspects of inspection and control. Negotiations could begin with a firm agreed technical basis and get directly to the equally difficult and unprecedented task of drafting treaty language.

II. The Course of Negotiations

Turning now to what has happened in the Geneva negotiations, I think an analytical approach may be more useful than a chronological one in gaining a quick perspective upon the 176 formal meetings of the conference that have followed to date.

The negotiations have consisted of two simultaneous but quite distinct levels. The first of these has been the laborious process of hammering out a treaty text. Despite many problems and a number of still unresolved issues, there has been slow and steady progress, which I shall review in a moment.

The second level has been the still unsuccessful effort to re-establish an agreed technical basis for a complete and adequately monitored cessation of tests. The emergence of new facts in the fall of 1958 exposed inadequacies in the original experts report. It required a tremendous expenditure of time and effort to get the Soviet Union to acknowledge the relevance of these new data, to examine their meaning, and in part to admit their implications. We cannot offer you any high probability of ultimate success in this effort.

To review first the drafting process, the first issue when the conference commenced, and, indeed for the first six weeks of the negotiations, was that of the paper ban on tests which the Soviets desired as contrasted with the Western position—that the treaty should embody detailed control provisions. On opening day the Soviet Union tabled a one-page treaty to be signed before control provisions were discussed. By Christmas of 1958 they had reluctantly agreed that detailed control provisions should be an integral part of the treaty and had actually tabled a fairly detailed, though inadequate, working paper on controls. The precedent of detailed negotiations on controls which has been established as a result will, I think, make Soviet demands for paper bans in other fields of disarmament in the future seem even more hollow and less convincing than before to world opinion.

Another major issue has been the veto—a long familiar Soviet demand in international negotiations. This is a complex question still short of a satisfactory resolution. The Soviet Union has, however, dropped unconditionally some of its earlier demands for a veto over the day-to-day operations of the system and has committed itself to such an extent that it would be difficult for it not to drop eventually several of its other veto demands. Here, too, as a result of negotiations to date progress has been made which will make any return by the Soviet Union to across-the-board veto demands in future negotiations show up clearly to informed opinion as a backward step indicative of lack of sincerity.

On-site inspection has been the crux of a series of related issues, for no other single component of the control system impinges as does this one upon Soviet secrecy and the concepts and procedures of a closed society. Under persistent Western pressure, the Soviets have dropped their earlier demands for a veto on the dispatch of inspection teams provided a limited quota or number of inspections to be carried out each year can be agreed. They now accept, in principle at least, permanent inspection teams and free access by such teams to sites of possible suspicious events. Within the last two weeks the Soviets have gone further and accepted important elements of Western proposed criteria for objective instrument readings which would determine the eligibility of such events for inspection.

Another issue has been control post staffing. At first the Soviet Union proposed, as they did also in the surprise attack discussions in 1958, a staffing pattern by which all foreign personnel would be excluded except one or two at each post to serve merely as observers. Now the Soviet Union has, although still with some strings attached, come close to acceptance of the staffing pattern proposed by the U.S.: namely, one-third U.S.-U.K. nationals, one-third Soviet nationals, and one-third nationals of non-permanent members of the organization. In contrast with their original refusal to accept foreign personnel beyond 1/30th or at most 1/15th of the total control contingent, they would now accept foreign personnel up to 2/3rds of the total. This, too, is a gain of value as a precedent.

Another major issue on which there has been movement in the Soviet position is that of the scope of the treaty and membership of the control organization. Partly, perhaps, to make its veto demands more tenable, the Soviet Union entered into the negotiations proposing a three power treaty. It has now been brought to accept in agreed treaty language an organization in which states other than the three original parties play a major role. We considered their acceptance of a treaty of world-wide scope essential to assure the world-wide controls which are technically required.

A further issue was that of nuclear detonations for peaceful purposes. The Soviets at first opposed providing for such explosions but have now agreed in principle that such experimentation should be permitted under the Treaty under safeguards which would prohibit weapons development in connection with such detonations.

Finally, and of particular importance as a precedent for sound future arms control agreements, the Soviets accepted, after loud initial objections, the text proposed by the U.S. regarding the duration of the treaty. This text explicitly recognizes that the treaty will be binding only so long as its obligations and provisions (including the installation and effective operation of the control system) are being observed and fulfilled. The Soviets also accepted our proposals for periodic review of the effectiveness of the control system, and this is now incorporated in an agreed article of the treaty. This is one more forward step in gaining Soviet recognition of the interdependence of effective controls and arms control obligations.

These changes in the Soviet position, are, we believe, of genuine significance for future negotiations even if one recognizes that the Soviet Union entered the present negotiations with a position which was untenable from the propaganda standpoint, and which from the standpoint of serious negotiations was patently impossible. In sum their importance lies in the Soviet Union's increasing commitment in principle to control and to specific arrangements essential for that control to be effective.

As regards shifts in our own position, our single most important modification has concerned the duration of the treaty. At the outset we stated that an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests could be extended on a year to year basis. Now we have agreed to accept an indefinite supension. However, this concession has been more than compensated by the explicit proviso I have mentioned that the obligation to suspend testing will last only so long as the terms of the treaty are being fulfilled and observed. A related change in our position on duration of the treaty involved the dropping of the original link to progress in other measures of disarmament. This change has enabled us to focus the issue in negotiations squarely on effectiveness of controls.

The only other noteworthy modification in the U.S. position related to control post staffing. The United States has consistently insisted on international as opposed to national staffing. While initially the United States argued for excluding host country nationals from technical or supervisory positions in control posts, however, we have now proposed that up to one-third of such personnel may come from the host country. Since Soviet personnel up to one-third of the total could not logically be excluded from the central headquarters of the organization which processes the data, it seemed a reasonable compromise to apply the same principle to the individual control posts which collect the raw data.

III. Where We Stand

As a result of these moves and of lengthy negotiations on matters of technical background, of language and of detail, the broad outlines of a possible treaty have emerged, founded squarely on the Western-proposed pattern, a treaty which would bear no recognizable resemblance to the one-page treaty tabled by the Soviet Union on October 21, 1958. Nineteen treaty sections, including seventeen treaty articles, a preamble and an annex on the Preparatory Commission have been agreed. If completed the treaty would have between 20 and 25 articles, a preamble, and 3 annexes dealing respectively with the detection and identification system, with privileges and immunities of the control system personnel, and with the Preparatory Commission. On some of these matters not already recorded in agreed language a substantial area of agreement has been defined in the give and take of long discussion. This is particularly true of the lengthy and important annex on privileges and immunities where remaining differences now appear to be small. Privileges and immunities of inspectors are keys to their ability to operate effectively and without obstruction.

One should not of course, forecast success by the mere extent of agreed text, for the most crucial issues, those which will in fact determine whether or not a satisfactory treaty can be achieved, are still to be resolved.

Broadly speaking these remaining issues lie in the categories of organizational issues on the one hand, and technical questions relating to the control system on the other. The latter category encompasses the fundamental questions of feasibility of adequate control with the system defined by the Experts in 1958 and thus of the nature of the obligations that can now be undertaken with respect to the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests, for the United States as you know is not prepared to assume obligations to cease nuclear weapons tests in environments which are beyond the reach of effective control.

Organizational questions which remain to be resolved include the following:

The composition of the control commission is undecided. The Soviets insist upon parity or equality in numbers between states in the Western alliance and those in the Communist bloc. We have thus far maintained that the seven-nation commission should not include a majority from either side, and have suggested that it might consist of 3 Western states, 2 from the Soviet bloc and 2 neutrals.

The veto issue is not yet fully resolved. Soviet withdrawal of its veto on the despatch of on-site inspections is conditional upon agreement to a small predetermined number of on-site inspections for each year. We insist that the number or level of inspection must be related to the dimensions of the control problem, and we have tended to prefer a percentage basis of unidentified events rather than a fixed number of inspections as the most direct way to express this relationship. Soviet withdrawal of its veto on recruitment of staff is conditional upon agreement on the proportions in which the staff is to be recruited. This in turn is held up because the Soviets tie their acceptance of our "thirds" proposal in staffing to a similar arrangement which would give them parity in the control commission. No resolution has yet been found for the issue of a veto on the budget. Thus while solutions can be foreseen the full removal of the original Soviet veto list as an obstacle to agreement has not yet been accomplished.

The important question of extension of the control system and of the treaty obligations beyond the three original parties to the treaty has not yet been formally considered, since the three parties at Geneva are in general agreement that a definition of their own obligations should precede any arrangements affecting other states.

The question of staffing is also not fully resolved as it relates to the nationality of inspection teams, the chief of post at control posts, and key positions such as that of deputy administrator in the control organization.

Then, too, the specific treaty language relating to the installation and operation of controls for outer space remains for discussion.

On the technical side the unresolved questions are more fundamental.

First, there is the question of the level of inspection necessary to assure adequate control in the light of the new seismic data. This involves not only the question of a numerical as opposed to a percentage manner of expressing the level of inspection, but more fundamentally the question of the relationship of the number, however measured, to scientific facts and the detection capabilities of the control system. We have not yet been able to bring the Soviets even to the point of naming a number at all. Despite the technical facts we have adduced, they continue to maintain that the quota should be "very small."

There is, too, Annex I, the substantial portion of the treaty which will define the technical characteristics and mode of operation of the detection and identification system. The U.S. tabled such a draft over a year ago, but fundamental disagreements over the so-called new seismic data and their implications have made negotiations on precise language thus far impracticable.

Next there is the question of joint research and the contents of a specific research program to overcome present inadequacies. The Soviets want such research to begin only after the Control Commission is established, and even then to contain no provision for nuclear detonations to test and improve the system.

Also unresolved is the question of criteria or instrument readings determining the eligibility of unidentified seismic events for inspection. Here there has been significant progress in the past two weeks toward Soviet acceptance of the kind of criteria our scientists recommended in the recent technical working group for locating events and identifying some of them. We are exploring the proposal carefully both here and in Geneva.

The most basic complex of technical issues, however, are not in any way resolved by the new Soviet proposal. They relate to the ability of the control system to detect and identify nuclear explosions in the lower yield ranges. The scientific complexities here involve the feasibility of instrumental techniques for distinguishing between earthquakes and nuclear explosions, the number of earthquakes equivalent to various yield ranges of nuclear explosions, the problems of muffling or decoupling nuclear explosions by the construction of large underground cavities, and, broadly, the whole interpretation to be assigned to the 5 nuclear explosions in the Hardtack series which have been conducted since the Geneva experts report of 1958.

In the fact of the sharp disagreement at the end of the latest technical meeting, the United States, in an effort to consolidate existing areas of agreement while resolving remaining technical differences through a program of joint research, advanced on February 11 a proposal for the controlled cessation of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space to the highest point for which installation of adequate controls can be agreed, under water, and beneath the surface of the earth within present limits of detection and identification. I should like to insert in the record at this point the February 11 statement of the White House outlining this proposal. In order to bypass existing technical disagreements the proposal called for establishing in the first phase of the treaty a signal strength threshold of 4.75. Events which gave a signal of this size would be eligible for inspection, and nuclear explosions which gave such a signal would be prohibited. The threshold, or lower limit, of detection would be progressively lowered as the results of joint research are incorporated in the system. This would enable us to halt at once all tests that can now be controlled and to work systematically toward the achievement of the complete test cessation which has been our goal since the beginning of the negotiations.

The Soviet response thus far, while negative, has shown a significant sensitivity to the logic of our approach. The Soviets have indeed stated again their familiar position that all tests must be banned from the outset. However, under the pressure of our criticism of their position on underground detection, the Soviet delegation has counterproposed criteria for the location and identification of seismic events which incorporate many of the proposals of U.S. scientists.

Our task in the immediate future in the negotiations is threefold. First, it is to continue the day-to-day spade work of reaching agreement on the numerous elements which would be applicable either to a comprehensive or to a phased threshold treaty or in many cases to other disarmament agreements. Second, it is to consolidate in agreed criteria the yielding to technical facts represented by the Soviet move. And third, it is to continue the process of patient persuasion that may lead, by a phased treaty approach and joint research, to resolution of the stubborn technical issues which the Soviets refused to face realistically in the technical working group which concluded its work in December.

The process of negotiations with the Communists unfortunately is slow and arduous. Successful negotiations such as the Austrian peace treaty have usually been the result of almost infinite patience and persistence. The negotiating process is less akin to the logical process of give and take perhaps than to the geological process of erosion, for it involves the wearing down of Soviet resistance at every step. In the Geneva negotiations the problem is complicated by the fact that it is a first treaty in the field of arms control, a pioneering venture for which few precedents exist and in which every precedent established is of lasting importance. We are frank to say we do not yet see a clear road to the successful conclusion of the treaty. Constant progress, however, is being achieved. In our approach to the day-to-day specifics of negotiations we are guided by the same significant objectives which prompted us to initiate these negotiations, and we are as convinced now as we were a year and a half ago that their achievement merits our best and most imaginative efforts.

CONTINUED SEARCH FOR A COMMON GROUND

Mr. **Farley**. I might add that the reason I wanted to go through the first section of my statement with you is that perhaps the single question we are asked most often is why, in the face of the difficulties and the failure to reach agreement to which I have just alluded, we have gone ahead with a negotiation that has gone on for 16 months. Many of the original reasons for entering into the negotiations, which I did read over with you, still have very great importance in our thinking. They explain why we have not stopped in the efforts to find an answer here; why we are still trying to see if there is a possible common ground which would enable a sound and enforceable agreement to be reached.

Senator **Green**. Thank you very much, Mr. Farley.

Senator Hickenlooper, did you have some questions?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I do.

MONITORING SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENT

Mr. Farley, I was out of the room for just a moment. Would you describe how far and in what detail we have gone in the matter of accessibility to the Soviet Union for the investigation of suspected events and what the Russians have actually agreed to along that line up to now?

Mr. **Farley**. Yes, sir, exploration of this matter of accessibility has involved a number of things. One is a specification of just what kind of access would be required under given circumstances. This involves, first, the right to place fixed control posts with instruments in the numbers and ranges of locations that were originally identified in the experts' report. Now that, I think, is substantially agreed to.

The next problem is the question of occasional aircraft flights which might be necessary in case there were suspicion of a weapons test and there were need to fly to the area in order to see if debris in the air could be intercepted. There, the general procedures have been agreed. There was still argument as to the extent to which such flights could be covered by designating in advance specific flight corridors in the Soviet Union, and the extent to which it might be necessary to make provision for some exceptions to this.

Accessibility by mobile inspection teams on the ground to places wherein particular nuclear underground explosions might be suspected, is the question on which there is the sharpest and most fundamental disagreement at the present time.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. In other words, there is no agreement on it?

Mr. **Farley**. There is not agreement on that.

There is agreement on the principle there must be provision for mobile inspection teams onsite, ground inspection teams to go to places where events are suspected of being nuclear explosions. There is disagreement as to the circumstances under which this should be done, and particularly how many.

NUMBER OF EVENTS OPEN TO INSPECTION

The recent Soviet counterproposal which has been in the newspapers, their acceptance of our so-called criteria for deciding when an event was eligible for inspection, relates to the first part of that; namely, an agreement as to the circumstances or technical grounds on which an inspection could be justified. But it does not remove their position that no matter how many such events may be identified as possibly deserving inspection, nevertheless the actual number of inspections must be very small and must be fixed by political agreement.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In other words, there is no agreement yet as to the number or percentage——

Mr. FARLEY. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER [continuing]. Of inspections or eligible inspections.

Mr. FARLEY. Right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Regardless of the scientific data or scientific indications in that case.

Mr. FARLEY. That is, I think, the most fundamental and important point.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is No. 1.

Now, No. 2, having no agreement on either the percentage or the number of inspections for suspicious incidents, they have not come to the point of any definite agreement or any clear understanding as to the method of inspection of an incident, even though it comes within the gap category of those that would be permitted to be inspected, have they?

PROCEDURES AND METHODS OF INSPECTION

Mr. FARLEY. There are two things. The detailed procedures for carrying out an inspection are something which I think would clearly have to be left to be laid down by the governing body of the controlling commission, in order to ensure that this is not put off to such a time with no legislation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand the details of the thing would have to be worked out. But there is no agreement on the part of the Russians on that point, is there?

Mr. FARLEY. I was only making the point, sir, that formal agreement on that would not be part of the negotiating process.

There have been fairly extensive discussions to see whether we had any common understanding of what would be required in the way, for example, of the integral equipment of an inspection team. There would have to be provision for low level flights to see whether there were indications in the area where a suspicious signal had originated that it might have been nuclear. The principles on which you would lay down the procedures have been discussed.

The other aspect of the thing which is of more importance, and I think it is sometimes realized, is just the question of the rights of the foreign inspectors in the territory of the United States and the Soviet Union. There, we have tabled a very carefully worked-out annex laying down the privileges and immunities of these inspectors and other control system personnel. That has now been agreed with the exception of two paragraphs which are not major points.

So there has been a good deal done here, all within the framework.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That still is frosting on the cake, in my view. It is comparatively easy if you agree on what their immunities and rights would be, if there is any determination as to what they can do. That is the meat of this coconut, the inspection and accessibility and the freedom with which inspection teams can operate in looking into suspicious events.

IMPORTANCE OF PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

Mr. FARLEY. Sir, I agree completely that until we have all aspects of the agreement worked out, the fact that we have this or that part does not mean that we have a deal. On the other hand, we could have agreement that you have to send any number of inspection teams out, as required by the number of suspicious events.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You say we could have. What do you mean?

Mr. FARLEY. I am sorry. I was trying to put this hypothetically. If we were able to achieve agreement on the principle that you would send as many inspection teams out as were necessary, unless you had detailed agreement as to their right to move in the Soviet Union, so that the inspectors would not be subject to various forms of hampering and practical obstacles, the purpose could be defeated. So I do suggest strengthening the privileges and immunities document. It is of considerable significance.

Senator GREEN. Does either side seem to be inclined to delay, or both?

Mr. FARLEY. I do not think either side is, as a systematic matter, trying for delay. From time to time when new technical facts come up or new proposals are put forward on one side or the other, there will be some stretching out while the situation is re-examined. But as far as we can tell, there is no deliberate effort to delay.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It seems to be pretty fundamental in the Russian position that they are not going to let people into their country with real freedom of movement and freedom of access.

EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENT

Senator GREEN. You say there is no effort on either side to delay. Is there any effort on either side to hasten an agreement?

Mr. FARLEY. I think the answer to that must be that the Soviet tactics from the first have been to say it is much more important to reach an agreement quickly than it is to have all the details spelled out as to how it would operate.

We have been in the position from the first of insisting that the importance of the commitments here was so great that it was essential to have a clear and sound understanding, adequately covered in the treaty and its annex, as to how it would be implemented and how the inspection would be operated. We have not felt that we could hasten that process of assuring adequate inspection—adequate organizational arrangements—to permit it.

Senator GREEN. Do the Russians say that if you keep this present attitude they can never reach agreement?

Mr. **Farley**. They say if we cannot agree to a comprehensive agreement which bans all forms of nuclear weapons testing from the outset, there will not be an agreement.

Senator **Green**. And what is our answer to that?

Mr. **Farley**. We are struck with the fact that the Soviet position and the amount of give in their position is always only determined when you put enough pressure on them so that they have to either shift or finally say this is no deal. It is interesting to us that, even though they have said they will only agree to a comprehensive treaty, when we put forward the phased proposal—the threshold proposal which the President authorized on February 11—we got a very important shift in the Soviet position.

They disowned their technical people on the question of the criteria for selecting an event and accepted that of our people. This indicates to us that there still is movement in their position, and we are trying to see if we can find more of that.

Senator **Green**. Mr. Hickenlooper, have you finished?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Yes.

Senator **Green**. Senator Mansfield?

Senator **Mansfield**. I have a few questions, Mr. Chairman.

CONSENSUS WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Farley, is there friction within the administration as to the need for continuing these negotiations in Geneva?

Mr. **Farley**. I think, sir, the answer to that is that we have a very vigorous debate on all the various possible courses of action, which come up on the basic point that the United States has an important interest in trying to reach a controlled agreement to suspend tests. I think it is fair to say there is agreement in the administration.

Senator **Mansfield**. There is agreement, or disagreement?

Mr. **Farley**. There is agreement that it is important, and a sound objective.

Senator **Mansfield**. Is it the desire of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Defense Department to resume testing?

Mr. **Farley**. To that I think I should say that the Atomic Energy Commission has responsibility for improving our weapons. The Defense Department has responsibility for seeing that proper application is made of nuclear weapons. In our military planning, they do point out to us, as I think they properly should, the fact that so long as we do not resume testing we are, to some extent, limiting the variety and effectiveness of our nuclear weapons arsenal.

Senator **Mansfield**. Does that indicate a possible disagreement about the continuation of these negotiations at Geneva?

Mr. **Farley**. There, sir, in the end we have the military significance of what we could make through resuming testing balancing against the kind of broad national considerations that are identified in the few pages of my statement I read to you. The responsibility for balancing these belongs to the President and there, I think we have had a consistent line throughout the negotiations.

TESTING BY U.S.S.R., U.S.

Senator **Mansfield**. Has the Soviet Union resumed any testing that you know of since 1958?

Mr. **Farley**. We know, of course, of at least two tests which the Soviet Union conducted after the negotiations began on October 31, in the first week of November. We have no knowledge of any tests which the Soviet Union has conducted since that time. In the absence of control machinery inside the Soviet Union, there cannot be a perfect assurance. I think it is right to say that there is a fairly high degree of confidence that they have not resumed testing, but not with certainty.

Senator **Mansfield**. Have we been conducting any nuclear tests in salt mines?

Mr. **Farley**. No, sir. We have conducted some small high explosive shots in order to test some of the theory of how explosions couple or put their energy into the earth, because in many respects you can learn a great deal from shots with high explosives. Ultimately, to improve our knowledge in this area would require doing this with nuclear weapons, but that has not been done yet, and there are no firm plans as yet for doing this.

Senator **Mansfield**. Now, if the President decides to resume nuclear testing, will he do it—as I am sure he can on his own responsibility—or will he consult with members of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee before making a decision?

Mr. **Farley**. I do not believe I can answer that question, Senator. It is my understanding in the past that this has been essentially a matter for the President's own determination.

Senator **Mansfield**. I just wanted to raise the question.

Mr. **Farley**. I would yield to Senator Gore, if he can correct me on that.

Senator **Mansfield**. That is all right.

Mr. **Farley**. I believe it is a matter of information rather than consultation.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF GENEVA CONFERENCE

Senator **Mansfield**. Do you think that, even though the negotiations at Geneva have dragged out for so many months, significant progress has already been made?

Mr. **Farley**. Sir, I think the progress is of very considerable importance.

In the statement which I have left here and only partially read, I have attempted to indicate the extent to which the treaty provisions—the agreement on principal matters of control—have established very important benchmarks for future negotiations. You see, these Geneva negotiations are serviced by a United Nations secretariat, even though they are private, and the full records are going to be made available for study. This is a matter which is going to be studied with the greatest care in, I think, most of the countries of the world, where they are made available.

This means that what the Soviet Union has conceded here in the form of control posts, the principle of ground inspection and aircraft flights, and the arrangements which it has admitted are necessary if these various forms of control are to work are all on record. The Soviet Union will find it difficult to argue against the record when, as we hope we will, we return to actual, formal negotiations of other disarmament agreements.

In general, there has also been very real advantage in that I think the United States has shown a kind of persistence and a responsible effort to push just as far as possible in this negotiation. This has stood us in very good stead in the United Nations, last year for example, and in many other respects. I think we have gained two kinds of very important political advantage from this.

Senator **Mansfield**. Well, now, getting back to my original question, do you think that significant progress has been made in the negotiations over the months since the Geneva Conference started?

Mr. **Farley**. There has been. The difficulty is to describe the relative significance of the three-fourths of an agreement that has been reached as against the one-fourth that has not. As Senator Hickenlooper so rightly pointed out, until you have the whole agreement you can lose all of it.

IS THE U.S. SEEKING A PERFECT TREATY?

Senator **Mansfield**. I was talking about progress. Is it the position of the administration that what we seek is a perfect treaty, or will they be willing to accept an imperfect treaty which may not give us all we want but might bring about a hope for mankind that there is a possibility of stabilization in this field?

Mr. **Farley**. We have not felt from the outset that one could expect to get a 100-percent foolproof agreement. Any such standard of what was acceptable, we think, would be unrealistic and unnecessary for our own security. But the problem as we have seen it has been, rather, whether we are going to have an agreement here which clearly permits quite an easy evasion and escape from the control responsibility by the other party. We have some very unfortunate experiences in the past in North Korea and in Vietnam with imperfect agreements, where the inspection mechanism and the agreements which underlay it simply were not adequate.

We believe that the new technical data which were developed and introduced last year, and the theories which have withstood such testing as we have given them so far, have the possibilities of evasion through concealment and decoupling. We believe these offer real opportunities, not the kind where it would be just sort of an even risk. There is a pretty safe way to evade the agreement, and unless we can see a way around it, we think it is not quite adequate to say that we are asking a perfect treaty when something less would be acceptable.

Senator **Mansfield**. Mr. Farley, I know it is pretty hard to carry on these negotiations, especially with the Soviet Union, and at times they are both disconcerting and disturbing. But I sincerely hope we have the patience and will go on for 16 more months or longer, if need be, in an attempt to work out a mutually satisfactory agreement.

Senator **Green**. Are you leaving, Mr. Mansfield?

Senator **Mansfield**. I am finished, Mr. Chairman. I do have to leave.

Senator **Green**. Mr. Gore, will you kindly take the chair?

Senator **Gore** [presiding]. Yes.

SOVIET CESSATION OF TESTING

Mr. Farley, when you remarked a few moments ago that we have reasonable confidence that the Soviets had not conducted tests since the two they conducted in the first week of November 1958, do you mean that to be a comprehensive statement, or do you mean that to apply to those categories of tests in which we think detection would be possible and probable?

Mr. **Farley**. With regard to tests in the atmosphere and under water, I think we are quite confident that they have not tested. With regard to underground tests, and high altitude tests, we cannot have assurance from our national monitoring system. I think I can say that we do have some other resources of knowing whether or not they have activity under way, and these give us at least some additional negative evidence that there has not been testing activity. But this again can never give us certainty.

I think it is right to say to the committee that we have discovered that we did not actually pick up, even with our own detection network, all of the Soviet tests. This is something we have learned in the past 2 years and there are uncertainties here.

Senator **Gore**. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator **Gore**. Back on the record.

Senator Carlson?

QUALITY OF DETECTION METHODS

Senator **Carlson**. First, I am thoroughly in accord with what the Senator from Montana said about continuing these negotiations. I hope, despite all the irritation and problems we have, that we will not be the nation to give up holding these meetings.

The question I want to ask you is this: Are we using the very best means that we have available to detect these tests? Can they be improved under the circumstances?

Mr. **Farley**. I have spoken already, Senator, about the fact that, in some respects, we had in the negotiations a political negotiation and a technical negotiation. We have had in addition, back here in the United States, and to some extent in cooperation with our British friends, technical efforts to understand the detection problem better. I think that the difficulties which we have found had the most play in the newspapers.

What has not been recognized so well is that we have put a very great effort in trying to find ways around these difficulties and improving detection methods. As I think we reported to the Subcommittee on Disarmament of this committee, we now have a program of roughly $8.4 million this year to improve the instruments and techniques for detection. We are engaged, with the very active assistance of the Defense Department and AEC, in an extensive program of trying to make sure that we have the best possible methods.

Senator **Carlson**. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Gore**. Senator Lausche?

SOUNDNESS OF SOVIET CONTENTIONS

Senator **Lausche**. In your statement under (a), you state the principal purpose in brief is, "To demonstrate the responsibility of the United States approach to nuclear matters and thus to combat the image of the United States as a military-minded nation." There is more to that paragraph, but I will not read it.

My disturbance presently comes principally from the large number of Americans who are believing the Russians and not believing our United States. With many, the word of Khrushchev is acceptable while the word of the President is rejected.

I would like to have you point out, if you can, instances in which Russia has made claims, exhibiting a purpose to ban tests effectively where your negotiations demonstrated that their position was not true or was unsound. You state in your paper that practically all of the proposals which you made had been accepted with certain exceptions, and that those contained in the one-page paper submitted by the Soviets have not been accepted.

Do you have in mind my question generally?

Mr. **Farley**. Yes, I can give you several examples, and may I then see if they are the kind of thing you are after?

Senator **Lausche**. I will give you the kind of thing I am after. It has been claimed, as I understand it, that scientific equipment was now adequate to definitely tell whether a nuclear or an ordinary earth tremor was the report on the seismograph. That is the Soviet claim, that equipment would demonstrate it. We claim there are certain types of tremors that you couldn't demonstrate.

Mr. **Farley**. That is correct.

Senator **Lausche**. Now, go ahead.

Mr. **Farley**. Just to finish that one, we think that the recent counterproposal of the Soviet Union accepting our criteria, which indeed do not successfully identify most tremors as earthquakes or nuclear explosions, is in effect an admittance by the Soviet Union that they were wrong and we are right.

SOVIET REVERSAL ON NATIONAL MEANS OF DETECTION

Even before that—even before we got into the negotiations—the basic Soviet claim was that you did not need any international control system et al.; that one could tell satisfactorily with his own national detection system. The original experts' report of 1958, in effect, was an acceptance by the Soviet Union of our position that you would have to add to national capabilities a quite extensive international control network for effective monitoring.

When we began the negotiations, the Soviet Union felt that one could adequately police these tests with personnel in the Soviet Union who were all Soviet nationals. This kind of self-inspection arrangement was obviously an untenable thing. They have had to concede to the principle that you need an international staff, predominantly foreign, if the inspection is indeed to be objective and effective.

The Soviet Union originally said that if you were going to have inspections you could perfectly well have them by agreement. If there is a suspicious event in the Soviet Union, ask the Soviet Union; if it agrees, go in and inspect it. That was vetoed on the dispatch of on-site inspection teams. The criticisms we have mounted on that have had their effect, and the Soviets have had to agree to the principle that inspection was meaningless if it could be vetoed by the country itself.

Those are perhaps the most clear-cut cases. I believe I identify some others in my statement, but these are perhaps the sharpest.

HAVE U.S. CONTENTIONS BEEN SOUND?

Senator **LAUSCHE**. Are there any instances in which they have clearly demonstrated a purpose to achieve agreement and where the proof shows that we were on weak ground?

Mr. **FARLEY**. Well, the basic problem we have had in the past year has arisen from the fact that we are the ones who developed the new technical data which raised the questions regarding the effectiveness of control. The Soviet Union has been able to claim that we did, in order to evade an agreement, make it difficult. We have had to establish, by insisting on joint examination by their scientists and ours, that these were indeed actual facts; that the implications we attributed to these facts were objectively and scientifically arrived at.

But that has been really the only case of that kind, and it is not quite, I think, the kind you were asking before—cases where we have had flatly to admit that we were in error or wrong about a position. At the moment, at least, I don't recall any clear-cut instance of that kind.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. In what field, in your opinion, have they made their most effective blow in putting us on the defensive as far as good faith is concerned in trying to reach an agreement?

Mr. **FARLEY**. Well, I think it is the matter to which I referred.

Senator **GORE**. You just stated——

Mr. **FARLEY**. Insistence on our part that the scientific facts require reappraisal. Then we must face the consequences of the facts and do the reappraisal.

The Soviets said that we were welching on a political agreement. We said the question of scientific facts is not a political agreement.

Senator **GORE**. Might I interrupt?

Senator **LAUSCHE**. Yes.

SOVIET "TOTAL BAN" TACTIC

Senator **GORE**. The very first day the conference met, I was there. The chief Russian delegate proposed that the three powers sign a treaty that day. He said, "I have one already written."

Senator **LAUSCHE**. Yes?

Senator **GORE**. "Stopping all tests for all time to come."

We had Ambassador Wadsworth suggest the necessity of having some terms for inspection, control and detection machinery. Well, that was something he said we would talk about later.

So that has been their tactic all along, is that not true, Mr. Farley?

Mr. **FARLEY**. That is right.

Senator **GORE**. They are still on that single one track, the complete ban, simple treaty. Ban everything and it is unnecessary to work the details out.

Mr. **Farley**. That is right.

Senator **Gore**. Except to work them out later.

Mr. **Farley**. Yes.

Senator **Gore**. Excuse me, Senator Lausche.

Senator **Lausche**. That is all right.

Then the principal point on which you disagree is that you are insisting upon an arrangement that will be effective.

Mr. **Farley**. That is right.

Senator **Lausche**. And, in the maximum degree, beyond the capacity of being hidden or broken.

Mr. **Farley**. That is correct, Senator. We don't ask for 100 percent. We do ask that it not be easy for an evader to conduct a concealed test, really confident that he will not be caught.

Senator **Lausche**. Now I am getting down in your statement, where you point out you have achieved a lot. You say there are remaining issues.

Mr. **Farley**. That is correct.

Senator **Lausche**. And you recognize that they are significant.

Now, one of the issues is the composition of the commission. Will you elaborate upon that a little bit?

COMPOSITION OF CONTROL COMMISSION

Mr. **Farley**. Yes.

Since this will be a control organization with a considerable number of personnel, a considerable budget and considerable responsibility, the governing body must have very real powers. Accordingly, the composition of that body and its ability to make decisions that are veto-free on all major issues, and which on the bulk of things cannot be hampered by an irresponsible or an interested minority, has been one of the major objectives.

As you are well aware, we are conducting this discussion of the control commission for a nuclear control test organization at a time when there is a concerted Soviet drive for larger, as they call it, parity representation in international bodies. Now, parity representation in a control commission with real decisionmaking responsibilities could be the equivalent of a veto in another guise.

Thus, in addition to our basic concern in the Department of State that parity for the Soviet bloc is not a fair reflection of their importance and their numerical ratio to the rest of the states in the world, there is our concern that a parity or even a heavily-loaded composition in their favor would obstruct the ability of the control commission to actually carry out its responsibilities.

Senator **Lausche**. What has been your basic review on what the composition should be?

Mr. **Farley**. We have felt that the principle should be that neither side should have an automatic majority; that there should be some fair recognition of the basic line-up of states in the world. We conceded that the Soviet Union, as a nuclear power, has a right to somewhat greater percentage of representation than it would get simply from the fact that there are nine Soviet bloc states.

So, adding these three things together, the fairest arrangement which we have seen would be three Western or free world states, two Soviet bloc states, and two of the so-called neutrals. But this has not been well received by the Soviet Union.

VETO POWERS SOUGHT BY U.S.S.R.

Senator **Lausche**. Now, was this the subject to veto power that the Soviet Union has been insisting upon?

Mr. **Farley**. This appears in a number of forms, some more difficult than the others. The first important veto, I believe, which they asked for, was the one that I referred to—the right to say yes or no on sending an inspection team into their territory.

Senator **Lausche**. And that is the one Senator Gore referred to?

Mr. **Farley**. I believe he also referred to that. There they have given us only a conditional satisfaction. They have said, "We will not insist on that veto if you will agree with us in advance that only so many controllers, or inspection teams, will be sent in each year, and that this will be a very low number."

Senator **Gore**. And they haven't agreed to a number yet. They want us to agree in advance before there is any agreement as to the number to be permitted.

Mr. **Farley**. Any agreement that might require inspection.

There are other vetoes where it is somewhat more debatable, but whether it is desirable. . . . For example, we may well feel ourselves that our own interests would be protected if we had a veto over the total size of the budget. Perhaps that is a fair trade.

Senator **Lausche**. Yes. Now, getting next to the question of the extension of the control system, you have had dispute on that. Just how would the control system be extended?

EXTENSION OF CONTROL SYSTEM TO OTHER COUNTRIES

Mr. **Farley**. Sir, so far there has not been dispute. While there has not been real resolution of the question, it has only been very informally discussed with the Soviet Union. This is really a matter which has been determined by us.

We have been reluctant to have explicitly discussed, in particular, the manner in which France and Communist China would probably be brought into the agreement, because of the political implications of doing that before we knew whether we really had a deal between us and the Soviet Union. But the concept by which it would be done is understood and agreed, in principle.

Senator **Lausche**. I see.

Mr. **Farley**. That is, that you would set up in the treaty a requirement that the control system and the obligation not to engage in tests would be extended in three specified phases beginning with the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, and going next to the contiguous countries, which brings in France and China. This would be done specifically by name.

Finally, it would be done with the rest of the world. The second and third phases extending the joining and the extent of the control system would have to be completed within a given time period, or we or any other party would have the right to withdraw from the treaty. So our protection would come over time—if, for example, Communist China did not join.

Senator **Gore**. Could I interrupt just a moment?

Senator **Lausche**. Yes.

Senator **Gore**. I was not aware that this particular agreement in principle had been reached. Has this been a matter of record during negotiation, or one of informal off-the-record discussions?

Mr. **Farley**. That is a proper correction. It is something in between the two.

In the discussions, Tsarapkin has said a couple of times that he understands the meaning of our duration clause as it relates to the principle in Annex 1—that you will identify three phases by which the extension of the treaty to the rest of the world will be accomplished. As I understand what you are going to do there, you want to get out—and it doesn't work.

Senator **Gore**. In other words, by informal discussion he understands what we mean when we use that particular phrase?

Mr. **Farley**. I was trying to say it is informal discussion, on the record.

In addition, there have been some off-the-record contacts of the kind you describe, in which it is recognized as particularly important to get the two countries I named in.

Senator **Gore**. Thank you, Senator.

ARE THE SOVIETS WILLING TO CEASE TESTING?

Senator **Lausche**. Just one further question. This team that was designated by the President to make the study as to the losses that would be respectively sustained by the Soviets and ourselves, concluded that the losses to the Soviets would be greater if the tests were discontinued than they would be to the United States. Is that right?

Mr. **Farley**. That is correct.

Senator **Lausche**. Well, now, on the basis of that, would you assume that the Soviets would be willing, and are not now making any tests?

Mr. **Farley**. I believe that for several reasons. One is that the Soviet Union has very considerable stakes, just as we have, in the estimates of the people around the world on its approach to disarmament and peace.

They have made this question of testing of nuclear weapons one of the key measures. They have themselves gotten in a slightly vulnerable position because they did test twice after the negotiations began. It would be a difficult thing for them to do if there were any chance that it would be found out.

I think that they have a political objective which reflects a somewhat different assessment of what kind of pressure an agreement would put on us than we do. We believe that an agreement to end nuclear weapons testing under controls would lead us inevitably and very quickly to agreement to ban nuclear weapons generally. We believe if you were confident that nuclear weapons testing were ended, the single thing which has most excited people and raised concern about nuclear weapons would be removed, and there would be less pressure for irresponsible, uncontrolled acts.

The other thing I must say is that most of us who have been engaged in the negotiation believe that to some extent the Soviet Union has responsible people who see a certain common interest in this agreement, and in seeing if indeed some kind of start can be made with the West in ending the nuclear arms race. I think they, too, are trying to play this hand out just as far as possible.

POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGES TO UNITED STATES

Senator **Lausche**. All right. Putting it in a little different form, if it is to their advantage to resume nuclear tests on the basis of military strength and to our disadvantage, as this statement declares, why should we be thinking about resuming them?

Mr. **Farley**. Well, what we have to consider is an alternative.

If there were a situation where we have actually stopped testing and had no way of knowing whether the Soviet Union had stopped—it may be able to test clandestinely—then we would have something that would be harmful, because there would be progress. They could make additional improvements that we could make which would have real, though perhaps somewhat less, military significance. So, if we had stopped and they were able to go on, that would be an unacceptable situation to us.

Senator **Lausche**. Then your answer would be that, if it is guaranteed that neither will make tests——

Mr. **Farley**. That is it, precisely.

Senator **Lausche** [continuing]. And we are certain of it, it would be to our disadvantage to quit.

Mr. **Farley**. That is right.

Senator **Lausche**. And to their advantage to continue.

Mr. **Farley**. Yes.

Senator **Lausche**. But if they can clandestinely make tests, and we agree to quit and do quit, then we are at the disadvantage.

Mr. **Farley**. That is correct.

Senator **Gore**. I might point out to you, if that is the objective of the Soviet Union—which I think it may well be—then for 16 months they have achieved their objective.

Senator **Lausche**. Yes.

Senator **Gore**. We have stopped all tests without any assurance that they have done so.

Mr. **Farley**. I would like to qualify that—without any firm and positive assurance.

We do have to make, every time the President extends our moratorium, the best judgment of whether our intelligence estimates indicate in sufficiently good confidence, that the Soviets have not begun testing and that it is thus best for us to continue this present stoppage.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT COMMENDED

Senator **Gore**. I thought the President's statement of December 29 partially recovered from a strategic error which was committed, in my opinion, in the August 22, 1958 statement.

Last December 29 the President declined to make a commitment that the United States would further refrain. He staked off for our country an independent course which gives to us the freedom to resume testing if we desire.

I thought that was the better position. Now, whether the tests should actually be resumed on the ground is something that must be weighed very carefully by the need for development of a warhead on a small projectile against the moral and political blame that we would take in the eyes of the world.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator **Gore**. Back on the record.

Senator Lausche, did you have any further questions?

Senator **Lausche**. I have no further questions.

Senator **Gore**. Thank you very much, Mr. Farley.

Mr. **Farley**. Thank you, sir.

Senator **Gore**. The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, MARCH 10, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session at 4 p.m., in room F-53, Capitol, for an informal discussion with General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Commander, Allied Forces, Europe.

[No record was kept of the proceedings or attendance.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session at 10:05 a.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Long, Gore, Lausche, Church, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

Theodore C. Achilles, nominated to be Counselor of the Department of State, appeared on his own behalf. At the conclusion of his appearance, the committee, on motion by Senator Mansfield, seconded by Senator Sparkman, voted unanimously favorably to report the nomination.

On motion by Senator Mansfield, seconded by Senator Sparkman, the committee ordered favorably reported the nomination of Thomas C. Mann, to be Representative of the United States to the 16th Session of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Mr. Mann did not appear.

Selden Chapin next appeared on his own behalf as nominee to be United States Ambassador to Peru. Senator Morse moved, seconded by Senator Sparkman, that the nomination be ordered favorably, which carried.

The committee also approved the nomination of Sigurd Stanton Larmon to be a member of the United States Advisory Commission on Information, and the nominations of Ralph J. Blake and 733 others in the Foreign Service, for report.

After discussion, it was concluded to put over consideration of S. Res. 94, relating to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, until the meeting of March 29.

On suggestion of Senator Lausche, the committee ordered the staff to prepare complete indexes hereafter on all committee hearings and other important prints, and to solicit the detail of an employee from the Government Printing Office to carry out such duties.

The committee next considered H.R. 1, requiring a study to be conducted of the effect of increasing the diversion of water from Lake Michigan into the Illinois Waterway for navigation. After discussion, and on suggestion of Senator Aiken it was concluded to postpone further consideration of this measure until the meeting of

March 29, and that the committee at the same time decide on hearings for H.R. 1 or other courses of action.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[Whereupon the committee adjourned at 12 noon.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, MARCH 24, 1960

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:15 a.m., in room F–53, Capitol, in executive session.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Sparkman, Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, appeared and testified on S. 3058, to amend the Mutual Security Act of 1954.

[The committee recessed at 12:20 p.m.]

Afternoon Session

The committee reconvened at 2:30 p.m. in room F–53, Capitol, in executive session on the mutual aid bill.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Sparkman, Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

Joseph C. Satterthwaite, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, appeared as witness.

For record of the proceedings, see the official printed transcript.

[Following his testimony, the committee adjourned at 4:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, MARCH 25, 1960

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session at 10 a.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

G. Lewis Jones, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, was the witness in the committee's further hearings on S. 3058, to amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1954. His testimony was supplemented by that of Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, Inspector General of the Air Force, and others, after which the committee recessed at 1:10 p.m.

Afternoon Session

The committee reconvened in room F-53 at 2:30 p.m. on the Mutual Security bill, in executive session.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Morse, Hickenlooper, and Carlson.

John M. Steeves, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs was the first witness on the Mutual Security bill, followed by others.

For the record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 5 p.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, MARCH 28, 1960

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Lausche, Church, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, was the main witness in the committee's resumption of hearings on S. 3058, to amend the Mutual Security Act of 1954.

[The committee recessed at 12:30 p.m.]

Afternoon Session

The committee reconvened in executive session at 2:30 p.m. in room F-53, to continue its hearings on the Mutual Security bill.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Lausche, Carlson, and Aiken.

The main witness was Vance Brand, Managing Director of the Development Loan Fund.

For record of the proceedings, see the printed transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 4:25 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, MARCH 29, 1960

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session at 10:35 a.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

The chairman noted that the first item on the agenda was H.R. 1, "To require a study to be conducted of the effect of increasing the diversion of water from Lake Michigan into the Illinois Waterway for navigation and other purposes." Paul H. Douglas, Senator from Illinois, appeared and testified in favor of the measure.

After discussion, the committee concluded to vote on the morrow in executive session whether or not hearings on the measure, H.R. 1, should be undertaken by the committee's Subcommittee on Canadian Affairs.

The chairman then inquired as to the pleasure of the committee concerning S. Res. 94, relating to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

Senator Morse made the motion that the resolution be favorably reported to the Senate, and that he was requesting that the absentees be permitted to be polled before the day was completed.

Senator Carlson left his proxy with Senator Aiken on leaving.

The chairman pointed out that there were nine members present, whereupon Senator Morse reminded the Chair that his motion provided that the chief of staff be authorized to poll the absent members. Senator Aiken agreed this could be done so long as there was a quorum present at the time the vote was taken, to which the chairman agreed, saying there were many precedents. Senator Hickenlooper stated he had some proxies, but not in writing, that they were based on personal contact. The chairman said they were good and could be voted.

The chairman stated the motion as being to report the resolution. Senator Hickenlooper accordingly offered a substitute motion that the matter be postponed, subject to future action on the part of the committee, or a future motion for consideration. Senator Morse agreed that a motion to postpone carried this right.

The chairman ordered the clerk to call the roll, and the following members were recorded, as follows:

YEAS	NAYS
Senator Sparkman	Senator Green
Senator Mansfield	Senator Humphrey (by proxy)
Senator Long (by proxy)	Senator Morse
Senator Wiley (by proxy)	Senator Gore
Senator Hickenlooper	Senator Church
Senator Capehart (by proxy)	Senator Aiken
Senator Carlson (by proxy)	Senator Fulbright
Senator Williams	

Senator Lausche was announced as wishing to vote yea to table, and that his vote accordingly on this motion was yea.

Senator Kennedy was announced later as wishing to vote nay.

So Senator Hickenlooper's motion to postpone carried, 9 to 8.

The chairman inquired if the committee wished to announce the roll to the press, and was assured that the committee generally has no objection.

The committee agreed to report two concurrent resolutions which would reprint in document form the two sets of contractual studies on U.S. Foreign Policy and U.S. Policy in Latin America.

For the record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 12:15 p.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 1960

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session at 9:45 a.m., in room 4219, the committee's conference room, in the New Senate Office Building.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Sparkman, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Wiley, Aiken, and Carlson.

The chairman stated the question, on previous order, to be if the committee would authorize a hearing by the Subcommittee on Canadian Affairs on H.R. 1, "To require a study to be conducted of the effect of increasing the diversion of water from Lake Michigan into the Illinois Waterway for navigation and other purposes."

Senator Wiley suggested the matter go over the next meeting.

Senator Morse, after discussion, renewed his motion from another day, as above.

In response to a question from Senator Lausche, the chairman stated that the motion did not limit the subcommittee's hearings to aspects dealing only with international relations, but that that was its main purpose.

Senator Wiley moved to table the motion, and the clerk called the roll.

The committee members were recorded, as follows:

YEAS	NAYS
Senator Green	Senator Sparkman
Senator Lausche	Senator Mansfield (by proxy)
Senator Wiley	Senator Morse
Senator Humphrey (by proxy)	Senator Gore
Senator Aiken (by proxy)	Senator Church
Senator Carlson	Senator Fulbright

So the motion to table was lost, 6 to 6.

On recapitulation demanded by Senator Wiley, the result was declared to be as before.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[Following further discussion, the chairman declared the meeting adjourned at 10:15 a.m., and the committee proceeded to room 4221 for other business.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, MARCH 31, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLICS AFFAIRS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 3:30 p.m., in the committee room, F-53, Capitol.

Present: Senator Morse (chairman), and Senators Long, Church, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

The chairman said that the meeting had been called in order that the subcommittee might go over the Mutual Security Program for Latin America as a subcommittee and give the full committee the benefit of its judgments.

After discussion, the committee agreed to meet tomorrow afternoon.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The subcommittee thereupon recessed at 4:45 p.m.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, APRIL 1, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLICS AFFAIRS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 3:40 p.m., in room F–53, Capitol.

Present: Senator Morse (chairman), and Senators Fulbright, Mansfield, Sparkman, Church, Hickenlooper, Capehart and Aiken.

The subcommittee chairman (Mr. Morse) welcomed the attendance of Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, in saying that the subcommittee was meeting in a continuation of informal discussions on the recommendations of the administration in respect to the Mutual Security Program for Latin America.

Secretary Rubottom then briefed the committee on different phases of the said recommendations.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 5:10 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, APRIL 5, 1960

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Gore, Lausche, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Williams.

Ernest Gruening, United States Senator from Alaska, appeared to testify on the Mutual Security Act of 1960 (S. 3058).

The chairman stated as the next order of business the bill S. 3074, "To provide for the participation of the United States in the International Development Association."

During discussion on the suggestion to postpone action on such measure, Senator Wiley raised the point that no quorum, or eight members (sic), was present. Senator Wiley then declared that another reason for postponing action was the absence of such quorum, to which the chairman responded that one had previously existed, that Senator Hickenlooper had been present but had left his proxy on departing. He pointed out the committee has continued to operate in the absence of a quorum already established, and that it did not try to take action unless "there had been a quorum present during the meeting."

Whereupon the committee, by common consent, agreed to put over the bill for a vote at the next meeting.

The chairman then stated as the next order of business the consideration of Executives J to N, inclusive, (86th Congress, First Session), known as the "Law of the Sea Conventions."

On motion by Senator Lausche, seconded by Senator Aiken, the conventions were ordered reported unanimously.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[There being no further business, the committee adjourned at 11:20 a.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 1960

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session at 10:40 a.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Sparkman, Gore, Lausche, Church, Wiley, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

The meeting was devoted to the discussion of and the markup of the Mutual Security Act of 1960.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 11:30 a.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, APRIL 11, 1960

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session at 2:40 p.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Sparkman, Long, Church, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Williams.

The meeting was devoted to the markup of the Mutual Security Act of 1960.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 5:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 13, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session at 10:15 a.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Sparkman, Mansfield, Church, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

The meeting was devoted to the markup of the Mutual Security Act of 1960.

[The committee recessed at 12:30 p.m. at the conclusion of the morning session, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee reconvened in executive session at 2:55 p.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Long, Church, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Williams.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee continued its markup of the Mutual Security Act of 1960 and adjourned at 4:55 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, APRIL 19, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m., in Room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (presiding), and Senators Mansfield, Morse, Aiken, Carlson and Williams.

Leland Barrows, nominated to be Ambassador to the State of Cameroon, appeared on his own behalf. On motion by Senator Carlson, seconded by Senator Aiken, the nomination was ordered to be favorably reported.

Louis Wellington Cabot, nominated to be Representative to the 15th Session of the Economic Commission for Europe of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, appeared on his own behalf. On motion by Senator Mansfield, seconded by Senator Aiken, the nomination was ordered to be reported favorably.

The acting chairman then announced S. 3072, to authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to effect the payment of certain claims of foreign nationals against the United States, as the next order of business. On motion by Senator Mansfield, seconded by Senator Carlson, the bill was ordered favorably reported.

The acting chairman stated that S. 2634, to amend Title II (claims against Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania) of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, as amended, as the next order of business. After his explanation of the bill, Senator Morse moved, seconded by Senator Mansfield, that the committee recommend the approval for report of the State Department's redraft of the measure. This carried on an unanimous voice vote.

At the suggestion of the acting chairman, Senator Morse then proposed that the committee agree to report the bill S. 2634 to the Senate, but withhold the filing of its report for a period during which the Committee on Judiciary would be asked to submit its recommendations. The period named was decided as being no more than 1 month, and that during such period, it was later concluded, the committee would not report said bill pending receipt of said recommendations. Senator Carlson seconded the motion, and the motion was agreed to by unanimous vote.

The committee agreed to have a pre-summit briefing from Secretary Herter.

The acting chairman read a letter from Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois asking for a hearing on H.R. 1, to provide for a 3-year study of the sewage disposal problems of Chicago. The committee agreed to place such request on the agenda of the next meeting.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[Whereupon the committee adjourned at 11:20 p.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 20, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Long, Gore, Lausche, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Capehart.

The committee continued its markup of the Mutual Security Act of 1960.

[The meeting was recessed at 12:25 p.m. until 2:30 p.m. the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee reconvened at 2:30 p.m., in room F-53, Capitol, to continue its markup of the Mutual Security Act of 1960, in executive session.

Present: chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Lausche, and Aiken.

After discussion, Senator Aiken moved, seconded by Senator Sparkman, that the bill, as modified, be reported favorably, subject to the condition that any member have the further right to propose amendments to it. This carried on a voice vote without objection.

The chairman announced that other members absent would be polled by the staff, after which the committee took a short recess.

When the committee reconvened, the chairman announced that without objection the vote by which the bill was reported would be reconsidered and the measure opened for further amendment. Several amendments offered were rejected on voice vote, following which, on motion by Senator Sparkman, the bill, as amended, was ordered reported favorably on voice vote on which there were several noes. Later, the result was announced as 16-1, Senator Long dissenting.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 3:55 p.m.]

PRE-SUMMIT BRIEFING

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—On November 22, 1958, the Soviet Union demanded the end of the occupation of Berlin, and threatened to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany if its demands were not met within 6 months. The Eisenhower administration was determined to hold West Berlin at all costs, "even to general war," as General Nathan F. Twining testified in executive session to the committee in 1959. On May 11, 1959, the foreign ministers of the Western Allies and the Soviet Union met at Geneva to discuss occupational rights in Berlin. Although the conference adjourned without solving the issue, it did result in lessening of tensions.

In the meanwhile, Vice President Richard Nixon had visited the Soviet Union; and in September 1959, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev launched a tour of the United States, which concluded with face-to-face negotiations with President Eisenhower at Camp David. Eisenhower withheld his support for an East-West Summit meeting until the Soviet Union showed some positive move toward settling the Berlin crisis. Khrushchev then withdrew his time limit on signing an East German treaty, and Eisenhower agreed to attend the Summit. The press dubbed this first thaw in the Cold War the "Spirit of Camp David."

In April 1960, the foreign ministers of the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, and Canada met in Washington to plan common strategy on the Berlin issue and disarmament, in advance of the Summit meeting which was scheduled to open on May 16.]

THURSDAY, APRIL 21, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 8:30 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, Carlson, and Williams.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Denney and Mr. St. Claire, of the committee staff.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. The Secretary has had his coffee and we can proceed to have ours while he is talking. Mr. Secretary, we are very pleased to have you come out this early in the morning. This is our customary time of getting to work, but it is not ordinary for the committee to meet at this hour. We understand you have a report to give us and we will be very glad to hear it.

Will you proceed, please.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTIAN HERTER, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary HERTER. Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, the matter that you wanted me to talk about particularly was the preparation for the summit conference and the status of the negotiations both on the nuclear test suspension and on disarmament.

The **Chairman**. That is correct.

Secretary **Herter**. With respect to the summit conference, there has been work underway for a very considerable period of time based on an understanding that at a summit conference the probable subject of conversation would include Germany and the Berlin question, disarmament and East-West relations, which is in a sense a catchall for other matters that might be brought up.

There were appointed three working groups covering those three subjects. One met in Washington, the Berlin-Germany committee, and consisted of Great Britain, France, Germany and the United States.

The delegates of five countries on the Western side—Canada, Italy, Great Britain, France and the United States—were asked to report on the progress of their discussions at the disarmament negotiations in Geneva; and in both Paris and in London, a subcommittee met to review in general terms what might come up for discussion under the head of East-West relations. The reports of those three committees, in a sense preliminary reports, were submitted to the Foreign Ministers who were here last week.

In the case of the East-West relations, [Paul-Henri] Spaak, the Secretary General of NATO, came over to discuss those with us because that subcommittee in Paris had reported to NATO that there had been some general discussion of these matters at NATO, and he came to give us the views of our NATO partners on some of the items which came under that head which I will discuss in a moment. At the Ministers' meetings here we reviewed the papers that had been prepared by the working groups. We discussed the matter of tactics and we discussed in quite general terms such instructions as should be given to the working groups for either refinement or reworking some of the papers in preparation for the conference, and in preparation for the next meeting of the Foreign Ministers which will take place in Istanbul on the first of May. The Foreign Ministers will be there for the NATO meeting—the annual Ministers' meeting, in any case—and they are going to take another review at that time with a possible final review 2 or 3 days before the summit meeting opens in Paris on May 16.

THE BERLIN QUESTION

From the point of view of the German and Berlin question, we reviewed first of all the probable Soviet intentions. There, obviously, one can only guess. We think it is almost inevitable that the Russians will raise this question. Khrushchev has done a good deal of talking about it in public speeches, but in recent days he has been soft pedaling it a good deal more than he had when he was talking in Indonesia and Afghanistan. However, it is very possible—and I would think probable—that he will open that discussion by again putting before his summit colleagues the question of a separate peace treaty with the two Germanys, his way of solving the German problem, and liquidating what he calls the "remnants of the last war."

Should he do that, it would mean that in effect we would be going back to just where we were before the Geneva conference began last summer.

That is the way they started then. As far as we know, there has been no change in his position from the point of view of making any new suggestion. We don't know; he may have something new to offer. Certainly our position on the Allied side is firm with respect to that proposal.

What that proposal would do in effect would be to recognize East Germany as an independent state. It would likewise freeze existing borders. It would establish a solidity within the so-called captive or satellite states, and is an entirely unacceptable thing from the point of view of the Western situation: Should he make that offer, we are prepared to take very much the position that we did at Geneva, modified in one respect only.

KHRUSHCHEV'S POSITION

At that time, as you may recall, we made an offer that was known as the Western Peace Plan. I won't go into the details of it unless you want me to during the question time. But Mr. Khrushchev had been talking a great deal about self-determination, and we have drafted, I think quite carefully, a proposal for a vote to be taken in all of Germany counted separately in East Germany, West Germany and in Berlin on the subject of the acceptance of either our proposal with respect to the reunification of Germany, or the proposal of the Russians, which is the two separate states with a single peace treaty. We are assuming that he will take the same position and turn this down, that then he will say, "Well, let's talk about Berlin."

I think that the Allies are entirely firm on that score, that we are not going to yield in principle to the abandonment of our rights in Berlin that derive from the settlements after the war, which are in black and white and which obviously we would be very remiss should we invalidate in any way unless there were some better solution offered which we don't see in the offing.

From more recent indications of the talks that Khrushchev had in Paris with General de Gaulle, and an apparent softening—and of course we can't be sure of his attitude with regard to the Berlin picture—it is possible that he will be willing to accept a temporary solution to that problem or even let it ride, provided he feels that he is going to make some headway toward the general disarmament proposals or the nuclear test proposals in which he seems to have a very keen interest.

WESTERN OFFER

We, of course, don't know just how these conversations will turn. We are ready on the Allied side to make exactly the same offer that we made at the end of the Geneva conferences, which were unacceptable to the Russians, and that our minds provided for an interim period in which on our side we would not increase our garrisons. We would scale the propaganda from West Berlin to that which is coming out of East Berlin. We would not impose nuclear weapons on the city of Berlin, and the Russians on their side would give an even stronger guarantee of access to the civilian population as well as our own troops than that which they have given heretofore.

The Russians might have accepted that provided we had been willing to accept such a temporary arrangement as implying an impairment of our occupation rights with respect to the future; and that, of course, we were unwilling to do. We took the position all the time this was only a temporary modus vivendi, so to speak, and was not in any sense a permanent settlement. We would make no permanent settlement with respect to giving up our rights unless it were in acceptable form.

LIKELY SUMMIT TOPICS

With respect to the two discussions that are going on in Geneva now, I might begin with the nuclear test suspension. That as such is not likely to come up at the summit conference as presently organized for the reason that the French will not engage in any discussion of it whatsoever. In other words, if there are some questions that the heads of governments want to discuss on the nuclear test suspensions it will have to be done in a forum different from the four-power forum because the French have not been a part of the negotiations, and while they are trying to build up their own atomic capabilities, they are not willing to discuss it in a four-power forum at all.

But it is quite possible that in some separate meeting of the British, the Russians and us, some of the moot points with respect to the negotiations might be raised.

The group in Geneva that is discussing this is coming together again next week, and will continue from where they left off. They still have some major problems to resolve. There are only two that I can see that might be referred to a group of the heads of state in Paris, one dealing with the possible length of a moratorium, the second dealing with the number of inspections that would be permitted with respect to the showing of suspicious events in the seismic instrumentation. We don't even know whether those will come up. But in addition to those, there are still a great many very knotty problems in connection with the composition of the control commission, of the control stations within the respective countries, and of the mobile inspection teams that will be entitled to on-site inspections. In addition to the question with respect to finance and questions, though, I don't think they are too difficult at the moment from the point of view of accession of other states to the nuclear tests.

I did my best in talking to Mr. Wadsworth,[1] who was here in the last few days, to get from him some kind of an estimate as to how long he thought it would take, assuming there were enough plans here on the Russian side to give us an acceptable break on these moot points, to actually get a treaty in such shape that it might be considered for signature. His best estimate was that it would not be before August at the earliest, even if some of these matters are resolved at the summit. That may or may not be an optimistic estimate. I think that they have a great many matters of detail and some of very real substance that they still have to thrash out. With respect to these general disarmament discussions, as you know, there is very little that I can add to what has been made public from the point of view of the negotiations up to this time.

---

[1] James. J. Wadsworth, chief U.S. representative at the Geneva nuclear test ban conference.

RUSSIAN TACTICS

The Russians have stuck quite literally to the proposals made by Mr. Khrushchev at the United Nations last fall. The Western side came in with a proposal that certain concrete measures leading toward eventual general and complete disarmament be considered and worked out in detail with proper inspection as a gage of whether or not one could go on to secondary steps leading toward more complete disarmament.

The Russians so far have been unwilling to entertain any of these specific measures. They have been trying to pin us down to a statement of general principles in words which, unfortunately, I am afraid they would interpret one way and we would interpret a different way. But it has been largely a propaganda effort to give the world the idea that they are the ones who really want disarmament and we are the ones who don't want disarmament. Those meetings are still going on now. The representatives of the five powers on the Western side have been asked to report by the 26th of April.

They are closing their discussions before the summit meeting on the 29th of April. They have been asked to report on the 26th so that their report as to the status of their negotiations will be before the Foreign Ministers when we meet in Istanbul. This is a very quick thumbnail sketch of the situation as it stands as of today, Mr. Chairman, but if I can fill in on detail anywhere along the line, I will be delighted to do it during the question period.

NUCLEAR TEST SUSPENSION

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. If I may return for a moment to this nuclear test suspension, do you feel that our Government believes that it is possible to complete some significant agreement in this field, or is it quite improbable?

Secretary **Herter**. No, we think it is possible. Of course, the great question mark that we have always had is whether or not scientific instrumentation can be developed in a reasonable period of time which would give indications even though it would not be completely foolproof in the small tests underground. The Atomic Energy Commission and our experts worked out a proposed series of tests in order to see what could be done to improve instrumentation; those have been very carefully worked out by a panel of scientists. They are going to be discussed on May 11, with Russian scientists in Geneva, and we of course hope that in a reasonably short period of time those tests will indicate whether or not it is going to be possible to have some reasonable assurance that we can detect the small tests, because as you know we are not willing to sign an agreement except for a very short period of time, a short moratorium. If the scientists' findings show no improvement, then we have a large area in which we have no assurance that we can detect.

We are still hopeful, however, that the instrumentation can be improved very materially, because the seismic art is one that has been in abeyance for a long time, and we have some hope that with the best scientific brains applied to this, we will be able to develop instrumentation which will tell the difference between a manmade explosion underground and an earthquake, which is very difficult to detect now unless the explosion is very large.

The **CHAIRMAN**. In reading the press it would appear there are some responsible and important scientists and others in this country who believe it is impossible to reach any agreement with the Russians on these matters and that there will never be adequate and foolproof inspection. That is why I asked that question, but if I understand you correctly, that is not the position of the administration. They feel that it is quite——

Secretary **HERTER**. We feel we ought certainly to try it out. There is a great division in the scientific world. This is a comparatively undeveloped art—that is, the seismic art—and there is one group of scientists who feel that it can be improved materially if the proper experimentation is done.

Another group feels that it is almost hopeless, that one will always be able to muffle the small manmade explosions so that they cannot be detected.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Mr. Secretary, what is the disadvantage to us if they cannot be detected in making an agreement regarding all the other explosions—testing in the atmosphere, underwater and so on? If we are already in that position what is the disadvantage?

Secretary **HERTER**. We have already offered to do that. As you may recall, we have said that if we can settle all these matters of how the inspection is conducted and so on, we would settle for a definite ban on those that can be inspected. But we will not settle on those that cannot be inspected; we would agree to a brief moratorium while the scientists are trying to see what they can do from the point of view of perfecting the instrumentation.

A THRESHOLD THEORY

The **CHAIRMAN**. Have we made a definite offer to them?

Secretary **HERTER**. Yes.

The **CHAIRMAN**. On all except the small ones.

Secretary **HERTER**. Yes. We have agreed that we would but we have still so many details. Remember way back in April of last year that first of all, the President said we would enter into an agreement as soon as the details of inspection could be made on all atmospheric and underwater tests. Then we advanced a threshold theory in which we said we would extend that to explosions that registered over 4.75, which is a given measurement on the seismic machines.

The **CHAIRMAN**. I am not at all clear about this. Would we be willing to proceed with an agreement excluding completely the below-threshold explosions?

Secretary **HERTER**. Yes, that is what we offered.

The **CHAIRMAN**. We have offered it?

Secretary **HERTER**. Yes.

The **CHAIRMAN**. And the Russians refused?

Secretary **Herter**. Yes. They said all or nothing.

The **Chairman**. All or nothing?

Secretary **Herter**. They said all or nothing. Then they modified that to the extent of being willing to take what they call a brief 4 or 5 years, which the President said was excessive moratorium, during which the scientists tried to perfect the instrumentation, but in which there would be no commitment for a ban on those, unless we were satisfied that the result of the scientists' work justified making the ban complete.

NO SUSPICIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES

The **Chairman**. Have there been any suspicious circumstances during the past 18 months that even made you suspect that they have engaged in clandestine testing below the threshold?

Secretary **Herter**. We don't know of any. We do know of a number of explosions which were announced, but those were supposed to be large quantities of TNT and we don't know what the purpose of those explosions was.

The **Chairman**. But you don't have any reason to believe they have engaged in it any more than we have.

Secretary **Herter**. We have no evidence one way or the other.

The **Chairman**. Presently we are living under a gentleman's agreement, so to speak. We merely refrain without agreement; is that right?

Secretary **Herter**. Yes. The ban expired on the first of the year. What we said was that if we are going to resume testing we will just announce it beforehand.

POSSIBLE DISARMAMENT AGENCY

The **Chairman**. One other question. There have been newspaper reports that the administration is contemplating a new agency created in the State Department on disarmament. Is that true?

Secretary **Herter**. No new agency. For several months now there have been discussions within the administration as to how best to staff a very complicated problem from the point of view of coordinating domestic position on various problems of disarmament; and the decision reached was that this should be done within the State Department.

In our budget estimates this year, we requested a considerable sum of money for that particular bureau, devoted largely to research studies. The reason it is being set up in the State Department is that we, after all, have to carry the responsibility of guiding any negotiations on this subject, and there have been some suggestions that it might be set up in the Executive Department. There have been some bills filed to have it set up as an independent agency. We are hoping, if we get the money for it—and I think we can do considerable, even with the funds that we have on hand—to set up a bureau within the State Department to carry on because we assume——

The **Chairman**. It does not require legislation. It will be done by administrative action.

Secretary **Herter**. It can be done by administrative action.

The CHAIRMAN. This is not quite in line with this but it is also very current and I have been asked in the last 2 or 3 days to comment on the situation in Korea. Could you tell us what the present attitude of the administration is as to that situation?

Secretary HERTER. May I say that the actions of the Korean Government, particularly in connection with the recent March elections were of a kind that were extremely distasteful to us.[2] The reports as they seem to have been confirmed more and more since the election indicate that there was a considerable amount of tinkering with the ballot boxes and that there was also a considerable amount of pressure brought about by both army and police sources.

We protested to the Korean Government very shortly after the elections as these reports came in to us. The recent riots that have taken place are, in our opinion, not Communist-inspired—although they may be utilized by the Communists as the basis for general fishing from troubled waters—but inspired by a genuine feeling of disgust that the Syngman Rhee government has exercised dictatorial arbitrary powers. The principal opposition newspaper has been suppressed. Certainly the consultative body that was provided for by their constitution has never been called.

The Vice President would have presided over it, and Rhee didn't like the existing vice president who is of the opposite party, so this body was never put together and he would not have a chance to preside over it.

And that type of thing of course reached its apogee in these riots, and the note that I handed the Ambassador the other day, a copy of which has now been handed by our Ambassador in Korea to Syngman Rhee, is a very stiff remonstrance and a little more than that. We have recommended certain specific action on their part in order to try to restore confidence in Korea in the Democratic processes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green?

Senator GREEN. Mr. Chairman, I apologize to our distinguished guest, the Secretary, for being late, but it is my misfortune. You have asked the only questions I thought of asking, from what I heard of his address.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wiley?

Senator WILEY. I notice by the morning paper—from the headlines; I did not have time to read the paper—that Rhee has made certain promises called reform. Do you know just what those are?

Secretary HERTER. No. We have no detail unless it has come into the Department this morning.

There was a brief statement that he made yesterday that was sent to us by wire from Seoul but it was identical with the one that appeared in the press. I don't know whether we have anything further this morning or not.

I don't think so.

---

[2] On March 15, 85-year-old Korean President Syngman Rhee was elected to a fourth term. Student-led demonstrations and riots protesting vote frauds eventually led to Rhee's resignation on April 27.

WHY KOREAN STUDENTS REVOLTED

Senator **Wiley**. You say you are of the opinion that what took place there among the students was not Communist-inspired but there may have been some Communists among them. What caused the students to take this action, if you know?

Secretary **Herter**. Well, I think it was a combination of very clearly indicated fraud in the last election, and then these very severe repressive measures that have been taken against the opposition party.

The fraud undoubtedly was much greater in the election for the Vice President than for the President. We are convinced that Syngman Rhee would have been elected anyway, even if the elections had been perfectly honest, and that that is not so much the issue. But Syngman Rhee and the extent to which he was familiar with what happened is still doubtful, because he functions very little, now. To what extent enthusiastic ministers in the government were responsible for these things and to what extent he was responsible is a little hard to tell.

The cabinet has apparently resigned, trying to take the blame on themselves and take it off Syngman Rhee. But I don't see how it is possible for the things to have happened without his knowing about it. And this student revolt is, I think, entirely a protest against what took place.

One rather interesting thing in connection with all the demonstrations and so on was that there was not a single anti-American act of any kind by the student groups and no indication whatever of there being any animosity toward us.

In a way that is interesting, because if the Communists had really been the leaders in those groups, I am sure that there would have been a couple of anti-American demonstrations as well as anti-government demonstrations, but so far there has not been a sign of that.

GERMANY: A LINK WITH DISARMAMENT?

Senator **Wiley**. Just one or two questions in relation to the German situation. In your opinion there is some possibility of arriving at some kind of a disarmament agreement, but that you still have doubts as to the reliability of the Kremlin in keeping such agreements; is that right?

Secretary **Herter**. Yes, the sine qua non of any agreements on disarmament has always been adequate inspection. It has been the great stumbling block in all the conferences on disarmament up to now and I am not sure that it is not still going to be a stumbling block.

Senator **Wiley**. Now you have had considerable talks. You are going to have some with de Gaulle, I presume, and you talked with Adenauer, with the Prime Minister of Britain. I presume they covered the matter of unification of Germany, and the Kremlin's attitude concerning Berlin. Now do you want to tell us your opinion as to whether there is a possibility of a unified Germany? Is there a possibility that, if that is not so, the Russians will recognize East Germany and what effect that would have upon our position there and so forth?

Secretary **Herter**. Perhaps I might start with the very last part of that question. If the Russians should go ahead and draw up a separate treaty with the East Germans, we would not recognize that treaty as in any way impairing the rights that we have insofar as Berlin is concerned. The Russians have taken the position that by signing a separate peace treaty with the East Germans, they could automatically wipe out our occupation status and that thereafter sovereignty in the entire surrounding area would then go to the East Germans. And the question of access to Berlin, which is the key thing from the point of view of keeping the free city alive, would then be a matter between us and the East Germans and the Russians would wash their hands of it.

We have consistently taken the position that you cannot dispose of your obligations and your responsibilities that are a part of an international agreement by merely signing another agreement with someone else. Hence we would not recognize those in any way whatsoever, and if the East Germans should then try to blockade Germany again, we would have a really serious situation.

Senator **Wiley**. You have not given me the idea as to what Adenauer's position or the British position is in relation to that very situation.

Secretary **Herter**. Might I perhaps go off the record?

[Discussion off the record.]

GERMAN PLEBISCITE

Senator **Wiley**. Just one other question. I want to get your idea on this thing. Suppose the matter blows up and the Kremlin recognizes East Germany as a separate state. Here is my question. I remember Adenauer's saying that if the Germans in East Germany had a chance to vote, 95 percent of them would vote for unification. But if this is a separate state and a vote comes up, why isn't that the solution, if Adenauer is right?

Secretary **Herter**. It certainly is a solution. As I said earlier, if this matter comes up, we are prepared to offer the actual terms of what we consider a fair vote in East Germany, Berlin and West Germany in order to try to effect that result.

But I don't think they will ever agree to that.

Senator **Wiley**. But the point I was getting at is that if he recognizes East Germany as a separate state, from at least a political angle, unless he has some special agreement with them that we don't know anything about, the East Germans then would be in shape to exercise the overall authority themselves in a plebiscite.

Secretary **Herter**. Oh, they certainly do.

Senator **Wiley**. What?

Secretary **Herter**. Do you mean they would be in a position to do it?

Senator **Wiley**. Yes.

Secretary **Herter**. Not with the government they have now. They have a puppet government in East Germany that is completely controlled by the Communists. They would never allow a vote of that kind. They consider themselves an independent country now. They could always have a vote if the Government would permit it.

Senator **Wiley**. That is all.

The **Chairman**. Senator Sparkman?

Senator **Sparkman**. They would be simply another satellite, wouldn't they?

But now let me ask you this; I don't believe you made this clear in your comment. What would be our attitude with reference to the new government? Would we recognize it, ignore it or just do business with it on an informal basis?

Secretary **Herter**. We would not recognize it.

Senator **Sparkman**. Certainly we would be thrown into contact with it.

"FREE CITY PROPOSAL"

Secretary **Herter**. There again, that is one of the almost inevitable things if the Russians pull out—this is perfectly possible, not probable but perfectly possible: In a separate treaty that the Russians make with the East Germans, they would require the East Germans to give exactly the same facilities of access to Berlin that the Russians had given us under the guarantees that they had undertaken. That is possible. The Russians have always said that if we would agree to their "free city proposal," they would get from the East Germans a guarantee similar to their guarantee with regard to access. But they also had certain requirements of cutting West Berlin off from West Germany completely and making them entirely dependent, even saying that they would guarantee supplying raw materials to keep the industries going from the East.

Senator **Sparkman**. Now let me ask you a brief question of Korea.

Some time ago I saw the report that if Syngman Rhee's party won a clear cut victory and the vice president that he wanted was elected, he might quit the job. Is there anything to that?

Secretary **Herter**. We have not seen any indication of it yet.

FRENCH NUCLEAR POLICY

Senator **Sparkman**. I am just skipping around. Back to disarmament. You say the French are not willing to discuss controls of nuclear weapons in a 4-power forum. I heard over the radio a couple of times in the last few days what I think was a direct quote from de Gaulle, to the effect that France would be willing to give up all of its nuclear weapons if the United States and Russia would do likewise.

Is that right?

Secretary **Herter**. That is correct.

Senator **Sparkman**. He made that statement?

Secretary **Herter**. That is correct.

[Discussion off the record.]

THE CENTO GROUP

Senator **Sparkman**. You are going to the CENTO [3] Conference. I wonder if you could give us a word or two regarding just what our relationship to it is, what the outlook is and so forth?

---

[3] Central Treaty Organization, created on Mar. 9, 1959 in place of the Baghdad Pact.

Secretary **Herter**. You know our relationship to the Baghdad Pact, the CENTO group.

Senator **Sparkman**. It is kind of vague, so far as I am concerned.

Secretary **Herter**. It is vague; there is no question about it. We have been members of various committees that were set up. We have never subscribed to the agreement. We do have unilateral agreements with Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran. We have no mutual security pact, so to speak, with Iran except as against Soviet activity. The principal question that has been disturbing that group has been that of a unified or centralized command. They have been very anxious to try to get us involved in a centralized command and we have been stalling it off because for the moment their principal preoccupation is not Russia. It is Afghanistan and Iraq, and we don't want to get involved in any kind of guarantees against neighbors there where it may be a straight trial battle or something of that kind, and not a major matter. This meeting has a very limited agenda. I think there is as much for an exchange of views and as much a matter of prestige and pride, particularly Iran which is not a member of NATO or CENTO. It is the one country on the perimeter of Russia which is not in any way tied in with an alliance. Burma of course is another one—and India—but Iran is very nervous about its position, and very frankly the——

Senator **Sparkman**. I am not sure I follow you. What country is it not tied in, Iran?

Secretary **Herter**. Iran is not tied in with us.

Senator **Sparkman**. With a regional conference?

Secretary **Herter** The Baghdad Pact is the only thing.

Senator **Sparkman**. Is the only conference?

Secretary **Herter**. The only thing it has.

Senator **Sparkman**. Yes.

Secretary **Herter**. And they are not officially members of that. Iran is nervous about its position, but both Pakistan and Iran today are worrying about Afghanistan a lot. They are worrying also about what may happen in Iraq, and I think they are awfully anxious to try to get us to guarantee help to them in the event they get in trouble with either one of those and we have enough commitments around the world not to want to take on any more than that if we don't have to.

Senator **Sparkman**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Senator Hickenlooper?

THE BRITISH POSITION

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Mr. Secretary, I am continually concerned about the British attitude in this whole set up. Frankly, I have felt for a long time that the British are in a way soft on the matter of agreements, especially with regard to banning nuclear tests, and, to put it rather bluntly, that the British would rather have an agreement regardless of what is in it, and that is their objective.

Now I think probably that is a little more extravagantly stated than the facts would warrant, but we have seen the demonstrations, for instance, in London yesterday or the day before, and we have seen what at least to me is the periodic suggestion on the part of the British that maybe we ought to move a little bit faster in getting agreements.

Do you feel that they are really standing firm on not compromising on basic principles in this situation?

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. I know him and he has been there 2 or 3 times and he has at least outwardly taken a very strong position on that. It is not so much what they say at the conferences or what their record position may be as it is the basic philosophy that they are following.

Now so far as these tests are concerned, you stated a moment ago—and I think the record is clear on that—we have offered as at least one step in the approach to this thing to abandon atmospheric, underwater, and I think we have even gone so far as to say we will discuss outer space tests. We are willing at least to ban atmospheric and stratospheric tests and underwater tests.

The thing that has concerned me always, and still does, is that we are engaged right now in some public hearings which are only a review of the things that we have already had before the committee in executive session, at least part of it, and I don't know of any scientist, when you pin him down, who has any basic concept of the feasibility of a system that will give any assurance of identifying from a distance a suspicious incident.

You talk about the possibility that we will go into research on these things, and that we ought to be able to find something; but with all the problems that are involved it seems to me that if we weaken in the slightest degree on this question of underground testing, and the matter of access and inspection which I may say parenthetically against a determined effort to conceal it just is not worth the paper it is written on. But if we and the other nuclear powers that are involved here don't stand quite firm on that situation, all we do is lose our position so far as progress in atomic weapons development is concerned, which we would be willing to lose, I think, under certain circumstances if we could have certain guarantees that are reliable.

IDENTIFICATION OF SEISMIC DISTURBANCES

But I earnestly hope that we don't, for the sake of agreement, get into something that we not only can't police but insofar as all scientific methods and data known, we can't even identify. I think some mention was made a moment ago about detection and identification. I don't know of any evidence that has been produced that says that we can positively identify a suspicious incident at a distance as an explosion.

I don't know of any evidence that has been produced. We have talked to the experts, all of them. You can identify something as a suspicious incident, but when 10 or 20 percent of the tremors and all those things that come along have all the characteristics of an explosion, at least so far as present instrumentation is concerned, you have that vast area where you can say something happened that could or could not be an explosion, and it could or could not be an earth movement, an earthquake.

But it would seem to me that we would be playing directly into the Russian hands because of their great ability for concealment, and our total inability to conceal anything in this country and in the so-called free world. They could very glibly talk about all these things simply because they know we can't conceal it here in this country.

We can't conceal it anyplace else in the free world. But they have vast areas where I think concealment would be very easy if they wanted to cheat. Their record of keeping their agreements has not been good in the past, and if they considered it to be to their advantage they could conceal these things without any difficulty. For instance, we had some public testimony just a couple of days ago that with the best instrumentation we have today, suppose you have your seismic stations at, say, four or five or three or six different areas, and you detect from each of them an incident that could be an explosion or an earthquake. The probable error of that area in there, either the triangle of its three stations or the quadrangle of probable error where those lines cross, somewhere in that area it has occurred, is probably on the average of 400 square miles.

In other words, all your seismographic stations can tell you is that somewhere within 400 miles or maybe 100 square miles under certain circumstances—but I don't know of anybody that said you could get under 100 square miles—someplace in the earth's crust, something happened. Now against any determined effort to try to conceal it, conceal roads, conceal travel to and from the point, cover it up, get people out of the territory and all this sort of stuff, the ability to send a team in there and start probing in the ground over 100 square miles or 400 square miles when you don't know with any certainty at all, unless you have a reliable espionage system that can tell you right where it is—the probability of location under inspection there is even more fantastic than looking for a needle in a haystack, in my judgment, according to all the evidence that we have.

I think there are certain agreements that we can probably get into providing they are in good faith, but I am very apprehensive about this situation, because once we abandon the power of the atomic bomb, suppose we destroy them all, according to de Gaulle's plan, destroy all fissionable material that could be used as atomic weapons—once we did that we would be utterly at the mercy of the land power of Russia. There is nothing in Europe that can stop them. We could not stop them with the Navy, high explosives or anything else if we gave up that particular weapon, and of course I don't know what the solution is.

I suppose all of us could write a solution, but then writing what the solution ought to be and getting an agreement are different things. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken has to meet the Canadian group.

THE SITUATION IN VENEZUELA

Senator AIKEN. The only thing I was going to ask him, Bill, is whether the situation in Venezuela is threatening from our point of view.

Secretary **Herter**. From our last information it is under pretty good control. Apparently the elements of the Army, the labor unions, the student groups and so on are supporting the Government.

Senator **Aiken**. And that is true of the political internal elements too.

Secretary **Herter**. Yes, but again my information is from the morning papers.

The **Chairman**. For the information of the committee, Senator Aiken has to leave to greet the Canadian group who are visiting us. They are to meet in room 4221 at 10 o'clock and we will probably have to adjourn. Do I understand the Secretary is going over to greet that group? Are you planning to greet the Canadians at 10 o'clock in the other room?

[Discussion off the record.]

The **Chairman**. Senator Mansfield?

Senator **Mansfield**. Mr. Secretary, what I have to say is very brief. I think that there are some things you ought to say to a person's face rather than behind his back. I think this is a good time to put in a good word for Mr. Farley, who has been quite accommodating and informative in his relations with this committee; in his field he is almost as good as Bill Macomber is in his. I want to congratulate you on finishing your first year as Secretary of State relatively unscathed.

AMERICAN NEWSMEN IN CHINA

Only one suggestion. Will you look into possibilities of perhaps American newsmen going into China and perhaps some relationships being achieved with outer Mongolia? I won't ask for an answer but just that you look into it.

Secretary **Herter**. On the question of the newspapermen going to China, I think we are getting out a release today. It was released yesterday. This is a matter that as you know we have been taking up regularly in the Wang talks in Poland.[4] There has been a little evidence—I can't call it substantial evidence—from their last conversation that when they meet again, which I think will be in 2 weeks, there may be a change in the Chinese position of this.

Senator **Mansfield**. On newsmen?

Secretary **Herter**. I just hold that out as a possible, hope, not probable, but apparently there was a different attitude shown in the last talks that made Beam think that they possibly would come up with something new.

Senator **Mansfield**. The suggestion on outer Mongolia was to the effect that it might be a good listening post and maybe it would give us more accurate information about Chinese-Soviet relations.

Secretary **Herter**. I saw that suggestion of yours and it is a matter that I am sure we will look at very carefully. To be quite honest with you, it had not occurred to me, up to the time that you mentioned it.

Senator **Mansfield**. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

---

[4] A series of meetings between the U.S. Ambassador to Poland, Jacob Beam, and the Chinese Ambassador to Poland, Wang Ping-nan.

The **Chairman**. Senator Capehart?

Senator **Capehart**. Just one question, Mr. Secretary.

How stubborn—if they are stubborn at all—are the Russians insisting that we abandon our airbases and military bases around the world?

Secretary **Herter**. They raise that question all the time. In connection with disarmament talks——

Senator **Capehart**. We are not giving in an inch on it, though, are we?

Secretary **Herter**. No, not a bit.

Senator **Capehart**. They are very insistent upon it.

Secretary **Herter**. Yes, they keep talking about it all the time.

Senator **Capehart**. You see no possibility of our agreeing to abandon them?

Secretary **Herter**. I can't see any.

Senator **Sparkman**. Our airbases where?

The **Chairman**. All over the world.

Senator **Capehart**. Air and military bases all over the world.

The **Chairman**. Senator Morse?

Senator **Morse**. I want to thank the Secretary and certainly wish him well on the conferences he is attending.

DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA

I only have one request, and that is that you give us a brief word on the latest developments in Cuba, particularly if there is any reason for us to have any fear at all that Cuba really is negotiating with Russia in respect to either military equipment for the Russians to supply Cuba or any possible military submarine base in Cuban waters.

Secretary **Herter**. This talk about a submarine base that I read about this morning is the first I had heard of that at all. I don't think we have had any news about this. Certainly our Navy people, I think, would be very alert to anything of that kind, and we will certainly check it out. But as far as I personally am concerned, this is the first I had heard of that. On the question of arms, we don't know of any agreement with the Soviet Government.

When we heard of the agreement with the Poles for an exchange or barter agreement in which some airplanes were indicated, I talked to the Vice Prime Minister who was here, and told him that we were very concerned about this. He said that the planes that were anticipated were entirely for spraying purposes in the cane fields for agricultural purposes and they were not in any way military planes. Then he made the statement public that they were not furnishing any arms or equipment of war.

Senator **Morse**. Is our American Ambassador in Cuba receiving any improved treatment on this last trip down there from what he got previously?

Secretary **Herter**. We have not seen any difference, and the Cubans have not sent any Ambassador to Washington.

Senator **Morse**. That is all.

The **Chairman**. They have not sent any?

Senator Williams, do you have a question?

Senator **Williams**. I have no questions at this time.

SECURITY AND NONCOMPLIANCE

The **CHAIRMAN**. Mr. Secretary, I know there are many more things that the members could ask you, but since we have a tight schedule and you have too, I guess we should conclude. I want to add only one thought about it. I know this is a matter of great delicacy and the differences are hard to draw. I am not quite as suspicious of dangers of noncompliance as Senator Hickenlooper is. This is a matter on which anybody can differ. I am inclined to think that on the minor or smaller explosions, assuming that the rest of the testing can be monitored in an adequate way, I would be more inclined to take some risk—more risk, perhaps, than others—because I think the establishment of some kind of agreement in this field might be very important as a pilot project to see whether or not they are serious about it. I think it would be of great value to make an agreement of this kind.

Of course, I wouldn't wish to sacrifice our security completely. I don't think we would in any such agreement until you test it. I think this is a matter on which honest men have different views. Some people believe that it is utterly impossible to trust them on any kind of agreement at any time, and they have much to support that view. I have a feeling we have to take some kind of risk, and I think the committee is divided on this as all groups are going to be divided. And that is up to you to use your best judgment on. Personally speaking for myself—certainly not for the committee—I would be inclined to back your judgment if you should take a calculated risk on these below-threshold explosions, granting that there is no perfect way. I don't believe there ever will be an absolutely foolproof way of getting at all these tests.

On the other hand, there is great danger to the Russians as well as to us in being caught at cheating, danger from the point of view of the whole world's attitude toward them.

They run a great risk that they might be caught; they can't guarantee it. I think it is one of those very difficult decisions that only you and the administration can take. I know that I would back an agreement if it is at all reasonable. This is a matter on which we all have different views as to what is adequate.

THROWING OURSELVES TO THE LIONS

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Mr. Chairman, may I make my position clear? I didn't mean to say that we had to have an absolutely foolproof copper-riveted guarantee that we could detect everything that went on.

I said that if we get into a nebulous agreement, that does not give us a fully adequate access to communications and inspection, even though we might not be able to detect everything that went on. We are just throwing ourselves to the lions.

[Discussion off the record.]

The **CHAIRMAN**. All I am trying to say is that I think we are justified in straining a point in making an agreement of some kind that is reasonably adequate in order to test their good faith about it. We are all interested to know whether or not the Russians are serious about wanting to do anything. I don't know whether they are or not, but surely we can maintain our adequate security during the test period.

We don't have to disarm during the test period by any means. We have many alternatives. Our missile program, the Polaris—all this will proceed on schedule, but somewhere surely there could be found a way that you can test their good faith in this small area.

I don't think nuclear testing is going to solve our problems by any means, but we have never really entered into any kind of agreement that would put them to the real test.

We can go back and say they violated their agreement on Berlin at the summit conference. I think they have a pretty good case to say there wasn't any agreement. It was just so vague and so general in terms that I don't know whether they made an agreement or not. We say they did, they say they did not, and it is very vague, I think, at best. There are all sorts of arguments going back to Yalta. Well, if we are going to freeze our attitude that you can never trust them, then it seems to me we ought to go to war as soon as possible, if we think we have an advantage.

I don't know whether we have or not.

SOVIETS WOULD BE GIVING UP A LOT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Bill, we have offered to test them. We have offered to give up atmospheric testing as a first step.

The CHAIRMAN. Apparently there is no disagreement on this.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The Russians won't take it. They won't even take that first step.

The CHAIRMAN. We are down to a point, if I understand it correctly, that this threshold is all that is holding it up; is that right?

Secretary HERTER. That's right.

There are other matters, but the main thing is the uncertainty under the threshold.

The CHAIRMAN. To experiment for 1 or 2 years. Well, I swear I don't see why we are justified in taking that risk for 1 or 2 years.

After all, then from their point of view, Bourke, and I agree with him, they are a secret closed community and we are not. We are giving up very little in doing that. They are giving up a lot. They have a great advantage in their secrecy and in their inaccessibility to the country.

This is a real advantage. You can't deny that. If they would break that down a little bit, I think that would be worth a lot to get started on it. If there is any possible way to breach the secrecy of that system to a limited extent as a testing of their good faith, it seems to me it is worth a lot to do it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I hate to go on with this, but may I just point this out? It isn't a question of a threshold. We have offered a threshold, 4.7. We have offered that threshold as a test. From that standpoint there may be some possibility of agreeing, let's say, on a 4.7 threshold as a possible order of magnitude.

But here is the point. There was a conference of experts a year or so ago in Geneva which met after the Ranier shots out here. They based their discussions on the only underground atomic test so far as they all knew, and that was the Ranier shots. They based their scientific findings on that. In later evaluations and in later tests which we had, it was shown that those scientific findings were inaccurate and unreliable from a detection standpoint. But the Russians sit there today and say, "We will not consider any new scientific findings. We will consider no 'in effect,' no scientific alteration of data." That was what you submitted in this first conference of experts. We will stand on that regardless of the fact that its error has been established and proven from a scientific standpoint. And they will not accept the new and more provable scientific data on detection.

They say it is a political matter.

Secretary HERTER. I think they have moved away from that position.

JOINT EXPERIMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. I thought they had moved away and did joint experiments in which they participate. At least that is what the reports indicate.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't know that they have.

The CHAIRMAN. If you understand joint experiments with the Russians on just such things as we are talking about, surely within a year or two it will appear that either they are stalling or they are uncooperative or they are arbitrary. I think it is worth going through this to see whether or not they are going to be uncooperative.

You are not committed beyond a limited period on that.

Secretary HERTER. We have no intention of signing a treaty that would put a ban on all those underground tests.

The CHAIRMAN. Until you establish this, I agree with that.

Secretary HERTER. Until we can take a better look at what is possible.

The CHAIRMAN. It is hard to decipher even from the official reports just what the meaning is, as we have difficulty in deciphering what our own laws mean here.

That is a great difficulty. But I don't see how you are much altered from the situation we are in now. They may be testing there now.

Secretary HERTER. That is one of the uncertainties of it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. One way we are worse off is that every day that goes by our laboratories are in a state of increasing deterioration.

The CHAIRMAN. They needn't be. Why should they be?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Because they have not anything to work on.

They have right now, but there will come a time very shortly when those laboratories are going to be dissipated if we don't continue testing. Maybe we should not. I don't say that we should not continue testing and get proper agreements. But that is one of the things then in the Russian's book of strategy: delay, delay, delay. We will deteriorate our scientific setup on these things. Meanwhile we don't know what they are doing.

The CHAIRMAN. We can't settle it, I am sure, and I think it is a very difficult problem. I wouldn't minimize that at all. I have no more to say. We will adjourn.

[Whereupon, at 10:55 a.m. the hearing was adjourned.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, APRIL 26, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee continued in executive session at 12:15 p.m., in room 4221, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Wiley and Williams.

Senator Wiley raised objection to having any action taken at the present time on consideration of H.R. 1, providing for a 3-year study of sewage disposal problems of Chicago, on the premise that no quorum was present. The chairman stated that no action was contemplated.

It was the sense of the chairman and those present that the committee pass over any further action on the Austrian property agreement (Executive A, 86th Congress, 2d Session), but agree that the record on it was complete, and that it would be scheduled at a future meeting whenever a quorum could be obtained.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 12:20 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, MAY 3, 1960

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session at 10:55 a.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Mansfield, Long, Lausche, Church, Wiley, and Carlson.

The chairman announced as the first order of business the bill S. 3074, To provide for the participation of the United States in the International Development Association.

During discussion, Senator Aiken moved that action on the measure be postponed for 2 weeks. Senator Wiley raised the question of no quorum, to which the Chair stated that one had previously existed, but that the Senator from Wisconsin could make the point of no quorum if he liked, but that the committee would adjourn. Whereupon, he asked Senator Aiken if he desired to make the point of no quorum, to which Senator Aiken replied that he was not, but that it might be pointed out on the floor that none was present at the time the vote was taken on reporting the bill.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[After other discussion, the chairman, on motion by Senator Wiley, declared the meeting adjourned.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, MAY 9, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session at 10:45 a.m., in room 4221, NSOB.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Sparkman, Mansfield, Lausche, Church, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Williams, and Aiken.

The order of business was stated as being S. 3074, To provide for the participation of the United States in the International Development Association.

The chairman noted the presence of a quorum.

After discussion, Senator Hickenlooper moved the bill be reported favorably.

Following debate, the chairman directed the roll to be called on the motion, and those present were recorded, as follows:

YEAS	NAYS
Senator Green	Senator Aiken
Senator Sparkman (by proxy)	Senator Williams
Senator Mansfield (by proxy)	
Senator Morse (by proxy)	
Senator Gore (by proxy)	
Senator Lausche	
Senator Church	
Senator Wiley	
Senator Hickenlooper	
Senator Capehart (by proxy)	
Senator Fulbright	

Senator Lausche changed his vote from yea to nay before the result was announced.

So the bill was ordered favorably to be reported, 10 to 3.

The chief of staff called the committee's attention to Executive A (86th Congress, 1st Session), an Agreement with the Republic of Austria regarding the return of Austrian property, rights, and interests. It was pointed out that inasmuch as the committee had taken no action on the Agreement, a motion to lay it on the table would clear the way for the Alien Property Custodian to enter on the matter and process the claims which said Agreement covered. Such action was recommended inasmuch as the committee did not appear willing to report the Agreement.

A motion by Senator Williams to lay the Agreement on the table was approved on a voice vote.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[Whereupon, the committee adjourned at 12:20 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, MAY 24, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session at 10:40 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Long, Gore, Lausche, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

The chairman stated that the committee was meeting to consider what it wished to do about proposed hearings on the events leading up to the summit conference. He said the Secretary of State had offered to meet with the committee on 10:30 a.m., Friday, May 24.

Senator Mansfield moved that the committee request the appearance of the Secretary. This was modified, on the seconding of the motion by Senator Sparkman, to accept the Secretary's offer to appear.

After discussion it was concluded to hold the hearings referred to, and to conduct them in the manner in which those involving General Douglas MacArthur were conducted, i.e., that the transcript be censored in page form by departmental personnel as each page is completed, and the censored version thereafter released to the press and public as soon as possible. In this manner, it was concluded, there could be a continuous flow of information about the hearings while the committee was sitting, and insure, also, that no premature "leaks" would occur about the hearings' proceedings.

The motion by Senator Mansfield was then agreed to with the provision that the Secretary of State would be the first witness at hearings to be conducted as above. The agreement was obtained on a voice vote. It was also agreed that each member would be limited to 10 minutes of questions on the first line of questioning.

After some discussion of the agencies to be called for the hearings, the committee proceeded to the consideration of other business.

Senator Morse asked that S. 2634, to amend the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, relative to the return of certain alien property, be taken up. The bill was ordered to be reported on a voice vote.

The committee next considered the convention (Ex. C, 86–2), the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, which, on motion by Senator Morse, seconded by Senator Sparkman, was ordered reported to the Senate.

Senator Morse then moved that the committee instruct the staff to arrange for subcommittee hearings on H.R. 1, To require a study to be conducted of the effect of increasing the diversion of water from Lake Michigan, and for other purposes. Senator Wiley moved to table the motion of Senator Morse. The chairman declared that such motion was out of order because it was defeated at the last meeting. Senator Wiley then moved to postpone consideration on the bill, on which motion the Senators present responded as follows:

YEAS	NAYS
Senator Green	Senator Sparkman
Senator Lausche	Senator Mansfield (by proxy)
Senator Wiley	Senator Morse
Senator Hickenlooper	Senator Kennedy (by proxy)
Senator Aiken	Senator Gore (by proxy)
Senator Williams	Senator Carlson
	The Chairman

So the motion to postpone was defeated, 6 to 7.

Senator Wiley thereupon raised the question of the validities of the proxies used by the chairman, he having voted Senators Mansfield, Kennedy and Gore in the negative. It was his statement that at least in one committee of the Senate the proxies had to be in writing.

Senator Fulbright, the chairman, said that it was customary in the Committee on Foreign Relations for members leaving the committee room at meetings to leave their proxies (oral) with the chairman or one of the members. Senator Hickenlooper concurred in this observation, saving it had been a long practice.

Senator Morse accordingly called for a vote on his motion, and the Senators responded as follows:

YEAS	NAYS
Senator Sparkman (by proxy)	Senator Green
Senator Mansfield (by proxy)	Senator Lausche
Senator Morse	Senator Wiley
Senator Long (by proxy)	Senator Hickenlooper
Senator Gore (by proxy)	Senator Aiken
The Chairman	Senator Carlson
	Senator Williams

So Senator Morse's motion was defeated, 6 to 7.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The chairman then adjourned the meeting at 12 noon.]

EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—Before the opening of the Paris Summit meeting, President Eisenhower had conceded that there was little hope it would settle the Berlin issue, but that he expected progress on disarmament and a nuclear test ban treaty. Then on May 5, the Soviet Union announced that it had shot down an American U-2 reconnaissance plane. NASA immediately responded that one of its weather research planes was missing, and the State Department denied any American intention of violating Soviet airspace. On May 7, however, Khrushchev said the pilot was alive and would stand trial for espionage. That same day, the State Department dropped its cover story and admitted that the U-2 was "endeavoring to obtain information now concealed behind the Iron Curtain." On May 9, Secretary of State Herter and CIA Director Dulles gave a secret briefing to Congressional leaders.

Khrushchev arrived in Paris on May 14, still insisting that he was willing to participate in the Summit. However, at the opening of the 4-Power talks, Khrushchev conditioned his participation on President Eisenhower's apology for acts of aggression, and his promise to end future flights and punish those "directly guilty" for the May 1 flight. Eisenhower assumed full personal responsibility for authorizing the flights, insisted that they were not aggressive, promised that the program had ended, but would not apologize. The flights, he said, were necessary for the security of Western nations against surprise attack. Khrushchev then left Paris and the talks collapsed.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the U-2 incident from May 27 to June 2, and met from June 15 to 23 to prepare its report. Fourteen members endorsed the report which criticized the administration for mishandling the U-2 incident and thereby contributing to the collapse of the Summit. One voted against the report; while two others issued a minority report, defending the May 1 flight but criticizing the administration's response. In a speech to the Senate on June 25, Chairman Fulbright charged that as a result of the U-2 affair, the international prestige of the United States had "reached a new low."]

FRIDAY, MAY 27, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:07 a.m., pursuant to notice, Hon. J. William Fulbright (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Mansfield, Long, Gore, Lausche, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

Also present: Senators Javits and Young (Ohio).

Also present: Douglas Dillon, Under Secretary of State; Livingston Merchant, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; William B. Macomber, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations; Richard Helms, CIA; Charles A. Bohlen, Special Adviser to the Secretary; Gerald Smith, State; Captain L. P. Gray III, USN, Military Assistant to Chairman, JCS; Julian P. White, State Department.

Staff members present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Denney, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Newhouse, Mr. Kuhl, and Mr. St. Claire.

[This hearing was published in 1960 with deletions made for reasons of national security. The most significant deletions are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the published hearings.]

* * * * * * *

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTIAN A. HERTER, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY HON. DOUGLAS DILLON, UNDER SECRETARY, AND HON. CHARLES E. BOHLEN, SPECIAL ASSISTANT

* * * * * * *

PREVIOUS U-2 FLIGHTS [P. 25]

The **CHAIRMAN**. Were any other planes lost on these same ventures prior to May 1?

Secretary **HERTER**. I understand some were lost in practice spins, but not over Soviet territory.

The **CHAIRMAN**. None had been shot down or lost over Soviet territory?

Secretary **HERTER**. No.

* * * * * * *

ISSUANCE OF COVER STORY ON OVERFLIGHT [P. 29]

Mr. **DILLON**. At that time, it was determined that a cover story would be used as was stated by the President the other night, which had been previously prepared for such instance.

There was full coordination on this. I knew that the cover story was to be issued and it was discussed that it would be issued as usual when a plane was lost at the base from which the plane was lost. There would be no statement from Washington, and this information was given to the people who would be in charge of the flight at the base where it flew from in Turkey. The agency which handled these flights, did the communicating with them, which is Mr. Dulles' agency, and as a result, in due course, the statement was put out there that a plane was missing.

* * * * * * *

PREPARATIONS OF GUIDELINES ON MISSING PLANE [P. 30]

Mr. **DILLON**. The State Department at no time worked directly with NASA on any of this publicity or anything regarding these flights.

Senator **GORE**. Did you say did, or did not?

Mr. **DILLON**. Did not. This is part of the cover operation.

The relationships with NASA were handled entirely by the Central Intelligence Agency and only a very few people—I don't know the number in NASA—were aware of this fact and who they were was known to the Central Intelligence Agency and they had all the relationships with them. We did not know this aspect of the matter.

* * * * * * *

SOVIET KNOWLEDGE OF U-2 OVERFLIGHTS [P. 32]

Senator **Wiley**. Isn't it a fact that, from his remarks that he made in his talk in Berlin he knew that we were using what has been called spy planes, and had been using the same for some time?

Secretary **Herter**. It certainly does, and that was repeated yesterday by Mr. Gromyko in the statement that he made at the United Nations in which he said they had known of this for some time, that they had known of it at the time that Mr. Khrushchev was at Camp David, and that even at that time they felt that we were a treacherous people.

* * * * * * *

WHO HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR U-2 FLIGHTS? [P. 35]

Senator **Humphrey**. When something goes wrong on one of these flights who is responsible to give the cover-up story, so to speak?

Mr. **Dillon**. Central Intelligence Agency, but we are also responsible for agreeing with them that this is a reasonable story, and it is proper in the circumstances, but they have the responsibility for executing it, if I may say that, for putting it out, and seeing that it is, the information regarding it is transmitted to the field, and to NASA here.

* * * * * * *

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE U-2 AIRPLANE? [PP. 36-37]

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Mr. Secretary, we hear a great many statements about this plane being shot down. What is the best evidence on that? Was it shot down from its maximum height or did they consider that it had a flameout at that height and then came down to a lower altitude or what?

Secretary **Herter**. Senator, there has been a good deal of speculation on that point. I think that we are very skeptical as to whether it was shot down from a very high altitude but I think from the point of view of details and such conclusions as we may have reached on the subject, you could get better testimony when you have Mr. Dulles here which I understand you are going to have next week.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Well, I think there is considerable difference in a situation where this plane might have been shot at 60,000 or 70,000 feet, or whether it was shot down or shot at at 5,000 or 7,000 feet.

Secretary **Herter**. We are very skeptical and there are certain evidences that it was not shot down from that altitude but I think the more detailed factual material that we have could be better given to you by Mr. Dulles.

* * * * * * *

DOES RUSSIA HAVE A LAND-AIR MISSILE? [P. 38]

Senator **Morse**. Mr. Secretary, do our experts believe that Russia has a land-air missile?

Secretary HERTER. I think you are having both the Secretary of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency that can testify to that better than I could.

Senator MORSE. Have they ever informed you as to what their opinion is as to whether or not Russia has a land-air missile?

Secretary HERTER. We, I think, assume that they do.

Senator MORSE. We assume that they do. Is it on the basis of that assumption that they have been asking Congress for some time for a speedup in our land-air missile program because of the assumption that Russia may have one?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir. I am being purposely cautious for security reasons, as you understand.

Senator MORSE. I understand.

Secretary HERTER. And possibly in executive session when you have talked to Mr. Dulles you could get further information on that point.

Senator MORSE. And yet, I think from the standpoint of our own security, it is rather important that we have some information as to the possibility, on the line of Senator Hickenlooper's question, the possibility of whether or not this was shot down by a land-air missile.

Mr. Secretary, do our Allies, particularly Great Britain and France, approve of spy plane flights over foreign territory?

Secretary HERTER. Sir, I am not in a position to speak or to involve other nations in this testimony. I will say this, that the position of the British and French in standing by us was completely solid.

Senator MORSE. I understand that. But what we need to know, it seems to me, is whether or not Prime Minister Macmillan and President de Gaulle approve of spy plane flights over foreign territory as a matter of Allied policy.

Secretary HERTER. Mr. Chairman, may I interject an observation? I am willing to give all the testimony I can here. I feel, however, that because of our relations with other nations, I ought not to interpret their positions or otherwise involve them in this hearing, if I can avoid it. For that reason I would prefer, if I may sir, to ask that this question and answer be stricken out.

Senator MORSE. You do not think that the American people are entitled to know—in order to evaluate both their own government's policies and the policies of our Allies—what the position of the Allies is in regard to conducting spy plane flights over foreign territory?

Secretary HERTER. Mr. Chairman, I still stick to this same position—that I ought not to pass judgment on the opinions of our Allies or comment on them.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, they have been publicly stating their solidarity and support of our position.

Secretary HERTER. They have been.

Senator MORSE. I know of no public statement, Mr. Chairman, that they support an Allied policy of spy plane flights over foreign territory. Of course, if that is their position, the world ought to know it and know we are then that much closer to war.

Secretary HERTER. May I say this, Senator Morse——

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't mean that, specifically. I meant in our position on this whole conference, not on the spying matter.

Secretary HERTER. Their votes and statements made in the United Nations in connection with the Russian effort to condemn this as an act of aggression were very clear-cut on that point.

Senator MORSE. I don't think so at all. I think it ducks the question completely as to whether or not they specifically approve an Allied policy of sending spy planes over foreign territory. The fact that they didn't support the resolution before the United Nations, I think, is quite irrelevant to this question. But I have your position any way.

* * * * * * *

COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA ON THE U-2 FLIGHTS [P. 39]

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, do you think the public knowledge now of these American spy plane flights over Russia has played into the hands of Communist propaganda with the Russian people themselves by increasing the fear, no matter how unfounded we know it is, the fear of the Russian people that our real objective is to make war against Russia?

Secretary HERTER. I think that the Russian Government will do its very best to work along that line in its propaganda.

As I said earlier, the evidence we have so far is that the attitude of the Russian people toward our officials, whether in Moscow or in our missions in the Soviet bloc countries has shown no change.

Senator MORSE. Is it not true, Mr. Secretary, that the testimony of American tourists in Russia, after they come back to the United States, is that they are constantly asked by the Russian people why the United States seems so bent on war against Russia as evidenced by our encircling Russia with bases and now we have evidence that we are sending out of those bases, spy planes over Russia? Is that not going to intensify those fears?

Secretary HERTER. I think it may.

POSSIBLE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONSIDERATION OF U-2 INCIDENT

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, what plans, if any, does the administration have of carrying on a peace offensive against Khrushchev now in a meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations?

Secretary HERTER. That again is a matter of speculation. The fact that, as I indicated in my prepared statement, he had gone through this extraordinary press conference in Paris with very extreme language, that he did not contain any threats of any specific action; that he then went to East Berlin and called off a mass meeting there, and only invited people to a meeting on the following day and then made a statement with regard to the Berlin situation indicating that there would be no action taken for some time may well indicate that his position on specific things has not changed. However, only time will tell, and what his attitude will be, what the attitude will be at the time of the meeting of the Assembly, of course, can only speculate.

It is very possible that he may want at that time to make a more conciliatory gesture. it is very possible that the pressures of a lot of the neutral nations, who are naturally nervous about any heightening of tensions, may have some effect there.

* * * * * * *

PLANS IN EVENT OF SOVIET DOWNING OF U-2 [P. 43]

Senator **Long**. Mr. Secretary, I believe that U-2 flights should have been made. I have said that publicly and I stayed by that statement.

I wondered if the Department and those responsible had not planned well in advance just what we were going to do when the Soviets ultimately got one of these U-2's. Had there been such plans made?

Secretary **Herter**. I believe they had. I think that question can be answered in greater detail by Mr. Dulles when he testifies.

Senator **Long**. Yes. But that also involves your responsibility because you would be the one who would give the explanation.

Secretary **Herter**. That is correct.

ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Senator **Long**. While I don't see how the great powers can avoid conducting espionage and military intelligence, as a practical matter as long as it is conducted on the other person's soil, isn't that a violation of international law?

Secretary **Herter**. All espionage is a violation of sovereignty, all forms of espionage.

Senator **Long**. In doing so, it is a violation of international law?

Secretary **Herter**. Yes, sir. However, the Chicago Convention, which is the principal convention dealing with this, has never been accepted by the Russians nor have they accepted any bilateral agreement with regard to air space over their country.

Senator **Long**. We recognize it as a violation of law, do we not?

Secretary **Herter**. Yes.

DEVICES CARRIED BY PILOT

Senator **Long**. Are these statements about this poison needle and the self-destruction devices correct?

Secretary **Herter**. I think so, but there, again, I think that the testimony of Mr. Dulles would be more accurate than anything I could give.

Senator **Long**. To the best of your information, was this pilot supposed to destroy himself rather than be captured by the Russians?

Secretary **Herter**. There, I think he can give you exactly what arrangements were made with the pilot.

Senator **Long**. What is your impression?

Secretary **Herter**. My impression is from what I have heard that the pilot was given an option, but I don't know. I just don't know what the situation is.

* * * * * * *

SELF-PRESERVATION [P. 54]

Senator **Wiley**. Is it generally conceded that the Kremlin has been engaging in espionage not only in our own country, but in virtually all the countries on earth and is still doing it? That is correct, is it not?

Secretary **Herter**. That is correct.

Senator **Wiley**. As demonstrated by Ambassador Lodge in the United Nations the other day, they even tried to pull a stunt on our embassy in Russia.[1] Did you see that?

Secretary **Herter**. Yes, sir. I might say that there have been over a hundred cases.

* * * * * * *

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m. the same day.]

Afternoon Session

The committee met at 2:30 p.m. Hon. J. William Fulbright presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Humphrey, Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

* * * * * * *

SOVIET HIERARCHY [P. 73]

Senator **Aiken**. What was the significance of the shake-up in the Russian Government prior to the U–2 incident, I believe, last April, was it not, when Mr. Kozlov was promoted, and coupled with that question, why don't we hear anything about Mr. Mikoyan any more? Has he been isolated or just out of the news, or what has happened with him? [2]

Secretary **Herter**. Mr. Bohlen, who is our expert, is also the censor of the document, I am afraid he has gone out of the room at the moment.

With regard to the disappearance of Mr. Mikoyan, we have been told this is just a normal vacation he has taken down to the Black Sea. It is true in years gone by he had taken rather extended vacations there, and whether this is true or not we can't say.

---

[1] U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge revealed to the Security Council that the U.S. Embassy in Moscow had discovered a hidden "listening device" in a carved replica of The Great Seal of The United States which hung in the Embassy for several years. Lodge charged that more than 100 of such devices had been found in other U.S. Embassies in Soviet bloc nations.

[2] At a plenary meeting of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee on May 4, 1960, Frol M. Kozlov was elected as a Central Committee Secretary, and reportedly became Khrushchev's chief aide on the committee. Anastas I. Mikoyan remained on the presidium as a First Deputy Premier. Alexei N. Kosygin replaced Kozlov as a First Deputy Premier, and 3 days later Leonid I. Brezhnev was elected chairman of the Presidium.

With respect to the shake-up, I think the only significance that it had were that two of the strongest members of the Central Committee were sent to other responsibilities and this may have been a personal strengthening of Mr. Khrushchev's power within the Committee itself. But it was not considered very highly significant.

Senator AIKEN. That is, Mr. Kozlov's promotion is not significant?

Secretary HERTER. I don't think so. I didn't know that he as such had been promoted.

Senator AIKEN. Wasn't he promoted to the second place in government?

Secretary HERTER. Deputy, yes.

Senator AIKEN. Promoted to the Second Vice President or what corresponded to second place in the Russian Government?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. I thought that was a good sign.

Secretary HERTER. A long time ago, I think when Mr. Averell Harriman was visiting in Russia he reported that Mr. Kozlov had been pointed out to him by Mr. Khrushchev as his successor, saying that he and Mikoyan were too old to carry on and that Kozlov was the No. 2 man. But there was no telling whether he was saying that seriously or whether he was being flattering about it because Mr. Kozlov was there at the time.

Senator AIKEN. I thought he made the best impression of any of our Russian visitors last summer. At least when he came before this committee, I thought he did.

I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Oregon.

FUNCTION OF THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, I think it would be helpful for this record if you made a statement in regard to the functions of NASA, and the part that NASA played in connection with the U-2 flight.

I don't think the record is very clear as to what are the functions of NASA, and what jurisdiction, if any, the State Department has over NASA and what the relationship between NASA, and the National Security Council is, and the State Department.

Secretary HERTER. NASA, as you know, is an agency devoted entirely to the peaceful development of satellites and outer space vehicles of one kind or another.

Its operations have now been separated out from what were called purely military operations, although it is always inevitable in the development of boosters that there should be an interrelationship between the two, because the military vehicle and the peaceful vehicle have the same problems of propulsion to get up into the air.

The witnesses of NASA, of course, will be before the committee.

The question as to NASA's coming into this particular incident, is one that apparently had been arranged as part of the cover story, because most of the U-2's are used by NASA in connection with purely scientific work, meteorological work. Actually, the Japanese Government found them tremendously valuable in tracing the course of tornadoes last year, and I think that NASA put out at least three publications on their findings from the U-2 weather observations.

This cover story, as I say, was apparently worked out some time beforehand.

NASA'S ROLE IN THE U-2 INCIDENT

With respect to the actual development of events in relation to NASA, I am sorry to say that I can't give you first-hand information.

Perhaps Mr. Dillon can supplement that as it occurred while I was overseas and when Mr. Dillon was in charge.

Mr. **DILLON**. All I can say is as far as I know the State Department didn't have any direct relationships with NASA on this matter, and the relationships that there were, were handled by the Central Intelligence Agency as part of a cover story. So, either Mr. Dulles or the NASA witnesses themselves will be able to inform you on that.

Senator **MORSE**. Why would NASA make a statement in regard to this plane if it was under the jurisdiction of CIA.

Mr. **DILLON**. On the cover story it was in the open, that the plane was under the jurisdiction of NASA. Actually for this operation it was under the jurisdiction of CIA as part of the cover story.

Senator **MORSE**. Therefore, NASA, in your opinion, was acting within the proprieties when it issued the statement that it issued.

Mr. **DILLON**. I think so, yes.

Senator **MORSE**. You think it had cleared that statement with CIA or had authority from CIA to issue it.

Secretary **HERTER**. I think so.

Mr. **DILLON**. They should have; as I understood the matter, these guidelines to answer questions were prepared by CIA. They were gone over with State Department people a day or two before. We had thought that NASA was going to handle this in the way of answering questions, which we knew they would get, because this was a NASA plane. They apparently chose instead to forestall the questions just by putting it all out in the form of a statement. But it was in the form of a cover story which was furnished to them by CIA in some manner with which I am not familiar, but which CIA witnesses will inform you of at a proper time.

* * * * * * *

ISSUANCE OF STATE DEPARTMENT AND NASA STATEMENTS [P. 80]

Senator **GORE**. Now, Mr. White[3] was asked the identity of the pilot and according to my information, he declined to give the name of the pilot on the grounds that the pilot's mother was suffering from a serious heart condition and could not stand the shock, but NASA proceeded blandly to name the pilot.

Do you call that coordination?

---

[3] State Department press officer Lincoln White.

Mr. **Dillon**. Certainly, all the details regarding the naming of the pilot was something that was supposed to be handled by NASA. I don't know why the State Department got into that at all. Certainly, it was not in the statement that we put out.

During his press conference Mr. White was asked whether he knew the name of the pilot and on an off-the-record basis, he said he did know but he preferred not to answer.

Senator **Gore**. Do you know whether the pilot's mother did, in fact, suffer a serious heart condition?

Mr. **Dillon**. I am not aware.

Senator **Gore**. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

* * * * * * *

POWERS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY [P. 84]

Senator **Lausche**. Is there any type of legislation that you feel that we ought to pass with respect to the curtailment of the duties of the powers of the Central Intelligence Agency or the expansion of them. If you have given that subject no thought you can state it.

Secretary **Herter**. I have given it no thought. I hope there would be no change so far as the activities are concerned. I think when Mr. Dulles testifies he can speak to you from the point of view of expansion, which I am sure he would like to do, rather than curtailment.

Senator **Lausche**. That is all I have.

ALLEGED FRENCH NEWSPAPER ACCOUNT OF OVERFLIGHTS

The **Chairman**. Mr. Secretary, there was one statement that I was told when I was in Paris that an account of overflights of the Russian territory had been carried in the French newspaper some 30 to 60 days prior to that.

Have you ever heard of such account?

Secretary **Herter**. I heard the same reports in Paris, but I never saw any documentary proof of it.

The **Chairman**. Have any of you people tried to confirm it?

Secretary **Herter**. Yes, but I have not heard it mentioned by anyone except when I was in Paris. I had not heard a word before that.

KHRUSHCHEV'S MAY 5 REFERENCE TO OVERFLIGHTS

The **Chairman**. The person who mentioned that to me was a rather important official in the French Government and he said this had been published before.

In his speech of May 5, Mr. Khrushchev referred to the U.S. overflight of July 2, 1956, April 9, 1960, and May 1, 1960. He said that the April 9 flight caused concern within the Soviet Government and resulted in admonishments to the Soviet military not to let it happen again.

Prior to the May 1 flight did the United States know that the Soviets knew of the earlier flights, particularly the one on April 9?

Secretary **Herter**. No, we did not know. I think that there is this: Perhaps I can take this off the record because it becomes a part of the rather delicate information in connection with it——

The **CHAIRMAN**. Mr. Bohlen will take it off the record, I am sure he ought to. If you warn him I know he will.

Secretary **HERTER**. We knew from previous overflights which flights had been tracked by radar, and how far they had been tracked, and when they were lost in the tracking so that we could tell pretty well. But we were never able to identify them as unidentified in the air as such and I assume they thought they were U.S. planes but had never been able to identify them.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Did we, that is the United States, know of the concern which this flight of April 9 aroused in the Soviet Government?

Secretary **HERTER**. No, sir.

The **CHAIRMAN**. So that our planners, that is the CIA in this case, did not know that the Soviets were already concerned about these flights and were in a sense prepared for the next one, is that correct?

Secretary **HERTER**. No. We are not quite certain that they were prepared for the next one either or whether they had some luck.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Do you know whether or not there was any attempt on the part of the Soviets to bring down the plane that flew over the Soviet territory on April 9?

Secretary **HERTER**. No, we don't.

SCHEDULE OF OVERFLIGHTS

The **CHAIRMAN**. Do you know whether any overflights were attempted or made between April 9 and May 1?

Secretary **HERTER**. I can't tell you quite honestly.

The **CHAIRMAN**. There has been no review of this matter in the Department?

Secretary **HERTER**. No.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Can you tell us how far the April 9 flight was over the Soviet Union? Was it all the way across?

Secretary **HERTER**. I am ashamed to say I can't remember.

The **CHAIRMAN**. You do not know whether any of them went as far as Sverdiovsk or anywhere?

Secretary **HERTER**. I think, sir, that Mr. Allen Dulles will be able to answer these questions.

WHO KNEW ABOUT THE FLIGHTS?

The **CHAIRMAN**. Did our Ambassador to Turkey know of these flights?

Secretary **HERTER**. I don't think so.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Or our Ambassador to Pakistan?

Secretary **HERTER**. I don't think so.

The **CHAIRMAN**. None of our Ambassadors knew about these flights?

Secretary **HERTER**. These were very closely held in the Government.

The **CHAIRMAN**. This is what interests me. If they were so closely held, how did an article appear in a French newspaper that we were doing it?

Secretary **HERTER**. That is why I still have some doubts about that report.

The **Chairman**. I think it would be interesting to know whether that is true. I think this ought to be taken off the record by Mr. Bohlen, but it was the Foreign Minister of France that told me that, and he is certainly a responsible man. It was a very curious piece of information.

Secretary **Herter**. I can't imagine its appearing in the French press and not having been picked up by the American press.

KHRUSHCHEV'S INTERPRETATION REGARDING CONTINUANCE OF OVERFLIGHTS [P. 85]

The **Chairman**. This, again, raises this point that puzzles me very much. The evidence is quite clear that Mr. Khrushchev, if he didn't know positively, certainly suspected that it was our planes that were going across his territory, didn't he?

Secretary **Herter**. That is what I assume.

The **Chairman**. And it comes back to this point that he hadn't raised such a terrible fuss about it until this one, that is, the May 1 flight, which he shot down. And, you said you couldn't reconcile his difference in his attitude toward the prior flights to the attitude toward the May 1 flight. But doesn't the reconciliation, if it is explainable at all—I am just asking you if there is one—does it not lie in the fact that our Government did take the position regarding the May 1 flight and this program, that this is a deliberate program which we, the President, takes responsibility for, and which we intend to continue?

Secretary **Herter**. Not which we intend to continue. That has never been said.

The **Chairman**. He interpreted it as such. Mr. Khrushchev in his statement, which I have a copy of here—this is his language. He says—this is a part of our Background Documents which says:

> At his press conference, Herter made an outrageous statement. Far from feeling guilty and ashamed of aggressive actions, he justifies them and says that he will continue in the future. Only countries which are in a state of war can act in this way * * *. Herter's statement has made us doubt the correctness of our earlier conclusions that the President and the American Government did not know about the flights. Herter's statement says that this intelligence plan was endorsed by the Government.

At least that is the way he interpreted it, and, as we said before——

Senator **Lausche**. Who is he? Who interpreted it?

The **Chairman**. This is a quote from Mr. Khrushchev's statement. He is interpreting what Mr. Herter said as speaking for the Government. But is this not at least a possible reconciliation of the difference in attitude between the prior flights and the May 1 flight?

Secretary **Herter**. It might be if one wanted to interpret the words that I spoke that way. There was no need of his interpreting those words that way. Certainly from what I said, that is a very far-fetched interpretation. I think he was interpreting it for his own purposes that way. I think that the one reconciliable feature between those two things is that in one case he had specific evidence and in the other case he did not.

The **Chairman**. Then it is your position that neither your statement nor the President's press conference can legitimately be interpreted as an endorsement and justification of the flights and a policy of pursuing them in the future?

Secretary HERTER. Certainly not the policies of pursuing them in the future. The President's statement that was made in Paris said it was perfectly clear from what I had said and from what he had said that there was nothing that allowed that inference.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you in your background news conference in Paris on Sunday, May 15, repeat the same statement that you had made prior thereto in Washington?

Secretary HERTER. I was asked at that background press conference whether or not I had made a statement that we would continue doing this. I repeated the very words which I had used in my statement. I said I stood on those; that did not imply that we would continue.

The CHAIRMAN. Prior to that second statement, Mr. Khrushchev had so interpreted it. Were you aware that he had so interpreted it in his statement to the Presidium?

Secretary HERTER. I think I may have been, but if one took cognizance of every interpretation of his of everything that happens in this country, one would spend all one's time trying to correct his statements.

The CHAIRMAN. You believe that it is an unreasonable and farfetched interpretation of your statement or the President's in his press conference that these would be continued, is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, I do.[4]

The CHAIRMAN. Is it or is it not a fact that the press in this country interpreted it in that same fashion?

Secretary HERTER. I am told that some did and some did not.

The CHAIRMAN. It might have been wise for us to clarify it at that time so that we both interpreted it properly, don't you think?

Secretary HERTER. That, as I think I have indicated earlier, referred to the cessation of the flights and not resuming the flights. The President had reserved to state in Paris in conjunction with the fact that he was going to offer at the United Nations his plan for aerial supervision of all nations that would be willing to submit to it.

* * * * * * *

JURISDICTION OVER THE AIRSPACE AND HIGH SEAS [P. 90]

Senator MANSFIELD. The fact is that we have these satellites going skyward hundreds of miles and we have these missiles going thousands of miles into the ocean. It was because of these new factors that I offered the suggestion that it might be well to have international conferences to take heed of changed conditions in this modern day.

We have also advocated, as you are aware, peaceful uses of outer space and we have made no headway.

Do we assert an interpretation of international law that reconnaissance flights of manned aircraft of one country over another, if they are for purposes of defense, are legal?

---

[4] See Appendix A.

Secretary Herter. That is a question that I could not answer without consulting counsel of the State Department.

Senator Mansfield. Fine. Mr. Secretary, you have had a hard day. I know that you have a cold, and I would like to request, Mr. Chairman, that the other questions be given to the Secretary and that answers be furnished for the record.

The Chairman. Without objection, that is agreeable to the committee.

Secretary Herter. It is all right with me, thank you.

[The document referred to follows:]

Department of State,
Washington, D.C., June 7, 1960.

Hon. J. William Fulbright,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Dear Mr. Chairman: The questions on the U-2 incident which were submitted by Senator Mansfield during my appearance before the Foreign Relations Committee have been reviewed here in the State Department and by the CIA. It seemed to us that with one or two exceptions the questions were subsequently answered during the course of the hearings to the extent possible. We have therefore indicated after each question the page numbers of the transcript where answers will be found, and in a few instances have added additional comment.

It is our understanding that this material is for the Committee's records and not for publication.

With warm regards,

Most sincerely,

Christian A. Herter.

Enclosure:

List of questions and answers. [*Page numbers refer to original transcripts.*]

ORIGINS AND AUTHORIZATION OF THE SPECIFIC U-2 FLIGHT INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT

1. On what date was this specific flight scheduled? How much time had elapsed since the previous flight of this type and the one before it?

1st part—Pp. 265, 273, 339, 391
2nd part—Pp. 346, 442

2. Was this particular flight a routine scheduling or was there anything unusual or special or extra-urgent about it?

Pp. 274, 360, 367, 385–6, 391

3. What Department or agency actually initiated the scheduling?

P. 265

4. What Departments or agencies knew of the scheduling in advance of the flight? To what level in each of these departments did the knowledge of the scheduling reach? (i.e. assistant-secretary, under-secretary, White House aide)

Pp. 311, 312, 351 and following, 436

5. Was anyone in the White House informed of the scheduled flight?

Pp. 311, 312, 346, 350, 351 and following

6. Was any objection interposed from any source to this particular flight at this particular time? (If so: by whom and why was the objection over-ridden?)

No. Also see p. 351 and on

7. General White of the Air Force has indicated that if the Air Force had been in charge of this project this flight would not have taken place at the time it did. Does this mean that the Air Force had no part in, was not consulted in the scheduling of this particular flight? (If answer is that Air Force was consulted—Who in the Air Force was consulted? Did he interpose any objections to this particular flight?)

General White has denied making any such statement. The Air Force was consulted and knowledgeable at a high level. AFCIN on USIB. P. 263.

8. Has the Air Force or any part of the Defense Department at any time interposed any objection to any of these flights?

No.

9. Was anyone in N.A.S.A. privy to the real purpose of these flights?

No.

10. Was anyone in that agency aware of the scheduled route of the particular flight involved in the incident?

No.

11. Were any objections interposed by N.A.S.A. as to this particular flight or any similar flight? (If yes—when and on what grounds?)

No.

12. Was any foreign government privy to the actual purposes of this particular flight? (If so—which governments and at what level in those governments?)

The Secretary has testified (pp. 75–76) that he is not in a position to interpret the positions of other nations or otherwise involve them in this hearing. See also pp. 314, 377, 392.

ORIGINS OF U–2 TYPE FLIGHTS OF DEEP PENETRATION IN GENERAL

1. What department or departments of the Executive Branch require the kind of information which deep penetration of U–2 flights over the Soviet Union might secure? (Air Force and possibly others.)

Pp. 255–258, 265 and Secretary Gates' testimony.

2. Was it at the urging of that Department (or departments) that these flights were instituted or did the C.I.A. itself propose that they be instituted? In other words, whose idea was this in the first place?

Pp. 257, 258

3. What Departments or agencies then participated in a discussion of the feasibility of and necessity for these flights? (Presumably members of the National Security Council)

Pp. 306, 351

4. When was the project of undertaking deep penetration flights first authorized?

P. 258

5. At what level was this approval obtained? Were those who approved assistant-secretaries, under-secretaries, the President himself?

Who actually said to C.I.A. that it is permissible to make these flights of deep penetration?

Pp. 350, 351, 352, 362

6. Did the Department of State, at the time of launching this project of flights of deep penetration or at any time prior to the recent downing of the U–2, interpose objections to these flights?

No.

7. At the time that this project of deep penetration was approved, did the Secretary of State or *any* cabinet members know that these flights were about to begin? And I underscore the words *deep penetration.*

P. 351

8. At the time of the recent U–2 incident, did the President or any Cabinet Member know that this project of deep penetration was still operative and that flights under it might be undertaken at any time? (If so, who knew it?)

Pp. 311, 312, 351

INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATION OF THE INCIDENT

1. Has Norway officially protested the use of its airfields in connection with the U–2 flight?

Yes.

2. Pakistan has done the same, has it not?

Yes.

3. And Turkey?

No.

4. Have we had a similar request from Japan not to use its airfields for any further U–2 flights?

The Japanese Government has not officially raised any question relating to U–2 flights.

5. Subsequent to the U–2 incident, did Denmark lay down any conditions on the use of its airfields by United States military planes?

No.

6. Have all U–2 type planes now been recalled to the United States?

Pp. 371–409.

7. In what other allied or friendly countries, if any, have there been repercussions since the U–2 affair, as regards the use of infra-structure in their territory by our military forces?

There have been no repercussions of this kind in other allied nations.

8. Has there been any tightening up on the entry and the activities of U.S. personnel in friendly countries since the incident?

9. (If so)—What form has this taken?

No.

10. Would you say that a central objective of Soviet policy has been to break up the infra-structure of our alliances, particularly as to those nations on its periphery?

Yes.

11. Would you estimate that the U-2 incident has helped or hindered the Soviet Union in driving an opening wedge into our alliances with nations around its periphery, to the extent, as least, of curbing the use of the facilities of the infra-structure which they provide or would you say that the U-2 incident has had no discernible effect whatsoever?

This incident has had no effect in impairing the effectiveness of our mutual defense arrangements with our allies. As the Secretary remarked in the hearings (p. 96), "One of the most impressive things I have ever seen was the meeting of NATO that took place after the aborted, so-called Summit Conference. I have never seen such unanimity, such firmness, such determination as exhibited at that meeting." See also pp. 320, 321.

Official U.S. Reaction to the U-2 Incident

1. The flight took place on May 1; is that correct?

Yes. P. 391.

2. The first public word that the flight was missing came from the Air Force on May 3; is that correct?

No. May 2. P. 283.

3. Now, at that time, on May 3, was anyone of Cabinet Rank and the White House informed of the actual mission and circumstances of this flight?

P. 351 and following.

4. (If yes)—Who knew it?

P. 351

5. (If no)—Why not? Didn't anyone in the Departments think that, in view of the impending summit conference, in view of the delicate situation, that the politically responsible officials should be informed that an intelligence plane may have fallen into Soviet hands?

6. On May 5th, Khrushchev announced that an American plane had been shot down but he did not elaborate. N.A.S.A. announced that the plane, on automatic pilot, may have gone off course after the pilot blacked out because of a failure in oxygen supply. Did N.A.S.A. make that announcement in ignorance of the actual facts? Did it have the instructions or advice of any other Department or Agency in making the statement?

Pp. 295, 375, 426–428

7. (If so)—What agency?

P. 375

8. Was the assumption at this time that the pilot was dead and that the plane had been blown up?

P. 284

9. (If so)—On what basis was that assumption made?

P. 284

10. Apparently, in reaction to Khrushchev's unelaborated announcement on May 5, the President, on the same day, ordered an investigation of the plane incident. On that day, was any Cabinet Member or the White House yet privy to the actual mission of the plane?

P. 351 and following.

11. (If yes)—Who was privy to it?

P. 351 and following.

12. On May 7th, Khrushchev took out all the stops and gave the details of the incident and the pilot's alleged confession. Did the President know, at this point in time, of the actual purposes of the flight? When did he actually learn of them? Did any Cabinet Members, at this point in time, know of the actual purposes of the flight? When did they learn of them?

P. 351

13. Continuing with this chronology, the State Department, on the same day that Khrushchev revealed the details of the flight—that is, May 7th—the State Department announced that "insofar as the authorities are concerned there was no authorization for such flights, as described by Mr. Khrushchev" but indicated that the particular flight had probably been undertaken.

Now what "authorities" did the State Department have in mind as not having authorized this flight?

The Secretary has testified (p. 245) that this statement was still partly cover.

14. The State Department announcement of May 7th appears to be the normal, classical disclaimer of responsibility for espionage. Why, then, was this disclaimer apparently disclaimed by Secretary Herter on May 9th when he said: "The United States has not and does not shirk this responsibility." What happened between May 7 and May 9 to bring about this apparent disclaim of the disclaimer? What discussions took place within the Executive Branch and who participated in them? What reasoning went into them? Who, in short, urged that we drop the classical approach of disclaiming official responsibility for espionage and for what reasons?

The Secretary has dealt with these questions in his testimony (pp. 44-46, 90-94). See also pp. 285, 286, 288, 289, 357, 361.

15. Did President Eisenhower approve of Secretary Herter's apparent disclaimer of the State Department disclaimer prior to the latter's release of it at the conclusion of the meeting with the Congressional leaders on May 7th?

Yes.

16. (If no)—Then was not President Eisenhower presented with the alternative, when he faced the press on May 10, of repudiating his Secretary of State or assuming personal responsibility for sanctioning espionage and its continuance?

17. On May 16th, the President announced that "in point of fact these flights were suspended after the recent incident and are not to be resumed." On what date, in point of fact, were these flights suspended?

On May 12 (see Secretary's testimony p. 39, p. 167). See also p. 412.

18. Why was the announcement of the suspension not made on the date the decision was reached?

The Secretary has explained (pp. 42-43) the reasons for the President's decision to make that announcement in Paris, namely, so that the suspension of overflights could be coupled with his offer to propose in the UN a general overflight program under United Nations supervision. See pp. 412, 414.

19. Why, after creating the universal *impression* on May 9th that the flights would not be suspended were they, in fact, suspended?

The Secretary has testified as to the misinterpretation of the Department's May 9 statement (pp. 126-128) and the discontinuance of the U-2 System after it had been compromised (p. 39). See also pp. 405-407.

20. Is the kind of information which these flights produced of a kind that can be obtained in no other way? Has it, in fact, been obtained in other ways? Is it or is it not a fact that the information which these flights produced is used primarily to confirm data and information obtained in other ways?

Pp. 307, 315, 343.

21. If this information is of such an enormous essentiality which justified the kinds of risks which were taken to obtain it why, then, have these flights been suspended? If we have to have the information what do we propose to do now that the flights have been suspended? Do we now face, as a result of the suspension, a Pearl Harbor which apparently we didn't face so long as these flights were going on? In short, if we justify the flights as really vital to defense against surprise attack, how can we not justify their suspension without recognizing that we are leaving ourselves open for a Pearl Harbor?

Pp. 319, 343, 360, 371, 409.

I have in my hand a clipping from the New York Times of February 11, 1959. It is the text of a question and answer from the President's press conference of February 10, 1959. I shall read this for the record.

FROM THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE—FEBRUARY 10, 1959

"J. F. TER HORST of The Detroit News—Mr. President, there has been a growing impression, or at least reports around the country, that in the course of the pursuit of normal military intelligence the U.S. planes sometimes play fox and hounds along the Turkish border in order to cause Soviet interceptors to scramble, and that therefore, or thereby, we can gain some knowledge of their preparedness and their procedures.

"Was the plane that was shot down, our plane that was shot down last September, on such a mission?

"*A.*—Well, I will answer the first part of it very specifically: The orders are very strict on this matter. Now, occasionally there are errors in navigation and sometimes there are storms and things of that kind; once in a while, we believe, there are false radio signals that will take a plane out of course. But any thought of playing fox and hounds, as you call it, to cause scrambling is contrary to orders.

"Actually, now, I have forgotten the limit, but I established it personally, some time back a couple of years ago, and I am sure that this happening is accidental."

Was there any relationship of the limit presumably of border penetration which the President says he established personally a couple of years ago and flights such as the U-2s?

No. See p. 350.

QUESTION OF DECISION NOT TO HALT PROGRAM OF U-2 FLIGHTS [P. 91]

Senator **Gore**. Would such a decision have been properly within the province of the State Department?

Secretary **Herter**. No. The State Department would not have a final decision in the matter. The State Department would have an advisory position in the matter, and the CIA did consult with us about it.

Senator **Gore**. Do I understand that the CIA, in such matters, would have superior authority to the State Department?

Secretary **Herter**. No, the CIA is the operating agency. I think we will have to take some of this off the record.

Senator **Gore**. Anything that needs to go off?

Secretary **Herter**. Yes.

Senator **Gore**. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take a half minute here to say that it is not pleasant to ask some of these questions, and I hope that none of the comments that have been made here today, either before noon or since, imply the opinion of any of our colleagues that we are doing other than performing our duty as we see it.

PROCEDURAL DISCUSSION

I understood the purpose of this hearing was to develop the facts insofar as we were capable of doing so, and, to the extent that security would permit, to make available the facts to the American people. Do I correctly understand the purpose of the hearing?

The **Chairman**. The Senator from Tennessee understands it as I understand it, in spite of the opinion of the Senator from Wisconsin.

Senator **Wiley**. Get your nickel's worth in, brothers. You might as well now.

Senator **Lausche**. Is it confined to what our Government has done or are we concerned about what the Soviet has done?

The **Chairman**. I certainly am concerned about what the Soviet has done.

Senator **Lausche**. It hasn't been manifested here today, if I may say so.

Senator **Gore**. The Senator from Ohio made a fine Fourth of July speech, I thought that was a wonderful manifestation.

Senator **Lausche**. I made a speech that was absolutely devoid of any political manipulation. That is what I made.

Senator **Gore**. What does the Senator mean by that?

Senator **Lausche**. What does the Senator mean when he says that I made a Fourth of July speech?

Senator **Gore**. I thought it was—I almost stood up and applauded.

Senator LAUSCHE. I want to repeat to you that nothing I have done here today has been tainted by political motives.

Senator GORE. Nor has anything I have done, I believe I am pleased to inform the gentleman.

Senator LAUSCHE. If I made a Fourth of July speech, I am proud of it and I think the time has come when some of you men had better make a Fourth of July speech.

Senator GORE. I was proud of it too, I was prompted to cheer. I had to restrain myself.

May I proceed?

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Tennessee has the floor.

Senator WILEY. May I just say one thing?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the Senator yield to the Senator from Wisconsin.

Senator WILEY. As long now the storm is over, I realize when I hit the ceiling before, that I was probably not as coherent as I should be. I want to say to you with the conviction of a man who has lived long, that the business of a committee like ours is to develop facts for legislation, facts that are necessary to bring out curative legislation, or if you please, if you want to investigate an individual, that is another thing. We had the McCarthy hearings. We know what that did, but here is another angle.

It is not the business of this committee to expose to the people of this country, a mechanism that is so important to preserve the life and integrity of this country, and I mean the CIA, I know what it means, I happen to know something about what it has done, and I have seen these pictures that have been made, and to me, at least, and as I say, as a young man of past 70 summers, please remember that when you go into this thing, as you are going into it, you are going to expose a mechanism that is as vital to the life of this country as anything you can think of.

It is that mechanism that made possible this series of 3½ years of exploratory missions over the Soviet Union, and got the photographs that tell us where every one of their layouts can be found.

If that is what you are going into, just count your words.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Tennessee.

Senator GORE. Dealing with the CIA is not a new experience for me. I happen to have handled in the House of Representatives the appropriation bill for the Atomic Energy Commission, for 5 years before I was elected to the United States Senate.

I was party to the appropriation for the atomic energy program when the atomic bomb was being built in my State. No one ever heard those secrets from my lips and every year for the past 14 years I have listened to the testimony of the CIA from one to two or three or more times. I don't think that it is necessary that we violate the security of this country in order to hear Mr. Allen Dulles' testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield? Mr. Dulles said to this committee when he was asked if he would appear, that he would be very pleased to appear. He thought it would serve a useful purpose. He had no objection.

Senator GORE. I am aware that I am pursuing very important questions that reflect upon the effectiveness of our country and the prestige of our country. That is all the more reason why they should be pursued.

I thought this was the purpose of the hearing, to develop the facts, and so far as they could be revealed to the public, to do so.

The **Chairman**. The Senator is quite right.

Senator **Gore**. All right, which I am awfully happy to see you two fellows agree at long last.

QUESTION OF DECISION NOT TO HALT PROGRAM OF U-2 FLIGHTS [P. 93]

To return to the question, insofar as either of you know or any official of the Department, no actual decision to proceed with the flight or not to proceed with the flight was made.

If such a decision was made, it was beyond your knowledge. Is that a correct statement?

Secretary **Herter**. Yes, I think that I ought to say this. When the matter came before me, I had an opportunity of disapproving it and did not do so. Not it, but the program.

Senator **Gore**. But this particular flight did not come before you?

Secretary **Herter**. It came as one of a group. That is why, as I say, this is a matter that is part of the technique of the CIA and that is why I asked that it be taken from the record, because I don't want to get into the intricacies of how these flights proceeded.

Senator **Gore**. Well, I want to be specific. You may take anything from the record you like. That permission has been given.

Secretary **Herter**. That is quite all right then.

Senator **Gore**. When you gave your approval to the program, some weeks prior to this flight——

Secretary **Herter**. Yes.

Senator **Gore**. Was this specific flight referred to in the program?

Secretary **Herter**. It was.

Senator **Gore**. It was?

Secretary **Herter**. It was.

Senator **Gore**. That is what I have been trying to get at.

Secretary **Herter**. I didn't know that I had been ducking that. I thought I had said that from the very beginning, including a number of alternates.

Senator **Gore**. Then you participated in no further decision with respect to it?

Secretary **Herter**. Not with respect to this one, nor with respect to the program.

Senator **Gore**. Then if there was a decision made to continue with it, or not to continue with it, you were not party to it?

Secretary **Herter**. No.

Senator **Gore**. When did you first learn of it?

Secretary **Herter**. Actually, you mean this particular flight?

Senator **Gore**. Yes.

Secretary **Herter**. I would say that I had seen it sketched out, and this is all coming off the record, 2½ years ago.

NOTICE TO SECRETARY HERTER OF PLANE'S MISFORTUNE

Senator **Gore**. When did you first learn of its misfortune?

Secretary HERTER. I received word in Ankara, Turkey that a plane was down. That is all.

Senator GORE. From whom did you receive it?

Secretary HERTER. It was handed to me from a slip of paper that Mr. Livingston Merchant had. He was sitting behind me at a NATO meeting and he handed me a slip of paper, "word has come that there is a plane down in Russia" or "a plane down" or "a plane is missing."

I don't think he said in Russia. I didn't know which one of the flights it was.

Senator GORE. Is it your presumption that this was communication within the Department?

Secretary HERTER. Oh, yes. I assume it was either in the Department or from CIA sources with whom we are constantly in touch overseas.

Senator GORE. I believe my time is up. I will return to this.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator was interrupted. If he wishes, he may continue.

Secretary HERTER. Senator, Mr. Dillon wanted to amplify one statement that he made a short time ago. Would you give him that opportunity?

Senator GORE. Yes, indeed.

Mr. DILLON. I just wanted to ask the Senator, which I mentioned to you off the record, after we were finished with our exchange, regarding our previous conversation regarding giving the name of the pilot, Mr. Powers, which Mr. Lincoln White did not do on May 5 when we put out our press release. There was some implication that the name was contained in the NASA release which came out immediately thereafter. We have since checked the new release, and there was no mention in that news release of Mr. Powers' name. As far as I understand, it was not mentioned at that time.

Senator GORE. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

INFORMATION SOUGHT

Senator GORE. What particular information was sought to be gathered by this particular flight which the President says was essential?

Secretary HERTER. There we are getting into the question of the details of the flight which I think you had better take up with Mr. Dulles when he is here before you.

Senator GORE. I am perfectly willing to take it up with him. I think it is a pertinent question, though, to the Secretary of State.

Here is a statement by the President that this information was so important and so essential to the national interest that a decision was made to proceed with the flight only a few days before the summit. It seems to me a very pertinent question.

What information was so essential as to justify the risk of this flight?

Secretary HERTER. Senator, I cannot go into the particular installations that they were anxious to get information about. I think that Mr. Dulles, who, as I understand the operation, intends to review the whole testimony afterwards with a view to national security—I think that it would be entirely inappropriate for me, since you can ask him that information.

I can only assure you of this, Senator, that they were very important elements that they were trying to get information about for our own national security.

Senator GORE. I do not question that they were seeking information which they regarded as important. Do you know what information was being sought by this flight?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, I do. Not in great detail, but in general terms, I do.

Senator GORE. I do not wish to press. Are you willing to state in general terms what it was?

Secretary HERTER. No.

Senator LAUSCHE. I don't think he should. What he will tell will be hearsay. Let Dulles tell it, the one who is in charge of it.

The CHAIRMAN. You may continue.

Senator GORE. I prefer that the Secretary of State give his own reply.

Is it just a matter that you do not want to testify on something which is properly within the province of Mr. Dulles?

Secretary HERTER. Quite right, and also a matter of very confidential information that I would hesitate very much to testify on.

I don't know whether Mr. Dulles will feel that he is free to testify on it. But after all, I have to use my own judgment as to what I feel that I can properly say about that kind of intelligence operation.

PARIS PRESS BRIEFING BY AMBASSADOR BOHLEN [P. 93]

The CHAIRMAN. You had one question of Mr. Bohlen. He was called back at your request.

Senator GORE. Yes. If I may digress a moment, I have been told several times, Mr. Bohlen, that in your press briefing at Paris, I believe on the 16th, that you expressed the view that, except for the U-2 plane, there would have been a summit conference.

Will you relate to us what you said at this briefing in this regard?

Mr. BOHLEN. I don't recall, Senator, honestly, that I made that statement——

Senator WILEY. A little louder, please.

Mr. BOHLEN. I don't recall that I made that statement. The press briefing that I held on the 16th was an open press conference on the record, and I do not recall any statement of that kind because my view then, as now, is that the U-2 was one of the factors that may have led to the particular Soviet behavior at Paris.

I really do not recall any such statement of that kind. It's all on the record. This was an open press conference.

Senator GORE. You did not hold an off-the-record background briefing?

Mr. BOHLEN. I held a background briefing later in which I outlined at that conference the three factors that I believed, and still do, entered into the formulation of the Soviet position.

Senator GORE. Was a transcript made of that background briefing?

Mr. **Bohlen**. I would have to check on that, sir. I think there probably was.

Senator **Gore**. Would you supply it to the committee if there was?

Mr. **Bohlen**. If there is one, I would have no views on it.

Secretary **Herter**. I would have no objection.

Mr. **Bohlen**. If there is a transcript of it, but I recall the circumstances very well in this, in that three factors that I mentioned earlier, the Soviet pessimism as regards the outcome of the summit from their point of view; the possible opposition or questioning of its conduct and the U-2 matters were the three factors that appeared to me to have entered into Soviet decision to torpedo the conference.

I might add, Senator, for clarification: we have used the words "scuttle the conference" quite often in this thing.

There are various ways of scuttling a conference. You can scuttle a conference before it begins or you can sabotage it from within. So that the fact of not coming to the conference, which was their attitude, didn't preclude the possibility, without these elements combining, for them to have come to a conference and have had another series of sterile meetings with the Soviets.

Senator **Gore**. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

The **Chairman**. Does the Senator from Ohio have any further questions?

DUTIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY [P. 95]

Senator **Lausche**. Mr. Herter, I have in my hand the National Security Act of 1947, and I have read that part of the material which deals with the duties of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Are the duties enumerated in this section complete?

Secretary **Herter**. Yes. I think those are enumerated in that section.

Senator **Lausche**. This section didn't place any directions on how intelligence is to be obtained.

Secretary **Herter**. No.

Senator **Lausche**. Is that correct?

Secretary **Herter**. Quite correct.

Senator **Lausche**. How are the monies for the Central Intelligence Agency appropriated? Are they specifically identified in our budget, do you know?

Secretary **Herter**. They are not.

Senator **Lausche**. To whom are they appropriated?

Secretary **Herter**. There again, I hope that this can be off the record.

Senator **Lausche**. Then I will not ask the question.

Secretary **Herter**. This has been a very well-kept secret for some time.

[Discussion off the record.]

PRESIDENT'S ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR U-2 FLIGHTS

Senator **Lausche**. Based upon the questions that have been asked here today, one set implied that the President should not have told the truth. The next set implied that one of the men lied. And the third set implied that there was an inability to coordinate the views.

Now, my question is—off the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Take it off the record.

We will make a special dispensation. Whatever the Senator wishes. Does he wish it on or off?

Senator LAUSCHE. Let it on. Has anyone given any thought about the peculiar position that the President of the United States is placed in in connection with the paradoxical situation that he is supposed to be a man of truth, and moral character, and yet requested to lie about these matters, if they are within his knowledge?

Secretary HERTER. I am not sure whether that is a rhetorical question or whether you are asking me that question.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, take it both ways. [Laughter.]

Mr. GORE. Rhetorical or oratorical. [Laughter.]

Senator LAUSCHE. Let's assume that you were the President, Mr. Herter, and you were faced with the dilemma of telling a lie about what happened or telling the truth. In either event you are hooked. What course would you follow?

Secretary HERTER. I can answer that one so far as I myself am concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. He followed both.

Senator LAUSCHE. I don't know. I am beginning to wonder if what the Central Intelligence Agency is doing ought not to be a matter left with them and without the knowledge of the President.

I have no other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I just want to make a comment. The Senator from Ohio has put his finger on the very point that perhaps I didn't make clear to him earlier in my inquiry. This is in my opinion a central important question about this whole matter, the wisdom of the policy of involving the President in this kind of business, that is, espionage, which traditionally involves lying and cheating and murdering and violating the sovereignty of countries with which you are not at war and all of this. And what the Senator has said is—perhaps I didn't make it clear—is exactly the point that I was seeking to raise and to elucidate in the first line of questions that I asked. And I agree with him this presents a very difficult dilemma, and the question is the wisdom of departing from the traditional historical practice of not involving the head of state in any espionage responsibilities, that he is above and apart from. We follow that in the Congress, as you have just stated, as we have all known that these appropriations are handled in a special way. I have never participated in the appropriation of them, I don't even know how they are appropriated. We treat it differently, and I was suggesting and raising the question of whether it is wise to depart from the traditional practice that all important states throughout history, without exception in accordance with the Secretary's testimony have followed, and this is the very point. I don't think the Senator understood what my point was.

Senator LAUSCHE. I knew if I were President——

Senator WILEY. You would tell the truth.

Senator LAUSCHE. I would tell the truth.

Senator **Wiley**. So did he.

The **Chairman**. He did and this is the answer.

Senator **Lausche**. And could you not expect him to do anything else?

Senator **Wiley**. That is right.

Senator **Lausche**. And the only way you could enable him to perform his duty to his country was not by having him know what was done and if he didn't know the questions would be pursued why didn't he know.

Senator **Wiley**. He taught the world a lesson in 1960, new diplomacy, by telling the truth, and I think that it will echo down through the years.

Senator **Lausche**. So I don't know which group to follow.

The **Chairman**. It is echoing down the years already. This is the principal echo that has arisen from this whole matter.

Senator **Lausche**. The tragedy is that this is made the principal echo, but all of the misdeeds of the Soviet are looked upon as inconsequential.

The **Chairman**. Well, the Senator is entirely incorrect in that statement. He draws conclusions that are not justified by the record or any statement that I have heard before the committee.

Senator **Lausche**. Well, I can——

Senator **Mansfield**. Can I ask a question?

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE PILOT

The **Chairman**. The Senator from Montana.

Senator **Mansfield**. Mr. Secretary, at a certain briefing it was my impression that we were told that pilot Powers, under certain given circumstances, was supposed to do away with himself and his plane. George Allen, the head of the USIA, on a TV broadcast a week ago last Sunday, made the statement that a pilot, perhaps Powers—I didn't hear the broadcast or see the TV show, I just read about it—in these circumstances was not told to do away with himself, but was ordered when questioned to give voluntarily what information he had to those who captured him.

Could you straighten that out for the committee?

Secretary **Herter**. I cannot. I would like to, if I could. I was somewhat surprised at that statement of Mr. Allen when it came out. I assumed that he must have gotten it from Mr. Dulles directly.

Senator **Mansfield**. I see.

Secretary **Herter**. Just what the instructions were to this pilot or to previous pilots, I think only Mr. Dulles can tell you.

Senator **Mansfield**. Well, Mr. Chairman, that is all I have to ask, but I——

The **Chairman**. Will the Senator yield on that same question?

Senator **Mansfield**. Yes.

* * * * * * *

RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECISION TO DISCONTINUE FLIGHTS [P. 99]

Senator GORE. Then if any decision to discontinue or if any decision was made not to continue, to use the words, you are not aware of it?

Secretary HERTER. No. The only decision that I know of at any stage of the game was to go ahead.

Senator GORE. And you thought that the information sought was of sufficient importance to justify the risk of the flight?

Secretary HERTER. I did.

Senator GORE. Even during the summit conference?

Secretary HERTER. I did.

Senator GORE. And you wish to leave to Mr. Dulles an identification of that information?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, I would be very surprised if he did it.

Senator GORE. You would be very surprised if he gave the committee the information?

Secretary HERTER. Yes. What is involved here, Senator, and I hope this comes out of the record, is saying——

Senator GORE. Anything you wish to come out of the record will.

Secretary HERTER. Right. What you are asking for is what information did we not have that we felt was essential to get. Here, the flight failed, so perhaps we haven't got that information. That would be of the utmost importance for the Russians to know today and I am not going to get involved in that.

Senator GORE. The President says that this was information which would probably not be available at any rate.

Secretary HERTER. Quite right. That is because of conditions under which flights have to be carried out.

Senator GORE. Would you specify further?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, 2 things, the weather and the angle of the sun. To get the right combination of those, it must be the right season of the year and you must have the exceptional day when you can do it. That means that you have to have a lot of leeway in the timing of the thing. We are getting to the end of the time when the combination is a probable combination and this flight could have been successful.

JUSTIFICATION OF RISK

Senator GORE. Well, in reaching the decision that this information, whatever it was that you sought, was of sufficient importance to justify the risk of a flight, not only 2 weeks before the summit conference but even during the summit conference, I take it you took into consideration that this might possibly jeopardize the success of the conference and the hopes for peace which not only we sought but the people of the world earnestly sought.

Secretary HERTER. Senator, what in effect you are arguing——

Senator GORE. I am not arguing. I am asking you.

Secretary HERTER. All right, I will answer. The purport of your question is to indicate that these flights should never have been undertaken at any time if there was danger of a failure. That was a risk that we were running in connection with every one of them from the beginning of the program.

No time would have been an appropriate time for a failure of the kind that occurred. Call it bad luck if you will—it was bad luck—but if we had tried to adjust these things to particular meetings that were taking place at particular times in particular places, it would have been almost impossible for the program to succeed.

Senator GORE. The purport of my question is to elicit information on which——

Secretary HERTER. I have been asked opinions, not information.

Senator GORE. I beg your pardon. I am asking for information.

Secretary HERTER. All right.

Senator GORE. I am asking you if you took into consideration in reaching this decision——

Secretary HERTER. I said I did.

* * * * * * *

AUTHORIZATION FOR U-2 FLIGHTS [P. 103]

The CHAIRMAN. Is this blanket authorization under review, either constant review or periodic review?

Secretary HERTER. In my experience the CIA has planned a number of alternate flights at a time. Those have been brought up in a group for approval, and obviously which ones came at what time were dependent on the weather factors and seasonal factors that I speak of.

* * * * * * *

BACKGROUND OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE STATEMENT OF MAY 9 [P. 105]

The CHAIRMAN. That full statement, if I understood it—I think you have testified—was only after complete and thorough consultation with everyone concerned, and had the unanimous support of State and the President; is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. It is, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore, go ahead.

Senator GORE. Well, when you made the final statement that the President did approve, he was responsible—I am not undertaking to quote you exactly—you also made it plain that he did not approve specific flights?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator GORE. Do you know, if anyone, in Washington, did approve this specific flight at the specific time?

Secretary HERTER. Well, that question, I think you will have to ask Mr. Dulles. Whether he himself authorized the exact terms of every flight or gave those who are operational people leeway because they have to judge conditions on the spot, I can't tell you.

* * * * * * *

[Where upon at 5:55 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday, May 31, 1960.]

EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

TUESDAY, MAY 31, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:05 a.m. pursuant to recess, Hon. J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, Senators Green, Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Wiley, and Carlson.

Also present: General C. P. Cabell, Deputy Director, Richard Helms, Arthur C. Lundahl, John S. Warner, Ed Enck, Central Intelligence Agency.

Also present: William B. Macomber, State Department, and Captain L. P. Gray III, USN, JCS.

Staff members present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Denney, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. St. Claire.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the committee come to order?

Mr. Dulles, we appreciate very much your willingness to meet with the Committee on Foreign Relations this morning as we examine incidents relating to the collapse of the recent summit conference.

As you know, a transcript of this meeting is being made. In accordance with our understanding that transcript is not to be made public until you have had a chance to review it.

Even then, should it appear to you that a censored version of the testimony received this morning should not be released, the committee will not do so.

Before asking Mr. Dulles to proceed, I wish to announce to members that the schedule of witnesses for this week has been changed. Tomorrow at 10 a.m. we will hear Dr. Hugh Dryden of NASA, and on Thursday at 10 a.m. we will hear Secretary Gates.

Testimony of these two witnesses will be treated the same as the testimony of Secretary Herter last week.

Mr. Dulles, I understand you have a statement that you wish to present to the committee.

STATEMENT OF HON. ALLEN W. DULLES, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. DULLES. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you. I have a statement that will take about a half hour.

I appreciate your reference to the conditions under which my testimony is being taken. As the committee understands, in my position I have a problem that goes not only to the classification of what I say but to the effect on other intelligence services of the world if my testimony—no matter how innocent or unclassified it might be—is given out. That is one of the considerations I have to keep in mind.

Mr. Chairman, the duty of the Central Intelligence Agency under statute, and under the National Security Council directives pursuant to statute, is to provide the President and the National Security Council with evaluated intelligence relating to our national security. The agency has no policy or police functions. In addition, however, the agency has the duty within policy limitations prescribed by the President and by the State Department to do whatever is within its power to collect and produce the intelligence required by the policymakers in Government, to deal with the dangers we face in the world today, a nuclear world.

Increasingly over the past 10 years, the main target for our intelligence collection has been the U.S.S.R.; its military, economic and subversive potential. Carrying out this task has been rendered extremely difficult because the Soviet Union is a closed society.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Great areas of the U.S.S.R. are cushioned over, curtained off to the outside world. Their military preparations are made in secret. Their military hardware, ballistic missiles, bombers, nuclear weapon and submarine forces, as far as physically possible are concealed from us.

They have resisted all efforts to realize mutual inspection or open skies. The ordinary tools of information gathering under these circumstances are not really adequate. These ordinary tools include both the normal overt means of obtaining information and the classical covert means, generally referred to as espionage.

It is true that from these sources, and from many Soviet defectors who have come over to the free world and from disaffected and disillusioned Soviet nationals, we obtain very valuable information.

However, these and other sources developed through the application of various scientific techniques, while very helpful, did not give us the full intelligence protection this country required against the danger of surprise attack from bases which might remain unknown, and by weapons the strength and power of which we might not be able adequately to evaluate.

Almost equally serious had been our lack of knowledge of Soviet defense measures against our retaliatory striking power. We were seeing the power of attack grow, while the ability to secure the intelligence necessary for defense against attack was slipping, bound down in part by tradition.

For example, while Soviet spy trawlers can lurk a few miles off our shores and can observe us with impunity, the Soviets cry aggression when a plane invisible to the naked eye flies over it some 15 miles above the ground. Either theoretically could carry a nuclear weapon. The trawler can develop a much more serious blow than a light reconnaissance plane. But of course, as we well know, no one would think of starting a nuclear war with either isolated plane or ship.

In this age of nuclear peril, we, the Central Intelligence Agency, felt that a new approach was called for in the whole field of intelligence collection.

GENESIS OF THE U-2

This was the situation when in 1954, almost 6 years ago, consultation was initiated on new intelligence collection techniques. We consulted with a group of highly competent technicians in and out of Government. From our discussions there emerged the concept of a high-flying, high-performance reconnaissance plane. In the then-state of the art of aeronautics, it was confidently believed that a plane could be designed to fly unintercepted over the vitally important closed areas of the Soviet Union where ballistic nuclear and other military preparations against us were being made.

We also believed, as a result of these consultations, that the art of photography could be so advanced as to make the resolution of the pictures taken even at extreme altitudes of very great significance.

On both counts, the accomplishments exceeded expectations.

While the developmental work for this project pursuant to high policy directive was in progress, there came the summit conference of July 1955.

Here, in order to relax the growing tensions resulting from the danger of surprise attack, the President advanced the open skies proposal. Moscow summarily rejected anything of this nature and Soviet security measures continued to be reinforced. Accordingly, the U-2 project was pushed forward rapidly, and a year later—that is, about a year after the summit conference—the first operational U-2 flight over the Soviet Union took place. For almost 4 years the flight program has been carried forward successfully.

Speed in getting the program under way had been a top priority. We were then faced in 1955 and 1956 with a situation where the Soviets were continuing to develop their missiles, their heavy bomber and bomber bases and their nuclear weapons production, without adequate knowledge on our part.

This was considered to be an intolerable situation—intolerable from the viewpoint of adequate military preparation on our part to meet the menace, and intolerable from the point of view of being able effectively to take countermeasures in the event of attack.

PROS AND CONS OF AERIAL ESPIONAGE

Gentlemen, it was recognized from the outset that this U-2 project had its risks and had a limited span of life due to improvement of countermeasures; that a relatively fragile single-engine plane of the nature of the U-2 might one day have a flameout or other malfunction in the rarefied atmosphere in which it had to travel.

If that resulted in a serious and prolonged loss of altitude there was danger of failure and discovery. To stop any enterprise of this nature because there are risks would be, of course, to accomplish very little in this field.

While air reconnaissance is an old and tried method of intelligence, a peacetime operation of this particular type and on this scale was unique. But I submit, as I have already mentioned, that we live in an age where old concepts of the limits of permitted techniques for acquiring information are outdated. They come from the horse-and-buggy days.

I see no reason whatever to draw an unfavorable distinction between the collection of information by reconnaissance at a low altitude in the air and espionage carried on by individuals who illegally operate directly within the territory of another state.

In fact, the distinction, if one is drawn, would favor the former. The illegal espionage agents generally attempt to suborn and subvert the citizens of the country in which they operate. High-level reconnaissance in no way disturbs the life of the people, does not harm their property. They do not even notice it. In fact, I believe these techniques should be universally sanctioned on a mutual basis and become an accepted and agreed part of our international arrangements.

The U.S.S.R. has known a good deal about these flights for the last 4 years. It has studiously refrained from giving the people of the Soviet Union the knowledge they now admit they have.

With respect to this U-2 project, I am prepared to support and document these conclusions:

THE U-2 PROJECT: CONCLUSIONS

First, this operation was one of the most valuable intelligence collection operations that any country has ever mounted at any time, and it was vital to our national security; the chain of command and authority for the project was cleared; every overflight was carefully planned, fully authorized until May 1, 1960, and effectively carried out; the technical and logistic support was prompt and efficient; the security which was maintained for this project over a period of more than 5 years was unique.

Senator **Gore**. What was that?

Mr. **Dulles**. It was unique. I shall deal with these points in the inverse order in which I have presented them.

First, security. The project was run by a small, closely knit organization at headquarters and in the field. Knowledge of the operation was restricted to a minimum.

Over more than 5 years, since the inception of the project, there has never been any damaging disclosure to interfere with the program. Of course, the existence of the U-2 aircraft was well known, though its full capabilities, particularly the possible altitude of flight and the range, were not disclosed.

It had important weather and air sampling capabilities which were effectively used and which afforded natural cover for the project. These weather capabilities were open and were publicized.

For example, as far as I know the U-2 is the first plane that ever has flown over the eye of a typhoon. It was used very effectively out in the Far East to learn about typhoons which cause so much damage, and we have a very extraordinary series of pictures of the U-2 looking right down at the eye of a typhoon from several miles above the top of it.

Of course, the U-2 also had very valuable characteristics as a reconnaissance plane for peripheral flights.

TECHNICAL AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT

With regard to the technical and logistic support, from the inception of the project the Central Intelligence Agency had called on the United States Air Force for support in the form of technical advice and assistance in those fields where the Air Force has the most expert knowledge. These included advice on aircraft design and procurement, operational training of air crews, weather, aeromedicine and communication, and the Air Force liberally gave all this support to us.

The CIA also drew on the technical knowledge and advice of those members of the United States Intelligence Board with particular competence in the field of intelligence priorities, targeting and the like.

Each mission was carefully planned with respect to the highest priority requirements of the intelligence community. The project had been directed in the Agency by a senior civilian in the CIA with high competence in this area of work. He was responsible directly to me and, of course, to General Cabell.

Since the inception of CIA—that is, going back 10 years—personnel from the military services, including the Air Force, have been given a period of duty with the CIA. We have had as many as 800 or 900 of them, I believe, at one time. These personnel take their orders from CIA, not from their parent service, during their period of detail.

This project, the U-2 project, under its civilian director, drew upon both the military and civilian personnel in the Agency. They were assigned to duties in headquarters and in the field staffs which were responsible for carrying out the technicial functions of the program. They were chosen in view of their particular qualifications for this particular project.

PLANNING AND AUTHORIZATION

Third, every overflight from the inception of the project and every phase of it were carefully planned and staffed. From time to time intelligence requirements were reviewed and programs of one or more missions were authorized by higher authority. Within the authority thus granted, specific flights could then be carried out on the orders of the Director of Central Intelligence as availability and readiness of aircraft and pilot and as weather conditions permitted.

On the afternoon of April 30 last, after carefully considering the field report on the weather and on other determining factors affecting the flight then contemplated, after consultation with General Cabell and other qualified advisors in the agency, and acting within the existing authority to make a flight at that time, I personally gave the orders to proceed with the flight of May 1. There was no laxity or uncertainty in the chain of command on obtaining the authority to act on in giving the orders to proceed.

With respect to the flight authorized on April 30, the same careful procedures were followed as had been followed in many preceding successful flights.

Now, gentlemen, I would like to turn to discussing the value of these flights from the intelligence viewpoint and from the viewpoint of national security considerations. I will do this within the limitation of what I think both you and I feel are the necessary security restrictions.

Under the law setting up the Central Intelligence Agency, as Director, I am enjoined to protect "intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." Naturally, I recognize this committee as an authorized body to whom can properly be made disclosures that should not be made public. In so doing, I wish to keep within the bounds of what I believe you would agree to be in the national interest to disclose even here. I feel, however, that you should share the facts which I confidently believe justified the obvious risks of this project. Such risks were recognized and evaluated at all stages of the project.

U–2 TARGETS

For many years, the United States intelligence community has been directing its effort to provide the information which would help meet the threat of surprise attack. Every available means in the classical intelligence field had been utilized, and over recent years these had been very valuably supplemented by the highly technical electronic and other scientific means to which I referred earlier in my statement. Our main emphasis in the U–2 program has been directed against five critical problems affecting our national security: The Soviet bomber force, the Soviet missile program, the Soviet atomic energy program, the Soviet submarine program. These are the major elements constituting the Soviet Union's capability to launch and carry forward a surprise attack.

In addition, a major target we have had in mind during this program has been the Soviet air defense system, with which our retaliatory force would have to contend in case of an attack on us and counterattack by us. Today the Soviet bomber force is still the main offensive long-range striking force of the Soviet Union. However, the U–2 program has helped to confirm that only a greatly reduced long-range bomber production program is continuing in the Soviet Union. It has established, however, that the Soviet Union has recently developed a new medium-range bomber with supersonic capabilities. The U–2 program has covered many Soviet long-range bomber airfields, confirming estimates of the location of bases and the disposition of Soviet long-range bombers. It has also acquired data on the nuclear weapons storage facilities associated with them.

Our overflights have enabled us to look periodically at the actual ground facilities involved. With respect to the Soviet missile system program, this I shall illustrate graphically, if you permit, Mr. Chairman, by showing you the photograph of these facilities, including both ICBM and IRBM test launching sites. These could, of course, also become and may well be operational sites.

Our photography has also provided us valuable insight into the problem of Soviet doctrine regarding ICBM deployment. It has taught us much about the use to which the Soviet Union is making of these sites for training troops and the operational use of the short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

The program has provided valuable information on the Soviet atomic energy program. This information has been included in the estimate that we give periodically to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, but in the past, of course, without referring to the actual source of the data. This coverage has included the production of fissionable materials, weapons development and test activities, and the location, type and size of many stockpile sites.

The project has shown that despite Mr. Khrushchev's boast that the Soviets will soon be able to curtail the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, the Soviets are continuing to expand fissionable material capacity. The Soviet nuclear testing ground has been photographed with extremely interesting results more than once.

The photography also has given us our first firm information on the magnitude and location of the U.S.S.R.'s domestic uranium ore and uranium processing activities vital in estimating the Soviet fissionable material production. We have located national and regional nuclear storage sites and forward storage facilities.

In general, the program has continued to give useful data and the size and rate of growth of Soviet industry.

USE OF THE INTELLIGENCE GATHERED

The material obtained has been used for the correction of military maps and aeronautical charts. Among the most important intelligence attained is that affecting the tactics of the United States' deterrent air strike force. We now have hard information about the nature, extent, and in many cases the location of the Soviet ground-to-air missile development. We have learned much about the basic concept, magnitude, operational efficiency, deployment and rate of development of the Soviet air defense system, including their early warning radar development. We have obtained photographs of many scores of fighter airfields previously inadequately identified, and have photographed various fighter types vainly attempting to intercept the U-2. All of that has proved invaluable to SAC in adjusting its plans to known elements of the opposition it would have to face.

As a result of the concrete evidence acquired by the U-2 program on a large number of targets from the Soviet Union, it has now been possible for U.S. commanders to make a more efficient and competent allocation of aircraft, crews and weapons.

U-2 photography has also made it possible for us to provide new and accurate information to strike crews to make it easier for them to identify their targets and plan their navigation more precisely. We have obtained new and valuable information with regard to submarine deployment and the precise location of their submarine pens. In the opinion of our military, our scientists and senior officials responsible for our national security, the results of this program have been invaluable.

The program has had other elements of value. It has made the Soviet Union far less cocky about its ability to deal with what we might bring against them. They have gone through 4 years of frustration in having the knowledge since 1956 that they could be overflown with impunity, that their vaunted fighters were useless against such flights, that their ground-to-air missile capability was inadequate.

Khrushchev has never dared expose this to his own people. It was only after he boasted—and we believe falsely—that he had been able to bring down the U-2 on May 1 by ground-to-air missile while the plane was flying at altitude, that he allowed his people to have even an inkling of the capability which we have possessed.

His frustrated military, many of whom know the facts, are far less confident today than they otherwise would have been.

At the same time, in competent military circles among our allies, the evidence of American capability demonstrated by the present disclosures of the U-2 flights has given a new and better perspective of our own relative strength as compared with that of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Chairman, if you will permit, I think it would be appropriate at this time to show a few of the pictures because they relate to the testimony that I have just given; and then, with your approval, I will proceed to discuss the details of the May 1 flight.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be very glad to see the pictures.

Mr. DULLES. I don't know how it is best—these pictures ought to be very close to you. Could they be put here?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, they could be put up here in front.

Mr. DULLES. May this be off the record—the conversation in regard to the pictures?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[Discussion off the record.]

TIMING OF MAY 1 FLIGHT

Mr. DULLES. At this point I would like to present the facts with regard to the dispatch of the May 1 flight and the ensuing developments insofar as intelligence aspects are concerned and insofar as they are known to us.

As to the timing of the flight there is, of course, no good time for a failure. I have already presented the circumstances under which I assumed direct responsibility for dispatching this flight on April 30.

If this flight had been a success, we would have covered certain targets of particular significance and in the normal course, we would have wished to analyze the results before scheduling a further mission.

When it failed, it was obvious, even before we received instructions, that we would not try again before studying the cause and effects of failure.

In either event—success or failure after this flight—we were not preparing to fly again for several weeks and until further possible guidance was received.

With respect to the timing of the flights, the President in his speech of May 25 covered this matter and had this to say:

As to the timing, the question was really whether to halt the program and thus forego the gathering of important information that was essential and that was likely to be unavailable at a later date. The decision was that the program should not be halted.

The plain truth is this—when a nation needs intelligence activity, there is no time when vigilance can be relaxed.

Incidentally, from Pearl Harbor we learned that even negotiation itself can be good to conceal preparation for surprise attack.

That is the end of the quotation.

I would point out also that for months before international meetings, and then for some time after such meetings, and before trips of high American officials to the Soviet Union, and during Soviet officials' trip here—in times of tension—flights should be stopped because they might increase tension; in times of sweetness and light, they should not be run because it would disturb any "honeymoon" in our relations with the Soviet Union. And on top of this, if you take into account that in most of the Soviet Union most days of the year are automatically eliminated because of weather and cloud cover and low arctic sun, then you can understand the problem of the timing of flights.

If you ask me whether or not a flight would have been made after this particular flight, I cannot give you the answer because I do not know.

At the time, we had no authority for any mission other than the one that was then undertaken.

With respect to the flight itself, when the aircraft did not reach its destination within the flight time and fuel capacity given it, it was presumed to be down. But at first, we did not know where. It could have been within friendly territory, hostile desert territory, uninhabited territory or hostile territory where, if alive, the pilot would have been quickly apprehended, as was the case.

We did not know whether the plane was intact or destroyed, the pilot alive or dead. I shall deal in a moment with the statements which were issued during this period of uncertainty.

CAUSES FOR THE FAILURE

The question, of course, arises as to what actually happened to cause this aircraft to come down deep in the heart of Russia. Let me remind you first that the returns are not yet all in, so our picture is not complete. However, we do have a considerable body of evidence that permits a reasonable judgment with a high degree of competence.

Our best judgment is that it did not happen as claimed by the Soviets; that is, we believe that it was not shot down at its operating altitude of around 70,000 feet by the Russians. We believe that it was initially forced down to a much lower altitude by some as yet undetermined mechanical malfunction. At this lower altitude, it was a sitting duck for Soviet defense, whether fighter aircraft or ground-to-air fire or missiles. As to what happened at the lower altitude, we are not sure. The pilot may have bailed out at any time or he may have crash landed.

The aircraft was equipped with a destruction device to be activated by the pilot as he leaves the aircraft. Again, we do not know whether or not he attempted to do so. It should be noted, however, that no massive destruction device capable of ensuring complete destruction could be carried in this aircraft, as weight limitations were critical and every pound counted. Thus, whether or not the destruct device was used, one might expect sizable and identifiable parts of the aircraft and its equipment to remain.

As to the nature and cause of the suspected malfunction, we are not prepared to pass judgment. But let me remind you that this aircraft and this pilot had proven their high degree of reliability in many technically similar flights inside and outside friendly territory. When operating, as in this case, about 1,200 miles within unfriendly, heavily defended territory, there can be no cushion against malfunction.

There has been much comment and some questioning with regard to the pilot and his behavior after apprehension. Of course we have only the Soviet's report on all of this, and we should accept it with caution. All of the pilots engaged in this difficult enterprise were most carefully selected. They were highly trained, highly motivated and, as seemed right, well compensated financially. But no one in his right mind would have accepted these risks for money alone.

Since the operational phase of the program started, the reliability record of the plane for aircraft of this character was little short of phenomenal. It was a tribute to the high skill of the designer, the maintenance crews and the pilots. Until the May 1 flight, over a 4-year period of operations, no plane had been lost over unfriendly territory in the course of many missions. Several were lost during the training period at home and in friendly territory abroad.

POWERS' BACKGROUND

Francis Gary Powers, the pilot of the May 1 flight, is a fourth-generation American citizen born in Jenkins, Ky. about 31 years ago. He received a B.A. degree from Milligan College, Tennessee, in September of 1956. Scholastically, he had a high average. He joined the Air Force in the fall of 1950 as a private and served in an enlisted status until November 1951 when he was discharged as a corporal in order to enter the Aviation Cadet School and train as a pilot. He attended the Air Force basic and advanced pilot training school at Greenville, Miss. On completion of this training in December 1952, he was commissioned as a second lieutenant. His first duty assignment was as an F-84, Commando Jet pilot with the 468th Strategic Fighter Unit at Turner Air Force Base, Georgia. He resigned his Air Force Reserve Commission under honorable conditions in May 1956. The reason for such resignation was to join the project we are now discussing.

His record with the Air Force had been uniformly good. He was given a special security screening by the Air Force and also a supplemental check by the Security Office of the CIA.

During his Air Force career he received training with respect to his behavior and conduct in event of capture, and after entering the employ of the agencies he took the agency escape and evasion course at our training station here in the United States in June

1956. He had subsequent training in escape and evasion after his assignment to his overseas post in August 1956.

An Air Force major flight surgeon, assigned to this program to watch over the pilots, worked with the U-2 pilots during their training in the United States and continuously during their stay overseas. He had this to say in regard to Francis Powers:

> During the period of my assignment as flight surgeon at Adana I not infrequently shared a room with Mr. Powers and participated in social, flying and mission duties with him. In my opinion Mr. Powers was outstanding among the pilots for calmness under pressure, his precision and his methodical approach to problems. I have flown considerably in jets with Mr. Powers. I consider him temperamentally devoted and perhaps more than patriotic, a man given to thinking before speaking or acting.

It should be remembered that Powers was a pilot, a navigator, a well-rounded aviator, trained to handle himself well under all conditions in the air or grounded in hostile territory. He was not trained as a sergeant, as there were no foreseeable circumstances, even the present ones, where he could act as such. Furthermore, such training would have been incompatible both temperamentally and also with the strenuous technical demand of his flight missions.

CONTINGENCY INSTRUCTIONS

The pilots of these aircraft on operational missions—and this was true in the case of Powers—received the following instructions for use if downed in a hostile area:

First, it was their duty to ensure the destruction of the aircraft and its equipment to the greatest extent possible.

Second, on reaching the ground it was the pilot's first duty for escape and evasion so as to avoid capture or delay it as long as possible. To aid him in these purposes and for surviving he was given the various items of equipment which the Soviets have publicized and which are normally a standard procedure and selected on the basis of wide experience gained in World War II and in Korea.

Third, pilots were equipped with a device for self-destruction but were not given positive instructions to make use of it. In the last analysis, the ultimate decision had to be left to the individual himself.

Fourth, in the contingency of capture, pilots were instructed to delay as long as possible the revelation of damaging information.

Fifth, pilots were instructed to tell the truth if faced with a situation as apparently faced Powers with respect to those matters which were obviously within the knowledge of his captors as a result of what fell into their hands.

In addition, if in a position where some attribution had to be given his mission, he would acknowledge that he was working for the Central Intelligence Agency. This was to make it clear that he was not working for any branch of the Armed Services and that his mission was solely an intelligence mission.

These instructions are based on a careful study of our experience in the Korean war of the consequences of brainwashing and the extent to which information could be obtained by these and other means available to the Soviets.

Whether or not in this instance the pilot complied with all of these instructions is hard to state today, with the knowledge that we have. However, a careful review of what he has said does not indicate the he has given to the Soviets any valuable information which they could not have discovered from the equipment they found on the pilot's person or retrieved from the downed aircraft.

I would warn, of course, against putting too much belief on what Powers may say, particularly if he is later put on trial. By that time they will have had a more thorough opportunity for a complete brainwashing operation which might well produce a mixture of truth and fiction.

THE COVER STORY

Gentlemen, I will now deal with the cover story statements which were issued following May 1.

When a plane is overdue and the fact of the takeoff and failure to return is known, some statement must be made and quickly. Failure to do so and under normal conditions to start a search for the lost plane would in itself be a suspicious event. Thus, when the U-2 disappeared on May 1, and did not return to its base within the requisite time period after its takeoff, action was required.

For many years—in fact, since the inception of the operation—consideration has been given to the cover story which would be used in the case of the disappearance of a plane which might possibly be over unfriendly territory. Because of its special characteristics which we have explained to you, the U-2 plane was of great interest to the U.S. Weather Service and to the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, the predecessor of NASA. NASA was very much concerned with the scientific advances which operations of these U-2's could make toward greater knowledge of the upper atmosphere and for other scientific purposes.

As already indicated, U-2's have now undertaken many weather and related missions. Their functions in this respect have been publicized by NASA, and this publicity has been distributed freely to the world. It was therefore natural that NASA's operation be used to explain the presence of U-2's at various bases throughout the world, although NASA did not participate in the development of intelligence devices nor in the planning and conduct of any intelligence mission.

Accordingly, when the May 1 flight was lost, an initial statement was issued on May 2 by the Base Commandant at Adana that a U-2 aircraft engaged in upper air studies operating from the base was downed and oxygen difficulties had been reported. This was identified in the press as a NASA plane. A search for the plane was initiated in the remote areas of eastern Turkey.

KHRUSHCHEV'S ANNOUNCEMENTS

On May 5, early in the day by our time, Khrushchev made his claim that "An American aircraft crossed our frontier and continued its flight into the interior of our country"—and continuing to quote him—"and was shot down." At that time on May 5, Khrushchev gave no further details of significance.

Apparently, as an attempt at deception, Khrushchev followed up his speech and the next day distributed photographs of a pile of junk—according to experts, pieces of an old Soviet fighter plane—

possibly for the purpose of making us state that the U-2 plane had been effectively destroyed. Since the fake wreckage was quickly identified for what it was, this particular ruse had no effect.

The NASA statement—that is the May 5 statement—which followed Khrushchev's speech of the same day developed somewhat further the original cover story. Also on May 5, the Department of State issued a further release which generally followed the cover story. Mr. Dillon covered this particular statement in his testimony before your committee on May 27.

At this time—on May 5-6—we still did not know whether the plane or any recognizable part of it or the pilot were in Soviet hands or whether the pilot was dead or alive. Furthermore, we did not know whether Khrushchev desired to blow up the incident as he later did, or put it under the rug and spare his people the knowledge that we had been overflying them.

Hence in this situation, there seemed no reason at this time to depart from the original cover story. The two press releases that I have mentioned, attributed to NASA—one on May 2 and the other on May 5—were worked out in consultation between CIA and NASA and after conferring with the Department of State.

These statements did not come out of any lack of forethought or attention to their preparation or lack of coordination. The basic cover story had been developed, as I mentioned some years ago, for the exigency of a failure; and this cover story on May 5—that is, the initial cover story we had thought up some time ago—was modified to meet our then estimate of what was best to say in light of what little we knew at that time about the details of the May 1 flight failure.

Subsequently, on May 7 Khrushchev adduced evidence that he had the pilot alive and quoted his purported statement. He also produced certain of the contents of the plane and later various parts of the plane itself. This clearly disclosed the true nature of the mission on which the plane was engaged, and the cover story was outflanked.

DECISION TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY

The issue then was whether to admit the incident but deny any high-level responsibility or to take the course that was decided on and clearly expressed in Secretary Herter's statement of May 9, the President's statement of May 11, and his address of May 25.

In Mr. Herter's appearance before this committee, he has dealt with the statements which were issued during the period after May 6 except for the two NASA statements I have covered.

I would add only that in my opinion, in the light of all of the factors involved, the decision taken to assume responsibility in this particular case was the correct one. Denial, in my opinion, over the long run would have been torturous and self-defeating in this particular situation.

Those who took this decision knew that I was ready to assume the full measure of responsibility, and to cover the project as a technical intelligence operation carried out on my own responsibility as Director of the CIA.

This alternative, too, was rejected because of the many elements making it highly incredible over the long run.

This, Mr. Chairman, concludes my statement with regard to the intelligence features of the U-2 mission of May 1.

The **Chairman**. Mr. Dulles, I think that is an extremely informative statement. I know the committee appreciates your going to the trouble to give us such a frank and candid report.

VALUE OF THE U-2 PROGRAM

I don't think any responsible person that I have ever encountered has any doubt about the validity of your program. I have never heard the slightest question that your project was a proper one. As for your responsibility being carried out well, I have heard nothing but praise with regard to your part in this whole matter, and particularly the effectiveness of the U-2 program. By your persuasiveness as to its value, it is very regrettable that we seem to have become committed not to continue it.

I think that concerned us much more than any way in which you have conducted it and I don't think anyone at all—certainly not I—has been disposed to criticize the way your CIA has functioned in developing and carrying out this project. So I hope that you didn't come here feeling that the committee, or I, had been critical of the program as such.

It seems to me it has been extremely valuable. What I regret more than anything else is that we seem to have finally gotten ourselves into a position where we are committed as a country not to do it any more. So that, to me, is the real question.

Well, under our procedure, we don't have too much time this morning. We have agreed to allow each member 10 minutes around, if that is agreeable to you, so that the special points that may be of interest to them may be developed.

I have a number of questions, but the first one that occurs to me is this last point that you make, which really is not, I suppose, your responsibility.

That is the responsibility to make this decision as to whether or not you or someone else should take personal responsibility for this. You are well informed, of course, more than any of us, in the practices in this field.

PRECEDENTS FOR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY

It is true, is it not, that in all history whenever an unfortunate occurrence like this has happened the man who is in charge of that does take responsibility and not the head of state; is that not the practice?

Mr. **Dulles**. That is the usual practice, Mr. Chairman. I have been looking back into the history of intelligence that I am somewhat familiar with. There are, I believe, some exceptions. There was a very interesting exception I came across the other day which involved Daniel Webster and an intelligence operation he got involved in at the time of the dispute over the boundary of Maine. That all came out—and I can give you the documents on that later—because of some question over the expenditure of money. It was a rather interesting incident in our own history.

This particular operation was unusual, making plausible denial extremely difficult, and that had been recognized early in the project. Here was an instrument, this aircraft, which only one or two countries could possibly have built, which could not have been a private enterprise.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you misunderstand my question. It isn't the cover story. It's this final decision you had referred to in which you said it was well known that you were personally willing to assume full responsibility for this; that you ordered it, but a decision was made that this responsibility should be assumed by a higher level, which I take to mean the President.

It seems to me this is a most unusual decision, and the one which above all others departs from precedent, and it has great political repercussions. It isn't essentially a CIA problem; I recognize that.

I was wondering if you could throw any light upon the reasoning which led our Government to take the decision that the President should personally assume responsibility for this, and intimate in his statement how vital it was leaving the impression that he intended to continue—a decision which he later changed.

There is some difficulty as to the proper interpretation of the first statement of the Secretary with regard to this, together with the President's press conference. But this seems to me a very crucial question.

I don't know whether you wish to comment on this or not, but if you could throw some light on the reasoning as to why it was decided that the President should take personal responsibility, why he didn't leave that for you——

CIA'S ROLE

Mr. DULLES. It is always somewhat difficult, maybe improper, for me to suggest what went through the President's mind in that connection. I think I had better not go into that, as the issue was not discussed with me.

I was in this situation where, as I say, I stood ready to assume the responsibility; therefore, I would have hardly been a proper party to any discussion with regard to assuming responsibility. I want that to be entirely clear.

I do feel, however, looking at it as the head of our intelligence work in this country, that while many things can be covered by cover stories and disavowals, it may be difficult to do so in an operation of the magnitude of this particular operation without having the implication that possibly there was irresponsibility in the conduct of government. The fact that I was going ahead on my own authority to do something of this magnitude may not have been widely believed, even if I had asserted and stuck to it.

The CHAIRMAN. When I consider our responsibility as Members of the Congress in appropriating money and so on, we do allow you to go ahead without knowing it.

I literally did not know about this program and I daresay very few on this committee knew about it. We have always handled and have set up a special priority in the Congress to handle your affairs, recognizing it is quite different from all other governmental operations.

I hope you weren't offended by what little reference I made to this in my opening statement. I certainly didn't mean to cast any reflections upon the character of the CIA personnel.

I was simply relating what I believed to be a historical truth; that espionage is not an admitted program. It is a covert program, per se, and in our Congress none of us—I don't—take responsibility. How could I, because I didn't know what you were doing. I don't know how much money you get. I don't know how many employees you have. I know very little, except what you have told us in the briefings, and I have taken the position it wasn't my responsibility to do it and it was perfectly proper.

You have never heard me complain about not being told more. I think that the results of this decision can be very grave. For instance, I think it is a great tragedy that we seem to be in a position that we are committed to the world not to continue these things; and I think everybody here is impressed by the presentation of these photographs and what you have been able to do.

You certainly have made a very great impression on me as to the efficiency of the way you have conducted your part of it. But this other decision, I grant, is not yours. I didn't mean to ask you to justify it or not. I just wondered if you had some light to throw upon it. If not, I don't want to press you at all for an answer, and if you say that is not your responsibility, I am quite content with that because I realize it isn't.

It was understood that you took responsibility and that is as far as you go. But it still puzzles me that we have set a new course here which I think may be a great hindrance to you and your activities and your whole agency. This is what disturbs me more than anything else about it. I have a feeling that came about in a sort of unexpected way.

CONSULTATIONS ON RESPONSIBILITY ISSUE

In your consideration of the cover story, which you say that you did, was this aspect of it ever considered in the consultations between you and State and NASA, that under certain circumstances, the President was to assume full responsibility for your espionage activities?

Mr. Dulles. Not at the time we were working on the cover stories, but when it came to the issuance of Mr. Herter's statement, I believe of May 7.

The Chairman. Saturday?

Mr. Dulles. That was the first statement which indicated that an intelligence operation might have been involved. On that statement I was consulted.

The Chairman. Did they ask you specifically whether you thought it was wise for the Chief of State to assume responsibility for these activities?

Mr. Dulles. Well, the Chief of State decides that, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. No, I didn't say that. Did they ask you, or did you make a recommendation that he should or should not?

Mr. Dulles. No, I made no recommendations.

The **Chairman**. You didn't personally advise them that this would be a wise course?

Mr. **Dulles**. Mr. Chairman, I can't properly discuss conversations between me and the President. Possibly it is appropriate to say this: I was not specifically consulted on that particular point.

The **Chairman**. That is my thought. This was not a part of your preparations for any such contingency, the cover story, and so on?

Mr. **Dulles**. Well, we knew this possibility was inherent in the situation.

The **Chairman**. Yes. That is why you had——

LARGE NUMBER OF PERSONS WERE INVOLVED

Mr. **Dulles**. There is one other point, if I may just add it here. Generally in intelligence operations, the number of people that know about the operation is extremely restricted. It can be kept that way.

The **Chairman**. It ought to be. I agree with that.

Mr. **Dulles**. But this type of operation by its very nature had to be known to quite a number of people, a large number of people. And that complicated, of course, the attitude one takes if an operation of this kind is blown. It was a very unusual operation. In the history of intelligence, I don't know of any operation that is in any sense comparable to this. I don't believe this should be a precedent with respect to the handling of other covert operations, and I would not expect that the high authority would assume responsibility in the ordinary type of clandestine operations. I agree with you wholly on that.

The **Chairman**. Did the NASA organization know when they made their second statement what was involved, that this was an intelligence operation?

Mr. **Dulles**. Those that were working on the statement did. I don't think it was known down the line, but Mr. Dryden can tell you about that better.

The **Chairman**. You had consulted them?

Mr. **Dulles**. Oh, yes, sir.

The **Chairman** [continuing]. With regard to it. Was that story intended to cover what actually happened or was it a different intention?

Mr. **Dulles**. It was intended to be of use particularly if the plane had come down in the border areas where one could plausibly have said that the plane had strayed over the frontier without meaning to. And, also, it was intended to give Khrushchev an out if he wanted to take it. At that time, as I said in my initial statement, we didn't know whether he wanted to blow this up or put it under the rug. There were a certain number of Russian experts that rather thought he would shove it under the rug at that time so as not to have to disclose to his people what had been gong on.

The **Chairman**. Senator Green, do you have some questions?

PRIOR INCIDENTS

Senator **Green**. Yes, may I ask just a question or two in this connection? Have there been other incidents of forced landings abroad of American ships?

Mr. DULLES. Of this type?

Senator GREEN. Government airships, yes.

Mr. DULLES. I will ask General Cabell, who followed that very closely, to respond to that, if I may.

Senator GREEN. Do you know of any?

General CABELL. I don't recall any——

Senator GREEN. I was asking the Secretary——

Mr. DULLES. I wonder if I could get the scope of the question quite clear, Senator.

Senator GREEN. Yes. We have been discussing this incident. Have there been similar incidents in the past?

Mr. DULLES. No, sir. There have been no incidents of any of this particular type of plane or this type of mission, coming down in unfriendly territory.

Senator GREEN. That is what I mean.

Mr. DULLES. You may recall there have been several instances of planes that have strayed over Soviet territory which have been shot down. You recall the two incidents in Armenia and the Caucasus a few years ago; and there have been instances off the tip of Japan and some near Alaska.

Senator GREEN. Who took the responsibility in those incidents?

Mr. DULLES. In one case it was a civilian plane. In the other cases they were military planes, and the military authorities took responsibility.

Senator GREEN. The State Department washed its hands of it.

Mr. DULLES. No, no, the State Department handled the matter, and in all cases protests were made to the Soviet Union on the shooting down. We got indemnity in the case off Alaska but it was acknowledged as a military plane. The State Department assumed the diplomatic negotiations for indemnity or apology, and in one case we are still endeavoring to get back, you know—they haven't told us what happened to, I think, eight or nine of the crew of one of the planes that came down in the area of Caucasus.

Senator GREEN. In view of those precedents you took the responsibility in this case. That is the State Department?

Mr. DULLES. In the case I was ready to take the responsibility. This was a civilian plane. It was manned by employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, not by military personnel. They were in civilian clothes. It was an entirely civilian intelligence operation and I was prepared to take the responsibility and document that responsibility.

Senator GREEN. Until the President stepped into the picture, is that right?

Mr. DULLES. Well, I was prepared throughout at any time. But after other responsibility was taken, then my offer became outdated.

Senator GREEN. But the other cases that you mentioned—this was the first case where the President took a hand, is it not?

Mr. DULLES. I don't know of any similar case in the past.

Senator GREEN. That is what I mean.

Mr. DULLES. I mentioned this one back in the days of Daniel Webster which has some little parallel to this.

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Senator **Green**. Have you any knowledge that the airplanes of the Soviet Government have made similar trips abroad?

Mr. **Dulles**. No, we don't believe they have. In the first place, Mr. Chairman, so far as the United States is concerned, they could not get here and back.

Second, they have pretty good photography of everything we have in the United States.

They could overfly Alaska so far as range is concerned, but there is nothing particular they would learn there that they don't know already.

Senator **Green**. So far as you——

Mr. **Dulles**. So they have no incentive. Russia is a closed society, we are an open society. They haven't much incentive to do it even if they wanted to.

Senator **Green**. So far as I know there has been no similar incident.

Mr. **Dulles**. There is one incident I can mention and I can produce all the evidence about it: The Communists, I believe—it is hard to tell exactly which Communists—in Eastern Germany, hired a German to overfly Western Germany in a plane and he was brought to trial. Two of them were convicted, weren't they? Two people were convicted, and went to jail?

I can furnish the committee with all the details of that particular trial.

It wasn't blown up particularly, but this was the kind of plane that anybody could buy if he wanted to. It is like a Piper Cub they can fly around with, but they did fly around Western Germany and took pictures and were caught at it.

Senator **Green**. I won't pursue that subject any longer. Have the Russians similar pictures of the United States, similar to those which you have shown us today, that we have of Russia?

Mr. **Dulles**. So far as we know, they have no pictures taken from the air, and we would hope it would be limited to pictures that were generally publicly available. I doubt whether they would be in the same detail as the pictures that we have.

DOES U.S. HAVE OTHER PHOTOGRAPHS?

Senator **Green**. Have we similar photographs of the other countries besides Russia?

Mr. **Dulles**. I don't—did we take similar pictures?

Senator **Green**. Has the United States pictures similar to those you have shown us today about Russia? Have we similar pictures of other foreign countries?

Mr. **Dulles**. Well, not as far as I know, because we are not particularly interested in taking this type of picture in other countries.

Senator **Green**. Has it been brought to your attention, then?

Mr. **Dulles**. What is it, sir?

Senator **Green**. It has not been drawn to your attention before that question of whether we are taking pictures abroad similar to the ones of Russia.

Mr. DULLES. So far as I know, we are not taking pictures of installations and airfields and so forth of other countries.

Senator GREEN. The Russians are ahead of us in that respect; is that right?

Mr. DULLES. Well, I don't know what they have, but I would assume they could obtain pictures through ordinary commercial channels.

Senator GREEN. Well, thank you very much.

ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dulles, just one comment there and one question.

You said if Mr. Khrushchev wanted an out—I interpreted his first statement to mean that he was taking an out, that the President didn't know about this, and it would indicate that he did want an out. That would seem to be a perfect invitation for you to have taken the responsibility.

Again, I am not blaming you. This is not your thing. But this is what puzzles me, and his first statement was interpreted to mean, "Well, the President didn't know about this. This was just something that somebody else was doing." This was the traditional way to approach it. This would indicate that he did want him to take an out.

Mr. DULLES. When I was talking about an out, I meant the whole out—just to forget the whole operation. It was clear after his statement of May 5 and 7, particularly May 7, that he didn't want a complete out.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe not yet, but in his speech he questioned whether it was the man who is Commander-in-Chief of the American Armed Forces, whom everyone knows is the President, or was this aggressive act carried out by Pentagon militarists. If such actions are taken by American military men on their own account, it is of much concern to world opinion.

I agree that is a dilemma, but the question was the wisdom, on the whole, of the action we took of putting it right at the President's feet and in making him take responsibility.

That was the point I was trying to make.

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I think your offer was a perfectly proper one and a commendable one and as I say, I have no criticism of you. This decision was essentially a political decision and not an intelligence decision and yet, it has very grave impact, it seems to me, upon your own future operations.

Senator WILEY. Do you wish to comment on that?

Mr. DULLES. No, sir.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Dulles, I want to say how much I appreciate your illuminating discussion this morning. I have seen some of those pictures before, but I want to say after seeing and hearing you and your very able assistant today, that there should be no question about who is responsible.

NECESSITY FOR U-2 PROGRAM

First, I guess we can attribute responsibility to the Congress of the United States who created the Central Intelligence Agency and voted the money, and I want to say I think the Congress of the United States did the right thing. They recognized that with ordinary means we couldn't get the information.

Now, is it a fact that after you go to U-2—it has been in operation as you said, for a matter of about 4 years; is that correct?

Mr. DULLES. Correct.

Senator WILEY. And you also said that Khrushchev has known about the U-2 operation for how long?

Mr. DULLES. Since July 1956.

Senator LAUSCHE. Why do you choose that day?

Mr. DULLES. He made a protest at that time. The protest was later published in the American press.

May I just add—excuse me—just to answer that, he didn't know it was a U-2. He misdescribed the plane and the mission. He called it a two-engine bomber, so it was easy to deny what he said because what he said was mostly wrong, but they had detected a plane overflying at that time.

Senator WILEY. You have demonstrated today the value to this country of having the U-2 and I think no one questions that.

You have also demonstrated there wasn't any similar practice in the world before. Is that correct?

Mr. DULLES. That is correct. There has been in time of war, of course, the use of aircraft reconnaissance which is well known.

Senator WILEY. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. But in time of peace, this operation, I believe, is unique.

MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF A NEW AGE

Senator WILEY. Yes. Now this is a new age, is it not, in many respects. We have missiles, A-bombs, H-bombs, and the new age requires new methods, new mechanisms to meet the challenges. You agree to that?

Mr. DULLES. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. And this was our meeting of the challenge that the Kremlin was getting ready to take over the world, and we wanted to know what the situation was behind that Iron Curtain.

Mr. DULLES. That is correct.

Senator WILEY. Now then, if Khrushchev and his Kremlinites knew about the operation, is it common knowledge that the espionage has been going on for centuries?

Mr. DULLES. Of one type or another, and this was what you might call an advanced type of espionage.

That is correct.

Senator WILEY. And it was something that was absolutely needed to meet the situation as it existed; is that right?

Mr. DULLES. That was the judgment in highest levels of government.

Senator WILEY. Yes. There has been a lot of talk about what some folks call the "mistake." I think the people of this world, by and large, have recognized the significance of your speaking up as you did once the unknown had become known and after that, the President spoke.

Now, as I said, who is responsible?

Well, I can't say I am not responsible because I feel I am. I voted for your agency and I am sure the President, as the Executive of this country, said the right thing in spite of what has been called the usual practice. We are not living in a usual age. That is right, is it not?

Mr. **Dulles**. Yes, sir. May I just correct one point?

I have made no public statements of any nature during this whole period. I have appeared before members of the committees of the Congress to which I am responsible, but I have otherwise said nothing public.

Senator **Wiley**. Yes. I was speaking about your testimony here today.

Mr. **Dulles**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Wiley**. And then I am speaking about the President's statement as Executive of this country, where he assumed responsibility which to me is the honorable thing and the right thing. I want to ask you one or two other questions.

VALUE OF THE PROGRAM

You said it is a new age, and it is not a usual practice. You claim that it is something of real value as far as providing for the defenses of this country is concerned. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. **Dulles**. I agree.

Senator **Wiley**. In other words, it has told the Armed Forces where all of these installations are and if we didn't have them and the balloon went up we would be firing all over kingdom come. But knowing where they are we can center our shots on those locations; is that correct?

Mr. **Dulles**. We can do much better than we could have done without the photograph. We had some photographs, of course, before we had this photograph. This has made it possible for us to be much more precise in the whole field of photography.

Senator **Wiley**. I would like to get your opinions on one or two questions.

I think you stated that Khrushchev knew before he went to Berlin—yes, before the U-2 incident—of those so-called overflights.

Mr. **Dulles**. That is correct.

Senator **Wiley**. Yes. Is it your opinion that when he went to Berlin, he had already made up his mind before the U-2 incident to shoot the summit?

Mr. **Dulles**. Paris.

The **Chairman**. Paris, don't you mean?

Senator **Wiley**. Paris, I am talking about. I thank you very much.

Mr. **Dulles**. The Secretary of State has testified on that point quite fully, Senator. As intelligence officers we, of course, have the right and the duty to make our own appraisals of this, and we have made several statements.

AN "OUT" FOR KHRUSHCHEV

They are very much along the line that Mr. Herter testified before this committee; namely, as I recall his testimony, that Khrushchev had realized for some time that the summit conference would not be productive for him, and that the President's trip to Russia would not be productive for him, and he might well have been trying to find a way out.

I would not deny that this particular incident gave him an excuse for doing something that he may have wanted to do in any event.

I would add as an intelligence estimate that if, as seemed quite possible, the summit conference had foundered or been inconclusive as a result of the consideration of the Berlin issue, the unfortunate situation may have been even more troubled if the conference had broken up on that issue than having it break up on this particular issue. I am not suggesting that the issue was created for that purpose, however.

Senator WILEY. I think I have just one other question because there has been some talk about the responsibility issue.

If he went to Berlin——

The CHAIRMAN. Paris——

Senator WILEY. Paris. If he went to Paris—he also went to Berlin afterwards—having in mind the U-2 incident, was it the incident that caused him to cancel the summit conference, or was it the President's stating that he took responsibility?

Mr. DULLES. Senator, those two things have not become a part of the whole issue, obviously; and as I said before, I think he took the entire incident as an excuse and possibly as an opportunity for breaking up a conference in which he no longer had any great interest, and in which he no longer had any great hopes as far as the Soviet Union was concerned.

Senator WILEY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield had to go to the floor and left me three or four questions here that he would like to ask in his name, if I could use his time for that.

THE ORDER FOR THE MAY 1 FLIGHT

He wanted it clear that you personally gave the order for the May 1 flight. That was clear, wasn't it, from your statement?

Mr. DULLES. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. He had understood, he said, that in the previous briefing you had said the order was given in the field, but he wanted to clarify that.

Mr. DULLES. I gave the orders to the command in the field.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. And then, of course, he mounted the operation. But I gave the orders for the flight.

The CHAIRMAN. You gave the order?

Mr. DULLES. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. He wished to know if Herter and the President actually knew personally about this specific flight rather than about the general program.

Mr. **Dulles**. It is my understanding that they knew that there was authorization for a flight in this general period. I do not think that either of them—in fact, Mr. Herter was away and this somewhat applies to Mr. Dillon in his place—knew about this specific flight. As I have testified, the flight was made within the general period and in the general terms agreed upon.

The **Chairman**. As a part of that question, no consultation took place between you and Mr. Herter or Dillon or the President with regard to this specific flight?

Mr. **Dulles**. There has been consultation earlier with regard to a flight in this period and of this general character. But there were various alternatives that were considered, depending upon weather. So there was consultation with regard to making some flight in this general period. But the details of the flight, the timing and so forth, were left to me and my associates, General Cabell and others.

WAS A MORATORIUM PLANNED?

The **Chairman**. Had agreement been reached as to a moratorium on all flights subsequent to this one on May 1 throughout the summit period?

Mr. **Dulles**. I did not so understand it. I would like to explain, Mr. Chairman, that the procedures with regard to these flights, while quite precise, were handled in an informal manner.

There were a certain number of people in these various offices, very few—one or two—who handled this particular matter with their chiefs, so that it was a question of being in touch quite continually. One didn't get together and lay down patterns and say, "well, this is it."

We were consulting all of the time with certain people about this. As I testified, if this flight had been a success, there would have been no question of making another flight, because we always looked into what one flight accomplished before we mounted another.

That had been our practice recently at least, and a wise practice. When it failed, of course, there wasn't any question of another flight.

Say the flight had been postponed because of weather a day or two. I would have gotten together with this small group and said, "What shall we do now?" I don't know what their decision would have been if we had done that, say, on Monday.

The **Chairman**. What I meant was that no previous decision had been made for a moratorium after this.

Mr. **Dulles**. No.

The **Chairman**. He asks this: When you say that you had offered to take responsibility, did you offer to the President to resign as a result of the U-2 incident?

Mr. **Dulles**. No, sir. I am subject to resigning at any time the President wants and I thought it would be——

U.S.S.R.'S WARNING; PAKISTAN'S KNOWLEDGE

The **Chairman**. What is your reaction to Marshal Malinovsky's warning on Sunday?[1]

Mr. **Dulles**. It it quite like a great many other warnings they have given. They rattle the missile any time they feel like it. It would be a very hard and unusual order to carry out because one doesn't know about these flights in that manner.

As you know well, in our own continental defense there are a lot of unknowns in the sky all the time, probably more over here than there are in Europe, because we have more support planes and things of that kind. But the idea that he is going to send a bomb to one of these countries because an unknown appears on his scope coming from this country, is quite ridiculous. I think it is bombast.

The **Chairman**. Did the Pakistanis know that this plane and its mission were taking off from their airfield?

Mr. **Dulles**. Mr. Chairman, one thing in intelligence that we never reveal at any time is any association or possible association of any allies with us, and so I respectfully request that the question be not pressed.

INSTRUCTIONS TO PILOT

The **Chairman**. One last one, I believe. He says, was this sentence correct as quoted as he has marked in the documents attributed to Mr. Allen. Talking of Powers: "When he went down he told exactly what his mission was and exactly what he was expected to do and he was under instruction to do that."

Mr. **Dulles**. I think that I have covered that pretty fully in my direct statement, but if Senator Mansfield has anything further, I would be glad to add to it.

The **Chairman**. That is all he has.

Mr. **Dulles**. I have given the full details of the exact instructions that were given to the pilot.

The **Chairman**. This last one, he says: Did the U-2 make initial findings or was it used to corroborate information previously uncovered?

Mr. **Dulles**. It was both. We would get some indication, for example, that there was some nuclear development, let's say, in Tomsk. We wouldn't know much about it, but we targeted the flights on the basis of all of the intelligence that we had, and then, of course, we picked up a good many additional things that had not been covered by intelligence.

The **Chairman**. Senator Hickenlooper?

RUSSIAN OVERFLIGHTS OF EUROPE AND NEAR EAST

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Mr. Dulles, a couple of days ago in the paper there was a story that the Danes claimed that a MIG had flown over Denmark. Do you have any information on that?

Mr. **Dulles**. I think that was later denied. I don't think it was a Russian plane. I will check on that, Senator.

---

[1] Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky, warned on May 30 that Soviet missiles would "strike at any base from which a plane might fly to violate the territory of the Soviet Union or the Socialist states."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The story I saw was that the Danes claimed that it was a MIG and it flew over at rather low altitude. You say it was denied?

Mr. DULLES. I will report if I come back this afternoon or I will report to you. I think I saw a denial of that. We followed that up, and we couldn't check it out.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. As I recall it, the newspaper report also said that the Danes claimed that there had been a number of other flights over their country, either identified or unidentified. When I say unidentified, I mean unidentified as Russian planes perhaps or perhaps identified as Russian planes. I just don't recall.

Mr. DULLES. The border there, of course—that area is very close to the Soviet zone of Germany, and there are from time to time planes straying one way or the other, just like our plane, an Air Force plane, strayed off course the other day coming back from Denmark to Hamburg. I can get you the details of that.

In view of all that the Soviets know about Denmark and the negligible interest in Denmark from a military angle, I would doubt that they would overfly it for the purpose of taking pictures. I don't know, but I would doubt it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Have there been incidents of Russian overflights of Iran?

Mr. DULLES. We believe that there have been such overflights. Planes have gotten down to Syria and Iraq, particularly Iraq—I should have said Iraq rather than Syria—on various occasions. And there is no way they could very easily get there unless they overflew either Turkey or Iran. We have reason to believe that there have been overflights of both Iran and eastern Turkey by Russian planes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In fact, haven't both of those countries made positive claims that overflights have been observed?

Mr. DULLES. Yes, they have made such claims.

SOVIET FLIGHTS OVER OTHER COUNTRIES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Have the Indians made claims that Communist planes have overflown their territory?

Mr. DULLES. I believe they have, sir, recently. Pakistan has also claimed to have been overflown.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

It runs in my mind there have been claims of some overflights of certain portions of Alaska.

Mr. DULLES. There may have been, over territorial waters there. I don't recall any recent incident over the land of Alaska. We had that incident some 3 or 4 years ago when they shot down an American plane. I don't know whether that was over international waters or our own waters but they did pay indemnity for that, and I think they probably invaded our airspace at that time.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Haven't there been claims that the Russians have overflown certain areas of Japan, especially the North Islands?

Mr. DULLES. Some of those islands in the North, yes, sir.

POSSIBLE CONTINUANCE OF U-2 FLIGHTS

Senator **Hickenlooper**. With regard to the continuance or discontinuance of these U-2 flights, I assume that it is pretty well accepted in theory that once you uncover a method of obtaining intelligence it loses a certain amount of its value.

Mr. **Dulles**. That is correct. As I said in my initial statement, we knew that this particular instrument would have a limited life; in fact in the initial stages of the project the life that we gave it is less than it actually had. That is, we gave it about 2 or 3 years' probable operational life, and it actually had an additional life.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Of course, as a matter of fact these flights could continue, I mean, from a physical standpoint.

Mr. **Dulles**. Yes, they could.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. They could continue. But is there an element involving the apprehension or fear, let's say, of our allies that perhaps the Russians might take reprisals on their bases if the Russians could establish that continued flights did occur from those bases?

Mr. **Dulles**. I think that question should be addressed to the State Department, Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Well, it is a political question.

Mr. **Dulles**. It is really out of my field.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. It is a political question, and I believe the State Department is probably better qualified to answer that, but it occurs to me it might be a factor. The uneasiness of some of these countries where certain accessible bases are located might be a factor in——

Mr. **Dulles**. I would think that is true.

Senator **Hickenlooper** [continuing]. In the future effectiveness or ineffectiveness.

Mr. **Dulles**. That is correct.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Either way?

Mr. **Dulles**. That is correct.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Of the continuation of these flights.

WORLDWIDE IMPACT OF U-2 PROGRAM

Now, from a general intelligence standpoint, do you have any evaluation as to the general effect on the world when this issue has finally been presented and brought into the open? That is, the overall effect on many countries of the world, where it is shown that these flights could be successfully accomplished over Russia, that perhaps Russia's ability to intercept and prevent invasion of the airspace—I don't know whether it is their airspace or not, but the airspace over Russia—is it possible that may have a beneficial effect on some of the world situations?

Mr. **Dulles**. I think it already has.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Both in Russia and outside of Russia?

Mr. **Dulles**. I think it already has among our allies. The general impression I get from reading the reports of the discussions of this matter among the NATO powers—there will be an opportunity here during the SEATO meeting to see about the effect on SEATO—is that it has, I think, tended to have a beneficial effect. In fact, a couple of years ago, after we had had a number of singularly successful flights there was some conversation, which never got to the highest levels of government. But there was some consideration of publicizing this operation just in order to get the benefit that we had achieved.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. To establish that very fact?

Mr. DULLES. To establish that very fact. It was decided against, because we thought it would put an end to the life of the operation, but we thought at that time that maybe it was coming toward its end soon and therefore this would be a good chance to get the benefit of showing what the Russian preparations were and how much we knew about them and our capacity in this field.

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY OVER AIRSPACE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Of course, that may be an academic question, but under modern concepts, where does the sovereignty in the air stop?

Mr. DULLES. No one has decided that, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There has not been any great furor raised, has there, as to the violation or invasion of sovereignty by these circling satellites or orbiting instruments that go over these countries?

Mr. DULLES. Khrushchev is reported to have said himself at Paris—I don't know whether this has been in the press or whether it is classified; I guess it is probably classified—he is reported to have said in one of his conversations there in Paris, "Send all these you want. I don't worry about these." Whether he will take that as his official position, I cannot say.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You mean the orbiting devices?

Mr. DULLES. That's right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, he doesn't want them to orbit for a temporary period of time at 70,000 feet over Russia.

I think that is academic at the moment. I am not certain we can decide that here. I just want to say, Mr. Dulles, that from my standpoint, the success of these missions and the apparent success of many other activities of your agency has been very heartening, at least to me, over the years.

In some phases of your activities, I haven't, of course, been fully informed but in other phases, on another committee, I have had some opportunity to know something about what you are doing.

I think that you and your agency have performed some very outstanding feats, beneficial to the security of this country, and against odds which normally might seem insurmountable. I appreciate your statement this morning and I congratulate you on the vigor and the vision with which many of these activities have been carried out.

If we can sleep peacefully at night to some degree, I think your activities have contributed a lot to that ability.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you very much. I appreciate that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't say we can all sleep with complete peace but at least you mitigate the worry. I will say that.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

SOVIET ADMISSION OF OVERFLIGHT

The Chairman. One further question about the overflights he mentioned: Have the Russians in any case asserted the right and taken the responsibility for them or have they denied them?

Mr. Dulles. I don't understand.

The Chairman. The overflights that the Senator asked you about.

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

The Chairman. Assuming they took place—and some did take place, I assume—have the Russians asserted their right to do it and said, "We are going to continue"?

Mr. Dulles. They never admitted it, no.

The Chairman. They have never admitted it?

Mr. Dulles. I don't think there have been any deep flights, and I don't know that there have been many intentional overflights except those probably trying to get their planes down to Iraq during that crisis in the Middle Eastern situation.

The Chairman. But he did not assert his right to do it even in that case.

Mr. Dulles. No. They never admitted they were doing it.

The Chairman. Yes. Senator Long.

Senator Hickenlooper. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, just one question if I may. I had a minute on my time.

The Chairman. Yes.

RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE

Senator Hickenlooper. They have the right of innocent passage through the Dardanelles.

Mr. Dulles. That is correct, by treaty.

Senator Hickenlooper. Through surface vessels. Do they have the same right of innocent passage by air through that corridor? Do you know? Maybe I had better ask the State Department about that.

Mr. Dulles. I think they have to get permission just as we would if we were flying military or commercial aircraft, or follow a normal pattern. I think they have to get permission but I don't know. Do you know?

The Chairman. Well, we will ask the State Department.

Mr. Dulles. We can find it out.

At the time the Treaty of Montreux, that determined the right of passage, aircraft were not of much consequence. I don't think it was covered in a treaty and I just can't give an answer, sir.[2]

The Chairman. Senator Long?

PHOTOGRAPHING THE SOVIET UNION

Senator Long. First let me ask you, in line with my previous questions, have you succeeded in photographing all the land area of the Soviet Union, or how much of it do you think you have succeeded in photographing?

---

[2] On June 17, John S. Warner, CIA Legislative Counsel, notified Chairman Fulbright that: "The Convention of Montreux of July 20, 1936, which was discussed, provides that all nations, including the Soviet Government, have the right of free passage by air for civil aircraft, within the corridor established and in accordance with certain routine regulations.

"It is noted that the treaty is silent with regard to military aircraft except to provide that vessels going through the straits may not fly their aircraft."

Mr. DULLES. Well, we would want to photograph only very little of that great land mass of the Soviet Union because——

The CHAIRMAN. You wouldn't know what you were going to photograph unless you had some evidence of what was there, would you?

Mr. DULLES. Well, certain things are very hard to get to places unless you have, say, rail or road. Now, if you are looking, say for missile sites—these missiles are very big things. You are not going to haul them over the tundra, very likely; you might haul a few. So we have clues as to what we want to know, but we have not even completed the photography of all of the Soviet Union we would like to photograph.

Senator LONG. You think you have photographed most of it, though, at least enough to know whether there is a railroad there. Would you want to know what was at the end of a railroad if a railroad was there?

Mr. DULLES. Well, they might build these missiles on the spurs; some would be like the picture we showed you. There is a lot we don't know.

Senator LONG. But insofar as you can photograph from the air and see a railroad going on there and you would like to photograph down to the end to see what was going on, do you feel you have done most of that?

Mr. DULLES. No, sir.

Senator LONG. Then there is a lot of the Soviet Union you just don't have on the photographs; would that be a fair question?

Mr. DULLES. There is quite a lot. It is a very big country, sir. We have taken our priorities and we had covered most of our first priorities. We had not by any means covered all.

Senator LONG. About how many of these flights would you have expected to make during the summer when the weather would be reasonably good?

Mr. DULLES. How many would we expect to make?

Senator LONG. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. Well, that is very hard to answer, Senator, because after each flight now we would study the results——

Senator LONG. I don't really have to know the answer.

Mr. DULLES. I don't think we had any expectation of the number. We would have carried on an orderly program, maybe one a month—something in that range, I should think.

Senator LONG. Would that be about what you did last year, for example?

Mr. DULLES. We did fewer last year, I think.

THE LEGALITY OF THE FLIGHT

Senator LONG. Now, in your judgment, was this flight a violation of international law?

Mr. DULLES. Yes, probably. I don't want to say that definitely, because I think an argument might be made that, flying at this height above all the regular channels of commerce and so forth and so on, it is conceivable that international law—which is not yet determined clearly with regard to the extent of control over space above a country—might say that anything over 70,000 feet was free for anybody.

I don't know that they will, but it is conceivable that that result might be reached. So when I say it was against international law, I would like to qualify it by stating international law in this field is not very well determined.[3]

Senator LONG. It could conceivably be argued that a nation does not possess the airspace that it is powerless to defend, but it is not likely that the small nations would be willing to agree to that argument, is it?

Mr. DULLES. I would doubt that, but we have the Law of the Sea by which we are able to defend a lot more than 3 miles off our coast, and yet we have not any sovereignty over it.

Senator LONG. Yes, but wasn't the historic base of that very doctrine, though, the fact that a cannon would fire 3 miles to sea, and that being the case, it was recognized that if you are able to get a cannonball out there that belonged to you?

Mr. DULLES. I think that is quite true, but we are probably going to arrive at our rules with regard to the airspace over countries under new conditions.

Senator LONG. You wouldn't be prepared to concede that the airspace over this country ended at 70,000 feet, would you? Would you argue it?

Mr. DULLES. I would if the Russians would.

Senator LONG. I am not sure that you would, Mr. Dulles, if you thought it through. You wouldn't be prepared to concede that if their bombers can reach 70,000 feet, you would let them hover over this country, would you? I don't think you would.

Mr. DULLES. They wouldn't hover very long over here.

PEACEFUL V. MILITARY PASSAGE

Senator LONG. If you agree that our rights ended at 70,000 feet and bombers were above 70,000 feet unless you knew what was in that plane up there, you wouldn't be prepared to agree they could keep those planes up there, would you?

Mr. DULLES. I think one very likely could make a rule with regard to the air, the same rule one would make on the ground. I have a perfect right to go to France and 200,000 Americans, civilians, have a right to go to France. But we haven't any right to send an army over to France without their approval. So I think one could very easily distinguish in the air between peaceful passage and military passage, just as well as it is done on the ground. You can't send an army of troops over anybody else's territory. You can send an army of tourists, if you want.

Senator LONG. You are attempting to make an argument here now that I haven't heard made previously, and that is that we can send a plane over a foreign country's territory in the air space above that territory at 70,000 feet without violating any of that country's rights.

---

[3] Questions regarding a nation's rights to air space over its boundaries were extensively treated in a symposium entitled "Legal Problems in Space Exploration," prepared for the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress in March 1961. (Senate Document No. 26, 87th Congress, 1st Session, 1961.)

Mr. **Dulles**. I merely said in reply to a question about international law that while my first answer was yes, it was a violation of international law as it is generally understood; and then I just went on to qualify that. I pointed out that international law in this field was not well determined, and it was conceivable, although I thought unlikely, that some area over 70,000 or 80,000 or 90,000 feet or 100,000 feet might be taken as above territorial control. It is unlikely, but since it is an open question, I didn't want to preclude that possibility.

Senator **Long**. Were there any numbers or markings on that plane?

Mr. **Dulles**. No.

Senator **Long**. Nor on the pilot's uniform? He had no Air Force marking, no insignia or anything of that sort?

Mr. **Dulles**. He was in civilian clothes. He had a civilian card so that if he landed at other places he could identify himself. He had a civilian card.

THE SELF-DESTRUCT MECHANISM

Senator **Long**. Mr. Secretary, with regard to this plane's not being destroyed, that to me seems to be a fantastic miss. How much high explosive do you think you would have needed to have destroyed everything about that plane that would have been of great value to our potential enemy? We would certainly want to destroy the camera and all the intricate mechanisms of that plane, wouldn't we?

Mr. **Dulles**. We had a destruct mechanism in it that would have pretty well destroyed it. We weren't sure it would knock it all to smithereens, because every pound was important, and we didn't want to use up too much of the poundage in high explosives.

Senator **Long**. My thought about that is, if you would let me have 5 pounds of high explosives, that wouldn't be much worth having, unless they might identify a plane wing tip or something. But it wouldn't be worth having after you used 5 pounds of high explosives on it, would it?

Mr. **Dulles**. General Cabell is an expert on that, and he might answer that.

General **Cabell**. I might add to that a little bit, Senator, in that the destruct device was particularly desired to be used in the air, and if you could cause a breaking up of parts of the aircraft then the aerodynamics of the situation would take over and begin to tear the airplane up so that it would come down in smaller pieces. But if it were used on the ground, it was enough, one would hope, to start a fire.

We don't think that it is quite clear that the destruction device was not actually used in this case, either in the air or on the ground, and we are unable to explain at the moment why it was not used. Now, whether the pilot attempted to use it or not, we do not know, but he might have attempted it and due to some malfunction or an inadvertence in climbing out of the airplane, he might not have set off the device.

Senator LONG. How heavy was that demolition charge?

General CABELL. About 4 or 5 pounds.

Senator LONG. I should think with that he could just blast the workings of that plane to pieces. It couldn't conceivably have gone off and left that camera intact, could it?

General CABELL. Senator, you could leave the camera intact, but have you ever tried to destroy a telephone book or something with laminations that are tightly rolled? The rolls of film are extremely tightly rolled to approach indestructibility.

Senator LONG. I would think it would pretty well shatter or blow in fragments almost anything with TNT sitting beside it, even small pieces.

General CABELL. I don't think it would do that, but in any case the explosion did not go off.

Senator LONG. Did the pilot have an ejection seat to get out of the plane or was he just supposed to climb out of it?

General CABELL. The aircraft was equipped with an ejection seat, but the ejection seat is to be used at the option of the pilot. I have talked to the U-2 pilots, and their belief has been that the best technique would be not to use the ejection seat if either the aircraft was under control or if both the aircraft and they were under control at the time of ejection, because they could do a better job of climbing out themselves and getting out over the side than the ejection seat would do for them. It would be usable by them in the event that they were in some way incapacitated or if the aircraft were in very unusual attitude.

APPREHENSION OF AGENTS

Senator LONG. Have we had some of our spies caught before, Mr. Dulles?

Mr. DULLES. Some spies caught. None in connection with the U-2.

Senator LONG. Yes, but some of our agents have been caught before?

Mr. DULLES. Oh, yes.

Senator LONG. Did we uniformly deny all those instances?

Mr. DULLES. Always, certainly. We had then in those cases a basis of plausible defense.

Senator LONG. Has that not been the same basis that the Soviets used when we apprehended their agents? Have they ever admitted that one of those agents was on a mission?

Mr. DULLES. No, they have not admitted it.

Senator LONG. The thought that occurs to me is that when we admit that one of our agents has been apprehended, we admit a violation of international law and that they can with some grace demand, then, that whoever is responsible for violating the law should be apprehended. Now, of course, in their system they just don't admit it, and so the question doesn't arise as to what the attitude is that should be taken. But how can we take the attitude that we haven't violated the law, and then admit it but say they are not entitled to an apology or any adjustment for it?

Mr. DULLES. I don't know that I get quite the impact of that question.

Senator **Long**. It seems to me that we are in a position of their saying, "Here, you violated the law and you should be punished. You should apologize. You should do something to throw yourself on the mercy of the court," and if we say "Yes, we did violate the law," how can we very well take the attitude that no adjustment is due or forthcoming?

Mr. **Dulles**. That is really a political matter. That is beyond the scope of my duties. I think that question should be addressed to others. I don't want to seem to apologize for what I do.

Senator **Long**. Don't we find ourselves in that situation when we admit before the world that we are violating the rights of another country? Isn't that what this amounts to when we say, "Yes, we did that"?

Mr. **Dulles**. Well, we produced plenty of evidence—they don't admit it—of many violations they have made of our territory and of the premises of our embassies and everything of that kind. So if there are any apologies they ought to be pretty mutual, I think.

ADMISSION OF ESPIONAGE

Senator **Long**. But they never admit it. We say, "Yes, we did it." It seems to me that so long as we are not in a position of pleading guilty or admitting it, we are in a position of saying, "We don't admit this, but I will tell you one thing, we know you people are spying on us. We can certainly prove that and we have the spy to prove it with." Isn't that how the game has been played up to now?

Mr. **Dulles**. Well, we have the spy Abel[4] here and the courts up to the Supreme Court have upheld his conviction. There isn't any question of who sent him and so forth.

Senator **Long**. But so far, isn't that the way the game has been played up until now? Our courts find their spies guilty and their courts find our spies guilty and both sides deny and both sides contend that the courts were completely beyond their jurisdiction, that the court did not act on proper evidence or that the whole thing was a fraud or wasn't a proper trial, or something.

At least we deny it to be the case and they do, too.

Mr. **Dulles**. They didn't say anything about the trial in most cases.

The **Chairman**. The Senator's time is up.

Mr. Dulles, we had better adjourn now for lunch.

Can you come back?

Mr. **Dulles**. Yes, sir.

The **Chairman**. All right, we will adjourn until 2:30. I hope everybody knows this is an executive session.

Senator **Lausche**. Mr. Chairman, before we adjourn, I would like to know what our program is relating to the testimony this morning.

The **Chairman**. I stated that at the opening of the session. There is no release of this testimony unless Mr. Dulles himself, after all the time he wants to look at it, says it should be. The committee is not going to release any testimony without his approval.

---

[4] Col. Rudolf Ivanovich Abel was convicted of spying on the United States for the Soviet Union. He was eventually traded for the release of Francis Gary Powers.

Senator **Lausche**. May I express to Mr. Dulles that I look with extreme concern about providing any information to the Soviets through what has been said at this meeting, and that in my opinion, any doubt in your mind should be quickly resolved against releasing any of the testimony or discussions that took place here today.

Mr. **Dulles**. Senator, at this point I am inclined to share your view.

The **Chairman**. The committee is adjourned until 2:30.

[Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m. the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee met at 2:35 p.m., Senator J. W. Fulbright presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, and Williams.

Also present: Senator Young (of Ohio) and Senator Engle.

The **Chairman**. The committee will come to order.

Senator Aiken, I believe that you are next.

I may say, Mr. Director, that it takes a long time to explain to the press why we can't say anything about the CIA. I did my best before lunch. They are hard people to get rid of. So we had to bear part of your burden anyway.

STATEMENT OF HON. ALLEN W. DULLES, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (RESUMED)

Mr. **Dulles**. I appreciate that.

The **Chairman**. Senator Aiken?

Senator **Aiken**. Mr. Dulles, you say that you gave the order for the U-2 flight on May 1. How long before May 1 did you give that?

Mr. **Dulles**. The afternoon of April 30.

Senator **Aiken**. You gave it directly for a flight to take place immediately, then?

Mr. **Dulles**. Yes. The flight had been planned for several days, and it was ready to go as soon as weather conditions permitted.

It was always the practice to report back to headquarters the exact weather situation, and when we received that report on the afternoon of April 30, we analyzed the weather report, and then I gave the direction to proceed.

Senator **Aiken**. I was just trying to bring out whether it was a specific directive or whether you ordered the flight to take place, we will say, at the convenience of the pilot when he thought it was the best time.

Mr. **Dulles**. We knew that the flight was ready to go because of the particular circumstances, the timing. Preparation takes a good many hours.

The pilot or pilots—generally there are two of them that are acclimated—go through their breathing exercise over quite a long period so as to be ready for the flight. Then on the field, the decision is made as to which—I believe there were two pilots in this case.

General **Cabell**. That is right.

Mr. **Dulles**. Two pilots in this case were prepared for the flight. The decision is made in the field at the last moment as to which pilot shall fly the flight.

Senator **Aiken**. At the risk of repetition I would like to ask you this again. Mr. Powers had been thoroughly screened and also thoroughly screened for the type of job that he was to carry out, even though he had not been trained in espionage work, as such, on the ground?

Mr. **Dulles**. That is correct, Senator Aiken. I gave, in some detail this morning in my direct presentation, what had been done with regard to the screening of all of our pilots, including Powers.

He had had a careful screening by the Air Force in connection with his duty with the Air Force, and after he came with us, he had another screening—and before he came with us.

WHAT BROUGHT THE U-2 DOWN?

Senator **Aiken**. Your best theory is that something forced him down to an altitude where he came within range of either the Soviet fighters or guns on the ground?

Mr. **Dulles**. That is our best theory. We do not wholly discount the fact that he had been subjected to ground-to-air missile attack, which may have had something to do with the flameout or otherwise may have caused the plane to lose altitude.

It is obvious to us that the plane was not hit. If the plane had been hit by a ground-to-air missile, in our belief it would have disintegrated.

Senator **Aiken**. Had the U-2 been subject to fire from ground missiles previous to May 1?

Mr. **Dulles**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Aiken**. It had been.

Mr. **Dulles**. Other flights had been, not this flight. General Cabell wants to correct me on that. I thought that there had been.

Would you give us your best recollection?

General **Cabell**. I don't recall, Senator, any time when we detected any firing, ground-to-air or air-to-air, having been directed to one of these flights.

Senator **Aiken**. There seemed to be a rumor——

General **Cabell**. There were attempted interceptions. The Director exhibited photographs this morning of some attempted interceptions, but they didn't come close enough, to our knowledge, to direct-fire.

Senator **Aiken**. The reason I asked is there seemed to be a rumor that the Soviets had tried out missiles on high altitude flights before, ineffectively.

Mr. **Dulles**. It is very possible they had, without the pilot's knowing about it.

Senator **Aiken**. Did Mr. Powers communicate with anyone while on this flight?

Mr. **Dulles**. No. Entire radio silence is imposed under all conditions.

THE INCIDENT'S EFFECT ON OTHER COUNTRIES

Senator **Aiken**. What effect has this announcement or admission by the President that it was a plane that was engaged in intelligence service, and so forth, had on the flow of information from other countries?

Mr. **Dulles**. It has had no adverse effect that I can see. In fact, the general reports I get from the profession are ones of approbation of the technical competence of the exercise.

Senator **Aiken**. I noticed that Norway and Pakistan promptly denied any part in it, which was the natural thing for them to do.

Now that we are stopping the U-2 flights, do you have any other means for gathering information comparable to what the U-2 had been doing?

Mr. **Dulles**. Well, we have other means that we will, of course, exercise to the full. We have nothing that is quite comparable, though, to the U-2 in all its aspects.

Senator **Aiken**. That is all the questions I have.

You know, the Air Force has recently deactivated Ethan Allen Air Base in Vermont and moved it out to west Texas. When I asked them why, they said that the reason was so highly classified they couldn't tell me over the phone. So I got a west Texas paper, and they said that these interceptors were being moved out there because it was anticipated that an attack on the United States would come across the Pacific on the jetstream and that they needed the interceptors out there in this district in west Texas.

Wouldn't it have been possible for the U-2 to have gone up and taken the jetstream across to Russia?

Mr. **Dulles**. It couldn't have come back, though.

Senator **Aiken**. It couldn't? It could keep on going to the U.S. I just thought sometime when you need to think up a good reason or excuse for something, if you communicate with the Air Force, they are experts at that.

Mr. **Dulles**. You may wish to address that question to Mr. Gates when he is here.

Senator **Aiken**. If I had known that you needed something of a statement, I could have advised you of that sooner. It seemed rather ingenious to me.

I think that is all, Mr. Chairman, at this time.

The **Chairman**. The Senator from Tennessee.

APPROVAL OF U-2 FLIGHTS

Senator **Gore**. Mr. Dulles, Secretary Herter told us—and I think you, though in different words, said virtually the same thing this morning—that the general program of U-2 flights involving the particular period of May 1 and prior thereto, had been approved.

Mr. **Dulles**. That is correct.

Senator **Gore**. When was this approval given?

Mr. **Dulles**. I don't think I can answer that question. It had been given sometime before.

Would you know, General Cabell? A month ago?

General **Cabell**. I would say it was in the nature of two or three weeks before.

Senator **Aiken**. Two or three weeks. How many flights did it involve?

Mr. **Dulles**. It involved one flight, but there were various alternates, depending on weather. I believe there were three, and the choice among those alternates was left to me and advice from the field as to the weather conditions with respect to the various alternates.

Senator **Gore**. Was not the April 9 flight involved in the same program that was approved at the same time?

Mr. **Dulles**. It involved the same program but it was our general practice, in view of the informality which I described to you in the close contact that was maintained, to touch base after a flight, before another flight was made.

Senator **Gore**. Then, the decision with respect to the May 1 flight—conceding that there were choices that you were to make—occurred after April 9.

Mr. **Dulles**. I believe it did, to my recollection.

THE PRESIDENT'S ROLE IN APPROVING FLIGHTS

Senator **Gore**. Was the President involved in that decision? Did he participate in the making of the decision?

Mr. **Dulles**. Well, the President has pretty well covered that in his own statement, and in my work I never refer to relationships with the President and I don't discuss what the President says to me or I say to the President. The President has indicated that he was knowledgeable of the fact that there was to be a flight. The characteristics of it and the exact timing of it were not known to him. They were not known to me, because I didn't know what the weather was going to be.

There is one point which I wonder if I can introduce here at this time. I think the committee will understand the problem a little better if General Cabell makes a very brief statement, maybe not against the Senator's time, on this weather situation. It is, I think, quite revealing. Is that agreeable?

The **Chairman**. It is, yes.

Senator **Gore**. It is indeed.

The **Chairman**. Well, without alloting it against the Senator's time, General Cabell can make a statement.

Senator **Gore**. Before he does so, I would like to day, Mr. Chairman, I am sure no member of the committee has had more pleasant relations with Mr. Dulles than I have had, and I doubt whether many of them have had more opportunity to deal with more secrets of the government than certainly Senator Hickenlooper and I have.

Go ahead, General Cabell.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WEATHER CONDITIONS

General **Cabell**. Mr. Chairman, just to give you an idea of the weather problem facing us in such operations: In this case we were dealing with intelligence targets in essentially two weather areas of the Soviet Union. That is, the weather conditions, in one area are different from the weather conditions in another, normally.

In one of the areas concerned, the area farther to the north in our planned operation, we are dealing with high latitudes—latitudes nearing the pole, where the sun angle is rather critical. As a result of that sun angle, we only have a maximum of 6 months of the year where the sun angle is sufficiently high in those latitudes to permit satisfactory aerial photography. Therefore our time period is condensed for the year into 6 months. Those 6 months begin in April and extend through September.

Now, in that particular northerly weather area, in the month of April we might expect only 4 days, on the basis of climatology, when we could expect to have weather conditions suitable for aerial photography. In the month of May, we might expect only 3 days. In the month of June, only 1. In the month of July, only 1; August, 2; and September, 2.

Now, in the second of the two weather areas, the one a little southerly, the expectations of weather are even less. I beg your pardon, I have those two areas reversed. The days that I gave you referred to the southerly area. The days that I now give for the northerly area are: 2 days' expectation in April, 1 day's expectation in May, 2 in June, 1 in July, and none to be expected in either August or September.

A RARE DAY

Trying to fit in one mission, weather in both weather areas that would come out even to give you, then, good weather in both areas—and that was one of the criteria that we had to set up for this flight—it is a very rare situation to find that good weather in both of those two weather areas simultaneously. May 1 was one of those very rare days.

In addition to that, we have the condensation trail to contend with. In other words, we have not been sending or do not want to send these aircraft on missions when they give out the telltale condensation trails that will draw attention of people on the ground to them.

We also have the problem of weather at the base of takeoff, and at the base of landing, so all of those factors had to come out even, and as I say, it is a rare case indeed when they come out even. May 1 was such a day.

Senator AIKEN. I was wondering how you could get the weather reports for the different parts of Russia. Are they released by the Russian Government from day to day? How do you know you are going to have perfect weather?

General CABELL. As a matter of fact, Senator, there is quite a publication of weather observations normally throughout the world. Even Russia puts out certain weather information that is useful in making forecasts. Also involved in making this forecast, of course, is the entire air weather service of the United States Air Force that was providing us with the kind of weather support and helping us in getting the weather picture for any given flight.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator Gore.

AUTHORIZATION FROM THE PRESIDENT

Senator **Gore**. Mr. Dulles, I don't think I have ever asked a member of the executive department to divulge the contents of a conversation, quote the President, or relate what the President said in a conversation with him.

That was not what I asked you. I asked you if the President took part personally in the making of this decision in approving this program?

Mr. **Dulles**. In approving the general program, yes.

Senator **Gore**. This particular general program, which involved this particular flight or some variation from it.

Mr. **Dulles**. Well, this was a part, of course, of a broader program. We had a continuing program.

Senator **Gore**. Yes.

Mr. **Dulles**. And we always had ahead of us targets that we wanted to cover. And the general nature of the program and the general objectives of the flights were known, but no details in general about individual flights or their timing. When we had an authority to act we would go until we made a flight and then we would touch base, report on that flight through this mechanism and then word would come as to whether we were to continue or for any reason not continue.

Senator **Gore**. Well, instead of attempting to spar and posing questions. I will just state the information I want. You said this morning that you had no authority for flight beyond this one or a variation of it. Now you have told the committee just now that you received this approval or authority after April 9.

Mr. **Dulles**. That is my recollection.

Senator **Gore**. Now, the question that I would like to know the answer to is: From whom did you receive this authorization, who were the parties, and was the President one of them?

Mr. **Dulles**. Well, we had a group.

Senator **Gore**. Who?

THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Mr. **Dulles**. Well, I don't know that I should go into names, but there was someone in the Department of State, Department of Defense, and someone at the White House to keep general track of the operations. It was through that little group that we received, after a flight was made, a general clearance to make another flight.

Then, after that, the question came down to one of the technicians to determine, in the light of the priorities, what has been covered, what was needed to be covered, and the next two or three flight priorities. Then those flight priorities were given to the field station, and they were told to plan in general, until they were told to stop, anyone of these flights and then to keep us advised of the situation—to let us know before going so that if we knew anything at the last moment, we could either authorize the flight finally or stop it.

Senator **Gore**. Well, if this hearing is to serve any useful purpose, and I sure hope it will, it seems to me that it can only come through learning of whatever error that was committed, if committed, in order to avoid it in the future and to improve such technique.

You told us you received your authorization from a group and you have named three agencies: the White House—I don't like to refer to the White House, I would say the President, or the Office of the President—and the Department of Defense, and the State Department.

Is that your line of command?

Mr. DULLES. My line of command, yes, sir, so far as the policy of flying or not flying was concerned.

Senator GORE. Who designates these people from these three agencies?

Mr. DULLES. Well, there was no formalized delegation. This grew up as the best method of handling this, and I just can't answer that. I assume that they were properly authorized. They always seemed to act with full authority. I don't know whether any formal designation was ever made or not.

Senator GORE. Your authority on this particular flight stemmed from this group.

Mr. DULLES. That is correct.

THE PRESIDENT'S REPRESENTATIVE

Senator GORE. You do not know, then, whether the man representing the Office of the President was personally designated by the President.

Mr. DULLES. I assume he was agreeable to the President.

Senator GORE. I would too, but of your personal knowledge, do you know whether or not this man was personally selected by the President or by one of his assistants?

Mr. DULLES. I assume that he was, but I have never questioned that.

Senator GORE. Do you know whether he personally reported to the President?

Mr. DULLES. I assume that he did, but I never questioned him on that, because this has——

Senator GORE. I would assume so too.

Mr. DULLES. This has grown up for years. A practice that has grown up for years, you accept. I accepted the practice, and when he said this was all right, I assumed it was all right if he had authority. If he thought he didn't, he would go and get it.

Senator GORE. I would make the same assumptions. I was only asking you if you, of your personal knowledge, knew that he had reported directly to the President with respect to the approval of this particular program.

Mr. DULLES. No, I don't know that.

Senator GORE. That settles that one.

Now, one of the questions which President Eisenhower stated to the country—my time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. We will come back to you.

Senator Capehart.

Senator CAPEHART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PLANNING FOR POSSIBLE U-2 FAILURES

Mr. Dulles, did you and the President's office and all others sit down in advance and anticipate what you would do if one of these planes was shot down or landed? In other words, did you have a program as to what you would tell the people of the United States and tell the world—exactly what you would do—if and when one of these U-2's was shot down or destroyed or a circumstance developed as did develop?

Mr. DULLES. Yes, we have a program that was developed from the very beginning, and it was essentially the cover story on which we started to operate, adjusted to meet the particular facts as best we knew them at the time.

Senator CAPEHART. In other words, you are saying to me now that you knew exactly what you were to say and do, and that the Air Force and Atomic Energy and everybody that had anything to do with it or that would be making statements each know exactly what you were gong to do and say?

Mr. DULLES. Well, we kept the Air Force and other elements of the government other than NASA out of it. We had some agreements with NASA because they were using these planes in the normal course of their own work and it was therefore quite natural that they should serve as a cover and they agreed to do so.

Senator CAPEHART. What do you mean by "cover?"

Mr. DULLES. Well, as a front.

Senator CAPEHART. What I am trying to get at is this: Did you sit down with someone and have a real policy or plan laid out that, if and when one of these U-2's was knocked down and captured or destroyed over Russia, you knew exactly what you were going to tell the world and the people of the United States?

Mr. DULLES. Yes, a basic plan.

Senator CAPEHART. What was that plan?

Mr. DULLES. That basic plan was the statement that it was a weather flight, and that it strayed away from where it ought to be. That was the basic plan.

DIVERSION FROM THE CONTINGENCY PLAN

Senator CAPEHART. Then why didn't you stick to that plan?

Mr. DULLES. As I said this morning, I think possibly you weren't here at that time—when they got the plane partly intact with all the contents of the plane and the pilot alive, the cover plan was outflanked. It wouldn't stick.

Senator CAPEHART. Why should it have been outflanked? There was always that possibility that they would capture the plane and the pilot.

In other words, are you saying that you had no policy or plan to handle the matter if they captured the pilot alive? Is that what you said?

Mr. DULLES. I think the decision to divert from the cover plan was really made in the light of all the circumstances and after careful judgment of all the circumstances by higher authority.

Senator CAPEHART. You mean to get away from the original plan?

Mr. DULLES. That is right.

Senator CAPEHART. Who did get away from the original plan? Who was responsible for making one statement one day and another statement the next day?

Mr. DULLES. It was felt by higher authority that in the light of all the disclosures that had been made, the fact that this was clearly identified as a reconnaissance plane, and that the weather story no longer held water—a decision was then made, as I say, above my echelon.

Senator CAPEHART. Did they consult you in making this decision?

Mr. DULLES. I knew that they had made the decision, yes.

Senator CAPEHART. You knew that they had made it. Did they discuss it with you in advance?

Mr. DULLES. They advised me in advance of issuance, yes, of the statement that they were going to make. That is correct.

Senator CAPEHART. Did they ask your opinion as to whether that was the proper way to handle it?

Mr. DULLES. I had a full opportunity, Senator Capehart, to express my views on the statement that was issued, and I raised no objection to its issuance.

Senator CAPEHART. Then you were outflanked when they captured this pilot alive.

Mr. DULLES. And the plane. If they just captured the pilot, I don't think I would necessarily have been, because we could have repudiated the pilot's statements as being given under duress and so forth. But when they had the plane and the contents, flight plans and things of that kind, it was felt that the plan was outflanked. I concurred in that judgment.

OTHER OVERFLIGHTS

Senator CAPEHART. How many U-2 flights had previously been made over Russia?

Mr. DULLES. We consider the actual number so classified that I prefer not to give it here, but there were a very considerable number. If I give the number and that ever should leak out to the Russians, they would have a valuable bit of information. Putting that together with certain radar trackings they have that they might not identify, they might then be able to draw a pretty good pattern of what we had covered and what we hadn't covered, and that I don't want them to know.

Senator CAPEHART. Have they been flying similar planes over the United States?

Mr. DULLES. No, sir.

Senator CAPEHART. You are certain of that?

Mr. DULLES. We have not identified any and, as a practical matter, they have no planes except the Bear type, which is a great big, very easily identifiable, not so very high flying plane that could fly from the Soviet Union and back. Otherwise, of course, there would be no use to fly over.

Senator CAPEHART. Do you have reason to believe they are flying any planes over Alaska?

Mr. DULLES. There has been no recent evidence of it. There is very little in Alaska that they cannot get by other means than flying over. We don't think, from the point of view of that, they would have any great interest in flying over Alaska. We are an open society as I said this morning. They are a closed society. That is one of the——

Senator **Capehart**. What do you mean by that?

Mr. **Dulles**. They can send any number of agents they want up to Alaska to wander around pretty nearly anywhere. We can't do that in the Soviet Union. Further, I think they probably pretty well know that Alaska isn't a major military base, as far as this is concerned.

VALUE OF FLIGHTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY

Senator **Capehart**. What specific thing were you looking for on this particular flight?

Mr. **Dulles**. That is a question, also, that I would prefer, Mr. Chairman, not to answer. It is highly classified. All I can say was that, at this particular time, there were certain targets that we were afraid we would not be able easily to get at a later time and which we thought were of great value to our national security.

Senator **Capehart**. Now, if it was important to fly these U-2's previous to the time this one was knocked down and the explosion in Paris, why isn't it just as important today? Why did you change your mind and say we are not going to do it any more?

Mr. **Dulles**. The President made that decision, Senator.

Senator **Capehart**. Did you have anything to do with making that decision?

Mr. **Dulles**. No, I had nothing to do with making that.

Senator **Capehart**. The President made that decision?

Mr. **Dulles**. The President made that decision.

Senator **Capehart**. Getting back to my first question of your anticipation of what you would say and do, and how you would act under certain given conditions, you say that you did have a plan, but that plan went astray when they captured the plane and the pilot.

Mr. **Dulles**. That is right.

Senator **Capehart**. Did the President then make the decision to tell the truth, or was it one of these gentlemen that you are talking about in the White House whom you did not identify?

Mr. **Dulles**. I believe that was the President's decision.

Senator **Capehart**. The President made that decision himself?

Mr. **Dulles**. As far as I know.

Senator **Capehart**. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Senator Lausche?

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE U-2

Senator **Lausche**. Mr. Dulles, this morning you stated that in 1954 it was decided to develop a plane that would have high altitude, long range cruising to be used, among other purposes, for service in your agency, is that correct?

Mr. **Dulles**. That is correct.

Senator **Lausche**. Where was that decision made? Were you present at that time?

Mr. **Dulles**. Oh, yes, right through the whole business.

Senator **Lausche**. Who else was present, if you can recall?

Mr. **Dulles**. Well, there was high authority for that basic decision.

Senator **Lausche**. And it was then decided that a plane of the type which was developed was needed to properly acquaint our military department and the Government with the military activities of enemy countries?

Mr. **Dulles**. That was considered vital, sir.

Senator **Lausche**. Now, then, what type of plane did you contemplate developing, high altitude, long range cruising?

Mr. **Dulles**. That is correct, and, as far as possible, to minimize the visibility to radar. We hoped at one time to have a configuration that wouldn't be picked up at all. That was not realized, but we wanted those characteristics you mentioned, plus the characteristic of partial invisibility or as much invisibility as could be obtained.

Senator **Lausche**. Was that plan revealed to the Congress?

Mr. **Dulles**. In view of the fact that a major part of the money came out of my budget, I mentioned that to the chairman and the ranking minority member of the Appropriations Committee, and to no one else.

Senator **Lausche**. Of the Senate or of the House?

Mr. **Dulles**. Of the House. The Senate was also, I believe, informed.

Senator **Lausche**. So that——

Mr. **Dulles**. Those two men——

Senator **Lausche** [continuing]. The Congress knew that our Government was developing a plane to be used for intelligence purposes so as to aid it in preparing the necessary defense to meet the offensive power of the potential enemy?

Mr. **Dulles**. There were a handful of people in the Congress that knew, and I think you may have read Chairman Cannon's statement in the House.

Senator **Lausche**. That he knew?

Mr. **Dulles**. Of this subject, yes.

Senator **Lausche**. Can you identify or do you want to identify the others who knew?

Mr. **Dulles**. No, I would prefer to leave it to them. Chairman Cannon has made it——

Senator **Lausche**. Was it at that time intended to exclude the Soviet Union from the surveillance work that would be done by this type of plane?

Mr. **Dulles**. Oh, no, sir, no. It was contemplated that would be the major target.

CONGRESSIONAL AWARENESS

Senator **Lausche**. Then it is fair and honest to say that the Congress knew of the existence of a plane of this type to be used for the acquisition of intelligence?

Mr. **Dulles**. Well, I don't know——

Senator **Lausche**. Insofar as these men knew?

Mr. **Dulles**. Mr. Chairman, this was handled very largely as the Manhattan Project with regard to the preparing of the nuclear bombs, and I don't know whether it is fair to impute to the whole

Congress the knowledge that one or two Members had. That is a question for the Congress to decide.

Senator LAUSCHE. During the time that you have been in your position, has any Member of Congress asked you what means you were using to acquire the information that you were giving to the Congress to aid it in development of programs?

Mr. DULLES. No one has ever pressed the question if they had posed it. Pursuant to the provisions of law about protecting intelligence sources from unauthorized disclosure, I would, I believe, have been reluctant to betray—not to betray because saying to a Member of Congress isn't, of course, publicizing it. May I say that the security of the Members of the Congress in all my dealings with them on the classified information which I have given them has been outstanding. I don't know a single instance where the committees that have been responsible for my work and the members of the Appropriations Committees that have gone over my appropriations have ever been responsible for any leak whatsoever.

Senator LAUSCHE. You described this as an extraordinary project in the acquisition of knowledge, and I suppose it had some elements of hazard that are not normally incident to your operation.

Mr. DULLES. Correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you at this time have any operations in which you are indulging that you feel are needed for the security of the country but are hazardous in the same category as the one we are discussing?

Mr. DULLES. Yes. I doubt whether there are any, though, that have the same political implications, but they are equally hazardous.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Senator LAUSCHE. I am not going to ask you what it is. From the standpoint of international law, is there any difference in the legality or illegality of espionage on foot as distinguished from espionage in the air?

Mr. DULLES. No, I covered that in my statement this morning, sir, in which I said——

Senator LAUSCHE. That is, if it is a breach of international law to get intelligence by airplane it is likewise a breach to get it by sending a man in by foot to get it.

Mr. DULLES. It may be a breach of domestic law. Whether it is a breach of international law is more questionable. It is certainly a breach of domestic law.

Senator LAUSCHE. I agree with you.

Is it or isn't it a historical fact that nations recognize that for security purposes intelligence must be acquired and that, therefore, it is not covered by international law except that the spy is without any legal protection and is on his own?

Mr. DULLES. I think that is a correct statement, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. Has it ever been suggested to you that in acquiring intelligence you must comply with international law?

Mr. DULLES. No, sir. Or domestic law, for that matter.

Senator LAUSCHE. What if I were to introduce a bill saying that you were not to operate except in conformity with Federal law and international law in the acquisition of knowledge? That is a rhetorical and an oratorical question.

Mr. DULLES. Do I have to answer that, sir?

Senator LAUSCHE. No, I think it answers itself. But if any member of this committee has any challenge on it, I wish it would be made.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you repeat it? I was making a note.

Senator LAUSCHE. The adoption of a law by this Congress declaring it to be a crime under the laws of the United States for any member of the intelligence agency to acquire information in violation of our law or the international law.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the question?

Senator LAUSCHE. What would be his attitude if I offered such a bill?

The CHAIRMAN. He would oppose it.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am asking if there is any member of this committee who feels differently.

The CHAIRMAN. I still don't understand the significance of the question.

TIMING OF THE MAY 1 FLIGHT

Senator LAUSCHE. Just one question: Knowing that the summit conference was to begin May 16 and recognizing its significance, did you, prior to issuing the order for the May 1 flight, consider the possible adverse impact on the conference?

Mr. DULLES. All matters were considered, but I considered that my job, as the intelligence gatherer, was to carry out these flights within any permitted times. The President has covered that point, I think, quite thoroughly in his speech of the other day.

Senator LAUSCHE. Why was it so essential that the project be carried out so as to put it into motion on May 1?

Mr. DULLES. That, really, goes to the weather problem, which General Cabell has just presented. We might or might not have had another day for the next six months when this flight could have gone.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, one further question, and then I will close.

The chairman of our committee, the Senator from Arkansas, has expressed his regrets—the regrets bordering practically on despondency—concerning the commitment of the President that no further flights will be made. What is your feeling about the wisdom of giving up this right to be used or not to be used in the making of the flights?

Mr. DULLES. Senator, I take my orders from the President, and I don't question the President's orders.

Senator LAUSCHE. The reason I asked—on the one hand the flight is condemned; on the other hand, we are wondering whether we made a mistake in prohibiting further flights. So I don't know. If you had known before May 1 what you know now, would you allow that flight to be made? [Laughter.]

Mr. DULLES. If I knew the flight was going to be a failure, I would certainly have stopped it.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a very fine answer.

Senator **Lausche**. Well, post factum judgments are quite simple to be made. That is all I had.

The **Chairman**. The Senator from Delaware.

Senator **Williams**. Mr. Dulles, first I would like to say I have listened to your statement and I have watched these exhibits with a great deal of interest. I would like to congratulate you and the members of your staff on a job well done. The security of our country is greatly improved as a result of the work you have done and I wish to compliment you.

Mr. **Dulles**. Thank you, Senator.

ILLEGAL AND LEGAL INFORMATION GATHERING

Senator **Williams**. In connection with some of the questions that have been asked as to whether or not this overflight of Russian territory was illegal, I think this has been answered before. Are not all acts of espionage, on land, sea or air generally considered to be illegal acts?

Mr. **Dulles**. They are almost always contrary to the law of the country where the acts are carried on, and are subject to punishment under our laws up to death. We caught a Russian spy here, you know, very recently and gave him 35 years—a very able spy named Colonel Abel. His case has gone all the way up to the Supreme Court on a technicality, but he is still in Atlanta for 35 years. He is about 50 years old and that is about the balance of his natural life.

Senator **Williams**. Generally speaking, the only way we can get this information as to what another country is doing is through some illegal means.

Mr. **Dulles**. Well, we get a great deal of information by perfectly legal means, and of course, the State Department gets a vast amount and military services get a vast amount of information by perfectly legal means. One has contacts; people talk to you. You make these contacts in valuable places and then you get valuable information. There are many ways in which we get information about the Soviet Union by perfectly legal means. We get a lot of valuable information from the travelers who go over there, although they are excluded from going into these closed areas of the Soviet Union where their most secret things go on. So there are many, many fields of intelligence other than the field of espionage, but espionage is a very important element.

Senator **Williams**. I appreciate the fact and that was the point I was trying to bring out.

NECESSITY OF RECONSIDERING U-2 PROGRAM

Now, I think you have said that these U-2 overflights have been going on for 4 years.

Mr. **Dulles**. Four years, minus. They started July 1956, so come next July it would have been 4 years.

Senator **Williams**. So while a great deal of concern has been expressed—and we all share it—over the necessity to stop these at this time, of course, the fact is not taken into consideration that, if you got caught at any time, the usefulness of the U-2 program would be destroyed. Was that not recognized in the beginning?

Mr. **Dulles**. It was considered at the beginning and also after May 1, and before the flights and before the President's statement, that the whole program would now have to be reviewed and reconsidered because, as you say, the blowing of the program by this capture made it very much more difficult to continue with an exercise of this nature. It might well have been stopped for reasons other than what may have been certain political reasons. But undoubtedly those who reached the decision to stop the flights had in mind what we, on the technical side, had in mind, just as you say, Senator, that the project had been pretty well blown by this particular incident.

Senator **Williams**. That would have been true regardless of the circumstances under which you were caught?

Mr. **Dulles**. That is correct.

Senator **Williams**. Prior to the summit or any other time?

Mr. **Dulles**. That is correct.

Senator **Williams**. It was thought that perhaps these new photographic satellites may replace the necessity of these planes—U-2's or any advanced planes.

Mr. **Dulles**. That really remains for the future to show us.

Senator **Williams**. You would rather not comment on that at this time.

Mr. **Dulles**. I would rather not comment on that at this time. Maybe the Defense Department could comment on it more effectively than we, because that is pretty much in their hands.

Senator **Williams**. Thank you. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

REASON FOR THE MAY 1 FLIGHT

The **Chairman**. Mr. Dulles, have you seen the New York Times article by Mr. Hanson Baldwin, in which he doesn't quote you, but just says according to Washington experts, among other things, that "in the case of the May 1 flight that ended with the loss of the first U-2 destroyed over any Communist country, there had been indications that the Russians were preparing a spectacular space shot for May Day. There were specific targets to be photographed, ranging from the borders of Afghanistan to the Arctic Ocean." He apparently got the information that there was something special to be expected on that day and gives it as a reason for it. Have you read that article?

Mr. **Dulles**. Yes, I have read the article. I don't know where that came from and I don't think he is correct on our belief that anything spectacular was coming on May Day.

The **Chairman**. Do you think that article is generally correct or not? Would you care to comment on that?

Mr. **Dulles**. Well, I haven't really analyzed it. I have read it, but I haven't analyzed it very carefully. There are quite a lot of things on it; on the other hand, Hanson Baldwin is a pretty able reporter, and he is a pretty good guesser, too. He also has pretty good contacts.

SUSPENSION OF EARLIER FLIGHTS

The **Chairman**. Did I understand you to say you did not suspend the flights during the Camp David meeting?

Mr. **Dulles**. I can't recall. I don't know of any recent suspension of flights for such a reason.

The **Chairman**. Were you even asked to suspend them for any reason other than weather or such things as you have already mentioned?

Mr. **Dulles**. I honestly can't answer that and I would have to look in the record to see. It doesn't come to my mind, though, at the moment.

The **Chairman**. Does General Cabell know about any suspension?

General **Cabell**. I can't add anything to the Director's statement.

The **Chairman**. In this article Hanson Baldwin states, "The U-2 overflights which have been going on for over 4 years were temporarily suspended prior to, during and after Premier Khrushchev's visit to the United States last September."

Is that a true statement?

Mr. **Dulles**. I would have to look up the record and check on that. I don't honestly know what the answer to that question is.

The **Chairman**. If such a suspension was made, would it have been at your orders or on orders from the President?

Mr. **Dulles**. Well, it would not have been on my initiative because I left that question to others as better able to judge the political or international side of the matter. I didn't feel that I was responsible for that.

INACCURATE STATEMENTS

The **Chairman**. He also says, "However, the President decided to assume full responsibility after various inaccurate statements had been made by minor officials who had no knowledge of the program." Is that——

Mr. **Dulles**. That is not correct.

The **Chairman**. In what respect was it not correct?

Mr. **Dulles**. The statements that were made, with one possible exception, were made by people who had full knowledge of the program. And that was a very minor casual statement as I recall, by someone in the State Department who didn't happen to have knowledge of the program. It was not one of the formalized statements that were given out.

The **Chairman**. I thought he had reference there to the statement by NASA.

Mr. **Dulles**. No, if he had reference to that he is inaccurate, because the statements that were issued by NASA were all gone over by us and we assumed responsibility therefor.

The **Chairman**. By the CIA?

Mr. **Dulles**. Yes, sir.

I find the record shows here that we did not actually make any flights during the Camp David period—that was only a few days—but I have here the record of flights and the timing of the flights. I don't have the causal relationships in this report I have here.

The **Chairman**. In fact, you didn't make them, but you don't know whether that was because of a coincidence of weather conditions or whether you did it for political reasons?

Mr. **Dulles**. That is correct, I do not honestly know.

The **Chairman**. You don't know that.

Mr. DULLES. No.

WAS SUSPENSION CONSIDERED BEFORE THE SUMMIT?

The CHAIRMAN. I am not sure, I may repeat, but I don't recall if you answered this question.

Was specific consideration given to suspension of the May Day flight because of the projected conference?

Mr. DULLES. Not by me, and whether it was done by others I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you never considered it and you never made any such decisions not to suspend?

Mr. DULLES. I decided earlier that I would leave to the political side of the government that decision.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. If they wanted to exercise it.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. I just wanted it clear.

Mr. DULLES. And because, as the President said in his statement, conferences have been used to hide aggressive intent. As we know very well, the Japanese delegates came over here to engage us in negotiations while they were planning Pearl Harbor. So it was up to the political side to reach those judgments and not for me.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you did not consider that aspect of it and you did not make any decision not to suspend them?

Mr. DULLES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all I want.

Mr. DULLES. That is correct.

REACTION BY ALLIES

The CHAIRMAN. To what extent were our allies aware of the use of their bases for U-2 flights?

Mr. DULLES. Mr. Chairman, if you will excuse me I will refrain from any comment in any way involving any of our allies with respect to this operation.

The CHAIRMAN. Had our allies reacted by requesting this government or requesting you not to use their bases for such flights?

Mr. DULLES. That really ought to be answered by the State Department because I do not have the knowledge in my own possession.

No flights are now contemplated, so far as I am concerned. So far as I am concerned that is an academic question, but the State Department could answer that much better than I.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether any protests have been made by the countries mentioned by Mr. Khrushchev? Specifically, I think it was Turkey, Pakistan, Norway, and I believe Iran.

Have any of those countries protested the use of their bases?

Mr. DULLES. I think there have been one or two, but that again is a question that I think the State Department should deal with.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you wish to reply to a question regarding your opinion as to whether or not these countries would cooperate if you decided to resume flights?

Mr. DULLES. I really think today that is an academic question, Mr. Chairman—an academic matter, I might say, rather than a question.

DISSENSION WITHIN THE U.S.S.R.

The **Chairman**. Do you have any view about Soviet policy having been influenced by dissension in military circles over force reductions?

Mr. **Dulles**. Yes. We estimate that the force reduction has resulted in a good deal of dissension, particularly in the officer class. There are a very large number, ranging between 100,000 and 200,000 officers that will be affected by this. They will have to go to the fields or the factories, and some of them don't look forward to that.

We believe that this has been a pretty tough decision and it has caused a good bit of difficulty.

The **Chairman**. Caused difficulty especially to Chairman Khrushchev?

Mr. **Dulles**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. To what degree did Chairman Khrushchev stake his personal prestige upon dealing directly with President Eisenhower as a man of peace? Do you have any view about that?

Mr. **Dulles**. I think that probably is a question the State Department could handle better than I. We do have the responsibility of estimating, and we have drawn up an estimate quite recently in this general field. We think that it had some effect on Khrushchev and we do feel that his position, while still strong, has been somewhat weakened by the events of the last few weeks.

The **Chairman**. Have you made any evaluation of the recent shakeup—although a mild one—in the Soviet hierarchy with regard to the strength or weakness of Chairman Khrushchev's domestic political position?

Mr. **Dulles**. No, we haven't as yet drawn up a specific estimate on that. We think it is a little premature. There are certain important facts that are still unknown. For example, the report had gone out that Mikoyan had been degraded. It seemed very surprising that he would be away from the Kremlin at this time unless he was seriously ill.

Khrushchev has now stated that he is merely on vacation. We are not sure how truthful that is. We are inclined to think that he has lost his influence, but we don't know to what degree.

Most of the men in the Presidium have been put there by Khrushchev himself and are his own stooges. We believe that he has pretty well packed the Central Committee with his own people. But the Central Committee may have a little more freedom of action than the Presidium.

The **Chairman**. My time is up.

Senator Mansfield?

Senator **Mansfield**. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Senator Wiley?

SOVIET DEFENSES

Senator **Wiley**. Mr. Dulles, in 4 years then there was one failure.

Mr. **Dulles**. That is correct.

Senator **Wiley**. You had no reason to anticipate that this would be a failure?

Mr. **Dulles**. No, sir.

Senator WILEY. Can you tell me as a matter of fact from 4 years of this kind of work, whether or not the defense of the Russians is within 500 to 1,500 miles of the border all the way along?

Mr. DULLES. I don't think it is as simple as that, Senator.

Are you talking about radar now?

Senator WILEY. I am talking about the defensive posture that they have there. You showed the pictures today how they have built, with their missile sites and so forth, defensive and offensive positions against the West.

Mr. DULLES. Their defensive position is geared almost exclusively to our SAC potential. They have no fear that anybody else would attack them. The old classical idea of defense no longer prevails in the atomic age.

They have offensive capabilities with their intermediate and long range missiles and with their bomber force of 125 to 150 heavy bombers. They have their troops posted. We know pretty well where they are, in various parts. They have quite a large force in Eastern Germany, which is their forward ground defense force.

We know a great deal about their radar because what they fear would be air attack. They are not worried about ground attack, therefore, they have around their periphery and in depth, a vast number of radars.

Out of these flights we have learned a great deal about where their radars are and the extent of their coverage. That is the kind of defense they have today.

Senator WILEY. I think you answered when you said around the periphery they have these set ups—whatever you want to call them—to meet any offensive by someone else. Also let us say they have their missile sites ready, as they have already threatened now to destroy the bases from which our planes may come.

Mr. DULLES. And they have many thousands of fighter planes, of course, that are strategically located to protect their frontiers. Any plane that can be brought down that is anywhere near their frontiers is jumped immediately.

SOVIET POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Senator WILEY. Are you, in your own mind, satisfied that the so-called internal condition that you have mentioned involving some 100,000 to 200,000 officers and the return of the Stalin group to power—I think that is conceded, isn't it?

Mr. DULLES. No, sir, no. We would not concede that the Stalin group has come back to power.

Senator WILEY. I know, but is it a fact that his associates have come back?

Mr. DULLES. His associates are pretty well gone. They are out.

Senator GORE. Except Khrushchev.

Mr. DULLES. Except Khrushchev. [Laughter.] And Mikoyan. And a few that are pretty elderly and are pretty well on the shelf. Most of the men now in the Presidium are younger men in their early fifties who were unknown in the Stalin days. We think that a few of them have certain Stalinist type characteristics, particularly Mr.

Suslov,[5] but they never worked under Stalin. They were very largely unknown in Stalin's days.

Senator **Wiley**. I saw that statement, but you have no information to the effect that this is one of the reasons he has changed his approach from a few months ago? Then he was all sweet and honey; now he is all the honey bee.

Mr. **Dulles**. We believe there is an element—I don't know whether I would call it Stalinist—there with Suslov probably and some others who are worried about the extent of the co-existence, the extent of the interchanges between this country and other free countries and Russia, and the extent to which Russians are going abroad. We feel that there is this group that is worried about the long-term implications of the easing of the tensions and of co-existence on the Communist system.

Senator **Wiley**. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Senator Gore?

ANNOUNCEMENTS OF NUCLEAR TESTS

Senator **Gore**. Like Senator Fulbright, as he expressed himself this morning, I have applauded this U-2 program. It has been marvelously successful. This, coupled with your radar installations near the Russian borders and radiological examination, has led to the fact that it has been the U.S. Government which has announced every single atomic test of Russia that has been announced? Is this not a fact?

Mr. **Dulles**. Yes. There are one or two cases where the Soviet also announced it; I think three or four. But most——

Senator **Gore**. But not before you did—except for one.

Mr. **Dulles**. One came out simultaneously, I just happened to remember that. That is, in one case, I don't think their announcement was triggered by our announcement. In every other case, I think it could have been.

Senator **Gore**. But there have been some tests about which our Government had some information but about which it did not make an announcement?

Mr. **Dulles**. That is correct.

Senator **Gore**. And the Russians did not either?

Mr. **Dulles**. That is correct.

INFORMATION SOUGHT BY U-2 FLIGHT

Senator **Gore**. I only ask that question in order to indicate my appreciation for the importance of this program. Now, I would like to know the character of the information sought by this May 1 flight. I realize you have already expressed your reluctance.

One of the big questions before the country in millions of people's minds is why this flight was undertaken so near the summit? President Eisenhower himself stated the question to the American people. Unless we can get some indication of the importance of this information we have no means of reaching an opinion or a judgment within this committee as to the advisability of the risk measured against the possible consequences.

---

[5] Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Secretary Mikhail A. Suslov.

What can you give us with respect to the character of the information sought by this flight?

Mr. **Dulles**. I knew that this question was going to come up because I followed the testimony given here before, and this morning I gave a list of the five major objectives we had. It falls within those—at least two or probably three of those major objectives. And it was with the idea, based on fairly good evidence, that if certain of the information was not obtained fairly soon it might be very difficult to obtain it later.

I think I can go this far and say that it is very much easier to get definite information on certain things during the period of construction, rather than after they have been constructed and camouflaged and protected. That was one of the important considerations. I frankly don't feel I should go further, but I will give it further consideration. This is a matter that affects the military, too, and I will discuss it with Secretary Gates, and Secretary Herter to see whether in their opinion it is appropriate or possible to go any further than I have gone.[6]

Senator **Gore**. Well, I may say that if you do not answer this question, it will be the first one I have ever asked you to which you did not supply a satisfactory answer.

Upon occasion, you will recall that even the employees of the committee have been asked to leave, but here is a matter which I think goes to the heart of this question of whether or not the Government of the United States was justified in undertaking a flight during the immediate period of the summit conference. Since you say you want to consider it further, I shall leave it there.

Mr. **Dulles**. Thank you.

Senator **Gore**. If you want to confide it just to the chairman of this committee, it seems to me that either the members of this committee or the chairman are entitled to this information, because it is only by possession of such information that we have anything to measure the advisability of this risk.

PATH OF THE MAY 1 FLIGHT

Now, had the pilot overflown one of the target areas before he went down?

Mr. **Dulles**. He had. General Cabell tells me he had. He had flown over denied areas on more than one occasion.

Senator **Gore**. I mean on this particular flight. Well, first, did Mr. Khrushchev release an accurate flight plan?

Mr. **Dulles**. Has he released a complete flight plan? I don't know whether he has, but what he said about the flight is reasonably accurate. What he has omitted, possibly because it was not shown on the flight plan, was that there were various alternatives.

---

[6] On June 6, CIA Director Allen Dulles wrote to Chairman Fulbright: "During the course of my testimony Senator Gore requested me to disclose to the Committee the particular intelligence objectives which were to be covered by the flight which was authorized on April 30th. I have given this matter most careful consideration and have consulted, as I said I would, with others. As a result I have concluded that it is not in the national interest to go further than the testimony given in which I indicated the basic objectives sought by the program and gave certain reasons for the urgency of obtaining that information.

"Each and every flight had certain precise intelligence objectives, generally based on collateral information as to vitally important targets. This was particularly true with regard to the May 1 flight. I do not consider that it is consonant with the national interest to give further precise details with respect to the objectives of this flight."

If, after the pilot reached a certain point, because of wind conditions, weather conditions or it seemed otherwise preferable to return to somewhere near the point of origin, those instructions were always given. They always have alternatives.

Senator GORE. I see.

Mr. DULLES. So to that extent, the flight plan which Khrushchev is talking about is inadequate. The pilot had various alternatives as to where to go.

Senator GORE. But if he had followed the flight plan to Sverdlovsk as General Cabell, I believe, has said, he would have overflown one of his principal target areas.

Mr. DULLES. I can answer that. He had overflown more than one important target area.

Senator GORE. Well, the General told us earlier that he had two principal target areas.

General CABELL. Senator, if I might explain that, when I said area, that is a wide area of territory.

Senator GORE. I understand.

General CABELL. Within those areas there were several individual targets.

Senator GORE. Well, you will consider further this question?

Mr. DULLES. I will, Senator.

Senator GORE. And I shall not persist in that.

SURPRISE ATTACK CAPABILITY

You had something to say this morning, and so did President Eisenhower and Secretary Herter, about being alert to the danger of surprise attack. It seems to me that one flight could only make a picture of whatever existed in a geographic area. To determine movement of troops or material, you would have to have a series of pictures, one to superimpose over the other to determine movements, would you not?

Mr. DULLES. That is correct.

Senator GORE. So you were not here undertaking to determine movement of troops.

If it related to surprise attack, would it not be with respect to capacity such as the strategic planes you had pictured?

Mr. DULLES. I think in almost all of my statements, I have used "the capability to mount surprise attack."

Senator GORE. Capability.

Mr. DULLES. I think your point is well taken.

Senator GORE. So this flight did not relate to some apprehension that a surprise attack was about to be mounted?

Mr. DULLES. No, sir. If it had been successful, we believe it may have given indications as to the capability for surprise attack, but not the exact timing of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the Senator yield?

Would the fact that this was May 1 have had any particular consideration?

Mr. DULLES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't May 1 one of their principal festive holidays?

Mr. DULLES. Yes, but it was not targeted for May 1. In fact, the flight had been planned for 3 or 4 days over a 3- or 4-day period, and the weather had not permitted it to go. We expected the flight to go, what was it—2 days before—3 days. May 1 was fortuitous.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

IMPORTANCE OF THIS SPECIFIC FLIGHT

Senator GORE. Did you regard this flight as more important than other such flights, or was this another U-2 flight?

Mr. DULLES. This had certain characteristics that we felt made it a bit more important than the possible recent flights that we have made. It was the hardest flight to get weather for, too.

Senator GORE. I am not quite satisfied with that. You say a bit more important than the most recent ones. Would you say it was on an average or——

Mr. DULLES. Above average.

Senator GORE. Above average?

Mr. DULLES. In importance. General Cabell would like to add, well above average, and he has been the one that particularly followed the targeting.

Senator GORE. How long before May 1 did you give your orders or approval for the flight?

Mr. DULLES. A matter of hours. What time was it? About 5 o'clock in the afternoon of April 30, Washington time.

Senator GORE. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have no more questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche?

Senator LAUSCHE. Pass me for the moment, please.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Vermont.

INFORMATION GIVEN TO ALLIES

Senator AIKEN. Just one or two more questions.

This information which had been secured by the U-2 overflights, has that been shared with other countries?

Mr. DULLES. Senator, I make it a practice not to discuss at all relations with other intelligence services as to what we give them or what we would hold from them.

Senator AIKEN. You have already told us that we receive information from other countries.

Mr. DULLES. I am perfectly willing to say that I give information, but I don't think I have ever disclosed what information we get from other countries or ever told what information we do give to other countries.

Senator AIKEN. Does England have any plane comparable to the U-2?

Mr. DULLES. Not that I know of.

Senator AIKEN. And none of the other Western European countries would have that?

Mr. **Dulles**. We don't know of any country that has a plane comparable to the U-2.

KHRUSHCHEV'S PRESTIGE AND INTENTIONS

Senator **Aiken**. You stated that you thought Mr. Khrushchev's prestige had been weakened in Russia through this series of incidents. If he has been weakened, who has been made stronger in Russia?

Mr. **Dulles**. That doesn't always follow, that any individual has been made stronger.

Senator **Aiken**. Nobody has been made stronger because of his becoming weaker? Does it probably mean that his consumer program, which he seemed to set so much store by, has been set back by these recent incidents?

Mr. **Dulles**. Well, it might be just the other way. He might feel that in order to regain a measure of popularity, he would have to push ahead with giving his people more consumer goods.

Senator **Aiken**. I understood you this morning to say something about Malinovsky's pronouncement——

Mr. **Dulles**. Yes.

Senator **Aiken**. As being another case of bluster which they are prone to indulge in very frequently. Would you care to take that as another case of bluster, or do you think we should take it seriously?

Mr. **Dulles**. Well, there have been so many somewhat similar threats. At the time of Suez, they threatened to send missiles over London and Paris. Khrushchev has again and again boasted of how many bombs he had reserved for various of the countries. He told the people that he had so many bombs reserved for them; the Turks, Greeks, and others. It is in a pattern, and Malinovsky must realize that under the NATO agreement, if an atomic bomb falls on any one of the NATO countries, the NATO agreement comes into effect and he is in a nuclear war. I don't think either Khrushchev or Mr. Malinovsky wants a nuclear war.

Senator **Aiken**. Does your information show greatly increasing tension over Berlin?

Mr. **Dulles**. No.

Senator **Aiken**. It does not?

Mr. **Dulles**. No. As a result of Khrushchev's statement that he is ready to wait 6 or 8 months on Berlin, I think the tension is somewhat eased. Some people expected that he was going to sign a separate treaty right after leaving Paris, and when he told them he was not going to do that and postponed that, tensions over Berlin seem to have eased a bit.

Senator **Aiken**. I think that is all.

The **Chairman**. Senator Lausche?

CIA RECORD-KEEPING

Senator **Lausche**. Yes. In reaching judgments, do you journalize the conclusions reached with respect to what espionage activities you engage in?

Mr. **Dulles**. How do you mean, Senator, journalize?

Senator **Lausche**. That is, do you have a meeting and put on record that it has been determined on this day with Smith, Jones, and Brown being present, that the flight shall be made over the Soviet Union with a U-2 plane.

Mr. **Dulles**. Oh, no.

Senator **Lausche**. What is the normal method of communicating instructions on espionage work? Is it by writing or by word of mouth?

Mr. **Dulles**. Mostly by word of mouth, unless a plan is required. In certain of these operations a basic plan is required and then that may be put on one sheet of paper so that everybody knows what the plan is. But you do as little writing as you possibly can in this whole business.

Senator **Lausche**. Off the record.

[Discussion of the record.]

Senator **Lausche**. So your instructions are normally delivered by word of mouth?

Mr. **Dulles**. That is correct.

THE PRESIDENT'S DILEMMA

Senator **Lausche**. Have you given any thought about the difficulty the President is in with respect to intelligence work? On the one hand, for the protection of the security of the country, he has to make statements that are probably in conflict with the truth. On the other hand, if he doesn't tell the truth, he is required to lie, which is wrong. Has any thought been given about the proposition that this espionage work ought to be conducted entirely independent of the President's knowledge, with trust and confidence placed in the efficiency and the ability of the man to whom the responsibility is assigned?

Mr. **Dulles**. That is very largely the case, Senator. It is only in the connection with major projects such as this that might have broad political implications. Ninety-nine percent of the covert work that we are doing has no such implications. It is readily deniable. You lose an agent, this or that, you deny it. There are, though, one or two operations of this nature in the intelligence field which have such broad political implications that I think the question would be raised, if it were done without the President's knowledge, as to who was directing the ship of state.

Senator **Lausche**. It is a dilemma.

Mr. **Dulles**. It is a dilemma.

Senator **Lausche**. I have no further questions.

The **Chairman**. Senator Capehart?

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE U-2'S CRASH

Senator **Capehart**. Do you have any information as to just exactly what did happen to this plane? Was it shot down; was it motor trouble?

Mr. **Dulles**. We don't have information that is at all complete. It is our belief that there was some malfunction of the plane when it was at altitude, that is, around 70,000 feet. These planes, under certain conditions, do flame out at very high altitudes. Whether that malfunction was or was not caused by a ground-to-air missile, we don't know.

We are quite certain the plane was not hit by a missile, because if it had been hit by a missile, it would have disintegrated in the air and they wouldn't have had the pieces they now have. We believe there was some malfunction due to some cause unknown. It might have been induced by a near miss or something of that kind, if they could get their missile that high, that it was forced down to lower altitude, about half of the altitude that it has been flying, and then was an easy prey to be shot down or brought down by fighters.

Senator CAPEHART. Has anyone talked to the pilot as yet?

Mr. DULLES. They have permitted no access to the pilot.

Senator CAPEHART. None whatever?

Mr. DULLES. None whatever.

Senator WILEY. You don't know whether he is alive?

Senator CAPEHART. You don't know whether he is alive or not?

Mr. DULLES. Well, we assume he is alive.

Senator CAPEHART. Do they refuse to permit you to talk to him?

Mr. DULLES. The State Department has requested that permission and it has not been granted.

Senator CAPEHART. Where did the President get all this information that justified him in changing his position or the Government's position?

Mr. DULLES. I don't quite follow.

Senator CAPEHART. Well, I was rather critical of the fact that you possibly did not have a plan or policy as to what you were all going to say or do if a situation developed as did; namely, the capture of one of our pilots and the plane.

You said, in your testimony, that the President had information that they had captured Powers and has captured the plane intact and they had all the evidence and so forth.

Where did you get that information?

Mr. DULLES. That was given by Khrushchev in his various statements and by press releases within the Soviet Union.

Senator CAPEHART. You mean his statements were so accurate; the things he described in his statement were factual?

Mr. DULLES. Yes, we knew what was on the pilot. We knew what was on the plane, and when his statements tallied pretty largely with the information we had, we knew that on those particular points they were telling the truth.

POWERS' RELIABILITY

Senator CAPEHART. Are you 100 percent satisfied that this pilot was on the square?

Mr. DULLES. We have no reason whatever to believe that there was anything phony about this. I gave the pilot's full record this morning, and you will find in the testimony, all of the assessments of him—testimony from people who knew him intimately. I talked with half a dozen people who knew him intimately. He is a fourth generation American.

They were kept apart there. In this detachment, the last 4 years—while he has traveled somewhat—they have lived a life which did not bring them into contact. It was very unlikely that he could have defected, even if he had wanted to. There was no reason—he loved flying, was making good money, and he was very happy, with a good temperament. If you are going to defect, you don't fly into the heart of Russia where you may be shot down anywhere before you get there; you go across the frontier, and he had been on scores of missions, any one of which before this he could have defected if he wanted to. There is not an iota of evidence——

Senator CAPEHART. How did you account for the fact that he did not commit suicide and destroy the plane? Wasn't he instructed to commit suicide?

Mr. DULLES. He was instructed to destroy the plane. He was not instructed to commit suicide. He was given the facility to do it if he wanted to.

Senator CAPEHART. How do you account for the fact he did not destroy the plane?

Mr. DULLES. We can't account for that, but there are many circumstances under which it might have been impossible for him to do it. If the plane was under attack and had been shot, and there were bullets in it, it might have prevented this mechanism from functioning. He might have lost consciousness for a while if the oxygen had failed or if he was trying to get out and his oxygen mask had been disconnected. There are a great many possibilities. We don't know what the true one is. He might have just failed to do what he was told to do.

HOW WOULD WE REACT?

Senator CAPEHART. The reaction of Mr. Khrushchev and the Russians, to finding this plane and spy 15 miles within their country was more or less the same reaction we would have, would we not, if we had found a Russian plane near Kansas City?

Mr. DULLES. We are finding their spies all over the United States all the time.

Senator CAPEHART. Well, you testified before that you have no knowledge of their ever flying a plane over the country.

Mr. DULLES. I think if we found a Russian plane as far as our plane was in there, some heads would probably roll at the Pentagon. I don't know. I think we would have gotten a Russian plane long before it had gotten there.

Senator CAPEHART. You don't think we would have been quite as angry as Russia?

Mr. DULLES. Oh, I don't——

Senator CAPEHART. I mean, we would have been, would we not? Our people would have demanded their scalp, would they not?

Mr. DULLES. I imagine we would be angry with them, yes.

Senator CAPEHART. Would it have been possible under those circumstances——

Mr. DULLES. We get angry when we catch Russian spies over here, although not so angry.

Senator CAPEHART. It was not possibly as dramatic as this. This was a very dramatic thing.

Those are all the questions I have.

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

The **CHAIRMAN**. Mr. Dulles, with regard to the questions of the Senator from Ohio, when confronted with this dilemma of either telling a lie or telling the truth, didn't he have a third out? He could have taken the equivalent of the Fifth Amendment, couldn't he, and say nothing?

Mr. **DULLES**. Who?

The **CHAIRMAN**. The President. He didn't have to answer, did he, by telling either a lie or a truth? That is a well-understood practice in this country, isn't it?

Mr. **DULLES**. It might have been difficult.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Well, he could have, couldn't he?

Mr. **DULLES**. Mr. Helms says it is difficult in an open society; it would have been easy in Russia.

The **CHAIRMAN**. It is not difficult to take the Fifth Amendment around here. We have been reading about them for years taking them by the dozens, haven't we? We recently had a case in the Army where, I think it was 21 officers took the equivalent of the Fifth Amendment, which surprised me very much. You know the case I am referring to. Turkey.

Mr. **DULLES**. Oh, yes.

The **CHAIRMAN**. You know that case, the Carroll report.

Mr. **DULLES**. The Turkish case.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Yes, the Carroll report. It is not necessary to answer when the truth is embarrassing. It isn't as obvious——

Mr. **DULLES**. It is not viewed with favor, is it?

The **CHAIRMAN**. What?

Mr. **DULLES**. It is not generally viewed with favor, is it?

The **CHAIRMAN**. We recognize that as a legally acceptable practice here. We don't do anything to them. It is part of the Constitution.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. May I ask the Senator from Arkansas if he is trying to demonstrate the truth of the opposite of what he is questioning? That is, would you want it to be said that the President took the Fifth Amendment?

SILENCE BY THE HEAD OF STATE

The **CHAIRMAN**. I didn't say I wanted it said. You said he had to do one or the other. I said he could have remained silent. That is a possible alternative, isn't it, Mr. Dulles?

Senator **WILEY**. Can you imagine the impact upon the——

The **CHAIRMAN**. Wait a minute, I would like to have the answer. You will have your time if you like.

As a matter of fact, it is customary in most of these espionage cases, except this one, that the head of state does remain silent, isn't it? He doesn't normally comment on all the spy cases or other types of espionage, does he? We have already gone over that but that is the truth, isn't it?

Mr. **DULLES**. In this case, I think it would have been extremely difficult over the long run to have remained silent.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Well, he might have remained silent, as the Senator from Indiana suggested, until we knew more about the facts.

That is a possibility. I am not saying he should have. I am merely examining what his alternatives were.

Mr. DULLES. The President's statement was made after the facts were pretty well available.

THE MAY 11 STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. You are familiar with the statement that the President made on May 11?

Mr. DULLES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It was a prepared statement which he presented to the press conference on May 11.

Mr. DULLES. Yes, I am familiar with it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you participate in the preparation of that statement?

Mr. DULLES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know who did? I mean, no one consulted you about it?

Mr. DULLES. Knowing that the President was going to make a statement, I made one suggestion which I think was included in the statement, but I did not see the statement before it was given.

The CHAIRMAN. Nor did you recommend it. That was done——

Mr. DULLES. For the reasons that I indicated this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. It was done——

Mr. DULLES. As I stood ready to assume the responsibility, I did not advise that anyone else should assume it one way or the other.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that statement, taken together with the previous statement by the Secretary of State on the preceding Saturday, which I believe was May 9 was interpreted generally as meaning we could continue these flights, was it not?

Mr. DULLES. It did not state that, Mr. Chairman. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. I say it was generally interpreted as such. It was interpreted as such by Chairman Khrushchev, was it not?

He so stated in his speech subsequent to that. You are familiar with his statement——

Mr. DULLES. I am familiar with his statement.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. That he made on the following Wednesday, in which he said the Americans have now stated that it was authorized by the President and they intended to continue it. That is what Khrushchev interpreted it to mean, didn't he?

Mr. DULLES. Did he so state it? I don't recall.

The CHAIRMAN. He did so state. It is in the official statement of his speech.

Mr. DULLES. He has been known to twist and turn words, you know, to his own purposes.

A REASONABLE INTERPRETATION

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I was going to add that the British press and most of our press so interpreted it. I have seen, and I have, as a matter of fact, in my office, statements out of the *Observer* published in London which so interpreted it. They are allies and, as far as I know, a friendly paper.

I think this was a reasonable interpretation of the two statements, particularly the one on the Saturday and then coupled with the President's. For example:

"The need"—this is a quote from the President's statement—"The need for intelligence gathering activities" is the first point.

> No one wants another Pearl Harbor. This means that we must have knowledge of military forces in preparations around the world, especially those capable of massive surprise attack.

Then I will skip a little. The second paragraph from that he says,

> As the Secretary of State pointed out in his recent statement ever since the beginning of my administration I had issued directives to gather in every feasible way the information required to protect the United States.

Isn't it a reasonable interpretation that—we had a demonstration this morning—this is not only feasible, it is one of the best ways that you have developed?

Mr. DULLES. Its feasibility might have run out though, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't it a reasonable interpretation this means they intend to continue if they can?

Mr. DULLES. Well, I don't think it is a reasonable interpretation to indicate that he expected exactly the same methods to be employed.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you had had an excellent record, you had been overflying Russia for 4 years and you had only one failure. That is a pretty good record. You have demonstrated that, I think, in an unanswerable way this morning. Except for the developments growing out of this incident, there is no particular reason why you should stop. This is not a case of its being blown, as you say, because the Russians found out about it because of the failure, because you have already testified they knew about it for years before. They knew about it, I think you said, as early as some time in 1956.

Senator LAUSCHE. July 2.

Mr. DULLES. July 1956.

OTHER REASONS FOR DISCONTINUING THE PROGRAM

The CHAIRMAN. So this experiment, this activity, wasn't discontinued simply because the Russians knew about it. The decision of May 12 not to continue them was taken because of reasons other than the fact the Russians knew about it, wasn't it?

Mr. DULLES. Mr. Chairman, this morning I mentioned the fact that when this operation was first started we estimated that, in view of the steadily improving capabilities of the Soviet Union in ground-to-air missiles and also the improvement in its fighter capabilities, we thought that the program would have a 2- to 3-year life.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Mr. DULLES. I think it is very likely that, apart from all these other considerations, if we had now sat down and reviewed the situation, we might easily have concluded that this particular program had run its particular life.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you have concluded that. The President has. But that is not the point; it is why you have concluded it has run its course. It is not because the Russians have found out about it, because they knew it all the time.

Mr. Dulles. I am speaking solely from the technical angle. It has run its life from a technical angle, apart from any political consideration.

SOVIET CAPABILITIES QUESTIONED

The Chairman. As a technical matter, you have testified very convincingly that you do not believe they shot this plane down at 70,000 feet, but that something happened. You say you don't believe yet that they are capable of shooting it down at 70,000 or 80,000 feet. Therefore, as a technical matter, so far as you know it remains as effective as ever. I am only saying that, that being true—and this is your testimony—there are other reasons.

Mr. Dulles. I have testified, Mr. Chairman, that they did not have a direct hit.

The Chairman. You didn't believe they did?

Mr. Dulles. They didn't have a direct hit. It is possible that the malfunction, as I have just said, I think, in answer to Senator Capehart, may have been directly or indirectly attributable to some of their ground-to-air fire. That, we don't know.

The Chairman. Or, as you also testified, it is quite possible that in the rarefied air, they had a flameout——

Mr. Dulles. That is correct.

The Chairman [continuing]. Which can happen to any plane, and they had to descend. I think you said that is a more probable explanation; that some malfunction such as a flameout caused him to descend at a lower level and he then became subject to attack by either aircraft or missiles.

But the only point, it seems to me, is a very simple one. The reasons why this decision was made, it would seem, are the events growing out of this particular experience rather than the fact that Russia found out about it, because they knew long in advance, or that you are convinced they have developed a missile that can shoot it down. There are other reasons. I think the reasons appear on the record. They are no fault of yours, I am not saying that, but I am just trying to get it.

THE DECISION TO HALT FLIGHTS

As of May 11, it looks as if the policy was that we were going to continue, as the President says, in every feasible way. Then on the 12th, it was decided that they would not be continued. Is that not correct?

Mr. Dulles. I am just following this.

The Chairman. On the 12th, the decision was announced and the Secretary of State testified that on the 12th, the decision was made not to continue. You said that you had no participation in the preparation of the statement on the 11th. Were you consulted as to the decision?

Mr. Dulles. Which statement on the 11th, may I ask, because I want to get the record clear.

The Chairman. That is on page 19 of our printed record.

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Transcript of President Eisenhower's conference, May 11. I am referring to the prepared part. This is not answering questions. He made this as a prepared statement, obviously carefully prepared before he went into conference. The parts I read to you occur in the fourth paragraph, I believe, and in the last paragraph on that page, that is the last of the first section.

This statement, as I say, together with the Secretary's has been interpreted very widely in the American press, the English press and by Mr. Khrushchev to mean that we were going to continue, as he says "in every feasible way" to gather this information. And the Secretary expressed the "vital necessity" of obtaining this information. And with all that, I agree. It was vital and very important. That isn't the question I am trying to develop. It is, is it not true that other considerations entered into it?

WAS THE WITNESS CONSULTED?

Now, I would like to ask, did you participate in the making of the decision that we are told was made on the 12th not to continue these flights?

Mr. DULLES. Yes—what page is that found on, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Page 19. The evidence of the decision not to continue was contained in the President's statement for the first time when he responded to Khrushchev on the following Monday, and with regard to that statement, the Secretary of State testified that this decision was made on the 12th, but the announcement was delayed until the 16th.

We went into that in the Secretary's testimony the other day. I want to ask if you were consulted about the decision that resulted in the decision to discontinue and to so state to Khrushchev.

Mr. DULLES. No. The answer is no to that.

The CHAIRMAN. You were not. That was not submitted to the Security Council?

Mr. DULLES. As I recall, there was no meeting of the National Security Council following the Tuesday—I believe it was Monday or Tuesday—prior to the President's departure.

The CHAIRMAN. You are a member of the National Security Council, aren't you?

Mr. DULLES. I am not a member. I am an adviser.

The CHAIRMAN. You usually attend?

Mr. DULLES. I attend the meetings of the National Security Council.

The CHAIRMAN. You would know whether or not this was a decision recommended by the National Security Council, wouldn't you?

Mr. DULLES. In this particular case, I would not because I was with you and others that afternoon with Secretary Herter, briefing the Congressional leaders. So I don't know what took place at that particular meeting.

As a matter of fact, I never do discuss what takes place at the National Security Council meetings. But I was not present at that particular meeting.

THE STATEMENT OF MAY 12

The CHAIRMAN. But you have testified that you were not consulted about the decision to discontinue any flights, the promise which the President made that we will not make any more flights "while I am in office." That is what he promised.

Mr. DULLES. Are you now talking about the Paris statement?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, the Paris statement. According to Secretary Herter, the decision was made on the 12th. He stated yesterday that the decision was on the 12th. We asked him why the announcement was delayed and he stated that the President, for his own reasons, wished to delay it until he met Mr. Herter in Paris.

Mr. DULLES. That decision was communicated to me.

The CHAIRMAN. When?

Mr. DULLES. Before the President went to Paris. That is, the decision to stop the flights.

The CHAIRMAN. But you didn't participate in making the decision.

Mr. DULLES. I did not participate in making it.

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't recommend it.

Mr. DULLES. The statement given out in Paris was somewhat different from the instructions which I received. The instructions I received were that the flights would be discontinued.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any explanation of the reason for the change in position between the 11th of May when the President's conference was held and the 12th of May when the decision to discontinue was made? Do you know of any explanation?

Mr. DULLES. I don't know that it is a change in position.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you don't know of any reason to change it, do you?

Mr. DULLES. I know of no reason.

The CHAIRMAN. Assuming there was, you don't know of any reason to justify it.

Mr. DULLES. That is correct. I don't assume though, that there was.

The CHAIRMAN. I want the record to be clear. There are those who interpret the two statements, not just the President's but the Secretary's and the President's to mean that the flights would be continued. That is a matter of fact that we have. Whether or not they are justified is open to anybody's right to question it. I mean that it was so interpreted and so stated both inside and outside of Russia.

NO FLIGHTS DURING SUEZ CRISIS

Mr. Director, were these flights suspended during the Suez crisis in October and November of 1956?

Mr. DULLES. I don't recall.

The CHAIRMAN. Can General Cabell say whether or not any flights were made during the so-called Suez crisis?

Mr. DULLES. I think we have a record here. But the mere fact that flights were not made doesn't mean the flights were discontinued because over a great deal of the area we want to travel—this was November, wasn't it?

The CHAIRMAN. It was becoming tense in October. The war actually broke in early November, just before the election. I remember that.

Mr. DULLES. We had a flight shortly after Suez. The dates were just around election time, as a matter of fact.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. DULLES. From about the 30th of October until early November.

There was a flight in November.

The CHAIRMAN. After that period. But during the crisis did any flights take place?

Mr. DULLES. I see no flights scheduled here as having taken place, but I must warn you that means nothing because there very likely were weather conditions or other conditions.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell us whether or not you ordered that no flights take place during this period of extreme international tension?

Mr. DULLES. I have no recollection of either given or receiving any such order.

The CHAIRMAN. Then if there was a suspension, it would have no relation to the crisis in your opinion?

Mr. DULLES. I have no recollection of any suspension, and a flight apparently was carried out in the month of November.

SUSPENSION OF FLIGHTS ON POLITICAL GROUNDS

The CHAIRMAN. Is it your position that at no time were flights ever discontinued because of political considerations or existence of a crisis in any part of the world? That had no bearing upon the flight?

Mr. DULLES. As I have said before, Mr. Chairman, I didn't pass upon that part of the work.

The CHAIRMAN. You would carry out the order, is what I meant. Were you ever asked to suspend them by anybody for such reason?

Mr. DULLES. I was asked at times to suspend, but I wouldn't necessarily know all that lay back of it.

The CHAIRMAN. You were asked to suspend flights?

Mr. DULLES. I believe there were periods when flights were suspended, other than for weather reasons.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you tell us about those instances?

Mr. DULLES. No. I haven't—because I don't have any specific remembrance. I don't want to say they were not suspended because I just don't recall, but I think they may have been suspended. But I don't remember the reasons for it.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had been asked to suspend them during the Camp David meetings, you would have remembered that, wouldn't you? You said you did not.

Mr. DULLES. I think I would have remembered that, because that is quite recent.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. You don't recall that you were asked to suspend them during that period?

Mr. DULLES. I don't recall that, no.

"NO COMMENT"

The **CHAIRMAN**. I don't know whether this is correct or not, and if you don't think it is, just say so: In one of the very widely read columns—I don't use this because I believe in columns, but they have a great influence upon American public opinion, apparently, because all the papers carry them. Mr. Alsop says, in sum, that Washington followed the rules long laid down by the President's press secretary, James Hagerty, that the useful reply "No comment" is not permissible. The President can never be portrayed as having any lack of knowledge of doings in the Government. Do you know whether or not that is a policy of Mr. Hagerty?

Mr. **DULLES**. I don't believe I can comment on that. I think "any doings in the Government" is a broad statement.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Well, I didn't——

Mr. **DULLES**. I don't know all that goes on in my own agency. I try to know as much as I can.

The **CHAIRMAN**. On occasion, as you have here, you feel perfectly free to say, "no comment," don't you?

Mr. **DULLES**. Yes, I do, Senator. Where it does not concern my own office.

The **CHAIRMAN**. This comes back to the first question I asked. There are occasions when you don't have to either tell the truth or lie about it. You can say you don't want to answer.

Mr. **DULLES**. That is correct.

The **CHAIRMAN**. You tell us that and we accept it, don't we?

Mr. **DULLES**. You have been very considerate.

The **CHAIRMAN**. That is exactly the same situation. I respect you when you say you can't answer for good reasons, because I think you often have good reasons. There are a few other——

Senator **CAPEHART**. Would the chairman yield for a point there which is in line with what you are talking about?

The **CHAIRMAN**. Yes, I yield.

Senator **CAPEHART**. Had Khrushchev cabled the President of the United States the day before the incident, saying, "I have reliable information that you are flying planes over my country and I want and demand an answer, yes or no, and given to the press and printed in all the papers," what would have been the President's answer?

Mr. **DULLES**. I really can't say.

Senator **CAPEHART**. What would you have advised him to have said? You may say this is insignificant. I don't think it is. It has to do with the policy of——

Mr. **DULLES**. I think it is just purely theoretical. You know that I don't really think I should be asked to comment on matters of that nature. I just don't know, Senator.

ADMISSION OF ESPIONAGE

Senator **CAPEHART**. What I am getting at there is, I think the President would have had a perfect right to have denied it. The point is, why did you have to admit that we were spying in the instance of the Powers matter?

Mr. **DULLES**. They had the evidence.

Senator CAPEHART. How would the President know, if he got such a cable as I just described, that they didn't have the evidence they were going to follow with the day before, if they knew the planes were flying over there?

Mr. DULLES. Well, we would know they didn't have any plane or anything of that nature. All they would have would be radar, which you could deny until the cows came home because they would never prove it.

Senator CAPEHART. Well, it is in line with what the chairman was asking. My question is, are you ever justified in admitting spying? Even though they have the evidence?

The CHAIRMAN. I will say to the Senator that is exactly the question—you were not here Friday—that we examined at considerable length. It is one of the questions, I think, that is the most interesting in this whole affair. If you hadn't had a chance to look at the record on Friday on this same point, I hope you will, because it is a very puzzling one. I don't want to minimize the difficulty of it.

Senator CAPEHART. I think the only good that can be brought out in discussing it is that we can use it as a guidepost in the future if other incidents come up.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with the Senator.

Senator CAPEHART. That is why I asked earlier if you had a plan or policy as to what you were going to say or do should one of these planes be forced down.

Mr. DULLES. We did have such a plan.

Senator CAPEHART. But you were crossed up because the plane was not completely destroyed and the pilot lived and walked away?

Mr. DULLES. That is correct.

SUSPENSIONS OF OVERFLIGHTS

The CHAIRMAN. I am not sure I am clear on these other suspensions for reasons other than weather. Did you say who ordered them or did you say you didn't remember, or what?

Mr. DULLES. No. I am frank to say that I would like to review this because I am not clear in my own mind that there have been suspensions of that character. It is my recollection that there have been.

The CHAIRMAN. There have been?

Mr. DULLES. But the reasons therefore I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't recall whether the National Security Council or the President or the Secretary of State ordered it? Did you ever receive any requests from any one of those authorities to suspend flights for any given period?

Mr. DULLES. Do you recall, General?

I think that there was a suspension while General Twining was in Moscow. It was just brought to my attention.

The CHAIRMAN. While General Twining was in Moscow. Who asked you to suspend them?

Mr. DULLES. I would have to check to see.

The CHAIRMAN. Who would have authority to ask you? Would it not be only——

Mr. DULLES. If the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense or any one acting for them asked me, I would suspend.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you decide yourself at any given date that the U-2 flights had been compromised and were——

Mr. DULLES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't decide?

Mr. DULLES. We knew they had been picked up on radar. But we had no evidence and still do not have clear evidence that they could be reached either by aircraft or by ground-to-air missiles. We do, however, credit the Soviets with having a pretty good capability in ground-to-air missiles up to 60,000 feet and some capability between 60,000 and 70,000. If they have a capability up to 70,000, they might get a plane, and they might have had a near miss on this plane, and a near miss might have caused it to lose altitude.

POSSIBILITY OF A NEW PLANE

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any plans to develop a plane that will do the same thing at 100,000 feet?

Mr. DULLES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not. You don't presently intend to develop a plane to fly at a higher altitude?

Mr. DULLES. One has been thinking about it, but—even if I had it, I think I would keep it awfully quiet.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, under the policy decision as made, you would have to discontinue any such plan even if you had been thinking about it, wouldn't you?

Mr. DULLES. I didn't quite hear you.

The CHAIRMAN. Even if you had been thinking about a 100,000-foot plane, you would discontinue it in view of the policy decision that has already been made; that is, that we would not do this any more.

Senator WILEY. There was no time limit placed on that.

Mr. DULLES. I don't know what I would do about stopping something that——

The CHAIRMAN. I think that you wouldn't imply that the President's promise not to do it is not truthful, would you? He means it, doesn't he?

Mr. DULLES. I didn't catch that one.

The CHAIRMAN. The President made the statement that for the rest of his administration he will not do it. Therefore, I assume everybody accepts that. You would accept it, wouldn't you?

Mr. DULLES. Oh, absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. You do accept it, don't you?

Mr. DULLES. I don't think anybody is going to have a plane between now and next January that will fly at 100,000 feet.

THE STATEMENT BY NASA

The CHAIRMAN. By whose decision and with whose knowledge was the NASA cover put into effect, when they actually put it out? Or was that just automatic, according to previous arrangements?

Mr. DULLES. Oh, no, there was very careful consultation, long consultation, between NASA, ourselves, and also some consultation between us and the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. On the day it was put out.

Mr. DULLES. On the day it was put out.

The **Chairman**. So you state——

Mr. **Dulles**. And prior thereto, because we had been in touch with them since the 1st or 2d of May. I think we were in touch with them on the day of the loss. I happened to be in New York that morning, so I didn't know it.

The **Chairman**. So that the State Department had full opportunity to consult about the statement on May 5 by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration?

Mr. **Dulles**. I don't think the State Department knew about the exact statement that was given out. I think that some guidance was given, through us, from the State Department with regard to general answering of questions, but I think Mr. Herter has testified that he did not know about that actual statement, or the State Department did not know about the actual statement that was given out, I believe, on the 5th.

The **Chairman**. May 5. He did not know about it. Did you know about it? Did your people know?

Mr. **Dulles**. I didn't personally know about it, but it was known by competent people in my shop.

The **Chairman**. In your shop?

Mr. **Dulles**. That is correct.

NASA'S KNOWLEDGE OF PROGRAM

The **Chairman**. It was not given out by NASA under the impression that this was really a weather plane.

Mr. **Dulles**. Oh, no.

The **Chairman**. They knew what it was.

Mr. **Dulles**. They knew what the facts were. I don't say all of the people in NASA did, but the top people working on this knew the facts.

The **Chairman**. The people who were responsible. It has been reported in the press that Mr. Bonney, who was responsible for it, was greatly embarrassed after he put it out, because he did not know the truth.[7] That was in the press.

Mr. **Dulles**. I don't know whether Bonney was cut in on this or not, but the higher officials were. He was cut in. General Cabell is quite familiar with this and I would rather have him answer the question.

The **Chairman**. All right, General.

General **Cabell**. Mr. Bonney was in fact knowledgeable of it on the day of the loss.

The **Chairman**. And he knew about what actually had happened?

General **Cabell**. Yes, sir. To the extent that we knew.

The **Chairman**. Yes. Well, didn't you see a piece in one of the broadcasts—I think I have it in my office—where they said, "Poor Mr. Bonney, his face was red because he made this statement not knowing what the facts were." I saw that. It was made either in a press statement or a broadcast.

---

[7] On May 9, Walter T. Bonney, director of NASA's Public Information Office, denied that NASA knew the U-2s were being used for espionage.

Mr. **Dulles**. Well, we didn't know what the facts were until it came out later in the statement.

The **Chairman**. Well, what they didn't know was that it was even espionage. He thought it was a genuine weather flight.

General **Cabell**. That is an incorrect assumption on the part of the writer of that article.

The **Chairman**. I think it is good to know that. I believe I have already asked you about that one.

KHRUSHCHEV'S BEHAVIOR IN PARIS

I would like your opinion, Mr. Director, on Khrushchev's Paris press conference on Wednesday after the break up. Do you regard it as a carefully controlled, clever performance or as an irresponsible act which heedlessly alienated world opinion?

Mr. Dulles, would you express an opinion or your evaluation of that press conference?

Mr. **Dulles**. I think, going back, our information is that the statement he made at the conference, which broke up the conference, was carefully prepared in Moscow before he arrived in Paris. That was the statement, I believe, of the Monday before.

With regard to the Wednesday statement, that appeared to have been quite largely, I would say, ad-lib, in Khrushchev's inimitable style. It certainly alienated public opinion in many parts of the world. I am inclined to think that, while he did not contemplate that result, the ad-libbing had been fairly carefully thought out, although not reduced, of course, to writing.

He has engaged from time to time in outbursts of this nature. He did it, you may recall, in London on a couple of occasions during his visit some years ago. He did it in Belgrade, as you may recall, even before that. He did it some time ago when the President of Italy was in Moscow. So while this may be the most brutal and gauche of his outbursts, he has shown the capability for doing this sort of thing on several occasions.

ARMED FORCES ALERT

The **Chairman**. Did the CIA play any role in the decision to order the alert of our armed forces which was made on Sunday night preceding the first summit conference?

Mr. **Dulles**. No. sir.

The **Chairman**. You were not consulted about it at all?

Mr. **Dulles**. No, sir.

The **Chairman**. As far as you know, that was entirely the decision of the Defense Department?

Mr. **Dulles**. Yes, sir. We were, of course, immediately notified.

The **Chairman**. After it was done.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Mr. Dulles, how might Communist China's relationship with the U.S.S.R. have been affected by the summit failure? Do you have any opinion about that?

Mr. **Dulles**. Initially, Mao welcomed the failure and praised Khrushchev for his attitude. Mao has never liked summit conferences from which he is excluded, and that applies to this conference.

When Khrushchev began to change his tune a bit, as he did when he arrived in Berlin, indicating that he wasn't going to take any action for 6 or 8 months and the like, Mao then seemed to cool a bit. But there is no doubt that whenever Moscow takes a very tough line, that is pleasing to the Chinese Communist leaders.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your estimate of Red China's capabilities and intentions with respect to aggressive actions over the next year or so?

Mr. DULLES. We are watching the situation in the Formosa Straits with very great care. There has been some little indication that there might possibly be some heating up there. There has been certain movement of aircraft and other indications of that nature.

We believe, however, that China has a great many internal problems, economic particularly, and we have no firm indications that there is likely to be any early aggressive move. However, the situation is such that this might change on rather short notice. It wouldn't take them long to group their forces, particularly their Air Force, which is very mobile, and to heat up the Formosa Straits situation.

Would you want to add anything to that?

General CABELL. No.

OTHER RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS

The CHAIRMAN. Have you made similar overflights of China to those you have made of Russia?

Mr. DULLES. I would prefer not to go into any action taken except that directly covered by this investigation, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether——

Mr. DULLES. This inquiry, I mean.

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad you corrected that.

Do you know whether any overflights of Russia have been made by any other agency of government, such as the Navy or the Air Force?

Mr. DULLES. That, too, I feel is not within my competence to deal with.

The CHAIRMAN. However, it is related to this inquiry as to whether or not you are the only agency carrying out these flights, isn't it?

Mr. DULLES. I think that is a question which probably should be reserved for Mr. Gates. Frankly, I wouldn't be able to give you a very good answer even though I should try.

The CHAIRMAN. I wondered whether you had heard about it in the course of your activities—whether they would do similar things.

You made a point of being very careful to have these planes disassociated from the military forces. You did in your original statement, I believe. You saw that this pilot was——

Mr. DULLES. That is correct. We made every effort to disassociate this, so that any incident that might occur would not rub off on the defense establishment or the Air Force.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. I understood that. I just thought it might be a pertinent question as to whether they had engaged in independent flights in addition to your flights.

Do you wish to add anything?

Mr. DULLES. No, thank you.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR PUBLIC STATEMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. Can you say whether the CIA or the State Department is primarily responsible for coordinating the statements and press releases concerning espionage matters in which the CIA is involved?

Mr. DULLES. I don't think there have been any previous cases. There was one. I am thinking back now. There was one previous case that I can recall, which was when a tunnel was discovered in Berlin, you may recall, from one sector of Berlin to the Soviet sector and which tapped some telegraph lines. That was in 1956.

At the time, the press releases were coordinated between the State Department and ourselves. In this situation, until it came to the question of the Presidential decision, there was coordination between State and CIA.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it possible to say that one or the other is primarily responsible for the actual duty of coordinating and seeing that whatever is stated publicly has been cleared?

Mr. DULLES. I never say anything publicly except an occasional speech that I make, but in this field I would never say anything publicly. It would be done by some other agency of government, presumably the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. That is really what I thought.

Mr. DULLES. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I just wanted your view. It would be my thought, although I didn't wish to put words in your mouth, that it is primarily the State Department's decision or responsibility, on all such statements as we have been dealing with, to coordinate the statement in the sense of clearing it for approval by you or whoever is engaged in it. But anything dealing with you—you do not normally make statements.

Mr. DULLES. I don't think we have ever—or practically never—made a statement. There are one or two exceptions on routine matters.

The CHAIRMAN. A better way to put it is that it is the State Department's responsibility, whenever a statement is made involving your activities, to see that the statement is properly cleared and so on, before they make it, is that right?

Mr. DULLES. I think that has been followed, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, and that is the policy.

Mr. DULLES. That is correct.

CONTACTS WITH MR. HAGERTY

The CHAIRMAN. This question is a practical one that has confronted me and I thought perhaps you could throw some light on it: The press, every day since this has started, has asked me whether or not Mr. Hagerty is to be called, and they intimate that he has played an important part, in this whole situation. Can you tell the committee whether or not you have consulted with him, and whether he is one of the principal contacts of your agency with the Office of the Presidency?

Mr. DULLES. I have quite frequent touch with Mr. Hagerty, often before a press conference. Mr. Hagerty will consult with me about the intelligence viewpoint on certain parts of the world and on matters of that nature.

The CHAIRMAN. In matters concerning the flights, was he your principal contact or conduit for clearance and advice with the establishment of the Presidency?

Mr. DULLES. The State Department was our chief point of contact here, because until the very end, the statements were given out at the State Department, until the President's conference.

The CHAIRMAN. I gather that they are coordinating. The point is whether or not it would be useful, for the information of the committee, to ask Mr. Hagerty if he cared to throw any light upon this matter. I just wondered, if you have had frequent consultations with him, whether it might be pertinent to this question.

Mr. DULLES. With respect to this particular matter, my contacts are largely with the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Not with Mr. Hagerty?

Mr. DULLES. And not with Mr. Hagerty.

The CHAIRMAN. Do any other members have further questions?

Senator WILEY. I have a few questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wiley.

AUTHORITY FOR U-2 FLIGHTS

Senator WILEY. During the 4 years that you have had these so-called overflights, your organization made the determination when you were to do it, is that right?

Mr. DULLES. After consultation, as I have indicated, with higher authority.

Senator WILEY. And who is the higher authority?

Mr. DULLES. That included primarily the State Department and the Defense Department, with occasional contact with higher up, in case there was any matter that it was felt should be brought to higher attention.

Senator WILEY. Then it was a question of determining the condition of the weather and after it has been determined, then you would get the U-2, the flyer and everything set up. But as a matter of policy, did you do this everytime or did you carry out the program to try to find out what the situation was in Russia?

Mr. DULLES. Well, the nature of these contacts was so informal that as a matter of routine, after a flight was run, a report would be made as to the results. Then you would discuss the question of another flight. The group that was continually working on this thing was meeting quite frequently on the substantive matters connected with these flights, the use of the information, how the information might be better exploited, and so forth and so on.

Senator WILEY. That is the way I understood it. I understood that it was a policy of your organization to ascertain what was behind the Iron Curtain.

Mr. DULLES. That is correct.

Senator **Wiley**. And when and if the time was opportune, you might have some consultation with some of these other people. But primarily, you were the head of the Central Intelligence. You were the one to determine more or less whether it was necessary.

Mr. **Dulles**. That is correct.

MIGHT FLIGHTS BE RESUMED?

Senator **Wiley**. I was just reading the President's statement here. He said in a statement of May 11, that in the statement of Secretary Herter of May 9,

> The position of the United States was made clear with respect to the distasteful necessity of espionage activities in the world, and where nations distrust each other's intentions. He pointed out that these activities had no aggressive intent, but, rather were to insure the safety of the United States and the free world against surprise attack.

Then he goes on and says,

> There is in the Soviet statement an evident misapprehension on one key point. It alleges the United States has through official statements threatened continual overflights. The importance of this alleged threat was emphasized and repeated by Khrushchev. The United States has made no such threat. Neither I nor my government has intended any. The actual statements go no further than to say the United States will not shirk its responsibilities to safeguard against surprise attack.

And, then here: "In the point of fact, these flights were suspended after the recent incident and are not to be resumed. Accordingly, this cannot be the issue."

Now, they are not to be resumed. That is the President's statement. It didn't say whether or not to be resumed within 1 month, 2 months, or during his administration. The point is that if things got real hot and the President thought it was in the interests of this country to resume these flights, that would be done, wouldn't it not?

Mr. **Dulles**. That you would have to address to the President.

Senator **Wiley**. I think the question answers itself.

Now, to several other questions.

U-2 PILOT; WRECKAGE

You don't know, as a matter of fact, that Powers is still alive, do you?

Mr. **Dulles**. No. We believe he is.

Senator **Wiley**. Yes. You don't know, as a matter of fact, whether they have the plane intact or whether it is all smashed up either?

Mr. **Dulles**. We know that because they have shown the pieces of it. They have exhibited them in Moscow, and the aircraft technicians who constructed the plane have identified it and said this is a part of the plane.

Senator **Wiley**. They have identified it.

Mr. **Dulles**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Wiley**. As part of the plane?

Mr. **Dulles**. That is correct.

Senator **Wiley**. I misunderstood. My understanding was that we looked at this wreckage and said that wasn't the plane.

Mr. DULLES. That was the first wreckage that Khrushchev put together, some wreckage of an old Russian plane.

Senator WILEY. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. And I think at that time he wanted to mislead us into thinking that our plane was all cracked up, because this wreckage was wreckage. There wasn't very much left of it, but it was not of our plane. It was of an old Russian plane and that was identified by the experts.

Senator WILEY. Yes. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection, I read a story from the New York Times correspondent in Moscow—I think his name is [Max] Frankel—that said what purports to be, and what I think you referred to now, as the remains of this plane are on display in Gorki Park. Is that your information?

Mr. DULLES. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And that is the one you think is really the plane?

Mr. DULLES. We have had quite a number of pictures of it examined by the greatest experts, those who constructed the plane, and they believe that this is a true picture of a part of the plane.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. This story certainly didn't cast any doubt about it.

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. He assumed it was the plane.

Senator CAPEHART. Mr. Chairman, one more question.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Capehart.

KHRUSHCHEV'S AWARENESS OF FLIGHTS

Senator CAPEHART. Khrushchev says they detected the U-2 flight on April 9 or the day after Twining was in Soviet Russia. Was such a flight made on April 9?

Mr. DULLES. I think there is a confusion there. There was a flight made on April 9, 1959.

Senator CAPEHART. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. But the time of General Twining's visit to the Soviet Union was June–July 1956. Khrushchev complained that there was a flight made just after General Twining's departure, and alleged that General Twining had come back and given orders to send off a flight right away. There was in fact a flight shortly after General Twining left Moscow. General Cabell wants to correct one point on that.

General CABELL. There was a flight on 9th of April 1960.

Senator CAPEHART. 1960.

Mr. DULLES. Yes, I am sorry, I said 1959. 1960, just 6 weeks ago.

Senator CAPEHART. And it was made shortly after Twining was in Russia.

General CABELL. They are talking about two different flights, Senator, the 9th of April 1960 flight was in fact made.

Mr. DULLES. Also, we did make flights shortly after General Twining's visit in 1956. They were two different occasions.

The CHAIRMAN. These are different occasions, Senator, 3 years apart.

Senator **Capehart**. My question was, were there such flights made?

Mr. **Dulles**. There was a flight made on April 9, 1960, and there was a flight made 3 years before in 1956, shortly after Twining left the Soviet Union.

Senator **Capehart**. Then there is no question but what Khrushchev knew we were making flights over his country prior to the U-2?

Mr. **Dulles**. Oh, yes, he knew.

Senator **Capehart**. He knew?

Mr. **Dulles**. Oh, yes. He didn't know all about them, but he knew the flights were being made.

Senator **Capehart**. That is all.

Senator **Lausche**. Mr. Chairman?

The **Chairman**. Senator Lausche.

THE OPEN SKIES PROPOSAL

Senator **Lausche**. Getting back to the 1954 determination to develop this plane which we spoke about earlier: in 1955, the President proposed Open Skies. Did that proposal have any relationship to this problem confronting us of acquiring information on what they were doing, and then allowing them through Open Skies to see what we were doing?

Mr. **Dulles**. Yes, sir, it did.

Senator **Lausche**. So there was a decision to develop the plane. The President, then, in 1955—was that at the summit conference of 1955 or was it——

Mr. **Dulles**. That was at the summit conference of 1955, which was July 1955, that he made this proposal. If the proposal had been carried out, it is very possible these planes would have been used to implement it. They would have been ideally suited for it.

And the President has recently indicated—I think it was the President—that if it was Open Skies, we would be glad to furnish part of the planes to accomplish that. When the Open Skies proposal did not go through, as I indicated this morning, then we redoubled our efforts to get this plane quickly going so that we could gain the necessary information.

GROUND OBSERVERS

Senator **Lausche**. Then in 1957, the President, still intent upon solving this problem satisfactorily, to the end of peace, proposed that ground observers be exchanged between the two governments.

Mr. **Dulles**. Various proposals of that nature have been made during the disarmament negotiations and during the nuclear test suspension negotiations.

Senator **Lausche**. And following that, the President also proposed that there be a removal of the bans on travel of Russians to the United States and United States citizens to Russia, with a view of opening up to general view what is being done in each of the nations.

Mr. **Dulles**. I believe that is correct.

Senator **Lausche**. So that the President proposed in 1955 the Open Skies plan; in 1957, an exchange of observers; and then, for several years, to open the doors to travel of visitors so that there would be open view of what was being done in the two nations with regard to military development.

Mr. **Dulles**. I don't want to be tied down to the exact dates, but in general, I believe that is correct. The question of observers had been made on different occasions in connection with both disarmament and in connection with nuclear test suspension.

Senator **Lausche**. Then it was because of the inability to get Open Skies observation, observation through an exchange of observers, and observation through travel of visitors, that we have been driven to the use of this plane.

Mr. **Dulles**. Well, if we could have obtained the information by Open Skies or anything comparable, we would never have needed to have this plane.

Senator **Lausche**. That is all.

The **Chairman**. Anyone else? Senator Gore, any further questions?

Senator Wiley?

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Well, Mr. Dulles, I certainly appreciate your patience and your cooperation in this meeting. It has been very informative. I certainly will do my best to protect your information and try not to say anything I shouldn't, and I know the rest of the committee will do the best it can.

I repeat again, this inquiry was not—certainly speaking for myself—because of nervousness about the discharge of our responsibility. I think everybody believes you have carried out your responsibility in the U-2 incident very effectively. It is unfortunate we had the loss. We can expect those sooner or later. I suppose that happens in any activity. That was not the matter under consideration.

I thank you very much, indeed, for your cooperation.

Mr. **Dulles**. Thank you very much, and thank you, gentlemen.

The **Chairman**. Do you have anything further to add to our enlightenment?

Mr. **Dulles**. I do not believe so. But I appreciate very much what you have said about the security of these proceedings, as I have talked very frankly and openly, except on one point and that I will go into, Senator Gore.

The **Chairman**. Well, I think then the understanding about the record is quite clear. You are to go over that and if there is anything——

Mr. **Dulles**. Yes, to add to what I have said.

The **Chairman**. If you think there is anything that might be made public, that is for your determination.

Mr. **Dulles**. Right.

The **Chairman**. And it might be useful, after consideration by you and your staff merely because this matter has become of such great interest that you might want to.

That is all.

Senator WILEY. The chairman expressed my conclusion in this matter too, Mr. Dulles, and I want to compliment your able staff. I have noted their assistance in this.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you, very much.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Dulles, do you know that the Soviet was the first to order copies of the transcript of these hearings?

Mr. DULLES. I didn't know that, but I thought they might well.

The CHAIRMAN. That does not include your hearings. That was announced yesterday.

Senator LAUSCHE. But whatever is published by way of a transcript, the first demandant of those transcripts is the Soviets.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, very much, Mr. Dulles.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee is recessed until tomorrow at 10 a.m.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you, sir.

[Whereupon at 5:10 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., June 1, 1960.]

EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 1, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:10 a.m., pursuant to recess, Hon. J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, Senators Mansfield, Long, Gore, Lausche, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, and Carlson.

Also present: William B. Macomber, Department of State, Richard Helms, CIA; Captain L. P. Gray III, USN, JCS; and James P. Gleason, Assistant Administrator for Congressional Relations, NASA.

Staff members present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Denney, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. St. Claire.

[A portion of this transcript was published in 1960, with certain deletions made for reasons of national security. The most significant deletions are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the printed hearings.]

STATEMENT OF DR. HUGH L. DRYDEN, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA)

* * * * * * *

U-2 OPERATION [P. 111]

Now, the U-2 operation is in the same general pattern of operation. This project was organized in 1956 when the CIA brought to our attention the capabilities of this new airplane. It was able to fly at altitudes very considerably higher than any existing airplane.

The program has been carried on entirely openly. There have been three reports issued, unclassified; there have been press releases on these operations from time to time.

The program was unclassified except that the data which revealed the airplane could go higher than 55,000 feet were classified. They will now be declassified since the potentialities of the airplane have become known.

Now, why did NASA enter into this agreement with the CIA for the use of an airplane, knowing at the time that it was to be used for some types of intelligence operations?

NEED FOR DATA AT HIGHER ALTITUDES

I must take you back to the atmosphere at the time. These were the days when the airlines had had DC-6's and DC-7's, and Constellations. At that time we knew the 707, the DC-8, and the Electra were under design. We were told that the first of these airplanes would be developed early in 1959.

All of our previous data with airplanes had been at altitudes generally not too much above 20,000 feet, where these airplanes operated. The new airplanes would operate at 35,000 to 40,000 feet, and the military services were interested in supersonic airplanes which traveled at much higher altitudes, so that there was at this time a great pressure on us to find methods of obtaining data, and the presence of the capabilities of the U-2 airplane seemed to us to give the answer. Some of our advisory committees at the time were bringing to our attention the great need for this information. I will simply read one extract, if I can find it quickly for you, and this committee called our attention to the fact that we did not have suitable airplanes available.

> There are three basic regions within which data are available; below 25,000 feet, up to 30,000 feet with military vehicles, up to 55,000 feet, where meager data are available from balloons and rockets and inference from meteor trails. Existing research vehicles are reaching to higher altitudes—

and so on.

> It is recommended that emphasis be placed on obtaining quantitative information on air turbulence at the highest altitudes reasonably obtainable with existing research vehicles.

We knew at that time that the activities of the NASA in this field would be used by CIA to explain the presence of U-2 aircraft in bases throughout the world. The logistic operation of these airplanes was, as I think you have been informed, by the Air Weather Service, although the operational responsibility lies with the CIA.

Now this program was carried on from 1956 through the present time. NASA was established on October 1, 1958, and this was one of the programs carried over into NASA.

I might recall to you that NASA was not extensively involved in aeronautical activities, that NASA, at present, is engaged in international space activities. So far we have not had any adverse reactions on the part of people with whom we are cooperating abroad in space programs.

I think this gives the general background and I would be glad to respond to questions or to continue with the NASA chronology of the week of May 1, as you desire, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps we ought to proceed with questions.

Doctor Dryden, did the CIA request you to serve in this position, or did State, or how did your connection with the CIA begin?

Mr. DRYDEN. The CIA told us of this airplane which was to be used for classified intelligence operations. We saw in it an advantage in securing this data at altitudes much higher than we could obtain by any means. I think we regarded it as a responsibility to cooperate with another agency of government in talking about our operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you report directly to the President? What is your hierarchical relationship to the rest of the government?

Mr. **DRYDEN**. At that time the NASA was managed by a committee of 17 persons appointed by the President, who did report directly to him. I was the chief executive officer reporting to the committee at the time this project was started.

* * * * * * *

REPORT OF U-2 LOSS [P. 112]

The **CHAIRMAN**. The first that you knew of this was the loss of the U-2 plane on May 1.

Mr. **DRYDEN**. On May 1 it was reported to the Administrator and myself that a U-2 had been lost, without further detail.

The **CHAIRMAN**. What happened after that? Did anyone give you any instructions as to the issuance of a cover story?

Mr. **DRYDEN**. No, sir, no instructions were issued, but the next thing which happened was on—let me get the chronology exactly, sir.

I can recall it, I think—here it is. On Monday at 3:30 the project officer on this project received a call from the Air Weather Service reporting the details which later appeared in the story released at Istanbul.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. What date is Monday?

Mr. **DRYDEN**. May 2, the following day.

On Tuesday, May 3, there appeared the Istanbul story, and in this time we were consulting with the CIA with regard to the so-called "cover story," which was in effect from May 1 to May 7.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Was that cover story prepared prior to May 1?

Mr. **DRYDEN**. In 1956, when the project was first set up, it was realized that in intelligence operations there might be loss of an airplane over neighboring territory. At that time there was a general discussion of the procedure to be followed, coordinated, as I understood it, between CIA and the other agencies of government.

There was no occasion to use this story until May 1, or to use any story until May 1.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Those were general directions that a cover story should be put out and that is all?

Mr. **DRYDEN**. That if a U-2 were lost in other operations, it would be reported as a missing NASA airplane.

The **CHAIRMAN**. With regard to the specific story that was published on May 5——

Mr. **DRYDEN**. Yes, may I continue the chronology?

On May 4, this story from Istanbul was in the Washington Post. We immediately received many inquiries for details from the press, and we were in consultation both on Tuesday and Wednesday as to how these specific inquiries would be answered.

The **CHAIRMAN**. What would that be, May what?

Mr. **DRYDEN**. 3 and 4. I may say we have no independent knowledge of the operations. As I explained our pattern before, we have been receiving film records and flight plans. For example, we received a——

INTER-AGENCY CONSULTATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. With whom did you have consultations on the 3rd and 4th?

Mr. DRYDEN. With the members of the CIA who were operating the U-2 project.

The CHAIRMAN. Who were they?

Mr. DRYDEN. I think that this is a matter that should be given to you by Mr. Dulles. I think I should not go into the details of intelligence operations.

The CHAIRMAN. This is an executive session. You can't tell us whom you consulted?

Mr. DRYDEN. It was the project officer, Mr. Bissell.[1]

ANTICIPATION OF INQUIRIES ABOUT LOSS [P. 113]

The CHAIRMAN. And did he consult with you as to the precise language of the release of May 5?

Mr. DRYDEN. What was——

The CHAIRMAN. Who drew up that language?

Mr. DRYDEN. It was discussed in consultation. The questions the press asked were: who is the pilot, where was the airplane going, what information do you have about it?

So that between CIA and ourselves, a list of these questions which we had received was recorded, and the general nature of the answers to these questions decided upon. Now, let me tell you about the so-called release of the statement. On the morning of Thursday, May 5, was Khrushchev's announcement that the plane was shot down. Somewhere between 11 and 12 o'clock, I believe, the President directed an inquiry and public report on the missing plane, and as reported in the *Herald Tribune*—I do not have any other stenographic record—it says:

> At the White House, Mr. Hagerty announced at the direction of the President a complete inquiry is being made. The results of these inquiries, the facts as developed will be made public by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of State.

* * * * * * *

REASON FOR MENTIONING OTHER U-2 BASES IN MAY 5 RELEASE [P. 114]

The CHAIRMAN. I don't wish you to read that memorandum. I only want to know what was your thinking. You issued this without checking it with the State Department. Why did you put in there that they were operating out of Turkey?

Mr. DRYDEN. This published report——

The CHAIRMAN. You had already published it?

Mr. DRYDEN. Had said, "These flights were made from bases at Watertown Strip, Nevada."

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but those were weather flights. They were not espionage flights.

---

[1] Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Deputy Director of the CIA for Operations, who conceived and supervised the plan for U-2 flights over the Soviet Union.

Mr. **Dryden**. I have explained that the story that this U–2 flight was a weather flight was the cover story which the CIA wished to use.

The **Chairman**. Did you, yourself, know that it was not a weather flight?

Mr. **Dryden**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. You personally did?

Mr. **Dryden**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. How many people in your organization?

Mr. **Dryden**. Very few.

The **Chairman**. Just one or two, or what?

Mr. **Dryden**. Yes, something of that sort.

The **Chairman**. But you knew the significance——

Mr. **Dryden**. Perhaps three of four, I don't remember without recounting the details.

The **Chairman**. And the substance of the statement was agreed to by the CIA?

Mr. **Dryden**. This is correct.

The **Chairman**. But so far as you know it wasn't——

Mr. **Dryden**. We had mentioned Adana, Turkey, and Atsugi, Japan, in this free and open publication.

The **Chairman**. Senator Mansfield?

GROUNDING OF U–2'S

Senator **Mansfield**. Doctor Dryden, have all our U–2's been recalled since the President's order of Thursday, a week ago, that there would be no further overflights into the Soviet Union?

Mr. **Dryden**. Not to my knowledge, sir. I believe at the present time the airplanes are grounded. But I think this is a question again that the operating people will have to answer.

INCIDENT IN JAPAN

Senator **Mansfield**. Do you recall an incident which occurred in Japan some months ago, when a U–2, I assume, landed at Atsugi and GI's landed from a helicopter and ordered the Japanese civilians in the area to leave?

Mr. **Dryden**. I remember the newspaper accounts of it. I have no personal knowledge of the incident.

Senator **Mansfield**. Don't you have personal knowledge of the U–2 flights which are under your immediate supervision?

Mr. **Dryden**. I think I tried to explain before that the operations are not under our immediate supervision.

Senator **Mansfield**. I see.

* * * * * * *

DATE OF COVER STORY [P. 116]

Senator **Wiley**. Let's get back to my question. What was the date of the cover statement that the chairman has been talking about?

Mr. **Dryden**. The 5th, as I understand it, sir.

Senator **Wiley**. All right.

Now, at that time, what information did you have in relation to Powers and the plane?

Mr. **Dryden**. None, except that the plane had been shot down. The mere fact that the plane had been shot down.

Senator **Wiley**. Well, I think that is the answer I am looking for, because there is so much confusion in the papers and otherwise.

Otherwise, you issued this cover statement with only the information that the plane had been shot down.

Mr. **Dryden**. That is correct.

It was down. I had forgotten whether Khrushchev himself, I believe he said it was shot down, but I——

Senator **Wiley**. NASA is primarily engaged not in what U-2 did, but in seeking weather information.

Mr. **Dryden**. We have no intelligence activities either in the development of devices, methods, instruments or operations.

* * * * * * *

PUBLIC RELEASES ON U-2 WEATHER FLIGHTS [P. 116]

Senator **Wiley**. Now, as I understood you, you said it was in 1956 that you entered into an agreement with CIA. Was that in relation to the U-2?

Mr. **Dryden**. This was in relation to installing instruments in U-2 airplanes—of having special flights made with those instruments to secure data on high altitude turbulence.

Senator **Wiley**. Then after you had performed that, your job was over, was it not?

Mr. **Dryden**. That is correct, sir.

Senator **Wiley**. So you had no control whatsoever of the plan?

Mr. **Dryden**. We had none.

Senator **Wiley**. And you were out of the picture, you might say, when it became a matter of——

Mr. **Dryden**. Except for the receipt of data back.

Senator **Wiley**. Yes.

Mr. **Dryden**. Our technicians' last visit to any site, I believe, was in 1957, when one of the technicians went to Japan and to Turkey.

Senator **Wiley**. Well, the point I am getting at is that the question was raised which called the thing a program. You had nothing to do with it after the plane had been equipped and placed in the hands of the CIA? You had no general directions after that?

Mr. **Dryden**. Only to request as many hours and miles of flight as at high an altitude as could be accommodated.

Senator **Wiley**. That is all.

* * * * * * *

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS PREPARED TO HANDLE INQUIRIES [P. 118]

Senator **Gore**. You have referred several times to questions and answers or the answers to questions as the case may be, supplied to you by CIA. Do you have a copy of that question and answer series?

Mr. **Dryden**. We may have some rough notation. What we did was record the types of questions that the press was asking us. We then took these types of questions to the CIA and discussed them with them as to the answers.

Senator **Gore**. You say "we". Now, who is "we"?

Mr. **Dryden**. It was done actually in this case through our public information officer, Mr. Bonney.

Senator **Gore**. The gentleman to your——

Mr. **Dryden**. No, he is not with me.

Senator **Gore**. Mr. Bonney is not here today?

Mr. **Dryden**. Not here. He can be made available if you wish to talk with him, sir.

Senator **Gore**. Was there not a typewritten copy?

Mr. **Dryden**. To the best of my knowledge, no. Very few of our operations with the CIA are reduced to writing, sir.

* * * * * * *

NASA'S LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF U-2 FLIGHT [P. 121]

The **Chairman**. Senator Lausche, The NASA statement is found on page 4 of the background documents.

Senator **Lausche**. Dr. Dryden, based upon news stories and statements made, there has developed the erroneous impression in the minds of many people that these flights, including the one of May 1 over Russia, were made without any legal approval or without any knowledge of the Congress. I want to explore that alleged understanding of the people.

Mr. **Dryden**. This matter is one, sir——

Senator **Lausche**. Just let me ask you the questions.

When did you first become informed that our Government was either going to develop U-2's or had already developed them and was contemplating using them for intelligence activities?

Mr. **Dryden**. Sir, may I discuss this very briefly off the record and then come back on the record?

The **Chairman**. The censor has the right——

Senator **Lausche**. I don't want it charged against my time.

The **Chairman**. That is all right.

Mr. **Dryden**. It is a very brief statement, sir.

The **Chairman**. The censor is authorized to take it off the record, but you can put it on the record.

Mr. **Dryden**. I don't think it is a matter really for the censors, but it is a matter for the committee. To answer your question, we were informed in 1956 that this airplane was developed for classified intelligence operations of various types, and that some of these might possibly involve the presence of the airplane over foreign territory.

Now, may I——

Senator **Lausche**. Did the foreign territory include the Soviets?

Mr. **Dryden**. Not explicitly, but certainly I think this was implied. May I say what I wanted to say before? I have been quite honest in answering this question fully. This decision was made in the days of NACA,[2] which was not an agency engaged in international operations. NASA, as you know, is engaged in essentially international operations.

Senator **Lausche**. Mr. Chairman, I do not want this time charged against my 10 minutes. I think we will get along all right if you allow me to ask the questions.

---

[2] National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.

The **Chairman**. I think you covered that point, Mr. Dryden, once. We understand the origin of this. You need not cover it again.

Mr. **Dryden**. No, but I just want to make one point, that it really is not in the best interests of the Nation to turn out publicly the exact extent of the knowledge of the high officials in NASA.

Senator **Lausche**. I agree with you fully.

Mr. **Dryden**. You agree with this. That is all I want to know.

Senator **Lausche**. I agree with you fully and I would not do it, but I am driven to do it to get the truth.

Mr. **Dryden**. I will be quite frank and honest. I just wondered if the committee felt the same way about it that I do.

Senator **Lausche**. I don't know how the others feel, but I agree with you. I am of the opinion we are serving the Soviet Union by this hearing and not our country.

Now then, it was in 1956, at what time?

Mr. **Dryden**. In 1956, in the early months. Our first release on NASA use was in May of 1956.

Senator **Lausche**. All right.

INFORMATION REVEALED TO CONGRESS

Did you at any time appear before any Congressional committees or discuss with any Members of the Congress this use of U-2 planes?

Mr. **Dryden**. No, sir, it was not my business. We are——

Senator **Lausche**. Do you know whether or not it was revealed to the Members of Congress in responsible positions that the plane was to be developed and used as it has been used?

Mr. **Dryden**. I do not know this of my own knowledge.

Senator **Lausche**. Do you know it from——

Mr. **Dryden**. I have heard it said there were certain Members of Congress who were advised, but I have no personal knowledge of the matter.

Senator **Lausche**. Then from the standpoint of your knowledge, for what length of time have these flights been made in various parts of the world?

Mr. **Dryden**. I do not know when the first flight occurred. The airplane has been in operation since the middle of 1956.

Senator **Lausche**. Then it is fair to say that constitutionally and from the standpoint of Federal laws these flights were authorized and, based upon information that you received, were known to the Members of Congress?

Mr. **Dryden**. This is again second-hand information, but I have no personal knowledge of any of these matters.

WEATHER FLIGHTS

Senator **Lausche**. As one of the scientists in NASA, knowing that you were interested in weather reports and knowing that this plane would reach a height of 70,000 feet, your agency was tied into it.

Mr. **Dryden**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Lausche**. And in the discussions that were had 4 years ago about pre-arranged defenses given in the event of some unexpected accident, were you a participant?

Mr. **Dryden**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Lausche**. And your recollection is that those took place in 1956?

Mr. **Dryden**. In 1956, and there has been no occasion to use them over a 4-year period, until May 1.

Senator **Lausche**. Now, how intimately were you informed about the number of flights that had been made?

Mr. **Dryden**. I have no knowledge of the number of flights that have been made, except those for our purposes.

Senator **Lausche**. Except those for——

Mr. **Dryden**. The 199 weather flights.

Senator **Lausche**. That is when the flight involved your direct——

Mr. **Dryden**. Instrumentation.

Senator **Lausche** [continuing]. Objective you knew about it.

Mr. **Dryden**. We knew about it afterward. We obtained the flight plans and the data obtained. They were all over non-Communist territory.

Senator **Lausche**. Yes.

Mr. **Dryden**. Along the routes of the airlines which, as you know skirt the edges.

EXPLANATIONS IN CASE OF UNEXPECTED EVENTS

Senator **Lausche**. What was the explanation that you were to give in the event there were some untoward event in connection with one of the planes?

Mr. **Dryden**. Well, in general terms, although necessarily with some modification, the story that was given about the missing NASA airplane.

Senator **Lausche**. The explanation that you gave of what this flight was, was in conformity with the cover story that was agreed upon 4 years ago?

Mr. **Dryden**. But not dependent on this whole story. As I explained, the moment the airplane was missing, we began consultations on what should be said.

Senator **Lausche**. At the time you issued your statement, you did not have knowledge of what the Soviet knew about it and what actually happened?

Mr. **Dryden**. We did not.

Senator **Lausche**. Did you have knowledge of the instructions that were given to the pilot?

Mr. **Dryden**. No, sir. No knowledge about the operations.

Senator **Lausche**. And that is——

Mr. **Dryden**. We heard Khrushchev's press announcement, of course, that morning.

Senator **Lausche**. I think that is all that I have with this witness.

PUBLIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE CIA

The **Chairman**. Mr. Dryden, the representatives of the CIA and the State Department who are censoring the record have raised a basic question as to whether or not any of the discussion with regard to the relationship between NASA and the CIA should be left in the record or should be deleted. What is your view about that matter?

Mr. DRYDEN. Well, my feeling is that this can only spread to the public information about the way in which the CIA operates. But I think this is a matter that the committee will have to decide.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a matter of public knowledge that you have been used as a cover for CIA already?

Mr. DRYDEN. It is not. We are regarded in one popular story as a piano player who didn't know what was going on upstairs. It is known now that we were used as a cover in this 1-week period. The question is whether the details of how covers are worked out for CIA operations should be spread on the public record. I have some doubts myself.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your position?

Mr. DRYDEN. My position is that it should not, but this is a matter, I think, for the committee to decide. I am answering your questions directly, and with full information.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that your position as an international weather gatherer has been compromised by this U-2 incident?

Mr. DRYDEN. No, so far, but it might very well be if it is brought out that we knew of this in 1956, and have continued during this period in anticipation of being used as a cover. I think as far as our operations are concerned, we would be greatly helped if this were not spread on the public record, as I said before. I am thinking of the welfare of the Nation, and the effectiveness of the agency. I think if we were still in the NACA days, it would not make as much difference because NACA was not involved in international activities.

CIA OWNS THE U-2'S

Senator CAPEHART. Mr. Chairman, on this point, may I ask this: Who owns the 10 U-2's, what department of the Government?

Mr. DRYDEN. All of them are owned by CIA.

Senator CAPEHART. They are all owned by CIA?

Mr. DRYDEN. CIA.

Senator CAPEHART. Who pays the pilots?

Mr. DRYDEN. They have all been paid by the CIA.

Senator CAPEHART. All the CIA did was to use your name, period?

Mr. DRYDEN. Well, they carried out a flight program which I have described, and talked about that program rather than the other uses of U-2.

Senator CAPEHART. They used your name, leaving the impression throughout the world that these 10 U-2's were operated by you?

Mr. DRYDEN. That is correct.

Senator CAPEHART. And that you had complete, 100 percent control over them and they were 100 percent weather planes, is that correct?

Mr. DRYDEN. That is correct, yes, sir.

Senator CAPEHART. When the truth is, you had nothing to do with them?

Mr. DRYDEN. The truth is we had nothing to do with actual flight operations, but may I make myself clear? At that time, and still, I appreciate the difficulty of hiding an airplane operating all over the world. I do not know what other cover story would have been effective. I felt it a duty to cooperate with an agency that is getting information vital to our national defense.

Senator **Capehart**. Were you directed by the President of the United States to permit the CIA to use your name as you have just described?

Mr. **Dryden**. I do not know personally to what extent the President was brought into it. In 1956 I was, as I explained, the Chief Executive Officer; I reported at that time directly to the chairman of NACA, who was Jimmy Doolittle, whom many of you know. What Jimmy discussed with the President, at the time I do not know.

CIA INVOLVEMENT NO LONGER A SECRET

The **Chairman**. Well, at that point, it is quite clear that everybody knows, as a result of this incident, that you have been used by CIA, don't they? There is no secret about it?

Mr. **Dryden**. Well, I think what I have been trying to make clear here is that we have been used by CIA, but that there was a research program of considerable magnitude on weather, which was carried out and it was, and is, useful in the design of aircraft and missiles of this country.

The **Chairman**. We realize that, but I mean there is no secret about the fact that these flights, when they took off from Turkey or Pakistan or anyplace else, were called NASA flights and now everybody knows—as a result of this, which has been in every newspaper in the world—that it was a NASA flight, don't they?

Mr. **Dryden**. This flight. I would say that perhaps 80 percent or more of the flights were NASA flights. At least, we had 199 flights in 4 years.

The **Chairman**. They know the U-2 flights——

Mr. **Dryden**. A quarter of a million miles.

The **Chairman**. They know the U-2 flights were——

Mr. **Dryden**. These are U-2 flights I am speaking of.

The **Chairman**. Primarily CIA flights?

Mr. **Dryden**. The airplanes were owned by CIA. They were operated a quarter of a million miles on 199 flights to secure data for us.

The **Chairman**. Did you pay for those flights which secured data for you?

Mr. **Dryden**. We did not pay for those flights. We offered to pay for the time of the pilots involved, but we have never been called upon to pay.

The **Chairman**. CIA paid for them and you were the beneficiary of the information?

Mr. **Dryden**. This was regarded as part of the training operation or whatever you want to call it. I think the only secret, sir, is the extent of knowledge of NASA in 1956 through 1960.

The **Chairman**. Then you prefer that NASA remain in the position of not knowing all that went on? That you were surprised by this flight?

Mr. **Dryden**. We would like to remain in the position of the stupid—well——

Senator **Capehart**. Of what?

Mr. **Dryden**. Of a stupid person.

The **Chairman**. As far as I am concerned, if the committee is agreeable that the censors can use that as a guideline, I see no particular reason why that part of the testimony should be made public. Is that agreeable to the committee?

Without objection, then, the censors may follow such route.

Mr. **Dryden**. I appreciate that very much because it means a lot to our future relationships with other countries. So far, from what has presently been made public, we have not seen any evidence of lack of cooperation with us or reaction to this incident.

NOT PLAYING THE GAME OF THE SOVIET UNION

The **Chairman**. I want to make one short statement with regard to the statement of the Senator from Ohio, when he says that this hearing is serving the purposes of the Soviet Union. I only want the record to show that, first, the committee authorized the hearing. I believe the Senator from Ohio was present at that meeting. I want the record to show that the President of the United States stated in my presence and in the presence of some 20 or 30 or 40 Members of Congress—both Houses—that he heartily endorsed these hearings. He has some responsibility with regard to the security and the welfare of this country, and I certainly accept his judgment as being very persuasive. I do not know of any important newspaper that has condemned them as not being in the national interest. The Governor of New York,[3] who is a right prominent citizen in our present day political life, has stated in a public statement that he thought an inquiry into this matter was in the public interest.

So I only want to show that I do not agree with the Senator from Ohio that these hearings are playing the game of the Soviet Union. I regret that the Senator has made such a statement because I assume there is no reason to take it out of the record and it will be published. I think it is a great disservice to this committee and to the Senate in its effort to discharge its responsibilties in this matter.

Senator **Lausche**. I would like to make a statement on this subject.

The **Chairman**. The Senator from Ohio.

THE FINGER OF GUILT

Senator **Lausche**. I was present when the committee decided to conduct the hearings. I subscribed to them. It was my anticipation that we would try to ascertain what happened.

I did not expect that efforts would be made to place the United States in an unfavorable light and to lift the dignity of the Soviets with respect to conduct among the nations of the world. In the three days that we have conducted the hearings, every effort has been made to put the finger of guilt upon the United States Government. I find a great scarcity of material in the record showing what the Soviets have done by way of espionage.

---

[3] Nelson A. Rockefeller.

Moreover, the Senator from Wisconsin asked that there be established an agenda. I do not know what you are trying to ascertain. Are we contending that the flights which were made were without legal or constitutional authority? Are we contending that the President violated any law or usurped any rights that are not vested in him by the Constitution?

If we are trying to prove guilt on the part of our Government, should not the suspected wrongs and issues be identified? In what respect is it implied that our Government is to blame? What are the issues?

This morning I read in one of the papers that the intelligence agency is held blameless. That statement implies that someone is to blame for something. To blame for what?

Now these are some of the things that are left pending and in a frightening state of confusion. If the issue is wrong because of conflicting statements, why aren't we clearly directing our questions at those points?

Now then, I do hope that we are not trying to prove that the President is to blame. He is not of my political party, but if you try to prove that, you are proving that Khrushchev is blameless and I can't go along with that.

THE PURPOSE OF THE HEARINGS

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator, of course, is entitled to his opinion about anybody's conduct. But he apparently misapprehends the purpose of the hearings. It is not to prove any contention. It is to find out what happened and, after the facts are determined, which is very difficult, then each man in the country can draw his own conclusion.

Senator LAUSCHE. How are you going to determine the facts?

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator has made assumptions which are wholly unwarranted by the facts as far as I am concerned. I know of no one who has assumed anyone is guilty of either an illegal act or of any other misdeed. But it is a matter which has attracted the attention of the world.

It resulted in a very dramatic failure of a Summit meeting to which great attention had been given, and it is the duty, as I understand it, of the Senate and of the Congress to inquire and to discover what actually took place. Then the conclusions as to whether or not there is any criticism warranted will result from those inquiries.

I think the Senator from Ohio, in obstructing or trying to obstruct the effort to find out what happened, is not promoting the purpose. I know of no one who has accused the President of illegal acts at all. But asking questions as to what happened is the only way that we know of in a democracy to find out the facts.

I have made no accusations. I don't know of anybody else on this committee that has. Of course, I don't know whether the Senator from Ohio has ever participated in an inquiry of this kind before, but I think the procedure being followed here is customary. I have participated in a number of them.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All in the world we are trying to do is discover what happened, and in every case in which people such as Doctor Dryden or others have said this information should not be published, the committee has not questioned that judgment.

Now, for the information of the committee, of course, I think these hearings have been very informative. The hearing we had yesterday I think was extremely informative. It was not published. It has not played into the hands of the Kremlin as far as I know, not unless members of this committee violate their oath of office and speak where they shouldn't.

But, on the other hand, so long as these activities are carried on by our Government, I think it is the duty of the Senate to know what goes on, and thereby to judge, based upon facts and not upon faith and theories. That is the only purpose of the hearings.

I don't know what the conclusion of the committee will be. I don't know what my conclusions will be.

I think the Senator from Ohio completely misunderstands the whole hearing when he intimates and very strongly implies that the chairman is out to destroy the President of the United States and build up Khrushchev, and I don't particularly appreciate any such insinuation from anybody. I think the Senator is entirely wrong in making any such statement.

WHOM ARE WE GOING TO BLAME?

Senator LAUSCHE. The Senator from Ohio did not ascribe that to the Senator from Arkansas.

The CHAIRMAN. The record speaks for itself.

Senator LAUSCHE. And that inference that is to be drawn from the questions that have been propounded supports the conclusions which I have reached.

The CHAIRMAN. The record speaks for itself.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I say that probably my newness on this committee and my newness in connection with the type of hearings that have been conducted gives me a light that might be used as some guidance in what ought to be done.

How are you going to make your findings of fact? Is that what we have been called together for, to fix blame or to establish immunity? Whom are we going to blame? What are we going to blame them for? And if we blame, what service will it be to our country?

Senator CAPEHART. Mr. Chairman, maybe I could help a little bit.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to quote to the Senator what I said yesterday in that connection when one of the reporters said something about blame. Wait until I read it all. My answer was:

> I haven't said there was any blame. I only raise at this point the question of the wisdom of certain decisions. Now, you jump at conclusions prematurely.

This is what I said to the reporters, which is very much what I am saying to the Senator from Ohio.

> Don't put in my mouth that I said the blame rests on anyone. The blame is a bad word to use in there. It's the question of their participation in a decision. You have to, in order to use the word "blame," you have got to assume then that it was finally and definitely bad.

And I do not know why you can't wait until we complete the hearings, until there is an opportunity to evaluate the hearings.

I want to say that I think if the Senator from Ohio—I don't wish to volunteer judgments, but since he is undertaking to be my censor and mentor, that any such accusations as his are much more likely to cause political friction within this committee and the Congress than I think the conduct of the hearing itself. I have never before seen a member of this committee accuse other members of having conducted hearings for the purpose of serving a foreign country, particularly one with whom we are not too friendly.

Senator LAUSCHE. My statement was that the net result of the questioning is leading to that end.

The CHAIRMAN. We don't happen to have Mr. Khrushchev here to question him. The only way we can find out what happened is from the people from our own Government.

Senator AIKEN. Let's subpoena him!

Senator CAPEHART. Mr. Chairman, I might make this statement——

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to make a point of order before any statements are made.

We are not proceeding according to the general agreement of this committee and I think first we should go around for 10 minutes per member.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator is correct. I apologize, but this statement was injected into this.

The Senator from Ohio's statement wasn't in the nature of a question. It was a direct statement critical of me. I think we should resume this and reserve such arguments until a little later.

NEED TO GATHER INFORMATION

Senator CAPEHART. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent to just make a statement, if I may, on this subject.

The CHAIRMAN. On this subject?

Senator CAPEHART. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Unanimous consent for how long?

Senator CAPEHART. I mean less than a minute.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Senator CAPEHART. Let me say this. I am in favor of this inquiry because as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee I want to get the information for my own individual use, not for publication, and it never was my intention that any information that we get here would be given to the press or anything else, because I am constantly confronted with the question, "You are a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, what do you know about this matter?"

Now, it seems to me that we are going to be better Senators and can handle situations that come up in the future much better if we know all the facts surrounding this, not from the standpoint of blaming anybody, not from the standpoint of criticizing anybody, but from the standpoint of the information, because we read a lot of information in the news which is not correct and only from those who have handled this situation can we get 100 percent of the facts which I think we, as members of the Foreign Relations Committee, are entitled to.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to say I appreciate the statement of the Senator from Indiana. He has participated in many of these hearings and I think he expresses exactly what I think.

Let me see, I lost track. Who is next?

I recognize Senator Aiken.

U-2 PHOTOGRAPHS

Senator AIKEN. Dr. Dryden, yesterday Mr. Dulles showed us pictures of an eye of a typhoon taken from a U-2. You are undoubtedly familiar with them?

Mr. DRYDEN. Yes, I am.

Senator AIKEN. Have those been released?

Mr. DRYDEN. I brought the magazine article along. Yes, I am familiar with them.

Senator AIKEN. They have been published.

Mr. DRYDEN. They have been published, yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Were they taken by a CIA flyer?

Mr. DRYDEN. They were taken from a U-2 airplane, yes, sir. You are speaking of this picture, and perhaps you would like to see them.

Senator AIKEN. We saw the pictures yesterday.

Mr. DRYDEN. Yes, sir. This is a publication, just to show where they were published.

Senator AIKEN. I haven't much to add to this controversy. I had an idea that instead of having this hearing to fix the blame that probably we were having a hearing in order to bestow credit that belonged to Dr. Dryden.

At what altitude does the jetstream flow?

Mr. DRYDEN. At varying altitudes at different times a year, at different parts of the Earth. It sometimes goes, I think, even higher than U-2's. Sometimes it is as low as 40,000 feet.

Senator AIKEN. Is that a Pacific phenomenon?

Mr. DRYDEN. No, sir, it occurs all over the world, actually.

Senator AIKEN. Could a U-2 rise to the jetstream, sir, in the eastern United States and be wafted across the ocean on it?

Mr. DRYDEN. Well, certainly the speed of the jetstream would be added to the speed of a U-2 itself.

Senator AIKEN. Could a U-2 with a normal supply of fuel fly well into Russia?

Mr. DRYDEN. It is my understanding that they can. Here, again, I do not have any detailed knowledge of the ranges of flights over Russia. Our own flights, you can figure from the 200 flights and a quarter of a million miles, divide 250,000 by 200, an average flight of the order of 1,000 to 1,200 miles in the weather flights made for us.

Senator AIKEN. Russia has not discontinued giving weather reports?

Mr. DRYDEN. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Senator AIKEN. To the United States?

Mr. DRYDEN. Not to my knowledge.

Senator AIKEN. And we give our weather reports to Russia?

Mr. **Dryden**. This is my understanding.

Senator **Aiken**. Is there general cooperation among all the countries of the world?

Mr. **Dryden**. In weather, yes, sir.

Senator **Aiken**. In weather.

That is all.

The **Chairman**. Senator Capehart?

THE CIA USED NASA

Senator **Capehart**. I think all of the questions have been covered that I was interested in, except I would just like to get a little more clear this: the CIA simply used your agency as a cover up——

Mr. **Dryden**. To explain the presence of these unusual airplanes.

Senator **Capehart**. That's right.

In other words the CIA owned the 10 U-2's; they operated them.

Mr. **Dryden**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Capehart**. They paid the pilots, they handled the whole business, but they used your name, plus the fact that they permitted you to have instruments in these planes and you did get a lot of valuable information.

Mr. **Dryden**. The planes were specially instrumented for our missions. At the time they flew our missions it is my understanding there was no intelligence equipment on board.

Senator **Capehart**. I see. Now, one other thing which I think is very important, and not to rehash what has happened because the milk is spilled and when it is spilled, it is gone, but in order that maybe we will avoid this sort of thing in the future, because there is no question but what we are going to continue with intelligence work, and that was this:

The thing that has concerned and worried me was the fact that the agencies involved in this mission, knowing about it, did not know exactly what they were going to do and say under certain conditions. You say that in 1956 there was a convention held in which it was agreed that, if one of these planes fell in the hands of a foreign country or was knocked down or captured, you would say that they were being operated by your agency, and they were there only to get weather information?

Mr. **Dryden**. The actual documents were worked out at that time.

Senator **Capehart**. And you were to make a statement that it was a weather plane and nothing more?

Mr. **Dryden**. That is correct.

Senator **Capehart**. That was agreed back in 1956.

Mr. **Dryden**. That is correct.

Senator **Capehart**. That was all that was agreed to.

Mr. **Dryden**. That's right.

Senator **Capehart**. That you were to do that; you were to say that.

Then my question is, why didn't you do that? Why didn't we go on with that program?

Mr. **Dryden**. We did until the decision was made otherwise.

Senator **Capehart**. Until—you did go on with that?

Mr. **Dryden**. For a period of a week.

Senator **Capehart**. You carried out what you thought was your assignment in 1956 and you told the press of the world that this was a plane?

Mr. **Dryden**. That's right.

Senator **Capehart**. For example, is it a fact the airplane took off from Turkey?

Mr. **Dryden**. Yes.

Senator **Capehart**. And the pilot ran out of oxygen, is that a fact?

Mr. **Dryden**. That statement was made.

Senator **Capehart**. Did he report back?

Mr. **Dryden**. Not to my knowledge. That is purely a cover story.

Senator **Capehart**. Purely a cover story?

Mr. **Dryden**. Purely a cover story.

Senator **Capehart**. Now then, someone later decided to tell the facts?

Mr. **Dryden**. That is correct, on Saturday, I believe.

Senator **Capehart**. They decided to tell the facts.

Mr. **Dryden**. That's right.

Senator **Capehart**. But at the 1956 meeting, were you the only agency that was to make any statements?

Mr. **Dryden**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Capehart**. You were the only one to make any statements?

Mr. **Dryden**. Yes, that was my understanding.

Senator **Capehart**. Then someone countermanded that and we started talking and going in every direction?

Mr. **Dryden**. I think I should say at that time no one contemplated an airplane with its equipment would come down in large pieces. This was an unusual, unexpected feature of this particular incident, which I think it is fair to say was not anticipated.

Senator **Capehart**. You mean it was never anticipated that one would be knocked down?

Mr. **Dryden**. No, but it was not anticipated that it would come down in one piece, essentially big pieces.

Senator **Capehart**. In other words, it was never anticipated that the pilot would live or there would be any pieces left of the plane?

Mr. **Dryden**. Well, it was thought, I believe, that he would be able to make his way out.

Senator **Capehart**. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Senator Carlson.

MEMO TO THE PRESS

Senator **Carlson**. Doctor, there is an old political axiom, never write. Telephone or visit personally.

Mr. **Dryden**. That is the basis of our relationships.

Senator **Carlson**. As I heard your testimony this morning, had you not prepared a memorandum—and I noticed when you released that it was a memorandum, it was not a statement, so to speak——

Mr. **Dryden**. Memorandum to the press of these answers.

Senator **Carlson**. In other words, it was reasonable to assume if you had held a press conference and answered all these questions, you would not be up here this morning.

Mr. **Dryden**. We were afraid we would have gotten many more questions that we did not have the answers to and have no opportunity to coordinate.

Senator **Carlson**. But as a result of writing this memorandum I believe there has been much talk about its being a statement—as I read this it says "Memo to the Press"——

Mr. **Dryden**. Yes.

Senator **Carlson**. And you did that just to avoid holding a public press conference which would, of course, keep you out of print, and I think—I can see your side to it—there would have no doubt been other questions. At the same time, by issuing this memorandum you were, of course, placed in the position of issuing statements that probably should have been issued by the State Department or some other agency.

Mr. **Dryden**. Yes.

Senator **Carlson**. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. I am not clear yet, Mr. Dryden, why you felt impelled to make any statement at all.

Mr. **Dryden**. Let's say it is a convenience when you have 25 or 30 people who want answers to questions, the same general questions——

The **Chairman**. Do you always respond to the press? I mean do they dictate whether you make a statement or not?

Mr. **Dryden**. They do not dictate it, but the whole public posture of NASA at the direction of the Congress has been to be as completely open as it is possible to be.

The **Chairman**. Well, now, were you being open? You knew this statement was false. Didn't you?

Mr. **Dryden**. I knew it was false when I agreed to go——

The **Chairman**. Do you call that open, then? Since you agree you had to make a statement, then why do you agree you had to make a false statement?

Mr. **Dryden**. When you get into intelligence business and cover operations, you assume this kind of an undertaking. Now, I personally have no difficulty in reconciling the desire to work peacefully with the countries of the world and the desire to see that my own country is protected by the means that are necessary.

DID YOU CONSIDER TELLING THE TRUTH?

The **Chairman**. Did you consider at that point telling the truth?

Mr. **Dryden**. No, I did not.

The **Chairman**. Did you participate in the decision on May 7 to tell the truth?

Mr. **Dryden**. No. No one from NASA participated as far as I know.

The **Chairman**. Well, is it fair to say that the CIA told you to make the untrue statement?

Mr. **Dryden**. No, we agreed to it. I would not put it on that kind of a basis. We agreed to serve as the cover for this operation, and regarded it as a duty of a responsible person in the government to do this.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Did you give any consideration to delaying any statement until you knew more about the facts?

Mr. **DRYDEN**. The cover story is effective only if you give facts immediately. An airplane is down, then it must have been going somewhere, and it must have had a pilot.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Well, it is effective for what purpose? What purpose did you expect to serve?

Mr. **DRYDEN**. Expected to gain time to find our what the Russians actually knew about the airplane; what they had.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Wouldn't you gain just as much time by saying nothing?

Mr. **DRYDEN**. I think it is impossible to say "no comment" on a research operation of NASA aircraft. This is a very difficult——

The **CHAIRMAN**. This is the point I don't understand. I don't know why it is impossible to keep your mouth shut when you don't know what you are talking about. I try to follow that sometimes.

Mr. **DRYDEN**. We knew what we were talking about. We were trying to convey the impression that this was a weather airplane lost on a mission owing to oxygen difficulties.

The **CHAIRMAN**. But it turned out you didn't know what you were talking about, did you, and it is your statement which actually embarrassed the State Department, wasn't it?

Mr. **DRYDEN**. Not to my knowledge.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Well, I think that is quite clear from the record, because your statement was so far from the truth that when Khrushchev followed it on the 7th with a statement that approximated the truth, then they were very embarrassed, weren't they, by the conflict between your statement and what actually happened?

Senator **AIKEN**. Mr. Chairman?

The **CHAIRMAN**. Is that not so?

Mr. **DRYDEN**. I don't understand the logic. If you decide to tell a lie for your nation, you tell a lie and you stick to it until you are told otherwise.

Senator **AIKEN**. Mr. Chairman?

The **CHAIRMAN**. I yield.

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

Senator **AIKEN**. Did not the Defense Department release stating that this was a weather plane precede the statement made by NASA?

The **CHAIRMAN**. Well, the Defense Department statement was a very sketchy statement.

Senator **AIKEN**. A very short one.

The **CHAIRMAN**. The great difference between the State Department's and NASA's was the detail which they put in which was untrue, and which gave many opportunities for the enemy to make the convincing statement on the 7th as to how untrue this statement was. If you will read Khrushchev's statement following the NASA statement, he ridicules the content of that statement.

My own opinion is that this statement did embarrass the State Department. The State Department was not consulted, they did not clear this statement, according to Mr. Dillon's own statement, and this is largely the root of their trouble.

Senator AIKEN. If the Defense Department release preceded the release of NASA, it would indicate that the Defense Department was calling the shots, wouldn't it?

The CHAIRMAN. Why couldn't they stand on the Defense Department's release? That is what puzzles me. It was a very short statement on May 5, which could not be attacked in anything like the NASA statement.

I don't understand yet why you felt compelled to go into great detail, giving a great many facts, all of which were untrue.

Mr. DRYDEN. I think again, sir, that it rests largely on the fact that the NASA operation is one which is open to the press. We could not remain quiet for 5 days.

The CHAIRMAN. Anybody can remain quiet. There is no compulsion on you. This is what I don't understand. You don't have to make any statements immediately because a reporter asks you.

Mr. DRYDEN. It would immediately confirm the operation. That is my interpretation of it. There was a chance at that time that Khrushchev did not have the airplane or the pilot, and this lie, this cover story, was continued as long as there was any possibility that the Russians did not have the plane or the pilot.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Mr. Hagerty ask you to make this statement?

Mr. DRYDEN. I have said before, I had no direct contact with Mr. Hagerty. A swarm of reporters came from the White House. The White House correspondents came to NASA looking for the facts.

The facts which you talk about had been coordinated with the State Department in the form of answering specific questions.

The CHAIRMAN. You said a while ago it was the CIA. You did not say State Department.

Mr. DRYDEN. With CIA. Who said that they had been coordinated with State?

The CHAIRMAN. It had not been cleared by the State Department. They stated that, and you are not——

Mr. DRYDEN. I have no knowledge of my own.

DISCUSSION OF LYING

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, for the purposes of information may I ask a question whether the published record will include this discussion of lying, and so on?

Mr. DRYDEN. I would hope not.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think that this witness is entitled not to have even any inference drawn of the unfavorable light.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say to the Senator from Ohio that we have censors appointed by the agencies whose responsibility is to protect the security of the country.

I don't know whether the Senator from Ohio wants it seen or not. If he wishes to be, we might give him that duty. But I think he can rely on the representative of the State Department and the CIA to see that that record is correct.

I don't know why he keeps worrying about my questions.

Senator LAUSCHE. I can only tell you that from my concept, I am stuck, like with a sledge hammer, when implications are being made that the man is a liar.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no implication. He stated it was untrue.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is all that can be drawn if it is published. That is the only inference that will be drawn. The word "lie" will be the highlight.

What he did was for his country.

The CHAIRMAN. I would appreciate it if the Senator would attend to his own responsibilities and not try to tell me what to do in this. He has an opportunity to ask questions and say what he likes.

Senator LAUSCHE. You have answered my question that the censors will determine whether it shall be included.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought that was understood, if the Senator had been following this at all.

I don't appreciate being interrupted by these implications, as I say once more to the Senator. If he will ask his own questions in his own way, I have no objection to it. I don't like to be interrupted with such implications.

Senator LAUSCHE. There was no implication. I merely had asked a question for my own information.

The CHAIRMAN. Never before have I seen another Senator have any such attitude toward another Member, trying to exercise what he believes to be his rights and to discharge his responsibilities.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, you should be fair also. These are irritating questions. They are not going to the heart of the matter, as the Senator from Ohio said. There is no question about this. The fact is clear. This is a policy matter and they went ahead and did what policy said.

Now there isn't any need of going into it and scrapping it all over the lot. I am getting disgusted also with the proceedings.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, you may be disgusted, if you like.

Senator WILEY. I have a right to be, and so has the Senator from Ohio and every other Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. The issue here is still—there is no question about it being untrue. That has already been published to all the world. There is nothing new about that. That was known some time ago.

WHY YOU FELT UNDER ANY COMPULSION TO MAKE A STATEMENT

The question is, and I still don't understand, why you felt under any compulsion to make this statement.

Mr. DRYDEN. I will say again, sir——

The CHAIRMAN. You don't need to repeat it. You don't have to answer it any fuller than you have, I suppose.

Mr. DRYDEN. The Aeronautics and Space Act passed by the Congress requires that NASA make available generally all of its information to the public when it is not contrary to the public interest. We could not refuse to answer questions as to where our airplane was supposed to go.

The CHAIRMAN. When you are put in a position where you can't answer truthfully, that law certainly wouldn't apply. It does not require you to make false statements.

Mr. DRYDEN. It is impossible to have a cover story without false statements.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course it is, but don't rely on the law. This is an informal agreement with you and CIA. No law required you to make such a statement that was wholly contrary to the facts.

Why would you try to persuade me of that?

Mr. DRYDEN. I have said before, sir, that I thought it was in the interest of national defense to support the cover story.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right, but the law didn't require you to make any such statement as this.

Mr. DRYDEN. No, I agree with you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. No. It was your judgment.

Mr. DRYDEN. It was mine.

The CHAIRMAN. Because you wanted to please the reporters, you made it.

Mr. DRYDEN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't have to make it.

Mr. DRYDEN. No, sir. I will say again that this was fully coordinated. The people concerned realized that answers must be found for these questions. They were worked out and agreed upon. It was not solely my responsibility.

The CHAIRMAN. They must be informed right then, immediately within an hour?

Mr. DRYDEN. No. This has been continuing for 3 days, sir, as soon as the Turkey story was published.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know whether I can gather my wits enough to continue the questions that have been prepared. I will pass for a moment.

Senator Gore, do you have any questions?

THE PRESIDENT SHOULD TELL THE TRUTH

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, on this question of falsification, I have been deeply disturbed. This ugly word "lie" hits me very hard. I haven't applied it to this proceeding, to this incident.

Since only you and I were here at the concluding statement the first day, I would like to read to my colleagues briefly what I had to say at that moment. It need not be reprinted in the record. Is that agreeable?

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator WILEY. Isn't it a fact that the President, when he came out and told the truth, reinstated, if you want to call it that, the confidence of the world in the leadership of America? I might say that last night I was out with a group of foreigners, and that is their conclusion.

What do you think? By refusing to tell a lie and coming out to tell the truth and take the responsibility, didn't the President do just that?

Senator GORE. You have 3 things in your question. I think the President of the United States and every other official of the U.S.

Government should tell the truth when he speaks. I feel the same way about every citizen.

I can't agree with this gentleman's statement that it would be impossible for him to say "no comment." I do not agree with him that it is impossible to have a cover story without telling a lie. One can be indirect in a statement. One can be non-specific, can leave the possibility of inference without telling a bald-faced falsehood.

I still don't like to use the word "lie" with respect to my government or any official of it. If the President said anything, yes, he should tell the truth. If this gentleman said anything, he should tell the truth.

At any rate, I cannot condone falsification by our Government. I happened to sit by a Sunday school teacher the other night and she told me she couldn't reach her Sunday school class that morning. This is something that humiliated millions of Americans, and I just cannot condone the testimony of this gentleman here today.

The question of whether the President should have assumed the responsibility of this is another question the Senator asked. One cannot assume responsibility for this incident partially, and to assume this direct responsibility when the record, I think, is perfectly clear now that neither the President nor the Secretary of State—well, at least the record doesn't show that either the President or the Secretary of State or the Assistant Secretary of State or this gentleman knew specifically of this flight, and for him to assume the responsibility, may I say to my distinguished friend from Wisconsin, was to associate himself with this reprehensible series of official falsifications. I don't like to see the President of my country associated with any such, and I think it was a severe mistake for him to have done so.

Senator WILEY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator GORE. I have finished.

DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE REAL ISSUE

Senator WILEY. Assuming the last statement implies that the President was guilty of any dereliction——

Senator GORE. I did not mean to imply such.

Senator WILEY. Then we will say, assuming that you didn't. My point is simply this: We are living in a world where espionage has been the feature and the practice of all nations, and this gentleman here, the doctor, was the head of NASA and he only had a few of the facts, and it was his responsibility, under the policy, to issue a statement, called a "cover statement."

Now then, the point I am getting at goes right back to the Senator from Ohio's position. Are we going to make mountains out of that molehill or are we going to ask who was to blame for blowing up the summit conference?

That is the real issue, and if you want to look into that point, I think you will find definitely that Khrushchev had no idea, when he went to Paris, of carrying on that conference. If that is what we are investigating, fine.

Now we investigated this man. We have investigated a public servant of this country. Are we going ahead now and blast this whole thing out and divert the attention from the real issue?

That is the reason that I feel that the Senator from Ohio is tremendously right in letting himself explode as he has this morning, not with any reflection on the chairman, but rather that we had better keep our nose to the grindstone and see where we are going.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Iowa.

NO CRITICISM OF DR. DRYDEN

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am moved by two motions on this particular discussion. I am moved to regret that it has come up and I also think perhaps it is a good thing to get it out and off our chests.

In the first place, I want to say that I cannot share the direct criticism or placing the blame on Dr. Dryden——

Senator WILEY. Hear, Hear.

Senator HICKENLOOPER [continuing]. Nor his group. I am leaving aside entirely a discussion of whether mistakes were made in basic policy decisions of some time ago, but I can't help but take the position and feel very strongly that whether or not it was a mistake for NASA to make this statement at the time it did, and that can be argued either way, nevertheless, there is no question in my mind but what NASA was following an agreed position which has been joined in by the CIA, by the State Department and others as a means of meeting a contingency which might possibly occur in the future, and that in NASA's view this was carrying out the previously agreed upon position, which was considered to be in the public interest.

And, therefore, I can't bring myself to put the onus on Dr. Dryden and on the NASA organization any more than I would put it on CIA or the State Department or any other groups which got together in discussing what would happen under certain contingencies. I believe that the NASA group thought that this was the time when that pre-arranged agreement was to be put into effect and they did put it into effect. Whether it was wise or not to do it is beside the point.

Now, as I understand the Senator to suggest a minute ago, he said he hated to see the President associated with falsehoods. I don't know what he meant by that, but it certainly seems to me that the President did apparently direct a factual statement about this, assume full responsibility, and told the truth about the matter, so I don't see that he was associated in any falsehood.

Now, so far as falsehoods and espionage activities are concerned, from time immemorial people have tried to get intelligence and information about what the other fellow was doing that might be detrimental to them, and generally speaking, they have refused to make admissions about any of these things.

As far as the Senator from Ohio's discussion goes——

Senator GORE. Since you referred to my statement, would you mind, I don't remember what it was, would you mind the secretary reading——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I drew no conclusions, but I said I didn't quite understand. The President told the truth in this matter, but he was not implicated in falsifying in any way.

Senator GORE. Would you mind if he read it, Mr. Chairman?

The **Chairman**. No.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. As far as I am concerned——

Senator **Gore**. I would like to say if I said the President of the United States told a falsehood, I didn't mean to. If we are to imply by assuming specific responsibility on this that he necessarily associated himself with the episode and that he knew of it, that it was his responsibility—I don't remember exactly what the President said, but I would like my exact words read back.

The **Chairman**. When you started reading that, you said, "I would like this to be off the record," and I said without objection it may be.

Senator **Gore**. Fine——

THE PRESIDENT ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I wasn't raising any particular issue, except I wanted to call attention to the fact that the President did come out and assume responsibility for the entire operation, that is, as Chief Executive of this country, and either directed or stated himself that the full facts be disclosed and told.

Senator **Gore**. But, Senator, the point I was trying to make was that when he assumed personal responsibility for this whole operation—I suppose the whole operation includes the cover story, I suppose it includes the whole operation—I just think it was a severe mistake for the President, or the Office of the President of the United States, to be associated with this kind of, shall I call it, mess.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Well, I don't know——

Senator **Gore**. When I say mess, I am referring to the whole series of false statements that were issued. I cannot condone it, and I don't like to see our President associated with it.

The **Chairman**. Gentlemen, I wonder if we can't complete our inquiry with this gentleman and then reserve our decision on the merits until afterwards when we are in executive session.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. May I just continue a very short statement about it?

The **Chairman**. May I cut this off? Mr. Dryden is not concerned about this aspect.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I want to say I thoroughly agree with the remarks of Senator Lausche that, inasmuch as we are inquiring into this matter, the question of Russian espionage should be a very pertinent part of the whole background of this operation. I am not so sure that we are doing ourselves a service if we only inquire into ourselves and don't inquire into the provocation and the necessity for these things.

I won't delay the committee any longer.

The **Chairman**. Are there any more questions to Dr. Dryden?

Senator Long, you didn't get a chance. Do you wish to ask any questions?

Senator **Gore**. I had not quite finished mine.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I beg your pardon, I thought you had finished.

The **Chairman**. We will discuss the other aspects after we have completed the examination of Dr. Dryden. Go ahead, Senator Gore. You are recognized.

Senator **Gore**. Thank you.

Senator **Aiken**. Mr. Chairman, while Senator Gore is getting his brains together, may I suggest that perhaps an abbreviated record would be better for the public than a complete one.

The **Chairman**. Today?

Senator **Aiken**. Personal references, it would seem to me, would be better left out.

The **Chairman**. I think the Senator's point is well taken.

Senator **Aiken**. I have no further suggestion to make.

INVESTIGATIONS BEFORE TELEVISION CAMERAS

Senator **Long**. Mr. Chairman, I didn't come in in time to be a party to any outbursts or recriminations one way or the other, but I would like to say that I was here when we had the MacArthur dismissal, and I felt at that time that some persons were going overboard politically in insisting that we conduct that investigation before television cameras, with all the secrets of defense, while a war was actually going on in Korea. I was one of those who voted against holding that investigation in front of television cameras and I was one of those who voted that the record should be screened for security purposes and I would certainly want to be consistent with the position that I took at that time. I hope the others would be just as consistent as I propose to be myself in that matter.

I recall one Senator sitting here made the motion at that time that one of the President's military advisers should tell him what he told the President and what the President said to him in confidence, and that was not agreed to. I was one of those who voted against it, and I protect the same executive confidence under the same conditions now that I voted to protect then, but I do think while I have been here that I never voted against any investigation of anything, whether it is Kefauver investigating the gambling in Louisiana or somebody investigating the President's policy. I think if someone feels they are entitled to know what happened, it is all right with me, they are entitled to look into it and find out, but I will support a motion to see that anything that is vital toward the security interests of this country should not escape from this committee once we have developed it.

The **Chairman**. That is the policy the committee already determined.

REQUEST A REPORT ON RUSSIAN ESPIONAGE

Senator **Capehart**. Mr. Chairman, when we are completed with this, why can't we have Dulles, CIA and Hoover[4] and others make an inquiry and give us a report on the known Russian espionage activities?

The **Chairman**. That is another matter. We certainly would be perfectly willing to consider that.

---

[4] FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover.

Senator CAPEHART. It would be very interesting to know what the information we have on them and two case histories we have on some of them.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a good deal known on that. The Secretary of State, of course, I thought, made clear the other day the nature of the Soviet society and the necessity for taking these actions. As a matter of fact, I didn't realize there was any question—there certainly has never been in my mind—about the necessity for the CIA operation, not only in the past, but presently. That is not the issue at all, in my view—whether or not they should have one—and as a matter of fact, I think this particular program is an excellent one. I don't think there is any criticism of that.

A GOOD WITNESS

Senator Gore, do we have any more questions of Dr. Dryden? Let's dismiss him before we get into our own arguments.

Senator GORE. Well, I think all this talk has pretty well disposed of me for the time being.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't you wish to ask any more?

Senator GORE. Not any more.

The CHAIRMAN. Does anybody wish to ask any more questions of Dr. Dryden?

All right, Dr. Dryden, thank you very much.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, I think the record should show that he made a good witness, that he didn't camouflage and he came out with the facts. We know the facts before us, so it didn't need to make a great deal of difference. I want to thank him anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Dryden.

Mr. DRYDEN. I want to thank the committee for their understanding of this problem of espionage and some of the things associated with it.

Senator WILEY. I think St. Peter will let you in. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I am informed by the staff that they have requested the reporters to hold up any publication of any part of the record, regardless of whether it bears on security or not, at the point of Senator Lausche's statement. I have no objection to that. I think it might be wise to do that, if it is agreeable with the committee.

Senator WILEY. What do you mean, cut out that statement?

The CHAIRMAN. No, all that took place subsequent to that at that point.

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Chairman, I think I should state that Senator Lausche simply said he wanted to take a look at the record beginning at that point, so all I have done is to tell the Senator to stop sending stuff to the press as of that point.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is covering my dialogue with the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

Mr. MARCY. As soon as the press knows about that, they will say what happened.

Senator CAPEHART. I think it would be a nice thing if that whole dialogue was completely eliminated in the best interests of everybody concerned.

Senator GORE. I join in that.

The CHAIRMAN. Then if it is the sense of the committee, nothing after that point will be released to the press, if that is agreeable, not only that statement but all that followed.

ONLY PART OF THE STORY

Senator WILEY. But, Mr. Chairman, let's get this straight. In the first place, the questioning of this man this morning, if you are going to put that out to the press, what you are trying to do is give to the public, as Senator Lausche suggested, one side of this whole matter.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator does not seem to understand that all of that, all prior to that, has already been censored by the CIA and the State Department.

It isn't all going out under any circumstances.

Senator WILEY. If you will let me finish——

The CHAIRMAN. They have taken that all out before.

Senator WILEY. You have a faculty of butting in like the rest of us when anybody else is talking. Let us have our say. After all the function of the chairman is one thing, but he is not the committee. I want to say this when I read in the press——

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that statement, Senator.

Senator WILEY [continuing]. I read all over the United States that the President of the United States made a mistake, quoting you, it just coincided completely with what the Senator from Ohio said, and I think that if you are going to get part of this story out, you might as well get it all out.

I think we might as well let the people in this country know that some of us, at least, realize what the issues are. It isn't a question of picking up the mistakes of our own public servants, if you call them mistakes; it is a question of getting at why Khrushchev pulled the stunt that he did. To me that is the big issue, and try to find anything else in this is just ridiculous so far as I am concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. About the record, it is agreed without objection the record from the point of Senator Lausche's remarks will not be released to the press.

Without objection, it is so ordered.

Is there anything further?

Senator GORE. One thing further, off the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record, Mr. Reporter.

[Discussion off the record.]

ANY SENATOR CAN SAY WHAT HE THINKS

Senator LONG. Mr. Chairman, I think it should be clear that the publication of this record is in the hands of the executive branch of this Government. But any Senator of the United States—and the chairman can't control them, the ranking Republican member can't control them—any Senator that wants to go out and say that he thinks the President did a foolhardy thing has the power and the right to do it. He may be beaten for office for doing it, but he certainly has the right to say it, and I have heard a lot of unwise statements made by Senators. But I do think that all of us are going to protect the security interests here and I don't know of any public statement where any member of this body or this Senate has leaked some essential secret that we were trying to keep down.

The administration admitted that the cover story was not true. Everybody knows it wasn't true. They themselves said it wasn't true, and their released statements to the press said so. We didn't release the statement. They released it. But as far as protecting the security, we don't decide what is published here. It is the CIA and the State Department to whom we convey that privilege.

Senator **Capehart**. Were you finished?

WITNESS HAD A DUAL POSITION

Mr. Chairman, I want to say this. I think Mr. Dryden was in sort of a dual position. I would agree 100 percent with the able Senator from Tennessee in respect to falsehood on the part of any public official, excepting that there is a case where he became a part of the intelligence department.

Now, the intelligence department, of course, dare not tell the truth at all times, because if they do then you have no intelligence department.

Senator **Gore**. Allen Dulles hasn't said anything yet.

Senator **Capehart**. He became a part of the intelligence department in the operation of the U-2's, and said that in 1956 they had a meeting in which they agreed that if an incident occurred such as did, he was to make a cover story, saying that they were operating under the auspices of NASA. From that standpoint he was a member of CIA. I think that is possibly an excuse.

The **Chairman**. I think the Senator from Indiana has exactly the right slant on this.

The real issue in this is not CIA. We are all for that. I don't know anybody that isn't for it.

The real issue comes down to the question of the impact upon CIA's activities in the future of the decision which made the President assume responsibility for telling about CIA, which position he finally took.

This is a question of judgment at the highest level. It is clear, responsible men for no political reasons, or any other reasons, can differ as to the wisdom of it because it has never been done before.

This fellow was in a dual capacity. On the one hand, one duty required stating publicly what it is. The other duty required telling a falsehood. He was in a difficult position. I don't criticize him for telling a falsehood. The real criticism is for saying anything at all at that particular time, when they didn't know any more than they did.

If he had waited 1 or 2 days, when the facts developed, they would have been much wiser. I think the State Department—in my own opinion—agrees with this. They specifically said this was not cleared by them.

Senator **Aiken**. Mr. Chairman, this whole affair reminds me of the bum hauled into court for throwing a brick through a plate glass window. He told the judge is seemed like a good thing to do at the time. [Laughter.]

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m. the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., June 2, 1960.]

EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

THURSDAY, JUNE 2, 1960

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:10 a.m., pursuant to recess, Hon. J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Long, Gore, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, and Carlson.

Also present: Brig. Gen. G. S. Brown, USAF, Capt. Means Johnston, Jr., USN, Military Assistants to the Secretary of Defense; Capt. L. P. Gray III, USN, Military Assistant to the Chairman, JCS; William B. Macomber, Department of State; Richard Helms, CIA; Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

Staff members present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Denney, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. St. Claire.

[The majority of this transcript was published in 1960, with certain deletions made for reasons of national security. The most significant deletions are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the printed hearings.]

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE THOMAS S. GATES, JR., SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

* * * * * * *

RUSSIAN KNOWLEDGE OF THE FLIGHTS [P. 126]

The **Chairman**. Well, Mr. Gates, did Khrushchev or the Russians, know of overflights prior to May 1?

Secretary **Gates**. He says he did.

The **Chairman**. Well, what do you think?

Secretary **Gates**. I believe that he did, Mr. Chairman, but I don't believe anyone could specifically prove it. But I believe that he did. I believe he told the truth.

The **Chairman**. If he knew about it, why did the incidents of May 1 compromise the flights, why should they be discontinued?

Secretary **Gates**. I don't believe he knew the exact type and character of the flights. He probably—all he knew was that they were hostile aircraft high in his sky.

KNOWLEDGE OF PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE RE ORDER FOR ALERT

The **CHAIRMAN**. On your order on May 15, your alert, did you *consult the Department of State before ordering it?*

Secretary **GATES**. No. I advised the Secretary of State, who was with the President when it was issued.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Did you advise him before you issued it?

Secretary **GATES**. He was advised before it was released yes, sir.

* * * * * * *

MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, MAY 5 [P. 128]

Senator **GORE**. Mr. Secretary, you are a member of the National Security Council.

Secretary **GATES**. That is right, Senator.

Senator **GORE**. Did you attend the meeting of the council held on May 5?

Secretary **GATES**. Yes, sir.

Senator **GORE**. Did the President participate in that conference?

Secretary **GATES**. At the meeting of the NSC?

Senator **GORE**. Yes.

Secretary **GATES**. Yes, sir.

Senator **GORE**. Was the cover story discussed there?

Secretary **GATES**. No, nothing relating to the U-2 incident was discussed at the meeting of the NSC, Senator.

There was a meeting of the small group after the NSC meeting.

* * * * * * *

VALUE OF U-2 FLIGHTS [P. 136]

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Now, these U-2 flights have been extremely valuable in the securing of intelligence, have they not?

Secretary **GATES**. They have indeed, Senator.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. They have also been very valuable in securing weather information, have they not?

Secretary **GATES**. Yes sir.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. We have had some testimony that there are comparatively few days in the year when a flight of this kind is practicable.

Secretary **GATES**. That is correct. From the standpoint of weather, Sun angle, and——

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Cloud formations and things of that kind?

Secretary **GATES**. That is right.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Is it your understanding that the particular day that this flight took off conditions were, the combination of conditions, let's say, were auspicious for this particular flight?

Secretary **GATES**. Yes. They were checked and they were auspicious.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. And there was no way of knowing just when in the future another similar advantageous time might occur. So far as you know?

Secretary GATES. No, there would be a period that would be identified in terms of general weather and then within that period you would have to finalize the analysis. There was no way of knowing specifically.

* * * * * * *

ANOTHER COMMUNICATIONS ALERT ORDERED [P. 137]

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you. My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator Long?

Senator LONG. Mr. Secretary, I don't insist that you answer this question. If it is classified, you can take it out of the record if you want to, but hadn't we been overflying Soviet territory even prior to July 1956?

Secretary GATES. We can, Senator, if it is incorrect from the standpoint of security. The answer is yes, Senator.

Senator LONG. It was my impression that we had been doing it for years before that. I didn't insist on knowing it, but it was my impression we had been doing it in 1954, 1955, and maybe before that.

Secretary GATES. Sir?

Senator LONG. My impression was that we had overflown Soviet territory without their permission in 1954, 1955, and even perhaps before that.

Secretary GATES. Senator, you are correct. Now whether these would be classified as deep penetrations and the extent of the penetrations, I am not familiar with, but you are correct as far as the territory is concerned.

Senator LONG. You could more or less see where they were and where they had their force deployed, when we thought we could do it successfully, overflying some of the positions.

We had at least been over their territory.

Secretary GATES. That is correct.

Senator LONG. Let me ask you this. Do you regard it as an act of war for an armed military plane of one nation to enter the air space of another without permission?

Secretary GATES. I don't know that I am wise enough to determine the definition of an act of war. I consider it most provocative.

* * * * * * *

EFFECT OF DISCONTINUANCE OF U-2 FLIGHTS [P. 138]

Senator LONG. If it were essential or important that the U-2 flights be made for years, right up to and including May 1, is the defense of the United States adversely affected by an absolute discontinuance on May 13?

Secretary GATES. We have lost, through compromise, an important source of information. This will mean we will have to augment other methods of obtaining comparable intelligence.

Senator LONG. In other words, we do badly need the same information that we were gathering with the U-2 flights?

Secretary **Gates**. We need a continuity of this information I think, Senator.

* * * * * * *

WAS ALERT RELATED TO SOVIET PLANS [P. 138]

Senator **Aiken**. Have you had any similar alerts since?

Secretary **Gates**. I testified a minute ago I believe, that we started one at 11 o'clock last night which will run for several days.

Senator **Aiken**. When Mr. Dulles was up here, he showed the committee some very interesting and large photographs of pictures taken of Russian bases and airfields, their Navy yard.

Secretary **Gates**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Aiken**. But in the President's address to the American people the other night he used, I believe, an aerial photograph of San Diego.

Secretary **Gates**. Yes, it was San Diego.

Senator **Aiken**. Why would it not be advisable to release for publication a photograph of a Russian base rather than an American base?

Secretary **Gates**. This is a good question I think, Senator.

Senator **Aiken**. I think so, too.

Secretary **Gates**. I have been thinking about this, myself. It is a matter of judgment, and it is particularly a matter for Mr. Dulles to determine, because it is a matter of what these pictures disclose in terms of intelligence that would be damaging to the intelligence business. I think if you could do this—this is a personal opinion—if you could do this without damaging intelligence in any way or expanding knowledge of intelligence in any way, that it would be a good thing to do.

Senator **Aiken**. How could it damage intelligence when it is common knowledge that we have been taking these photographs over the last four years?

Secretary **Gates**. It gives precise——

Senator **Aiken**. I wouldn't want it done if it damaged our intelligence system, but now that the cat is out of the bag——

Secretary **Gates**. This gives a precise picture. It gives a precise, I guess, knowledge of the effectiveness of the camera. It gives specific identity and it is a question that I am sure should be determined by the intelligence people.

Senator **Aiken**. But the Russians now claim to have the camera itself, and showed photographs developed from films they claim were taken from it.

Secretary **Gates**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Aiken**. And which I understand is probably authentic. So there would be no further loss to our intelligence system in that respect.

Secretary **Gates**. I would rather have the experts pass judgment on that, myself, Senator. I think from another point of view it might be a good idea to publish some of these pictures.

Senator **Aiken**. I wouldn't publish many of them, but just one of them, perhaps, taken from several hundred miles inside the Russian border should have a very salutary effect upon the American people, upon other friendly nations and particularly upon the Russians.

Secretary GATES. I think, Senator, that you get really the same effect if you show pictures of the United States installations taken from an airplane, and then you do not disclose how much or how little or leave open the way to speculation as to what you have on the Soviet Union. You get really the same effect if you flew a U-2 across the United States at 70,000 feet, you could get a set of pictures that would let people understand the type of pictures you have been able to take in the Soviet Union.

Senator AIKEN. Now that we have given the Russians an aerial view of our bases why not give them an aerial view of their bases? We certainly would not be divulging any secrets to them. They probably know what it looks like already.

Secretary GATES. I appreciate your point of view but, as I say—to the best of my ability I think it is a question of further compromising intelligence. This is a judgment factor we ought to ask Mr. Dulles about.

Senator AIKEN. I don't see how they can be further compromised in this respect.

That is all.

Secretary GATES. Well, the point is that it tends to confirm what we know. They don't now know exactly what we know and we should be careful not to let them know what we know or what we still need to know. This should be very carefully handled.

Senator AIKEN. But these—you don't question the authenticity of these photographs that we were shown. They were not retouched, were they, so far as you know?

Secretary GATES. The photographs that you were shown?

Senator AIKEN. Of the Russian bases. Yes.

Secretary GATES. Oh, no, they are just the blow-ups of the original photographs, I presume. I didn't see the ones that you saw.

Senator AIKEN. I can see where if there would be inaccuracy you would not want the Russians to see them?

Secretary GATES. Oh, no.

Senator AIKEN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, if this has been covered please tell me.

Secretary GATES. Yes, Senator.

IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET THREAT AGAINST OVERSEAS BASES

Senator MORSE. I am somewhat concerned about the implications, propagandawise and otherwise, of the alleged threat of the Marshal of the Air Forces of the Soviet Union that if they know that another spy plane is leaving a foreign base the instructions are to shoot a missile to that base. What is your judgment as to the seriousness of that threat?

Do you think it is a bluff or do you think that he means it?

Secretary GATES. Well, Senator, this is awfully hard to know. He must know that if he did such a thing that we have allied commitments. If it was an allied country, for example, that he would be starting a very major problem for himself.

Senator **Morse**. That is the point I want to raise.

Secretary **Gates**. And this would only be done with the assumption that he would take the consequences of an act that would probably start a general war. Most of us in the Department of Defense do not believe that we could have a limited war in the NATO area.

Senator **Morse**. I don't see how we can either.

* * * * * * *

QUESTION OF ALTERNATIVES TO MAY 9 STATEMENT OF STATE DEPARTMENT [P. 145]

The **Chairman**. Did anyone at that meeting raise the point that for the President, the Chief of State, to assume personal responsibility would be a departure from the historical practice of this country?

Secretary **Gates**. I think this was understood, Senator, and I believe that we felt the circumstances were different from anything that had prevailed heretofore.

The **Chairman**. But the point was raised and discussed?

Secretary **Gates**. I can't accurately say that it was raised and discussed but it was certainly in my mind and I believe it was obvious to all of us that it was a departure from precedent.

The **Chairman**. It was a departure from precedent in this country. Do you know of any other country that has followed this policy?

Secretary **Gates**. No, I do not.

The **Chairman**. Did any one—was any one concerned that this might have far-reaching implications for the future of our intelligence operations?

Secretary **Gates**. Well, we knew that it already had marked the end of this particular method of collection of intelligence because of its being compromised, but we didn't believe it marked the end of our intelligence activity.

* * * * * * *

COVER STORY DISCUSSED IN "GENERAL MANNER" [P. 153]

Senator **Gore**. Mr. Secretary, you stated earlier that in that small meeting following the meeting of the National Security Council on the 5th, the cover story was discussed in a "general manner."

Can you be more specific with the committee as to what you mean by "general manner"?

Secretary **Gates**. I don't really think I can, Senator. We were still living under conditions where the cover story was the story, and we were still living in this period.

Senator **Gore**. Would it be reasonable to assume that when you discussed it in a general manner that its general purport was stated and generally understood by the meeting, the conferees?

Secretary **Gates**. It was not discussed in detail, no, sir.

Senator **Gore**. I didn't ask you detail.

Secretary **Gates**. You said general purport. I thought you meant the character of it.

Senator **Gore**. Well——

Secretary **Gates**. We already issued several statements, you see, before this; we issued one right after the plane was missing that a weather reconnaissance plane was missing. This was done earlier in the week. And we were still using the cover story.

Senator **Gore**. And the decision was made to continue using the story?

Secretary **Gates**. The question was, which we did not know, at that time, how much information Khrushchev had. And we didn't know exactly where we stood.

Senator **Gore**. Well, that is about the third time you have hypothesized your recommendation that the truth be told. Earlier you said, you made that recommendation "particularly when it would not stand up with respect to the facts."

Later on you said it depended upon, as you said now, if the facts became known.

Secretary **Gates**. That's right.

Senator **Gore**. What troubles me, Mr. Secretary, is how you and others who recommended that the President, if there were others who recommended that the President assume specific personal responsibility for this program, could conclude that in the public view he could do so only in part. Of course, it is easier to question this decision now, I am sure, than it was at the time, but——

Secretary **Gates**. This was, Senator, a conversation it was not a decision. I was speaking as an adviser, I was not involved in the cover story. I was not responsible for public releases in connection with this event in any way. I was merely speaking as a person who was there, and my opinion was, and still is, that as then it subsequently turned out to be the fact that Mr. Khrushchev had a great deal of information, a great deal of valid information, and a pilot, that the President should have accepted the responsibility, which he subsequently did.

At the time we were meeting at Camp David—this location which was not Camp David, this temporary location, we did not have the full facts, I was talking about what might develop.

As a matter of fact, I would like to check the date, but about this time or later that day or the next morning, a picture of an airplane was printed in the Soviet press that was just a pile of debris and was not the airplane. We were dealing with a set of facts where he said he had some part of them and then we later found out he had a great deal more than we hoped he had and it was my opinion and I stated it if he had everything essentially the President should assume responsibility for it.

That was my discussion.

THE POSSIBILITY THAT WE MIGHT BE CAUGHT

Senator **Gore**. I share your feeling that the President should not be associated with any such undertaking. What I am unable to comprehend is how a group of able men, including yourself, could reach the conclusion that the President could assume responsibility publicly for the program and avoid, at least some, responsibility for the whole series of, shall I say, incorrect statements, the nature of which, in a general way was discussed at the meeting on the 5th. This is what perplexes me.

Secretary **Gates**. Well, this business of cover is a very difficult and sensitive operation. It is characteristic of all intelligence activities. At the time of this meeting we were still using the cover story and we continued to use it.

We were talking about what were the true facts which were then unknown.

Senator **Gore**. You based your recommendation then upon telling the truth on the possibility that we might be caught telling an untruth, was that a fact?

Secretary **Gates**. No, sir, I base my recommendation on the possibility that Mr. Khrushchev had in hand a complete set of facts, which subsequently it turned out that he did have and which we did not know at that time.

Senator **Gore**. Well, you said earlier, I don't have all of your words but I did jot this down, "Particularly when it would not standup with respect to the fact."

Secretary **Gates**. That is right. If that turned out to be the case.

Senator **Gore**. Doesn't that mean that you recommended that the truth be told provided the cover story was proven before the world to be untrue?

Secretary **Gates**. Essentially that, essentially that. If it was so obvious that the cover story was unrealistic completely that then I felt that in my judgment the President should assume the responsibility.

A DISTASTEFUL BUSINESS

Senator **Gore**. Well, Mr. Secretary, I want to be very candid and fair. I have long been aware of the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency was in operation, that it was securing facts, information, valuable to this country. I was not aware of the specific operations of the U-2 planes. I did not raise any objection to the operation of the Central Intelligence Agency.

So if I am to be found at fault for not doing so, then I concede it. But I must say that I never knew until this incident came up that cover stories went so far as to become, I don't even like to use the word you used, I will say a falsehood, I just didn't know that it went that far. I don't think it is necessary for cover stories to go that far, I don't think it is necessary to go that far in order to obtain intelligence information. I hope it isn't.

I do not condone an official falsehood at any level of government by my government. I am not saying this in any—I am just expressing my views.

Thank you.

Secretary **Gates**. Senator, the heart of a distasteful business of intelligence involves stories that are not true, it is the heart of an intelligence operation, it is a characteristic of a distasteful business.

Senator **Gore**. It is entirely so now.

The **Chairman**. The Senator's time is up.

The Senator from Ohio, any questions?

Senator LAUSCHE. No further questions.

* * * * * * *

U-2 INCIDENT'S EFFECT ON SUMMIT CONFERENCE [P. 154]

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think he should have refused to participate if there had been no U-2 incident?

Secretary GATES. I think he would have—again, we must only speculate, Senator—I think he would have probably employed tactics that would have ruined the Summit from within.

The CHAIRMAN. But you think he would have participated?

Secretary GATES. I think he would have participated and found some other mechanism of destroying it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, would you give the circumstances surrounding the alleged incident at Atsugi, Japan, when a U-2 landed and the Japanese were kept away from it by military personnel?

Secretary GATES. I could get that for the record, Mr. Chairman, I can't give it out of my head.

The CHAIRMAN. Does one of your associates—when was it? When did that happen?

Secretary GATES. I know of the incident to which you refer, and I remember seeing some photographs of the U-2 on weather work in Japan at about that time. My rather hazy memory tells me it was about a year ago. It was in the summer of last year, but I would like to check the incident and supply to you for the record anything you would like pertaining to it.

The CHAIRMAN. The point I want to ask you, is it not true that that incident to a considerable extent compromised the U-2 program? In other words, that incident led to considerable speculation that this was an intelligence plane, didn't it?

Secretary GATES. We have had occasional speculation in various countries and the press about this, but it was never in our judgment compromised, and the degree of security that pertained to this program was really one of the most remarkable things we have ever done in our country.

The CHAIRMAN. The account I read was as soon as it came down, it was an emergency landing, that very soon thereafter it was surrounded by military personnel and everyone was kept away from it. Is that correct?

Secretary GATES. I think the account is correct. I don't know whether the facts are correct. I think I read the same thing. But these planes were well identified with extraordinarily useful work and legitimate work in weather reconnaissance.

The CHAIRMAN. The fact that they took such precautions to keep everyone away from this one is what led to the speculation that it wasn't a weather plane, that it was an intelligence plane. Isn't that what the story said?

Secretary GATES. I would have to check it, Mr. Chairman. I am not perfectly sure. I recall the article you refer to in a magazine.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish your assistants to comment on it?

Secretary GATES. We could check it.

My associates don't recall, either.

If you would like, we will enlarge upon it.

REPORTS IN FOREIGN PRESS

The **Chairman**. I think it is only pertinent to this same question that the Russians and, in fact, other people had been speculating that these were used for intelligence purposes. I was told while in Paris that there had been an article in a French newspaper 2 or 3 months before this incident that these were intelligence flights. Do you know anything about that?

Secretary **Gates**. I heard this reported, but I don't know anything about it. I was told when your comment was repeated to me that there had been an article in an English newspaper.

The **Chairman**. Mr. Dulles testified that the Air Force gave CIA weather forecasts that were helpful to the U-2 operation, is that correct?

Secretary **Gates**. That is correct.

The **Chairman**. What other support in the operation was given by the Department of Defense?

Secretary **Gates**. They gave support originally in design and development of the airplane. They gave support in the training of pilots. They gave some support in furnishing initial operational base capability. They gave support in terms of the formal logistics that go with operations, and I think they gave some aero-medical support in terms of service to the pilots. It was all of the normal housekeeping.

The **Chairman**. Have the personnel from the Department of Defense as distinguished from CIA, ever made covert overflights of foreign territory?

Secretary **Gates**. You said "ever", Senator?

The **Chairman**. Yes.

Secretary **Gates**. They have.

The **Chairman**. Were these intentional overflights or accidental?

Secretary **Gates**. I am sure this will be censored, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. That is all right——

Secretary **Gates**. They were intentional overflights.

The **Chairman**. On any extensive scale or just occasionally?

Secretary **Gates**. Well, it was quite awhile ago and I was not cleared for the information and I am not personally familiar with it, and I believe that it was not the kind of penetration capable by the U-2 aircraft.

In other words, I believe it was more of a border, a periphery nature than a complete, deep penetration type of flight.

As long as we are discussing this subject, I might testify that there have been no such flights since 1956.

The **Chairman**. By the military?

Secretary **Gates**. That is correct.

* * * * * * *

Secretary **Gates**. I believe now we should continue this careful and continuous process, and I have no desire right now to make any further recommendations to the Congress. The Senate Appropriations Committee is about to mark up the defense bill I believe next week or this week.

FLIGHTS OVER COMMUNIST CHINA [P. 155]

The CHAIRMAN. I meant to ask you with regard to the overflights, have you made overflights over China, Red China, sir?

Secretary GATES. I don't know to my own knowledge that we have. I do not think we have.

The CHAIRMAN. Either the Air Force or the CIA?

Secretary GATES. I do not think so.

* * * * * * *

SHOOTING DOWN OF AN AMERICAN PLANE OVER THE BALTIC [P. 155]

Senator HUMPHREY. You remember the shooting down of an American plane along the Baltic Coast some years ago?

Secretary GATES. Yes, I do remember, Senator.

Senator HUMPHREY. Was this plane engaged in any kind of reconnaissance mission in the Soviet Union or over Soviet territory, this would be the Baltic states.

Secretary GATES. To the best of my recollection, it did not.

Senator HUMPHREY. How did it get over there?

Secretary GATES. It was off course.

Senator HUMPHREY. Off course. Do you recall the statement of Mr. Khrushchev or Soviet leaders that they would shoot down any planes that were over their territory?

Secretary GATES. He made several statements after this incident.

Senator HUMPHREY. No, before this incident.

Secretary GATES. No, I do not recall the statement.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you recall the concern we have expressed over the failure to find the flyers, whether it was 9 or 14, that were shot down?

Secretary GATES. Yes, I recall this incident.

Senator HUMPHREY. Was this plane engaged in any type of espionage activity or reconnaissance activity?

Secretary GATES. No, my recollection, and I would want to be very careful to check, but my recollection would be this was a transport aircraft.

Senator HUMPHREY. It may have been a transport aircraft, yes, but that is not what I asked you. I asked was it engaged——

Secretary GATES. I don't think it was engaged.

Senator HUMPHREY. Was it just off course?

Secretary GATES. I think so.

Senator HUMPHREY. Did we engage in overflights in the Soviet Union in 1950? Do the records in the Department of Defense show that?

Secretary GATES. We could check that, Senator, I can't tell you exactly. We engaged—I just answered some questions on that subject, and I want them to be censored—that we did engage in overflights of the Soviet Union from the Department of Defense point of view, but none since 1956. When in 1950, precisely I don't know.

Senator HUMPHREY. The reason I asked the question is I sat in a briefing with General [Omar] Bradley in which maps were brought out. I believe you, Senator Morse, and some others were present at that in which there were factories pointed out on the maps, the production at this particular factory of a certain type of aircraft, whether they were working two shifts or three shifts, the detailed information was really very startling and revealing as to not only the production program but the location and the degree of development of a new industrial site.

I was wondering how that information was gathered; whether it was gathered with the use of overflight photographic reconnaissance or how did you get it?

Secretary **Gates**. Well, the incident you referred to I can't tell you, sir. We may have used a number of sources or a number of methods, but the way you described it, it sounds like overflight in addition to other methods of collecting intelligence.

Senator **Humphrey**. Were we engaging in overflights from 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953, and so on?

Secretary **Gates**. We were, and I can't tell you the beginning point. I can tell you the ending point. We were engaged to some extent in overflights, but as I testified, I do not think these were deep penetrations.

OVERFLIGHTS CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL

Senator **Humphrey**. Do you think it was essential to have overflights in order to gain the kind of information that is supposed to have been gained in recent months?

Secretary **Gates**. Yes, this was by all means our best information.

Senator **Humphrey**. Well, it might be your best information.

Secretary **Gates**. Yes, I think it was essential, yes, I do.

Senator **Humphrey**. You answered the question of the chairman to the effect that insofar as you knew, there had been no overflights in China, the Mainland of China.

Secretary **Gates**. That is right.

Senator **Humphrey**. Why not, if you were overflying the Soviet Union?

Secretary **Gates**. I think we have other sources and better sources of information in China. And also I think we have reasonable assurance that they don't possess any capability of attacking the United States.

Senator **Humphrey**. So are you indicating by that reply that the only purpose, the main purpose of the overflight, of the spy plane activity was surprise attack prevention?

Secretary **Gates**. I think the primary requirement was one for evaluating the capability of a surprise attack.

* * * * * * *

[The committee adjourned at 1:10 p.m.]

TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY WITH JAPAN

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—On Jan. 19, 1960, at a White House ceremony, Japanese Premier Nobusuke Kishi signed a treaty of mutual cooperation and security with the United States. Replacing the 1951 treaty, which gave the United States primary responsibility for Japan's defense, the new treaty returned full sovereignty to Japan but permitted the United States to maintain military bases on Japanese soil. President Eisenhower announced that he would visit Japan on his way home from a trip to the Soviet Union in June. Although the Soviet trip was cancelled in the aftermath of the U-2 incident, Eisenhower went ahead with plans for his Japanese visit as part of a 2-week "goodwill tour" of the Far East. Massive protest demonstrations and riots in Tokyo, including the stoning of a limousine carrying Presidential Press Secretary James Hagerty, forced the President to abandon his plans for visiting Japan. On June 19 the Japanese Diet ratified the security treaty, and on June 22 the Senate voted its consent by a 90 to 2 margin (with Senators Russell Long and Richard Russell voting against it).]

TUESDAY, JUNE 7, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 12 noon, in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Hon. J. William Fulbright presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Sparkman, Gore, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

Also present: Hon. J. Graham Parsons, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Hon. Eric H. Hager, Legal Adviser; Hon. William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Charles Bevans, Ely Maurer, Carl Salans, John Czyzak, Marten van Heuven, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State; Hon. John N. Irwin II, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, John P. White, David M. Bane, Richard L. Sneider, K. W. Swayne, Department of State; Captain Thomas F. Howe, and R. P. Kelly, Jr., Office of Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Marcy, Mr. Denney, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Newhouse, and Mr. St. Claire of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the committee come to order?

Has everybody gone out that has to go out, only members of executive branch?

Mr. Secretary, I know one or two members have asked you about it and I know they are all interested in the situation with regard to, well, two points: First I would like your view about timing of our own action with regard to ratification, and then the reasoning or background of the decision for the President to go. We want to be reassured, I suppose, about that matter. I know they are all interested in it. Would you discuss both of those questions?

Secretary **Herter**. Yes, I would be glad to, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTIAN A. HERTER, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary **Herter**. With regard to the timing of ratification we consulted with Ambassador MacArthur [1] on that subject particularly in connection with the timing of the President's trip. It so happens that the date that the President would be arriving in Japan is the end of the 30-day period from the point of view of the Upper House having an opportunity to pass on the treaty.

We have been advised confidentially, and this is the reason I wanted to discuss this in executive session, that the upper branch will probably approve of the treaty on the 15th of June. The President will be arriving on the 19th.

However, some 3 or 4 weeks ago at the time of the demonstrations, we asked MacArthur to take up very confidentially with Mr. Kishi the question of the postponement of the President's trip because we felt particularly with the coincidence in these two dates, it being the last day, that there might be particular demonstrations on that day. We had suggested the possibility of postponing it until the end of July or early August, feeling that perhaps things would have simmered down and the treaty issue would be out of the way.

JAPANESE OPPOSITION TO THE TREATY

Mr. Kishi felt very strongly about it, and there I have to go into his own personal situation a little bit because that enters into this picture. He has this opposition from the socialist group, but that from the point of view of his own position is not the most serious opposition.

He has opposition within his own party from a number of ambitious people who feel he has served as Prime Minister long enough. It is a domestic fight within the party itself, and this is a matter that does not necessarily affect the treaty, because those who are opposing him are still staunch supporters of the treaty, I think, with two exceptions among the leadership in his party who feel that a new Prime Minister ought to be given a chance.

I am told this is somewhat of a standard situation in Japan when any prime minister has had 3 years that others in the party feel it is their turn to be given a chance.

Mr. Kishi reacted very strongly against a postponement and he reacted strongly against it for fear that if it were announced prior to the complete ratification of the treaty that it would indicate a doubt as to whether the government could survive or those who were proponents of the treaty could hold on.

The only way the treaty can be defeated is curiously enough not through the action of the upper branch because it has no veto power. It can take adverse action, but even if it takes adverse action the judgment of the lower branch is the controlling one so that the treaty would go into effect but until it had that 30-day period to act in nothing can become finalized.

The **Chairman**. If it should recess or adjourn that stops it.

---

[1] U.S. Ambassador to Japan Douglas MacArthur II.

Secretary **Herter**. No, if they dissolve the Parliament or if they don't meet, if it is recessed. They met and extended the period of time for 50 days so as to give ample time for this 30-day period to intervene, and they are now actually in session and will be——

The **Chairman**. I understand if Parliament was dissolved then the treaty, before the 30 days are up, would not go into effect.

Secretary **Herter**. If it is dissolved you have to start from scratch all over again.

The **Chairman**. That is what I mean.

Secretary **Herter**. And of course the great effort of the opposition is to get the Parliament dissolved.

The **Chairman**. I see.

Secretary **Herter**. And they have hopes if they can get Kishi out before this treaty goes into effect they would have a chance with the new government to order new elections which would take care of this problem.

The **Chairman**. I see.

PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO JAPAN

Secretary **Herter**. When Kishi's views were considered by the President, we were all of course concerned about this possibility of an unfortunate reception there, but this matter was very carefully considered in the executive branch and it was felt in view of the importance of the treaty that it would be a desirable thing for the President to keep on with his plans, which he is doing—that only if at the last minute the developments seem to be such, that it might be a dangerous thing for him to go. In the meantime we have had reports that some very large groups even including a very large student group, have assured the Prime Minister they plan to turn out in large numbers for a hearty welcome to the President when he comes and the Government itself is convinced that it can keep order and that there will be a favorable reception.

But this being a part of the internal workings of the Japanese Government I felt I could not put it on the public record.

TIMING OF RATIFICATION

The **Chairman**. What is your advice to the committee with regard to——

Secretary **Herter**. With regard to the timing of the ratification, may I read you this telegram we received this morning from MacArthur?

> We have carefully considered the advisability of seeking final Senate action on the treaty before the President's departure and prior to the Diet Upper House action in the light of both probable reaction in Japan and ratification procedures set forth,

in a previous telegram he sent us, the procedures that had to be gone through with.

> Since it is generally known by the Japanese press and political leaders that the Senate plans to defer final action until after ratification is completed by the Diet,

this was anticipated some time ago,

> and since to accomplish Senate ratification before the President's departure there will probably have to be a clearly visible speed up of Senate action which might be construed that we are forcing a reluctant Japan and putting heat on the Govern-

ment of Japan prior to the President's visit, we feel on balance the advantage lies on letting the Senate proceed as originally planned, complete Senate action on the treaty as soon as possible after the final Japanese Diet action.

The CHAIRMAN. After the final action.

Secretary HERTER. After the Japanese Diet action.

The CHAIRMAN. And not before?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, in other words not related to the President's visit but related to the Japanese Diet action.

Another important overall consideration is we are trying to counter the Communist anti-mainstream charge, which is that the President's visit is to bolster Kishi's regime and to secure ratification of the Japanese treaty, by saying on the contrary the visit is a part of the overall centennial observances, including the President and the Crown Prince,

which is what the visit was originally planned for.

It was planned, as you know, to stop on his way home from Russia, and it was planned because of the Centennial celebration that is going on that the Japanese have taken very seriously and the committees in both countries are making a very large issue of. It is a friendly gesture on both sides. And the Crown Prince is planning to come back here. So with the feeling of Kishi and all his advisers that it would be better for the President to come as scheduled, the President has made that determination, of course, unless something happens at the last minute.

Actually the advance party, the President's appointment secretary, Mr. Stephens, and Mr. Hagerty, are in Japan at the present time and are very close to that situation. I feel confident if it is developed in such a way that it might create an unpleasant incident that the President would cancel it at the last moment.

But certainly publicly we have to insist that it will be continued and we expect that it will be continued.

Mr. Parsons would like to add one word to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Parsons.

COMMUNIST-LED AGITATION

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, to some extent the agitation being conducted is mixed up as between agitation against the treaty, agitation against Kishi and agitation against the President's visit, and as the Secretary has testified it comes largely from Communist or Communist-led movements both inside Japan and in Communist China and Soviet Russia.

They are trying to achieve through a minority element and through mob rule a reversal of the will of the majority, and while the President's visit is less intimately connected with this agitation than the other two factors, nevertheless if the President were to cancel out at a particular time in a way it would lend force to the proposition that all these agitators have to do is try hard enough and they can achieve just that result of mob rule and minority decision, and the results for a Japanese democracy in the future would be unfortunate.

I think the fate of parliamentary democracy in Japan is really the basic issue which is being thrashed out at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman.

POSSIBILITY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIONS

Secretary **Herter**. May I add a word on this? We also have given some consideration to the possibility that the Communist Chinese might stage some sort of special action in connection with Formosa or the offshore islands while the President was there, and as you probably know there has been some buildup on the mainland and there has also been some shelling activity of a rather unusual sort in recent days.

But once again we felt that if the President should cancel out with that matter in mind, that it would have very unfortunate repercussions in the whole Far East.

The **Chairman**. Senator Sparkman.

Senator **Sparkman**. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that I think the reasoning stated is absolutely correct.

I don't see how you could come to any other conclusion. It seems to me if the President canceled or delayed his trip it would encourage a continuation and the buildup of these activities not only in Japan but any other country that he might want to go to. It seems to me the only deterrent that should be considered is if it is found that he would actually be in danger and that adequate security would not be provided.

PROTECTION AT THE AIRPORT

Let me ask you this: Someone remarked to me this morning that they were planning a sitdown on the runways at the airport so that his plane could not land.

Have you heard anything about that or it may have been in the papers, I don't know. I had not heard it, someone told me.

Secretary **Herter**. We had not heard about that officially. How much this is an effort——

Senator **Sparkman**. But the Japanese would certainly be able to protect the airport?

Secretary **Herter**. They could cope with that.

Senator **Sparkman**. And the route into town.

Secretary **Herter**. Yes, sir.

Mr. **Parsons**. Senator, they said they were going to prevent Prime Minister Kishi from leaving the airport in January to sign the treaty.

Senator **Sparkman**. Yes.

Mr. **Parsons**. The Prime Minister was able to get there all right. There is no trouble.

Senator **Sparkman**. I think it certainly would be a show of weakness to change the plans and I hope that unless it becomes apparent that adequate security cannot be provided, that you stick to them.

The **Chairman**. Anyone else?

Senator Hickenlooper?

[Deleted.]

RESTORATION OF JAPANESE SOVEREIGNTY

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Now, I think, Mr. Secretary, that this is a very forward step in the restoration of Japan to complete sovereignty. I was there in very early December when this treaty was in its final stages of completion and I saw the final draft at that time, at Ambassador MacArthur's. I talked to Mr. Kishi and Mr. Fujiyama, who is the foreign secretary of Japan, and I think that it is probably wise under all the circumstances that we do defer action on this treaty until after the Japanese Diet has finally acted.

But I would see no reason why we might not be able to act between the time the Japanese Diet acted and the time of the President's visit.

Secretary **Herter**. If that could be done——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. How many days would be involved there? Did you anticipate that it may be adopted on the 15th you say?

Secretary **Herter**. That is our present information.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. That is only 4 days which would make the time very short so that it might not be practicable to do that.

But in any event I would hope this treaty could be adopted in this session before we adjourn, because the Japanese that I talked to in December all felt that this was a very dignified forward step restoring Japan to a situation of complete sovereignty and it is also a step which is a definite orientation step toward the West of their own sovereign power.

I think is is a very good treaty.

The **Chairman**. Senator Gore.

A SHOW OF UNANIMITY

Senator **Gore**. Mr. Herter, like Senator Hickenlooper, I had an opportunity to examine this treaty in Japan in some detail with the benefit of Ambassador MacArthur and the Japanese. There is no stronger supporter of that on the committee. I raised the question as to timing of ratification because I thought it might possibly be helpful to have a little show of critical questioning, if not possible opposition. If that would be helpful to play this little game out a little bit, I will be glad to cooperate. If it would be helpful for a show of unanimity I shall not raise a question further.

Secretary **Herter**. I appreciate that. I think in connection with the ratification it might be very helpful if this committee saw fit to vote favorably on that, to have had that vote taken perhaps even though the matter had not been reported onto the floor of the Senate.

The **Chairman**. Before the 15th.

Secretary **Herter**. Before the 15th, I would think so. I think the committee action rather than the final step might be a helpful factor.

Senator **Morse**. I think, Mr. Chairman, it is very important that the committee act on that before the President goes to Japan. I think that is a very symbolic step as to a status in the Senate and then if we can't get to it on the floor of the Senate, I don't think time is so important then. But I think it is important that you get it out of the committee.

The **Chairman**. Any other question?

Senator **Aiken**. I see no objection. In fact I see many advantages to the committee taking action on this before the President goes to

Japan, although it won't be brought up on the Senate floor until after the Japanese have approved it and I don't see any way how the President can avoid going to Japan now unless there is greater danger involved than is indicated at the present time. It seems as if he avoids going on the demands of possibly 2 percent of the people of Japan, that the President will be just prohibited from traveling anywhere from now on because in almost any country a minority can organize 1 or 2 percent of the people to protest. Even here we could. I am not sure that more than 1 percent of our people protested Khrushchev's visit last summer.

The CHAIRMAN. They didn't protest as violently.

Senator AIKEN. No, they didn't throw rocks.

Senator GORE. Almost.

STATUS OF CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE MEMBERS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, there is one question about their consultative committee, the security consultative committee. I understand that our representatives will be our Ambassador to Japan and the Commander in Chief of the Pacific, is that correct?

Secretary HERTER. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Will they have co-equal status or will the Ambassador be the senior member of this team?

Secretary HERTER. I assume the Ambassador usually is the senior official.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that ought to be understood.

Secretary HERTER. It is.

Mr. PARSONS. It is clearly specified.

The CHAIRMAN. In case of any disagreement, of course, it might be resolved in Washington, is that right?

USE OF OKINAWA

Secretary HERTER. Might I add a word to that in connection with Senator Capehart's question? I think the military would agree with me that in the event of disagreement with regard to the use of our facilities in Japan for combat purposes, this would not be as serious as it might be—it would not necessarily mobilize what we had there because from a strategical point of view a very large part of what we have there could be moved to Okinawa and Okinawa used as a base of operations.

The CHAIRMAN. This treaty then does not restrict our use of Okinawa in any way.

Secretary HERTER. In no way whatever.

The CHAIRMAN. It continues as is.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I want to raise a point on this matter involving this consultative committee.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Oregon?

MILITARY SHOULD NOT DETERMINE POLICY

Senator MORSE. I am not going to raise any objection on the floor of the Senate or with the committee because I think the time is too perilous and we need as much nonpartisan unity as we have, but I do want the record to show that I think it is a great mistake to set up this kind of committee. I do not think the military at any time should be put in a position of policymaking in the field of American foreign policy. It is the duty of the military to carry out the policy determined by the civilian members of our Government.

I think this is a very unfortunate precedent. I think it is going to arise to plague us. I think that the consultative committee should be composed entirely of civilian members of this Government with the military sitting at the right arm to advise them as experts on the military problems at all times. But I think it is a great mistake to put the military in any such policymaking position as this, and you can't tell me this isn't a policymaking position because the very nature of the things they are going to take up is going to deal with foreign policy. I am at a complete loss, may I say most respectfully, Mr. Secretary, why we are doing this on this committee.

We have got a chance here, it seems to me, to demonstrate again this is a civilian government and not a military government and the military should never be put in a position of policy.

The **Chairman**. Do you wish to comment on that?

Secretary **Herter**. I would like to comment on that because I am told that the Ambassador, the United States Ambassador, will serve as chairman and the Commander in Chief of the Pacific will be the Ambassador's principal adviser on military and defense matters.

Senator **Morse**. He is a voting member of the committee.

Secretary **Herter**. But it is explicitly stated——

Senator **Morse**. He has in effect a status of a full member of the committee.

Secretary **Herter**. There won't be any votes.

Senator **Morse**. Well, there won't be any formal votes but they are going to determine policy and you are putting a military man in a position of policymaking on problems that involve foreign policy. You ought to keep the military in a complete consultative position to the civilian heads of government at all times and never move them into a position of foreign policymaking.

The **Chairman**. Senator Gore?

U-2 PLANES IN JAPAN

Senator **Gore**. There was testimony that there were three U-2's in Japan. Is this an exacerbating influence right now, will they remain there, have you given consideration to turning them over to the Japanese for weather study and reconnaissance?

Secretary **Herter**. These planes have never been used for anything except weather observations. The Japanese Government has been entirely familiar with their operations and actually they have been of very considerable assistance. There is one extraordinary photograph taken by one of these, I don't know whether you have seen it, of a typhoon.

Senator **Gore**. Yes.

Secretary **Herter**. Indicating to the weather experts considerable weather data from the standpoint of the direction of the typhoon and speed and all that.

Senator **Gore**. Do you mean all the time these have been based in Japan there have been no flights over Kamchatka?

Secretary HERTER. None out of Japan.

Senator GORE. Or the naval base there?

Secretary HERTER. No.

Senator GORE. None out of Japan?

Secretary HERTER. No.

Senator GORE. Have they been used out of flights from Okinawa or Formosa or other places?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, there have been flights out of Okinawa.

Senator GORE. Well, I have no suggestion to make. I was just wondering if these were going to remain in the Far East?

Secretary HERTER. This I hope will be off the record.

The CHAIRMAN. This record is executive, what we are taking now will not be published.

Senator GORE. You have reached no decision there as to whether they will be brought home or remain there?

Secretary HERTER. No, there have been no requests on the part of the Japanese Government to have them removed. I think they felt they were really doing valuable services for the Japanese.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I have one other little matter relating to something else.

MILITARY'S ADVISORY ROLE

The CHAIRMAN. Well, he is discussing it. I wanted to ask the military representative here do you agree to the statement that the military Commander in Chief of the Pacific acts only as an adviser to the Ambassador, is that your interpretation?

Mr. IRWIN. I am not completely clear, Mr. Chairman, on his exact status in view of the point that Senator Morse raises. He certainly is an adviser and a principal consultant and my belief is he is a member of the committee as Senator Morse says but I am not clear on status.

Senator MORSE. He obviously is, Mr. Chairman, because if they get in disagreement between the two of them they have to come back to the White House or State Department for an arbitration of their difference.

Mr. PARSONS. Sir, by way of illustration, I recall one meeting of the predecessor committee in which Admiral Felt contributed a most useful assessment of the general security situation in the Pacific area and it amounted in fact to a briefing of the type the Japanese authorities would not otherwise have had access to. This contributed a good deal to their knowledge and understanding of broader issues, and helped to predispose them toward the type of arrangements which we have been discussing this morning.

Senator MORSE. It doesn't mean to suggest that he has to be a member of the committee in order to be a briefer.

Mr. PARSONS. This facilitated—provided a good framework for him to give a very confidential report.

Senator MORSE. Obviously, not at all. Unless you want to elevate the military in this form of government of ours to policymaking status, and I happen to believe we ought to make very clear in these perilous times of the position of what the military is, and as one member of this committee I am growing weary of hearing the military announce itself on American foreign policy in some instances instead of the Secretary of State.

The **Chairman**. Well, we have had instances of that, certainly of speeches by some representatives of the Pentagon which appeared to me to go far beyond that role. Specifically for the record I remember Mr. Brucker's speech in Taiwan [2] was very controversial. I hope, too, the Secretary of State may be given recognition by the military. Any such speeches should be at least submitted to him before they are made.

What was the other matter that was going to be cleared up?

Secretary **Herter**. I think that was the only one.

The **Chairman**. Something that you and Mr. Macomber wanted to talk about.

Secretary **Herter**. That matter we have got under consideration and we will give you an answer on it very soon.

Senator **Gore**. Then I will desist.

The **Chairman**. Any other questions from any of the other members?

If not, thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, and we will go back into open session to hear the public witness.

I hope some of the members will stay here.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m. the hearing was concluded, and the committee went into open session.]

---

[2] On January 19, U.S. Secretary of the Army William M. Brucker pledged that the United States would defend the islands of Quemoy and Matsu against Chinese Communist attacks.

DISARMAMENT DEVELOPMENTS—SPRING 1960

FRIDAY, JUNE 10, 1960

United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Disarmament of the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 4219, New Senate Office Building, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey presiding.

Present: Senators Humphrey, Green, and Aiken.

Also present: John Irwin, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Lt. Gen. John A. Dabney and Addison Lanier, Department of Defense; William Gehron and James Goodby of Mr. Farley's office.

Mr. Marcy and Miss Goetz of the committee staff.

[This hearing was published in 1960 with the deletions made for reasons of national security. The most significant deletions are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the published hearings.]

* * * * * * *

STATEMENT OF PHILIP FARLEY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DISARMAMENT AND ATOMIC ENERGY

* * * * * * * *

SOVIET SHIFT FROM EUROPEAN CONCEPT ON ARMS CONTROL [P. 10]

Senator **Humphrey**. The Soviets have shifted from the central European concept they had for a while, haven't they?

Mr. **Farley**. Many of us thought, I will admit frankly that some proposals for European arms control would be some of the new things that Mr. Khrushchev pulled from his bag at the summit. But so far there has been no indication that they are planning to revive those, and this may be a relationship to their posture.

Senator **Aiken**. Does that indicate they may be relying on more distant bases for their military strengths?

Mr. **Farley**. I had not drawn that inference. Perhaps Mr. Irwin would want to comment, too. It had seemed to us, though, that it was probably related to their campaign with West Berlin where they would not want to have two proposals of a somewhat different nature being advanced simultaneously. Had you seen any other significance in this thing? In their playing down the Central European thing?

* * * * * * *

THE WESTERN APPROACH AT THE SUMMIT [P. 12]

Senator **Humphrey**. Did we have any proposals that we were going to advance at the summit relating to disarmament?

Mr. **Farley**. Not really. The thing we had hoped to do at the summit was to explain persuasively as men, we believe, like the President and General de Gaulle can, reasons why the West is genuinely concerned about the nuclear missile arms race; the reasons why we believe that in the present state of military balance, there is a real risk even when the leaders of the two sides do not want war. We hoped they would point out that there is, nevertheless, a real risk that conflict can break out arising, for example, out of a small incident which builds up or out of somebody's mistakes or miscalculations. That it is our belief that it is practical to take the kind of first step measures, and I say the kind of, because we do not by any means hold only to the things which are specifically set forth in our plan, but the reasons why we think the kind of first step measures which we have urged are important to make a beginning in solving this.

* * * * * * *

QUESTION OF COMMUNIST CHINA IN DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT [P. 13]

Senator **Aiken**. Has there been a discussion at the conferences relative to the Soviet proposal to drop Communist China from any agreement?

Mr. **Farley**. Well, Senator——

Senator **Aiken**. If so, what is the significance of the proposal anyway?

Mr. **Farley**. I do not think, Senator, that the effect of the June 2 Soviet document is to drop Communist China from the agreement. It will be noted in the general provisions of the proposal, that one of the early measures would be the calling of a world conference to obtain the adherence of all states to the agreement.

What they have done is to drop, in the things they list in the second stage of their proposal, any reference to the specific force level that Communist China would have. I would just like to say I think they have probably done that only to make their proposal more symmetrical and match ours.

It must be a little odd to them if we do not cite a specific force level for Communist China, their ally, and they do.

So I don't think there is any significance except they don't mention it but their plan clearly envisages bringing in all significant states.

Senator **Aiken**. It would simply be a suggestion which might tend to continue the conference or basis for future conferences and then Communist China would naturally have to be brought into the picture.

Mr. **Farley**. It comes in by implication.

Senator **Aiken**. After they are initiated.

Mr. **Farley**. I think they must have thought it looked a little odd for their ally for them to be setting a figure for Communist China.

Senator **Aiken**. Can you see any possibility of a workable disarmament agreement without the consideration of Communist China?

Mr. **Farley**. No, I can't. From our point of view——

Senator **Aiken**. How would they be considered? How would we go about bringing Communist China into the picture?

Mr. **Farley**. That is something which we have considered a good deal, at great length and it is specifically identified in our proposal. Our principle has been that because of the political difficulties of entering into negotiations with Communist China we should not do that until we have made the first breakthrough, gotten a common ground of negotiation and some initial areas of agreement with the Soviet Union. But having done that, and specifically on this question of the force levels, the numbers of men in the Armed Forces, it would be necessary promptly to bring Communist Chinese in, and our plan calls for a world conference of all militarily significant powers to reach agreement.

Senator **Aiken**. Have we any reason to believe that Communist China would enter into such a discussion as Communist China? I would see why they would come in as China but would Communist China consider coming into the picture as Communist China?

Mr. **Farley**. Well, that is a question, of course, that you won't get the answer to until you try, but I am sure there will be many political shoals when we start trying to negotiate with them either in this one or the nuclear testing agreement.

Senator **Aiken**. I don't believe we have to face up to that for a few days.

Mr. **Farley**. Well, it is not one, of course, which we can put off thinking about though because we haven't got a workable approach or if we undertake commitments which would be unsound if Communist China stays out, then we would be acting irresponsibly.

* * * * * * *

Mr. **Farley**. What is ominous are the indications they are giving recently, and there have been a number, that they are going to play a very hard political game when they are approached to come into the second stage of any disarmament agreement. I think it is clear they realize it would give them bargaining leverage which they would use for whatever purpose is most attractive to them at the time.

DESIRABILITY OF HAVING COMMUNIST CHINA IN NEGOTIATIONS [P. 14]

Senator **Humphrey**. Why wouldn't it be desirable to invite them into the disarmament negotiations at the beginning? Let's face it, there are 700 million people there. I have long felt that this is only like academic games. What American Congressman, Senator, Governor, President, Secretary of State or official could dare ask this country to enter into a disarmament agreement of any proportions that did not include Communist China?

Their army is the biggest in the world and they can fight, and they are tough, and they don't need to attack us directly. You know, there are lots of ways to be killed. For example, you can be choked to death by suffocation. You don't need to have somebody grab you at the throat.

Mr. **FARLEY**. I am glad to hear you say this, Senator, because one of the things we all have been criticized for in our proposals is the fact that we initially suggest very little reduction in our Armed Forces in the first stage agreement that involves simply the 10 countries at Geneva, and the principal consideration has been this, that there is another major power.

Now the reason for not having Communist China in is really a double one: The one which concerns the United States more than some other participants is the position we have taken because of our worldwide political and security problems vis-a-vis Communist China, and our desire to avoid giving them the prestige, the encouragement to their desires for status which would involve participation in this kind of negotiation before it was necessary.

Second, we have been able to justify this as not necessary and even desirable at this stage to allies who do not have the problem we do, because it clearly is very difficult even to begin a negotiation in this area with ten countries. If one introduced into the already complicated interplay at the table at Geneva the interplay that there would be with their additional state, I think we would have even more of a completely cold war propaganda exercise. It simply has to begin with a manageable group.

* * * * * * *

COMMUNIST CHINA: A POWERFUL THREAT [P. 15]

Senator **HUMPHREY**. Does it necessitate official recognition of a power to invite them to a conference table if you do it under some form of international conclave?

Mr. **FARLEY**. It does not necessitate it.

The problem is what condition that power will attach. What is the condition that power will attach in coming to the conference table? It can't come without being recognized.

Senator **AIKEN**. Has Communist China shown any indication that they would accept such an invitation?

Mr. **FARLEY**. No.

Senator **AIKEN**. Have they shown some indications that they would tell us to go jump in the lake if we invited them?

Mr. **FARLEY**. They have been putting out such indications, and I think this is clearly what one would do in their position in order to prepare for the maximum bargaining power if the time ever comes.

QUESTION OF DEALING WITH COMMUNIST CHINA

Senator **AIKEN**. Has Communist China ever applied for admission to the United Nations as Communist China?

Mr. **FARLEY**. I shouldn't try to answer that question. I don't think they have.

Senator **AIKEN**. I don't recall that they have.

Mr. **FARLEY**. Of course they are sponsored for representation.

Senator **AIKEN**. That's right.

Mr. **FARLEY**. As China every year by their friends in the United Nations.

Senator **Aiken**. That's right, and they are voted for as members, as a member of the United Nations by other people, the neutralists, for instance. But so far as I know, they have never asked to be admitted to the U.N. as Communist China.

Mr. **Farley**. No, they have no interest in the so-called two China approach.

Senator **Aiken**. They are interested in getting Taiwan thrown out, the nationalists thrown out.

Senator **Humphrey**. Sure.

Senator **Aiken**. More than they are getting themselves in.

Senator **Humphrey**. I am not trying to indicate this is an easy matter, Mr. Farley. I don't want my remarks so interpreted. I think what Senator Aiken is pointing out is a very salient technical point which has genuine realism to it from the world situation. Communist China does not want to be known as Communist China. It wants to be known as China, although China once had all she hoped to ever have, not only what she once had but what she can take.

Senator **Aiken**. All she plans to have.

Senator **Humphrey**. All she plans to have.

But I do feel, going back to Senator Aiken's question, that very careful consideration should be given to the fact that the Russian proposal did eliminate reference specifically to the force levels of Communist China. During the conference Mr. Stassen handled over in London, as you may recall, the Soviet Union always indicated the force levels for China, and considered the Chinese force levels in the total pattern for negotiation.

ELIMINATION OF CHINESE FORCE LEVELS FROM NEW PLAN

Now she has eliminated that from her most recent proposal. This must have some significance over and beyond even the fact that they looked a little peculiar adding up what they thought were the force levels for China. The Soviets do not worry so much about how they look. I just think that there must be a deeper meaning to it, and I thought that you might have had some other comments.

Maybe Mr. Irwin has got some comment on that.

Mr. **Irwin**. No, sir, I don't. I think there is some merit to the point Mr. Farley made—we had included it originally in the figures of ours and then we left it out of our plan, and that they may have followed suit.

On the other hand, there may well be other meanings back of it that are not apparent to us.

Mr. **Farley**. We will certainly study this some more.

Senator **Humphrey**. I am sure you will.

Mr. **Farley**. Our first reaction had been that the structure of the Soviet proposal clearly contemplates them coming in, and that the omission of any specific reference was adequately explained by the fact that we don't have a specific reference, and the additional fact that the Chinese themselves have been making the kind of remarks that you mentioned, that they are not going to be bound by any agreement negotiated in their absence, which makes it a little inconsistent for the Soviets to be proposing that we reach a complete agreement now and yet not actually pressing for the Chinese to come in. We will look at it further.

* * * * * * *

DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FRENCH [P. 20]

Mr. **Farley**. There was a good deal of exchange of views with them, both at the time we were preparing the Western five power plan of March 14 and since that time, since we do not, of course, believe that the March 14 plan is necessarily the final word.

There are elements in the March 14 plan which reflect this French interest. The provisions in the early stages for control of orbiting vehicles, for prior notice and examination of missile launchings, for example.

And less directly, but very definitely, there are provisions for the initial deposits of armaments in supervised depots to begin gradually the process of reduction of major armaments.

As I say we have had extensive discussions with the French since then on what additional measures should be proposed.

The difficulties, frankly, are very great because of the practical problems—in particular of controls over missiles where a relatively few long-range missiles can represent a very major military threat, and where there are also political considerations in that, to some extent, attention to delivery systems is troublesome to us politically on occasion in relation to some of our allies who are quite sensitive to our bases and are vulnerable to political attack domestically or abroad.

You may want to hear Mr. Irwin's views on this, too, because the Defense Department has assisted us in studying this, because of the very direct military implications.

* * * * * * *

FOUR-POINT SAFEGUARD PROGRAM FOR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS [P. 28]

Mr. **Farley**. We have proposed a four-point program of safeguards for a nuclear explosion, and I think it probably would be best if we gave you a copy of precisely what we did propose. The four points were that, one, we would use. only proven stockpile types of devices; two, that these would be placed in internationally supervised deposits in advance, we hope we can make this before August 15; three, that the instrumentation at the time would be limited to certain very specific yield measurements so there would be no possibility of getting the kind of diagnostic information which would enable anyone to determine whether a weapons improvement had been made; and finally international observation of people in the conduct of the experiment.

The Soviet position has been that these are not adequate, that they must be able to take the device apart, and examine it minutely, and this is what is inconsistent with the Atomic Energy Act.

Senator **Humphrey**. Do the British have that same problem?

Mr. **Farley**. It is a very mixed situation.

Senator **Humphrey**. I mean do the British have in their weapons system an act comparable to the McMahon Act?

Mr. **Farley**. No, but their weapons development production program in the past 3 years has become so intimately involved with ours, and they do have, and it is necessary under our Atomic Energy Act. The British maintain the same classification requirements that we do on information derived from us, so that it is very doubtful that they have any current models, at least, which would be free of this restriction.

* * * * * * *

EXAMINATION OF WEAPONS DEVICES [P. 29]

Mr. **Farley**. So it is possible, and both for propaganda reasons and because, no doubt, there are people who have real concern, the Soviets say "We want to look inside."

So I am sure there is a variety of reasons.

Senator **Humphrey**. I am sure there must be. Do you think there is any way out of this impasse again?

Mr. **Farley**. Well, we are looking very hard at the possible solutions. Here are some of them: One abstract possibility is to try to arrange to use United Kingdom or even Soviet devices.

This has the very great disadvantage that it just looks as if we can't deal with our own problem to have to import somebody else's devices to do a seismic research program we have insisted on. It's just not good. Second, there are even very great problems of safety and of the administrative arrangements.

Senator **Humphrey**. I don't see that first one at all. I am a man in politics and many times we have a man do things we don't want to do for ourselves. If we did it, we would be suspect.

This is common practice.

Mr. **Farley**. Yes, but that is something which the Soviets in particular have said is quite unnecessary. They aren't going to shoot off any nuclear devices. They have conceded that we considered it necessary and are going to. They said this in their May 3 announcement but they still claim it is unnecessary and undesirable.

To then have to turn to them to provide the devices to conduct the explosion would, I submit, be pretty close to ludicrous. But there would be——

KNOWLEDGE OF SOVIET UNDERGROUND EXPLOSIONS

Senator **Humphrey**. Let me ask you, there has been a rumor circulating pretty freely in the Congress, that comes out of certain committees, that the Soviet Union has been exploding nuclear weapons underground, and that the White House has this information to that effect.

Mr. **Farley**. I don't know of any information to that effect. The hard fact is that we have no way of assuring ourselves they have not.

Senator **Humphrey**. I know, but do you have any reason to believe that they have been conducting these explosions?

Mr. **Farley**. We have no information to indicate they have.

Mr. **Irwin**. I would say that one, the Russians have the capability of testing without our being able to detect it. Two——

Senator HUMPHREY. So do we, don't we, without their being able to detect it.

Mr. IRWIN. I think not, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. You don't think we have the capability of testing without their knowledge?

Mr. IRWIN. I think in our free society it would be almost impossible to conduct nuclear tests without being detected.

Senator HUMPHREY. You do. I didn't know anything about the U-2 plane incident and that was in our free society. I don't think anybody else did either. If so, they weren't talking about it.

Mr. IRWIN. That is a different dimension than a nuclear test, with the atmospheric detection capabilities that are available to the world today, with our own U.S. seismic posts. I don't say it is impossible, but I think it is extraordinarily difficult for that type of testing to be conducted by the United States and remain secret.

Senator HUMPHREY. Isn't the signal similar to the earthquake signal, as some people say?

Mr. IRWIN. Sir, it is not only the explosion, it is the preparation, it is the cost, it is all the people who have to know about it, it is the whole paraphernalia of testing that makes it extraordinarily difficult.

Senator HUMPHREY. I can see that. I am just trying to look at it from the other side. I am interested in aviation and I read a lot of aviation bulletins but I never read anything about that U-2. That is a very unique plane. I know more about the U-2 now than I ever did in my life and I learned about it from a fellow who saw it in the Soviet Union.

Mr. IRWIN. It is one of the unique successes, I think, of the CIA that they were able to conduct it, so few knowing.

Senator HUMPHREY. They do a lot of things like that.

* * * * * * *

[At 12:25 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY WITH JAPAN

TUESDAY, JUNE 14, 1960

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:30 p.m., in F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. J. William Fulbright presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Long, Kennedy, Gore, Church, Wiley, Hickenlooper, and Carlson

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Denney, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Newhouse, and Mr. St. Claire of the committee staff.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

Gentlemen, we are gathered here for the express purpose in executive session to consider the approval of the Japanese security treaty. We have already had hearings on it, so the meeting is open for consideration of the treaty. Do I hear any motion?

Senator Mansfield. I move it be reported.

Senator Hickenlooper. I move it be reported favorably.

Senator Gore. Could I second the motion?

Senator Sparkman. Second the motion.

The Chairman. Is there any discussion?

Senator Long. Mr. Chairman, I don't care to hold it up, the committee can vote it right away as far as I am concerned. I think I will vote against it on the basis I don't personally like a treaty where we agree to defend somebody without a reciprocal agreement. I voted against the treaty with Formosa that way. I don't want to embarrass the President, but my personal feeling is we should not undertake a defense treaty without some commitment from the other party. That is why I think I will vote against it.

JAPAN COULD NOT DO MORE

Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say just this: I hope the Senator from Louisiana reconsiders. Remember, we virtually forced Japan to write that in her constitution.

General MacArthur boasted of the fact that he had obtained the writing into the constitution of this provision that makes it impossible for her to guarantee. Now she has done about as much and does under this security pact about as much as she can do, in that she makes bases available for us, she is allowing us to maintain the greatest base in the Western Pacific and one of the greatest in all the world, Okinawa. It is an armed fortress, and I don't see how we can ask Japan to do more than she is doing, particularly in view of the constitutional limitation that we virtually put in her constitution. She is fulfilling up to the fullest of her ability.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is right, Russell. She could not go that far under her constitution.

Senator LONG. She can amend that constitution.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is a process which she will have to leave to her own people.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I wish Senator Long would reconsider for this reason. As has been stated by Senator Sparkman and the chairman, I don't see how Japan can go any further than Japan has gone. She is absolutely prohibited under her constitution from going any further. She can under the constitution make the agreement of reciprocal defense assistance in that area.

COMMITMENTS UNDER THE TREATY

Senator LONG. I just don't think we should have it in the treaty then—if we are going to go to war from the event she is attacked if she can't make a reciprocal commitment. I don't think we ought to make such commitment if she can't make one in return.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We don't necessarily say we will go to war. We use the general language; we don't say it. But I think it is based on the idea that an attack on Japan and an attack on that area would inevitably involve us in war and our own defense, and we have no choice there.

Senator SPARKMAN. Even if we had no security pact.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think the unanimity of this committee would be very important to obtain under this treaty, especially in view of all the circumstances in the Orient. In fact, if I may just continue, I was in Japan last September, and I had several talks with Japanese officials. They—at least the present government of Japan—made it extremely clear from the Prime Minister on down, that they would be perfectly willing to go further, as far as they possibly could. But this was the extreme limit of their ability to agree, under any kind of stretching of the constitution of Japan, as it is presently written. I think they have gone just as far as they possibly could.

The fact of the matter is, if one got too technical, one might disagree with the Japanese courts on their own interpretation of how far they have gone under the constitution. One might say they have gone farther than the constitution really permits them to go in their armaments and all that sort of thing.

Senator LONG. So far as I am personally concerned, I am sorry but I feel these piecemeal commitments to go to war, and this is one, if something else——

Senator MANSFIELD. Will you vote me in favor of it?

Senator LONG. Without reciprocal commitment, without being joined in some sort of area pact, where we have help if we go to war, nobody but us—that part of Article V restrains me to vote against it. I voted against the treaty on Formosa on the same basis, and in my judgment it is a mistake to make that agreement. That being the case, I think that is the way I feel about it.

THE IMPORTANCE OF UNANIMITY

The CHAIRMAN. Would you consider withholding your vote?

Senator LONG. I can be absent. Do you have a quorum here?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would you consider voting to report it to the Senate reserving your right to take whatever position you want on action before the Senate? I think that is often done. I certainly know I have voted to report bills out on occasion when I was not in favor of the bill at all, but I was perfectly willing for the bill to go to the Senate.

Senator LONG. If you want to be unanimous, you have got a quorum here. I will be absent.

Senator GORE. Let me raise this question: What is to be gained by unanimity? I know when I was in Tokyo the Ambassador was very strong in his view that we should not take this up even in committee until the Japanese had ratified it. The opposition to this treaty in Japan is so severe that our cause and the cause of those who are friendly to America over there, just might be served by some considerable opposition to it. That was the motivation of my questioning of Secretary Herter the other day—wondering why we should rush, if this should not be postponed until next year. I am not sure that unanimity serves either our cause or the cause of our friends in Japan. Maybe this point of view is not well taken. What is your view on that, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. I think under normal circumstances that it is perfectly all right to have opposition. This is an outgrowth of this very unusual attack upon it, which I think is most serious. I don't like to try to influence anybody's vote on these matters, but I do think these circumstances are very unusual and that it would be a very important thing that it would appear to be unanimous. It is psychological, I suppose, more than anything else that because of this attack, led and inspired at least by the antagonists of this country, I feel it is more important in this than any other treaty I have seen, that we feel that almost unanimously. I would like to see it unanimous.

A RECIPROCAL ARRANGEMENT

Senator LONG. If my vote were going to defeat the treaty, Mr. Chairman, I might feel differently about it, but under the circumstances, I don't know whether we know that one Senator feels we get too little and give too much. From being at the point where Japan is being imposed on, we are being imposed on. We are committed to go to war in the event Japan is attacked and there is no similar commitment in the event we are attacked. Those unilateral commitments, it seems to me, are not in this country's best interest. I think we ought to either not make the commitment at all or make it a deal that is reciprocal.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, I can't imagine a war in that area which would not involve her, whether she is committed or not. The war would take place on her territory. I believe our bases are there.

The fact is that our bases in Japan expose them inevitably to attack. How can they avoid it? And then under their own self-defense they will have to become involved.

Senator LONG. I am ready to vote on it, and I will be absent if you would like me to.

The CHAIRMAN. If you can't vote for it, I think it would be better if you were.

Senator LONG. You asked me to make a quorum, if you need me to make a quorum.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate your coming very much.

Senator LONG. If you want to have a quorum and want a unanimous vote——

Senator CARLSON. I was going to suggest he be called to the telephone.

The CHAIRMAN. You can go to the telephone now.

Senator HUMPHREY. I don't think he should absent himself at all if he feels strongly opposed to the treaty.

Senator LONG. If you want to report it out unanimously, if you would like, I will just go hear Jack Kennedy's speech and I will see you later.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further discussion?

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to find out something. Does this treaty, in its report, have any definition of what we mean by constitutional processes?

The CHAIRMAN. There is no definition in it. I think all you can say is the established processes by which we declare war or do other things. That is what is meant by that.

Senator HUMPHREY. The late Senator [Arthur] Vandenberg, as I recall, when he insisted upon the inclusion of the phrase "constitutional processes", wanted that to be understood to mean commitment of the Armed Forces of this Nation would come only after declaration of war by Congress under the terms of such a treaty. Is that to be included in the explanation of the legislative history of this treaty?

The CHAIRMAN. I think this opens up a question upon which the great scholars have been divided and have discussed ever since we have been a nation. We all know that is a theory that the Congress must declare war, but we also know that we have gotten into war after war by the development of circumstances in which the Executive is compelled to exercise his discretion in the use of our Armed Forces and for practical purposes we are in war before.

Senator HUMPHREY. There is a difference between that and making commitment under a treaty, may I ask most respectfully.

COMMITMENT TO WAR IS IMPLIED

The CHAIRMAN. This treaty itself does not obligate us to go to war per se, in so many words. I think in effect it does, because it is like the NATO Treaty. We are obliged to consult and use those means which are considered to be in our interest and I think this would mean war, but the provision itself is very similar to the one in the NATO Treaty, and that is Article III, subject to their constitutional provisions. I don't know, I don't believe as a matter of fact that the constitutional theory would support the idea that the Executive has no power under the Constitution to resist or to use the

Armed Forces until and after the Congress has acted under its power to declare war.

Senator HUMPHREY. What does the phrase mean then?

The CHAIRMAN. You can write treaties, and many treatises on what it means, before the formal declaration of war, which may often well be meaningless. This continues to be a formal declaration of war although we are already actually at war. The President is not given the authority under the Constitution to declare war. He merely fights. The declaration is left to the Congress, although in many cases we are already in war.

This is like the great discussion whether a treaty is a treaty or an executive agreement, and I don't think there is any final clear distinction between them. I used to read about that and make speeches and I came to the conclusion there is no way to do it.

There are particular circumstances that exist which will impel the Executive to submit an agreement as a treaty, if it is very solemn and he wants to. On the other hand, if he doesn't want to for his own reason and he makes an executive agreement, there is no practical way that I know of for us to challenge it. I don't think you can find anything in cases or history that gives you any practical way. There are many things in the Constitution that are not self-executing, and we operate under it. There's no way to make them self-executing.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, can I get a word in?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

TIMETABLE FOR TREATY'S APPROVAL

Senator WILEY. I am interested in getting an answer to this question: First, is it the desire of the Department that we vote on the treaty before Sunday next?

The CHAIRMAN. May I say the last meeting—and it is in the record—I asked the Secretary specifically and in detail on this point, and he said that the administration would be very desirous of our passing on the treaty in the committee at any time we could prior to the 15th, so that the Senate would be in the position to vote upon it before the 19th. He said as of that time—which, of course, is subject to any unusual development in this trip—that they would like the treaty approved by the Senate before the President arrives on the 19th, but subsequent to the time when they anticipate the Upper House of the Japanese Parliament would approve it, which would be the 15th.

Therefore, I am trying to make it as acceptable as possible. I am particularly anxious to do so because of the very serious thing that has developed in Japan. I, for one, do not wish to in any way cause any further embarrassment. To put it the other way, I want to cooperate as much as I can with their wishes, and these wishes are explicit and in the record of the executive meeting the last time the Secretary of State was before the committee.

Senator WILEY. Well, that answers the first question. I was interested in the inquiry of the gentleman from Tennessee because in today's paper there is the statement that the socialists and the people in the government are debating the matter of how the President will be received. There was a suggestion that it is possible that the Diet may adjourn and, if it does, will dispose of the treaty. There isn't any treaty.

The **Chairman**. That is correct, but we will not act. If the Diet is not to adjourn before the 19th, it automatically becomes effective. Under their constitution, the Upper House does not have to act at all for it to come into effect. All it has is 30 days in which to consider it. During that period their Upper House may approve it or they may do nothing. They do not have the power to reject it.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I think it is the 16th, isn't it?

Senator **Carlson**. The 15th.

The **Chairman**. No, the date of the expiration of the 30 days is the 19th, but the Secretary said he expected them to vote favorably on the 15th.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I see.

The **Chairman**. And therefore a favorable vote confirms it. However, they do not have the power, in the Upper House, to defeat it by inaction.

EFFECT OF SENATE'S ACTIONS ON JAPAN

Senator **Wiley**. That brings me to the inquiry of the Senator from Tennessee. Let us stop, look, and listen for a minute and see what effect, one way or the other, our action that we take here will have effect in Japan. That is the only reason that I am getting into this. I think that your inquiry is very pertinent, because it may have a beneficial effect and it may not have. I would like to get the judgment of some of you better heads on that subject. To me, it is a very significant thing because conditions in Japan are not very wholesome.

The **Chairman**. Does anyone wish to make a statement?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. He qualified it by saying better head, and I think that rather precludes——

The **Chairman**. I don't know that anybody would respond to that. [Laughter.]

Senator **Gore**. Not responding to that qualification but the point which I raised in executive session with Secretary Herter, I indicated that I was willing to play the game with some show of opposition here if he thought it would be helpful. He did not indicate it would, but rather, I thought in response to the chairman, expressed the view that we should cooperate with a schedule without any demonstration of opposition. So I am willing to go along with his judgment in the matter, although I really seriously question that it will serve our cause to have unanimity here. Some show of opposition to the treaty might strengthen our friends over there, but that is not the judgment of the Department and I am willing to yield to their judgment.

The **Chairman**. For the record, in answer to or at least as a comment to the Senator from Minnesota's query, I think it would be well to read from the report of this committee under the chairmanship of Senator Vandenberg.

The report on NATO Treaty said,

> The committee does not believe it appropriate in this report to undertake to define the authority of the President to use the Armed Forces. Nothing in the treaty, however, including the provision that an attack against one should be consid-

ered an attack against all, increases or decreases the constitutional powers of either the President or the Congress or changes the relationship between them.

I remember there was a long discussion of this same problem and that was all the committee could come up with.

Any further discussion?

A MATTER OF JUDGMENT

Senator **Humphrey**. I am not going to vote for the treaty, Mr. Chairman. I will vote to report it out, but I disagree with the passage of this treaty under the circumstances that presently exist. I do not think it lends itself to strengthening our hand. I think it lends itself to further abuse. I think that the Kishi government is a government that is not going to last very long. I don't have any value judgment as to whether it should or should not.

I doubt that a display of this committee's action at the request of the State Department will be helpful at all. In fact, I think it is a matter of judgment, a matter of timing, and I think their judgment is in error. I think we will have a much better chance of a treaty being effective and being acceptable if the President's trip to Japan is anywhere near successful.

He is going under the most difficult circumstances. In fact, I have been one privately, at least, who has felt deep concern about this. If anything happens to the President, this could be an unbelievably difficult international situation. I have surely been one who supported the President's journeys. I think he does great good when he has the opportunity.

I don't see the urgency of reporting this out of committee as of today. It is only my judgment, but I shall not stand in the way of the committee's reporting it. I shall not try to be obstreperous in terms of what you call the spirit of unanimity, but I shall not vote for it. I wanted to take a little time to decide on that. I am not at all sure that this base in Japan is as important as some people make it out.

ROLL CALL VOTE

The **Chairman**. Any further discussion?

If not, are you ready to vote?

Senator **Aiken**. Vote.

The **Chairman**. Clerk, call the roll.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Green?

Mr. Sparkman?

Senator **Sparkman**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Humphrey?

Senator **Humphrey**. I shall vote to report it out, only.

Mr. **St. Claire**. He votes "aye", Mr. Mansfield?

The **Chairman**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Morse?

Mr. Long?

Mr. Kennedy?

The **Chairman**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Gore?

Senator **Gore**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Lausche?

Senator LAUSCHE. Aye.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Church?

Senator CHURCH. Aye.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Wiley?

Senator WILEY. Aye.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aye.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Aiken?

Senator AIKEN. Aye.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Capehart?

Senator CAPEHART. Aye.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Carlson?

Senator CARLSON. Aye.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Williams?

Senator WILLIAMS. Aye.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Aye.

We will meet at 3 o'clock tomorrow afternoon to consider the report on the U-2 hearings, in this room.

Senator WILEY. I got the report today. I haven't been in.

The CHAIRMAN. The vote is 14 "ayes" and no "nays". And you may call by phone and see if Mr. Morse and Mr. Green want to be recorded.[1] All those present voted to report it.

THE COMMITTEE'S SCHEDULE

Now, Senator Wiley?

Senator WILEY. I was saying that I got this letter today and I got the report, but I was in committee all morning and I am over here now most of the time, and I just have got notice I had better be over on the floor. This letter said that the report, which I guess Senator Hickenlooper has a copy of, must be 50 or 60 pages, and you want us to have a hearing tomorrow on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Executive hearing.

Senator WILEY. Or a discussion?

The CHAIRMAN. It is a discussion.

Senator WILEY. If we could find time, but the first thing in the morning we have our breakfast group, and then we have a committee, and then so forth and so on. It occurred to me that a delay of a day or two wouldn't hurt. If the purpose is simply to have a discussion and then let it go over, why, I think that is all right, but some of us are going to find difficulty in finding the time to read it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, this is a preliminary discussion to get the sentiment of the committee as to the next step. It can be read. I may say this, you were there at all those hearings, and there is not a thing in there that will not be clearly familiar to you. You wouldn't have any trouble in that.

Senator WILEY. You are optimistic. I happened to look at some of the conclusions I couldn't agree with. I didn't get a chance to read it. I just opened it up and a fellow came in and said you are due in such and such a place.

---

[1] Subsequently, by telephone, Senators Green and Morse asked to be recorded as voting "aye."

The **Chairman**. You can read the conclusions in 15 minutes and the rest of it is just a discussion of the transcript itself.

Senator **Aiken**. I read the first 30 pages; I think we can all agree on that. I didn't get any farther.

The **Chairman**. I think you will find it is very simple to read, and you will know by reading the conclusions, and if you don't agree, why, I don't think you will agree any more 2 days later.

It won't take you long to read that. It is a very factual report up to the point of the conclusions.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Senator **Aiken**. Isn't it possible that we could get out a report on whichever one could agree on the factual part of it—we will say up to the first 50 pages—and then if anybody wants to also make supplemental awards of merit or the contrary on their own they can do so.

The **Chairman**. That is exactly what tomorrow's meeting is to discuss, just to raise the questions.

Senator **Aiken**. I think it is important for the committee to agree on the factuality of it.

The **Chairman**. Yes, that is what the meeting tomorrow is.

Senator **Aiken**. We can expect we will agree on everything else for the next few months.

The **Chairman**. Well, is there anything more in executive?

I advise you all that Mr. Pfleger is back, ready to go on with the Antarctic Treaty at 3 o'clock, now.

Senator **Aiken**. He has got very stiff competition right now. One of our distinguished members upstairs is making a speech.

The **Chairman**. I hope some of you can stay here. You can read Mr. Kennedy's speech in the record. The executive meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3 p.m., the committee proceeded into open session]

TO CONSIDER REPORT ON HEARINGS REGARDING EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 15, 1960

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:25 p.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol, Hon. J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, Carlson, and Williams.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Newhouse, and Mr. St. Claire of the committee staff.

The Chairman. Gentlemen, we have a quorum and the committee will come to order.

I hope you have all had an opportunity to read the confidential draft, and of course the reason it is confidential is because unless the committee approves of it, I don't think it ought to be made public.

CHANGES RECOMMENDED

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman, I have read it, and I have a few suggestions which I think, in the main, are quite minor. I believe overall the report is quite factual and I think it is quite an objective report, but I do have some recommendations.

The Chairman. We will have them. What are they?

I think Pat Holt did most of this, and worked very hard on it. I think he deserves a lot of credit for going through a difficult record. Our procedure of shifting every 10 minutes makes it very hard.

Senator Hickenlooper. I think it is a very excellent report.

The Chairman. To get it out in any regular chronological order. I thought he did a very good job myself.

Senator Hickenlooper. I think if you will just indulge me in my little suggestions, you will not find they distort in the slightest degree the report.

The Chairman. Do the suggestions relate to the factual part or the conclusions?

Senator Hickenlooper. Two or three things. I can just start out by telling you on page 3, or any way you want to proceed.

The Chairman. No, go ahead.

Senator **Sparkman**. What page?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Page 3.

The **Chairman**. May I say, Senator, before you start, we did send all up to page 51 to the Department, to clear for security. I have a letter from the Department which says,

> In accordance with your suggestion, we have reviewed the draft sections and do not believe their publication will disclose information prejudicial to national security.

That relates to all up to page 51. Thereafter it is a matter of interpretation and opinion, which is not their business. But they have cleared the first part of it, the factual report.

OTHER NATION'S VIEWS ARE IMPORTANT

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I went over this hurriedly. I just went over it once this morning. Starting at the bottom, the paragraph beginning the last two lines of page 2,

> Although this inquiry and information developed by it concerned the foreign relations of the United States, public examination of these matters is wholly and intimately the domestic affair of the United States.

This is only a suggestion as to the connotation, what our policy is and the procedures we design for executing it, are our business and no one else's. Now that, coupled with one or two other suggestions I have so far as verbiage is concerned, is what I want to raise a question about.

Basically it is certainly our business and no one else's. But I do believe we should recognize that foreign policy must also take into account some impact on world opinion. In other words, I wonder if we haven't said that a little too bluntly in that and two or three other statements there.

Senator **Gore**. Would you yield?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Yes.

Senator **Gore**. I have a checkmark on the same sentence. My thought was similar to yours. Though the policy of the United States invariably affects—and we hope, will affect—the policies and collective security of the free nations, its determination within the United States is primarily our responsibility. That is the general thought. Is that what you had in mind?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. It is along the line. If we can go on, I have about three suggestions here in that main paragraph, all of which would go to the development of the general connotation——

Senator **Lausche**. Will you yield there?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Yes.

DECISIONMAKING BY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Senator **Lausche**. I have question marks made wholly independent of what you have said, and I was going to ask about the last paragraph,

> What is at stake here is whether on the one hand the American people are mature enough to make their particular kind of government workable or whether on the other hand they are naive enough to allow themselves to be influenced, however unwittingly, by self-serving bombast and innuendoes from abroad.

Now, what bombast and innuendoes are we thinking of?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I have a question on the same thing.

Senator **Sparkman**. You are ahead of him.

Senator **Lausche**. I understand that, but I am pointing out my thinking and obviously yours——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. My thought is this: I don't mean a sentence by sentence correcting particularly, but I have about three. If I can develop those down to and including the general sentiment which Frank expressed, which I also have a notation on, on this page, I would hope.

I can't see, in other words, that it serves any particular good purpose to say that it is our business and nobody else's. "Because"—if that were eliminated, then the next sentence "in making these decisions," which would follow, of course, the words "United States" in the preceding sentence, "in making these decisions we may as a people consider the views of foreign nations if and to the extent that we so desire."

Now, I would feel better if we modified that sentence by saying something to the effect that we should consider the views of foreign nations if, and to the extent that, those views serve our overall purposes. Do you see what I mean?

The **Chairman**. Yes.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. In other words, I get the impression here that we have rather a little chip on our shoulder, and saying——

Senator **Capehart**. Would the Senator yield?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Yes.

TREADING ON THIN ICE

Senator **Capehart**. I would like to make a motion we eliminate everyting from the beginning of the bottom of page 2 and all of page 3. Eliminate it all.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. All?

Senator **Capehart**. I think it is negative; it doesn't serve any purpose.

The **Chairman**. The point he is trying to make here, Homer, is that we shouldn't let Khrushchev's condemnation——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. That's right.

Senator **Capehart**. I don't believe you do that.

Senator **Lausche**. I don't think you do it.

Senator **Capehart**. I would rather take it out entirely.

Senator **Lausche**. I don't think we do it here.

Senator **Capehart**. I don't want to say that.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. My suggestion is that we might well eliminate that one sentence, that what our policy is and the procedures we design for executing it are our business and on one else's. We in effect say this other——

The **Chairman**. It is a little blunt.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. It is rather blunt and I am thinking of other nations who are not necessarily hostile to us. I think other nations can well say, "Well, America and the United States and the free world are so much wrapped up together, we don't like to have them make a statement that they don't care anything about our sentiments." I don't think that is what is meant by this.

The **Chairman**. I think it ties it down a little too far.

Senator **Gore**. Would the Senator from Indiana permit a suggestion? Instead of eliminating it from there, why don't we let the staff, in view of this discussion, rewrite this particular section?

Senator **Capehart**. I would just as soon eliminate the whole thing because I think you tread on thin ice and it is hard to write. You never can say what you have in mind exactly.

CONCERN FOR FREE WORLD'S INTERESTS

Senator **Sparkman**. Instead of making a short sentence saying it is nobody else's business, why don't you make a little more complicated sentence and say while it is our own concern, we must have in mind at all times the interests of the free world?

The **Chairman**. The next sentence does that.

Senator **Sparkman**. I know it does, but you are doing it by sentences, don't you see, and I said if you would compound your sentence——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I would be satisfied in using the next sentence which begins, "In making these decisions," which refer back to the public explanation matter and so on—

> In making these decisions we may, as a people, consider the views of foreign nations if and to the extent that our overall mutual interests are served.

The **Chairman**. I think that is good.

Senator **Gore**. I think that is good.

Senator **Sparkman**. I think I would include the next sentence.

Senator **Lausche**. "The interests of peace are served also."

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I said, "Our mutual interests are served."

Senator **Gore**. "Primarily peace."

Senator **Morse**. Why don't you add, "which is primarily peace"?

Senator **Sparkman**. And we ought to incorporate the next sentence which is, "We would be unrealistic not to take into account world opinion".

Senator **Williams**. Use an "and"—"And we would be".

The **Chairman**. Yes.

FOREIGN INTERVENTION

Senator **Hickenlooper**. We come on down in the next sentence or the sentence below that, beginning with the word "On" at the middle of the page. We say, "On no account should Mr. Khrushchev or any other foreigner be allowed to intervene in any way in this peculiarly domestic matter."

Now are we saying to our allies, "You don't participate in any deliberations on general foreign policy that we have"? I know what that sentence means and I agree with it. I don't think Mr. Khrushchev has any business monkeying around with our foreign policy, but isn't that rather blunt for any foreign nation?

Senator **Sparkman**. What does it mean for Norway or Turkey, for instance?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I am talking for our allies. We say, "no other foreign nations." Of course, foreign policy is primarily our responsibility and it is our business.

Senator **Wiley**. What is the objection to Homer's motion to take out the whole page?

Senator **Capehart**. The more you gentlemen talk, the more convinced I am that the whole thing should come out.

Senator **Morse**. I would like to suggest, if Bourke would be willing—I would not insist on it—that we add your suggestion at the end of his sentence, which is "primarily peace." And strike out the rest.

Senator **Gore**. We are going to consider your views, is what we say, for whatever they are worth in our mutual interests of serving peace. Really we have implied everything that you tried to set out specifically in the remaining sentence.

Senator **Lausche**. What about something like this,

> On no account should Mr. Khrushchev be allowed to intervene by self-serving bombast and innuendoes to interfere with the accomplishment of this objective of world peace.

Senator **Green**. Why limit it to those two ways?

Senator **Lausche**. I have done that because below there is used this "by self-serving bombast," and I want to draw it to Khrushchev and no one else.

Senator **Green**. Yes, but you are limited to two ways.

Senator **Lausche**. Or otherwise—or otherwise in the achievement of world peace.

MANNER RATHER THAN SUBSTANCE

Senator **Sparkman**. Don't we say further in the report that if a spy plane from Russia were caught over Kansas, we would be rather bombastic ourselves?

Senator **Morse**. I think you go far enough to say what Bourke said and stop.

Senator **Sparkman**. I know, but further in the report you do in effect say that.

Senator **Green**. You are criticizing the manner rather than substance, are you not?

Senator **Sparkman**. Or primarily because it is Kansas. [Laughter.]

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I am in this position: Having said what I did in the proposals, the suggestion that Senator Gore and Senator Morse made would meet with my approval really, or I could take the rest of the paragraph also. Either way, it doesn't make any difference to me.

Senator **Gore**. What would be wrong after this discussion in instructing the staff to take the report, beginning with the bottom of page 2 and through page 3, and submit to us a revised draft of that part of it? And if you still want to strike it out, you can do so.

Senator **Capehart**. Will somebody give me a good reason why we shouldn't strike it all?

Senator **Green**. I, for one, don't understand what the purpose is to change this draft anyway. It is for our personal use, is it not?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. No, this is for the public.

The **Chairman**. This is a draft, which if the committee wishes, will be approved and then published.

STATEMENTS MIGHT BE TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I can just see Communist propaganda taking some of these statements out of context and saying here is a declaration of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, where they are saying they won't associate themselves with other nations, then twist it all out of context.

Senator LAUSCHE. Whom were these statements directed at?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. At Khrushchev.

Senator LAUSCHE. At Khrushchev alone, is that what we basically have in mind?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Khrushchev.

Senator GORE. It was the self-justification for having the hearing, and I don't think we have to defend ourselves.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to make a motion that this be rewritten?

Senator GORE. I don't know that we ought to proceed to a vote on either one of them. I was just hoping, before we vote to strike it out, that the staff could bring back a redraft and see if it is satisfactory.

The CHAIRMAN. And simplify it.

Senator CAPEHART. The reason I am opposed to that—and I am not stiff-necked at all about it—I don't think the substance belongs to it. I think the more you try to deal with it and try to write about it, the deeper you get into water. You talk about sort of slapping foreigners.

SECTION WILL BE REWRITTEN

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't we ask them to rewrite, and we don't have to have it if we don't like it.

Senator GORE. I don't have to make a motion.

Senator MORSE. Let me say this: I don't think the rewrite ought to contain what is after Bourke's suggestion. I would like to see that part of it in, about our telling the world,

> Yes, we will consider your points of view for whatever we think they are worth if we think it fosters our mutual interest of peace.

Why dignify this Communist rascal, which is a very mild term, by even mentioning the buzzard's name in the first couple of pages of this report? We have to talk about him later as to what he said, but why even mention Khrushchev's name in the first two pages?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we can leave his name out.

Senator MORSE. Ignore him.

The CHAIRMAN. Leave his name out. The general principle is that we do take world opinion into account, but it is our prerogative.

Do you understand the objective?

Mr. MARCY. I am not at all sure that I did, Senator. I would like to ask if it is the intention of the committee that we rewrite this now, because I think this raises a bit of a problem as to whether we should try to clear these paragraphs now or whether this is going to be a matter of rewriting sections and then for instance, bringing it back tomorrow, sir.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I would prefer that the staff work on this.

Senator **Williams**. I think it is important enough.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. And revamp it. I think generally the committee understands this.

FORMULATION OF FOREIGN POLICY

Senator **Aiken**. We are taking out any inference that we formulate foreign policy without consultation with friendly nations. You are taking care of that in this same rewrite.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I don't wan't to minimize the fact that foreign policy is our basic responsibility and ours alone. But also I wouldn't want to create the impression that we were so completely isolated on the subject that we do not consider the views or the attitudes or the general conditions of our friends. That is our general feeling

Senator **Carlson**. The word "foreigner" isn't good.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I don't think it was the intent of this paragraph, but I think for propaganda purposes they can distort it.

The **Chairman**. They can try and then if we don't like it, we can ignore it.

Mr. **Marcy**. If you read the first sentence of that paragraph, they were talking about solely the inquiry and the information developed. We are talking about that; we are not talking about the formulation of foreign policy. When we come over here, we say this is a choice wholly for us to make, and we are talking about the choice of examining ourselves. This is self-examination and this is a peculiarly domestic matter. We are not talking about the formulation of foreign policy. I take it the committee agrees with that emphasis.

The **Chairman**. But the second sentence up there does say our policy; it doesn't say with regard to this inquiry. It is the policy, and it does leave a false impression.

Your objective is much narrower than the language expresses there. So you can, I think, take that out and change it, and cut it down to one paragraph probably, and be more clear. But if it isn't successful, we will—we might try it now, if Pat or somebody else wants to try if we go on with the rest of it.

GENERAL INTENT IS GOOD

Senator **Wiley**. What about Homer's suggestion to strike this page?

The **Chairman**. If the rewrite is not satisfactory, we will leave it out. This gives them another opportunity to see if they make the point.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I think some of the general intent, as I understand that paragraph, is good. I would favor that general impression, and I would like personally to see the rewrite before we act finally.

The **Chairman**. That's right.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Whether it is cut out or not.

The **Chairman**. All right, what is the next one? Let's go on.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. The next paragraph begins, "What is at stake here."

Senator **Gore**. That is included in this whole thing.

The **Chairman**. That is included in the rewrite.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I have got a comment on one or two words in there.

The **Chairman**. Make it for their guidance.

MATURITY OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

Senator **Hickenlooper**. What is at stake here is whether on the one hand the American people are mature enough to make their particular kind of government workable. I don't like even suggesting that we are not mature enough to make our Government workable. I think our Government works and is workable.

Senator **Morse**. That paragraph should come out.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. And I think we have a substantial degree of maturity. The fact is——

Senator **Gore**. If that thought is to be in, shouldn't it be in the form of a positive statement rather than on the one hand or on the other hand?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Of course, in the last sentence in that paragraph the committee has proceeded on the premise that the former is correct. I think that is kind of damning us with faint praise and I would rather leave that in, but I would say the committee is convinced.

The **Chairman**. I think that will be included in the rewrite.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I think it will be included in the rewrite. See if we can't revamp it. I think it is a rather soft approach to the thing.

SOVIET PURPOSES QUESTIONED

Senator **Lausche**. I would like to comment on page 4, beginning with the second paragraph. My belief is that this ascribes to the Soviet a legitimate and bona fide purpose to have a genuine summit conference intended for the solution of problems. I don't think that has ever been the purpose of the Soviet.

We say here that

> Since 1956 the Soviet Union has repeatedly indicated desire for a summit conference of the heads of government of the United States, France, Britain and the Soviet Union. It was frequently intimated in Soviet statements that this desire was based on a belief that the international tensions could best be served and loosened.

I don't feel that in my own mind I can ascribe that bona fide purpose to the Soviet.

Senator **Gore**. Well, frankly, the President of the United States said, "Khrushchev has gone further and suggested that just he and I talk."

The **Chairman**. You take the statement, Frank, of the Secretary of State and I quote, on page 4, "The U.S.S.R. had repeatedly indicated a desire for that summit meeting since 1956." Those are his own words.

Senator **Capehart**. Whose words?

The **Chairman**. Herter's.

Senator **Lausche**. Well, that still doen't make me believe that the Soviet was genuine in its proposal.

Senator **Wiley**. We are stating that as a fact.

Senator **Morse**. We didn't say it was genuine, but we say indicated a desire.

A FACTUAL STATEMENT

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I think, Frank, reading the rest of that paragraph, now I make no comment on that because I was personally satisfied with the statement. I think it is a factual statement that the Soviet has been pushing for a program of a summit conference. Then, they go further and say, "it was frequently intimated in Soviet statements that this desire was based"—and we say it was intimated--"on a belief that international tensions could best be relaxed" and so on.

I think that is a factual statement. I think they intimated that in their statements. We are reciting some historical background there which I don't find any particular quarrel with.

The **Chairman**. It goes on. It says this was received without enthusiasm partly because of skepticism of Soviet motives, and partly because of a Western belief which seemed particularly prevalent in Washington that the summit conference should only follow long and careful preparation at lower levels. I think that indicates our skepticism that they made it.

Senator **Lausche**. The reason I am now motivated in reading this question is that I get entirely too many letters arguing that the Soviet has been wanting a conference; it has been earnestly demanding the banning of nuclear weapons. I think many of our citizens are laboring under a misapprehension and that this paragraph will continue more toward that end.

Now, then, that is all I have to say on it. It seems that there is not much support in what I have to say.

Senator **Wiley**. I think, Mr. Chairman, that Senator Lausche is correct. If we want to rewrite it, we have to say that while the Soviet officials have apparently made these statements, we are not convinced there is any validity to them from their actions. The actions indicate just the opposite, and I think we have got to be very careful about getting our statements that are a report of a committee. We are making conclusions here, and it is very serious for us to state what the facts don't really prove.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. That is covered pretty well later in the statement, just what you said.

Senator **Humphrey**. Also the Secretary testified to that effect.

PURPOSE OF REPORT

Senator **Capehart**. What are we trying to prove by the statement? I mean, what are we trying to prove?

Senator **Wiley**. We don't prove anything by it.

Senator **Capehart**. I think maybe it is a fact, but what relationship does the statement have to our hearings?

Senator **Morse**. It is part of the chronology.

Senator **Green**. I think we ought to decide in the first instance what the purpose of this document is to be.

The **Chairman**. The part we are now considering is a statement of factual background. It appears in the Secretary of State's own statement, and it is a fact.

Senator **Green**. You mean whether it is favorable or unfavorable to our own point of view?

Senator **Capehart**. You state here they repeatedly wanted a conference. At the end, you conclude that the failure of the conference was due to the U-2 incident.

Senator **Morse**. May I respectfully point out that it says they repeatedly indicated a desire. We don't say they have a good faith desire, but we want to say they repeatedly requested a summit conference. That is a fact. They repeatedly wanted it.

Senator **Capehart**. The inference of the average person would be that they were anxious for a conference and hoped for a conference. When he gets through and reads the conclusion, it is that the conference would have been successful had it not been for the U-2 incident.

Senator **Morse**. I do think we ought to state in the chronology and unless you have another procedure, I would like to move we strike "indicated a desire for," and insert in lieu therefor "repeatedly requested a summit conference."

Senator **Lausche**. May I offer a substitute motion? That is, the chronology is adequately set forth by the first paragraph on page 4 connected with the material on page 5. I move as a substitute that the last full paragraph on page 4 be stricken because it serves no useful purpose, and is subject to misinterpretation by the casual reader.

MOTIVATIONS SHOULD NOT BE JUDGED

Senator **Morse**. Mr. Chairman, I don't think we should get ourselves in a position where we are judging motivations. I think it is a fact, as Herter brought out, that this is part of the background of our relations with Russia. When you state it and then point out what this fellow Khrushchev did, you show what a scallywag the guy is in the subsequent pages of your report. But there is no doubt, in my judgment, that part of his propaganda drive has been a repeated request for summit conference—pretty smart propaganda, but it is a pretty smart picture.

The **Chairman**. What I thought the committee might do is to reasonably segregate the factual statement from the conclusions, if they could agree on the factual statement. Maybe we could not agree on the conclusions, but at least factual statement of what was developed could be agreed upon. There is no question but there is a fact that is testified to by the Secretary, and everybody knows they have been pushing for this. We have resisted it for years.

Senator **Morse**. The President said so.

The **Chairman**. Well, it was reported in the press day after day. We resisted it for years and then finally agreed to it, largely as an outgrowth of the so-called ultimatum on Berlin. That is what precipitated the summit. They have been pushing for the thing for years, requesting it. I think the requesting is, rather than indicating a desire, maybe——

Senator **Humphrey**. I think the whole paragraph, as Senator Hickenlooper says, properly puts it in perspective. When you get down below sentence No. 2, it says while the Soviet Union may have very well requested the summit conferences or indicated a desire for them, that the request was received with skepticism and rightly so, and that there was a feeling that there was a need of long preparations. I believe that the Western position is pretty well documented here.

Senator **Sparkman**. I feel that way, Mr. Chairman. I don't quite follow you, Frank, on your reasoning.

REASON FOR FAILURE OF SUMMIT

Senator **Capehart**. Will the Senator yield? I have no quarrel with what you just said, except the conclusion here is that the failure was due to the U-2 incident.

The **Chairman**. That comes in the last section.

Senator **Morse**. It comes later.

Senator **Capehart**. I know it comes later, but when you tie the two together, they repeatedly wanted a summit conference, et cetera—and I agree that Herter and others said this—and then the conclusion is, we agreed to a summit conference, then we flew an airplane over their country which was shot down, and as a result of that the conference was a failure. That is about what this report says.

Senator **Morse**. They said a lot of other things too.

Senator **Capehart**. That is in substance what you say and that, to me, is in the report.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. But it is made quite clear in this report here, I think, later on in discussing this thing, that they did not in truth want a summit conference, and if the U-2 incident had not come along, they probably would have found some other way to blow it apart. I think that is pretty well set up here.

Senator **Morse**. And the hearings show it.

Senator **Lausche**. You don't say that in your conclusions. You say the summit failed because of the U-2.

Senator **Wiley**. That's right.

Senator **Lausche**. I read it carefully.

Senator **Wiley**. Well, get rid of the conclusion later on.

Senator **Lausche**. And there is a premise for the conclusion in my opinion.

MOTION DEFEATED

The **Chairman**. The only way I suppose we can make progress is to act on motions. The substitute is to strike the motion. All in favor hold up their right hand.

One, two.

Then, all opposed?

The motion fails. It reverts now to the original motion to substitute the word "requested" in place of "indicate a desire for."

All in favor——

Senator **Lausche**. What about, "Since 1956, whether in good faith or not, the Soviet repeatedly requested"? That is some indication that we are not certain about their good faith in the matter.

Senator **Humphrey**. Surely it is obvious they wanted a summit conference, but for what purpose they wanted it is another thing, Frank. They wanted to go to the conference; I don't think they had anything particularly good in mind for us.

Senator AIKEN. They wanted one that would serve their purpose and not ours.

Senator MORSE. In any case, in my judgment they wanted it as long as they had hopes they could divide France, England, and the United States.

Senator HUMPHREY. That's right.

Senator MORSE. But when they had these presummit conferences among the allies and saw they could not divide us, they lost their interest in the summit.

Senator SPARKMAN. Frank, it seems to me that the words here "repeated a desire" more describe the situation that you describe that they requested. I don't believe they made any formal request for a summit conference.

Senator MORSE. I don't think they did. I think they made formal requests.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the language of the Secretary is "indicated a desire for."

Senator SPARKMAN. It was not more than an informal way. I think "indicated a desire" is better.

The CHAIRMAN. I can't remember the precise form.

MOTION WITHDRAWN

Senator MORSE. I don't object to the language as we have it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Neither do I.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we are safer to take the language as the Secretary, who is primarily responsible for it, put it.

Senator MORSE. I do too. Frank doesn't like it at all.

Senator LAUSCHE. I might say to you I am not going to be bound merely by what is said in the record in forming my conclusions. I have never believed in the good faith of the Soviet in asking for the conference or in intending to relieve world tensions, and I am not going to subscribe to any statement that expresses or implies that to be the fact.

Senator SPARKMAN. I don't feel that this does.

Senator LAUSCHE. I have nothing more to say to the item.

Senator MORSE. If you want to leave it the way it is, I will withdraw my motion.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's leave it the way it is for the present anyway.

All right, what is the next one? Page 6, Bourke?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is mine, unless somebody has got something to say on page 5.

The CHAIRMAN. Page 5?

Page 6. What is it, Bourke?

DATE OF KHRUSHCHEV'S VISIT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Just for clarity and for history, although this Khrushchev only had one visit to the United States, I suggest we just tie it down—in August or whenever it was, August 1959.

The CHAIRMAN. When it was?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Just for pinning it down whenever it was. September 1959.

Senator **Aiken**. We adjourned the Senate last year, you may recall. That is how I can remember when he came.

The **Chairman**. Without objection, added after "the United States," is "in September 1959."

Senator **Aiken**. September 15. [Laughter.]

Senator **Sparkman**. He was here twice, George.

The **Chairman**. Any other suggestion on that page?

Senator **Lausche**. On what page, 6?

The **Chairman**. Page 6.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I haven't anything until page 10, so if anyone else has any in the meantime, let them put it in.

FACTS MISSING ON SUMMIT'S COLLAPSE

Senator **Lausche**. All right, I get down to page 8. I submit to you that pages 7, 8, and 9 are woefully lacking a full description of the facts that were justly considered in determining who wrecked the conference.

Beginning the last pararaph on page 7,

> Meanwhile during the winter and spring Soviet policy gradually took a harder line in regard to Berlin, culminating in Chairman Khrushchev's threatening speech in Baku April 25, in which he said that the Western Powers would be forced out of Berlin.
>
> This speech, however, in Secretary Herter's appraisal, though it was the most sweeping since February 1959, was only a harsher version of what he had been saying for months before.

I made a notation on my file, omissions, of all that was said in November, December, January, and February.

Now, Herter testified that beginning in November, Khrushchev began making his attacks. He attacked the building of the tower in Berlin, he denounced Adenauer vigorously, and I submit that in this place there should be included a complete description of the acts of Khrushchev beginning last November 5. I will read to you what Herter said to the subject, page 6 of the printed testimony:

> #### Summit Prospects Dimmed
>
> In the first weeks after the Khrushchev American visit there was a general improvement of atmosphere and people began talking, partly in hope, partly in some confusion, about "détente." There were comparatively conciliatory speeches on each side; there was progress in the test ban talks at Geneva; a new Soviet-United States cultural agreement was signed November 21, and on December 1 the United States, the U.S.S.R. and other powers signed the Antarctic Treaty.
>
> But clouds began to gather even then. One of the earliest signs was the strong Soviet protest on November 11 against West German plans to build a broadcasting station in West Berlin. Another was the Khrushchev speech on November 14 which was harder in tone, boasted again of Soviet missile prowess, and began a concentrated attack on Adenauer and the German Federal Republic which later increased and seemed to be a central feature of Soviet presummit tactics. The reason for this attack is still a matter for speculation. Perhaps they thought it would undermine the Western position on Berlin by helping to divide the Western Allies. It had no such effect of course, but naturally rallied us to speak out in defense of our German ally.
>
> Khrushchev as early as December 1 also began repeating the threats to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. He repeated these threats in his speech to the Supreme Soviet on January 14 and in his remarks during his visit to Indonesia and other countries in January. On February 4, the Warsaw Pact powers issued the first formal blocwide commitment to sign a separate GDR peace treaty.

PREPARATION FOR FALSE CONCLUSION

I submit you can't leave that material out of this report without misstating the facts.

Senator **Wiley**. Or conclusions. You want to remember also in the meanwhile, it doesn't——

Senator **Lausche**. The omission of this constitutes a preparation for a false conclusion.

Senator **Wiley**. In the meanwhile he had made his trip to China.

Senator **Lausche**. Then you have Baku and the other places. The only one we mention is Baku.

Senator **Wiley**. Yes. We have got to get these in, because these are the facts where he went down there and didn't do very well with the Chinese leaders.

The **Chairman**. Do you want to incorporate all of this printed record in our report?

Senator **Lausche**. No, that question is completely unjustified.

The **Chairman**. This report is supposed to be a condensation of what is in the record. The record is printed. It says here was only a harsher version of what he had been saying for months before. That is what he has been saying. If you are going to repeat the whole thing, of course, it is impossible.

Senator **Lausche**. No. May I say to the chairman that I was on the bench for 10 years and I know what constitutes a proper statement of the relevant and pertinent facts.

The **Chairman**. Well, gentlemen, I don't know whether there is any use in trying to issue a report. There is no necessity; we don't have to issue a report. We can all give our own report.

AMOUNT OF DETAIL IN REPORT

Senator **Sparkman**. Frank, those speeches that you specifically referred to, didn't they all relate more or less to the Berlin situation?

Senator **Lausche**. Yes, they related to it.

Senator **Sparkman**. They all related to it.

Listen, it says, "Meanwhile during the winter and spring Soviet policy gradually took a harsher line in regard to Berlin, culminating in this Baku speech."

The **Chairman**. All of these are in the record.

Senator **Sparkman**. That is what he was reading. I was wondering if that sentence was not sufficient. You can say there, "in repeated speeches" but I don't think we ought to bring out every single speech that he made.

Senator **Lausche**. If you were not so detailed in pointing out the incidents that occurred on May 1, and the incidents that occurred following it, I would find some justification in what you said, but there is not much more to be added. There are probably 20 lines of additional material, and I can't see why we can't put it in.

Senator **Capehart**. Mr. Chairman, I wouldn't be unhappy if we didn't issue a report, and I am going to tell you why.

The **Chairman**. I won't either.

Senator **Capehart**. I will give you a concrete example. The papers have been filled with what might happen to Eisenhower in Japan every day now for days and days. It will continue until he gets over there. If he arrives in Japan and there are no incidents—and let's pray to God there are not any—and a million people turn out to see it, it will be in just one issue of the newspapers of the world and that will be the end of it. But for days and days and days they will read about the fact that something is going to happen to them and protest about it.

That is, I think, one of the things we have not learned yet as a country. We propagandize this fellow Khrushchev and his cause.

Senator **SPARKMAN**. I see no necessity for a report.

AIDING SOVIET PROPAGANDA

Senator **CAPEHART**. I think the less we say about it, the stronger we remain and the less we say about him, I just don't—I would be just as happy not to issue a report, but I see what the able Senator from Ohio is driving at. He wants to get in this report the factual things that blamed Khrushchev for failure of the summit conference.

Senator **SPARKMAN**. Even prior to May 1.

Senator **CAPEHART**. Even prior to May 1.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. Yes, that is my position.

Senator **CAPEHART**. You object to the conclusion, which I brought out before, that it was the U-2 incident that was directly or indirectly responsible for the failure.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. Well, I can see where different minds will differ about the conclusion, but to give the ordinary citizen a chance to know all of the facts and draw his own conclusion, I think that it is essential that these items be included.

Senator **CAPEHART**. You see, Khrushchev and communism can't live if everything is settled and everybody happy; he just can't exist. He can't live. Now, they know that, and therefore they live on frustration, confusion; they live on Japanese incidents, U-2 incidents, all kinds of incidents, and they are wise enough to prolong the publicity and the propaganda for months and weeks and years and years. Why do we help them do it?

Senator **LAUSCHE**. I am afraid that we are going to add still further.

Senator **CAPEHART**. That is the unfortunate part of this U-2—that our people flew this plane a week or 10 days during this conference and prior to it. That was something that just made my blood boil, to think they didn't have enough sense not to do it, because they didn't need to do it.

They had been doing it for 4 years and they had all the information possibly they needed. It wouldn't have made any difference if they hadn't flown it for 30 days; they could have flown it for 4 years after. It makes me boil to think they put themselves and this country in a position where they could be propagandized to death.

Senator **SPARKMAN**. I agree with you thoroughly.

RESPONSIBILITY IS TO ISSUE REPORT

Senator **MORSE**. I want to express an observation, too, as to whether or not we ought to put out a report.

I think we ought to try to put out a report, if we can agree on a report. Then if any of us find ourselves in disagreement, we should put out our individual or joint statements about these hearings.

I think we should have conducted these hearings. I think we have a public responsibility either as a committee or a group within the committee to file with the American people our conclusions in regard to the hearings. Therefore, I hope we would draft this report so that all of us can sign it or as many of us can sign it as agree to it, and those that can't would be free to put out their own report.

But I certainly do not think that because we can't agree here on page 8 on the suggestion that Frank makes we should throw in the sponge and say we are not going to have any report. I think we ought to do our best to get out a report, those of us who can agree, sign a statement, and the other do what he wants to.

Senator **Lausche**. I move that we include——

Senator **Sparkman**. Wait before you make a motion.

Right on page 7 where they refer to "Meanwhile during the winter and spring" and so on, how would it do to put a footnote there in which these various speeches you referred to are set forth?

Senator **Lausche**. These two or three paragraphs on pages 6 and 7 contain the facts and that is all I want to include.

Senator **Sparkman**. Doesn't a footnote——

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL

Senator **Lausche**. That would do if the report were not so meticulous about the incidents of May 1, 4, and 5. You can't pass on this whole question without the whole framework.

Senator **Capehart**. What is wrong with putting in those incidents that Frank suggests? It just takes up a little more space. They are good and they ought to go in.

The **Chairman**. I have no particular objection.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Would it serve that purpose if these were put in by way of a footnote?

Senator **Lausche**. It has got to be rewritten in this page. Does that simplify it? All you have to do is recite these incidents that led up to it—well, the sort of compulsion on the part of Herter to answer these things.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I don't think that it makes much difference whether it is put in the body or a footnote, except my own feeling would be that it might be a little better composition in a general compilation of the report if details are put in a footnote occasionally rather than in the body of the report. Do you see what I mean? You could footnote it right down at the bottom with those paragraphs.

The **Chairman**. You could still read it then in a manageable form.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. You can read this.

The **Chairman**. If we are going to do it one time, that is all right, but if we are going to do it every time, on every one of those we will have to reprint the whole record.

Senator **Lausche**. All right, put it in the form of a footnote. He can pick out the facts; I want merely the different dates on which these things were done, particularly where the Warsaw Pact powers threaten to sign a separate peace with East Germany. It is very, very pertinent.

Senator SPARKMAN. Even take excerpts from the speeches themselves.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, Carl can handle it.

The CHAIRMAN. What you have in mind generally is what is included under that section entitled "Summit Prospects Dimmed" on page 6—to put that part there.

THE STRAW THAT BROKE THE CAMEL'S BACK

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask, Carl, did Herter have a heading "Summit Prospects Dimmed" or is that our heading?

Mr. MARCY. I would have to check that, Senator. That is probably ours.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes. But you see, your placing that "Summit Prospects Dimmed" indicates that your inference is that beginning at this time dimness began to fall over them.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, as a matter of fact, reading this suggested report as a whole, here is what I get out of it: The report recognizes that it was being dimmed, that Khrushchev had probably come to the conclusion he just was not going to be able to divide the Western Powers, and that he was looking for an out.

Then comes the other thing, and I think they used the expression that the U-2 flight was the straw that broke the camel's back. I think they used that expression in there. So it seems to me that it fits right in with what you are saying. There is no contention in this suggested report that that, and that alone, broke up the summit conference.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Senator SPARKMAN. But it was the straw, the final straw, that broke the camel's back. And gave Khrushchev a mine of propaganda material.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Did they agree to put that in the footnote?

The CHAIRMAN. Is that agreeable to put it in a footnote?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Carl, you can put this in a footnote.

Mr. MARCY. Yes. Do I understand this is just to be a reference to a hearing where you say Herter says——

Senator LAUSCHE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Quote it in a footnote.

Mr. MARCY. All right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have a suggestion on page 9.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it that footnote would be put in there right at the end of the sentence saying, "For months before," and then the footnote would explain the basis for that sentence.

All right, what is the next page?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. My next one is on page 9, the first paragraph.

Senator AIKEN. Are we inserting in here a footnote that the U-2 incident broke the camel's back, as John said?

The CHAIRMAN. No, that was the conclusion.

Senator **Lausche**. We haven't received that.

Senator **Aiken**. The camel's back was already slated for destruction, I am sure.

A DRAMATIC STATEMENT

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Page 9, the first paragraph. "When the U-2 aircraft came down over Sverdlovsk the morning of May 1, 'with a crash heard around the world' "—I think that is a little dramatic statement. I think it should be left out. I think it is better reporting to just say "When the aircraft came down over Sverdlovsk on the morning of May 1." I think that is a little too dramatic.

Senator **Morse**. I like this style for individual writing, but for group writing, I recognize the position taken by the Senator.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. This is a report. We are not criticizing in this.

Senator **Morse**. It is not a magazine article.

Senator **Aiken**. You cut out "a crash heard around the world." Is there any objection to deleting it?

Without objection those words are deleted.

The **Chairman**. What is the next?

Senator **Lausche**. Page 9.

Mr. **Marcy**. It would be a mistake if any of these slip out.

The **Chairman**. I think everybody ought to leave their copy here. That shouldn't get out because it is not going to be put out that way. It is going to be changed and we ought not to put these copies out.

UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

Senator **Lausche**. The final full paragraph on page 9: "Although a question was evaded as to who was present when the basic decision was made to develop the U-2" and so forth. I think that leaves a misimpression. I observe no evasion about the fact that the U-2 was contemplated for development.

Senator **Aiken**. "Remained unanswered."

The **Chairman**. No, that was present.

Senator **Lausche**. No, but when you use the word "evaded," it has a bad implication. The fact is that the leaders of the Congress were told.

Senator **Aiken**. "The question remained unanswered."

Senator **Morse**. Instead of "was evaded."

Senator **Aiken**. "Although the question remained unanswered."

Senator **Lausche**. Yes, but why do we have to put that in there and also cast the implication that is bad?

Senator **Wiley**. We all voted for it. We appropriated money for it.

Senator **Lausche**. The Congress knew about it.

The **Chairman**. That is not so. I didn't know about it.

Senator **Wiley**. The CIA were given the power to do what they did

Senator **Lausche**. That is what ought to be said. The Congress approved.

The **Chairman**. I didn't know.

Senator **Aiken**. The question was asked, but the answer was not insisted upon.

Senator **Lausche**. Dulles testified they went to the leaders of the Finance Committee of both the House and Senate and told them what was to be made.

Senator **Morse**. Well, they didn't speak for us.

THE DECISION TO DEVELOP THE U-2

The **Chairman**. Senator Lausche asked Mr. Dulles,

> Mr. Dulles, this morning you stated in 1954 it was decided to develop the plane that would have high altitude, long-range cruising to be used among other purposes for service in your agency, is that correct?
>
> Mr. **Dulles**. That is correct.
>
> Senator **Lausche**. Where was the decision made? Were you present at the time?
>
> Mr. **Dulles**. Oh, yes, right through the whole business.
>
> Senator **Lausche**. Who else was present if you can recall?
>
> Mr. **Dulles**. Well, there was high authority for that basic decision.

I wouldn't say that is a responsive answer. He says.

Senator **Wiley**. Mr. Chairman, the fact is in 1955, after the conference failed for the overflights, that we sought and have been seeking for 4 years, it was then that CIA came into being and money was appropriated without any strings. It was in 1956 that we created the U-2, and from July 1956 until the present time the U-2 has been operating. How many times, we can't say, but I heard the question asked if it was over a dozen times, and they said yes.

Well, never mind asking any more, they said. How many times, "We don't know." There, this is the only time it failed, but the point is there is no need of our using words like "evasion" and so forth with the idea it is a political year. There is no question about that, but we are trying to get out a report here that states the facts and honest conclusions.

Senator **Sparkman**. Why don't you say although the question remains unanswered?

Senator **Lausche**. You can find that out.

Senator **Sparkman**. The question was asked but it was not answered.

Senator **Lausche**. I was the one who broke the thing because the whole status of the testimony was that nobody knew about the U-2, and I asked if the Congress knew.

Will you please read what was said further on about telling the leaders of the Congress about it?

Senator **Sparkman**. This relates not to who was informed of it, but who was in on making the decision—who was present when the basic decision was made.

The **Chairman**. And the question was not answered.

Senator **Sparkman**. And that is what they say: the question went unanswered.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Personally, I don't see that this paragraph adds anything to the report. As far as I am concerned, I would just as soon see it out.

KNOWLEDGE OF CONGRESS

Senator **Lausche**. I think it is very pertinent. The Congress of the United States, under the processes we follow, knew about this. All of the members were not told because if you had been told, the Soviets would have been told, and so they went before the leaders of both Houses and before the leaders of the Finance Committee and told them that they had the money included.

Will you read what was said there?

Senator **Morse**. That was new to us.

The **Chairman**. I was present when the Speaker said over in the meeting that he never heard of it.

Mr. **Holt**.

> Senator **Lausche**. Was that plan revealed to Congress?
>
> Mr. **Dulles**. In view of the fact that a large part of the money or a major part of the money came out of the budget, I mentioned that to the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member of the Appropriations Committee and to no one else.
>
> Senator **Lausche**. And of the Senate or of the House?
>
> Mr. **Dulles**. Of the House. The Senate was also, I believe, informed.
>
> Senator **Lausche**. So that——
>
> Mr. **Dulles**. Those two men.
>
> Senator **Lausche**. The Congress knew that our Government was developing a plane to be used for intelligence purposes so as to aid them in preparing the necessary defense to meet with the offensive power of the potential enemy?
>
> Mr. **Dulles**. There were a handful of people in Congress that knew and I think you may have read Chairman Cannon's statement in the House.
>
> Senator **Lausche**. Can you identify or do you want to identify the others who knew?
>
> Mr. **Dulles**. No, I would prefer to leave it to them.
>
> Senator **Lausche**. Then it is fair and honest to say that Congress knew of the existence of a plane of this type to be used for the acquisition of intelligence. Well, I don't know whether it is fair to impute to the whole Congress the language that one or two members had, that is a question for the Congress to decide.

Senator **Wiley**. We may be naive, but when we constituted the CIA to meet that situation, which was very definite when the Kremlin wouldn't agree to the overflights, then we created CIA with the function and the money to do what? To do just what they did do.

Senator **Morse**. Not at all. Not at all, without notice though to this Congress that they just so much as whispered to us. You would have had one fine scrap in the Congress if we thought our Government was going to follow this shocking course of action that they followed in regard to the U-2 plane, which in my judgment, time will prove has cost us dearly as far as world prestige is concerned.

MATTERS OF FACT

Senator **Wiley**. Each one is entitled to his own conclusions.

Senator **Morse**. Sure.

The **Chairman**. Well, gentlemen, those are opinions of policy. It seems to me this statement here is quite accurate according to the record and that is as far as it goes.

Senator **Sparkman**. It shows it was fully authorized.

The **Chairman**. This has nothing to do with whether it was wise or not.

Senator **Aiken**. Mr. Chairman, I say that we want advice as to who was present when it was decided to develop the U-2. We were told by Mr. Dulles what Members of the Congress were told of it after the decisions were made, and that undoubtedly included Clarence Cannon.

The CHAIRMAN. The last sentence said a limited number of Members of Congress were also informed.

Senator AIKEN. It was probably limited to two or four.

Senator WILEY. What is the purpose of this?

The CHAIRMAN. The whole purpose of this, if it has any, is to merely enlighten the Senate and public as to their own government. I assume they are entitled to know how their government is run.

Senator SPARKMAN. It seems to me, as a matter of fact, it is well to have it in because it shows that this wasn't something just picked up and flown. It was designed, and it was designed on high authority of our Government.

Senator AIKEN. What we don't know is who made the basic decision for the U-2. We know who was told about it. That is, we know a couple of them.

Senator SPARKMAN. But we received assurance there was high authority for it.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what he says. That is exactly what the record shows.

Senator SPARKMAN. It was not an illegitimate thing.

Senator LAUSCHE. It is not illegitimate. Would you accept that the Congress authorized the expenditures of money for the development of it?

Senator MORSE. Not at all. They didn't know it was authorized.

Senator SPARKMAN. They authorized money for CIA to spend, and CIA decided to spend money for this.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is true of all these things.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

LANGUAGE AGREED UPON

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would you accept this language in that paragraph? The first sentence: "Although it was not disclosed as to who was present when the basic decision was made to develop the U-2"—I think that is a factual statement.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It was not disclosed as to who was present when the basic decision was made.

Senator AIKEN. I don't think we asked that question, did we?

Mr. HOLT. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. As to who developed?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. As to when the basic decision was made. The answer was the decision was made at high echelon.

Senator SPARKMAN. On highest authority.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Just say it was not disclosed. I think it is probably a little better than "it was evaded."

The CHAIRMAN. I see no objection to that. I think it means the same. We have already decided to take out "evaded", and say "remained unanswered".

Do you think it is better than "evaded"?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We did not demand an answer. I think that the most practical statement is that it was not disclosed.

The **Chairman**. What is your language now? Read it again.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. "Although it was not disclosed who was present"——

The **Chairman**. I see no objection.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. "When the basic decision was made," and so on. The rest of the paragraph I would be satisfied with.

The **Chairman**. I have no objection to that.

Senator **Morse**. The committee received assurance that it was a highest authority decision.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I say I am satisfied with the rest of the paragraph.

The **Chairman**. I have no objection to that. It means about the same thing.

CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL

Senator **Lausche**. If somebody asked where the moneys were obtained to develop the U-2, what would be the answer?

Senator **Wiley**. Congress has to appropriate it.

Senator **Sparkman**. The same place that the money was appropriated to develop the atomic bomb. Two billion dollars without anybody asking a question.

Senator **Lausche**. I move there be added to this paragraph the sentence:

> The moneys for the development of the U-2 were obtained out of the funds allocated to the Central Intelligence Agency for its work and which was approved by the Congress.

Senator **Morse**. Without the Congress being advised as to the specific purpose for which it was going to be spent.

Senator **Lausche**. You have already said a specific number of members know.

Senator **Morse**. But without Congress. This is bringing in government by trend of secrecy in this country.

The **Chairman**. I think if you get into that, then we would have to submit it to security because they would object to putting that kind of stuff in. They don't like to testify in any circumstances as to how it is done.

Senator **Lausche**. Let's go on. I will withdraw that. There may be strength to what the chairman has said, that it deals with intelligence.

The **Chairman**. Anything else on that page?

WEATHER TESTING FLIGHTS

Senator **Lausche**. Yes, one thing.

They refused to disclose the number of flights that were made and here the last line says, "In fact made some 200 flights."

I do know that you modify it and confine it to air tests.

The **Chairman**. That is right. That is in the public record.

Senator **Lausche**. But 200 weather tests?

The **Chairman**. Just for the weather.

Senator **Aiken**. 199.

The **Chairman**. That is public testimony.

Senator **Lausche**. That's right. I understand that, but still I think it could be made clearer by identifying 200 weather testing flights.

Senator **Aiken**. It is on the next page.

Senator **Lausche**. I know it is on the next page.

Senator **Sparkman**. It is a part of the same sentence.

Senator **Lausche**. All right, go ahead.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I have a suggestion on page 10, the bottom of the paragraph that begins on page 9, the first paragraph ending on page 10. "And pictures taken from a U-2 of the eye of a typhoon have been published."

Now, as I understand it, those are the first pictures of the eye of a typhoon ever taken. It was testified that they gave very valuable assistance to the meteorologists in their knowledge, extending their knowledge of the action and movement of typhoons. I just thought maybe a little statement——

The **Chairman**. That is what it says, that the Japanese Government found the U-2 pictures of great value in tracing the course of tornadoes last year.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Yes, the pictures taken by the U-2 from the eye of a typhoon have been published. I thought to say, "the first pictures ever taken of"——

Senator **Sparkman**. Are you sure of that, Bourke?

Senator **Aiken**. Have been for the first time published.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. As I understand the testimony, it is the first picture ever taken from the eye of a typhoon.

Senator **Sparkman**. I thought the Navy had done that before.

The **Chairman**. Does the testimony say the first time?

Mr. **Marcy**. You would have to say the first pictures from such height, because the Navy has been flying into this.

WORTH BRAGGING ABOUT

Senator **Hickenlooper**. They have been doing that for years, but to get clear up over a typhoon and take a picture looking down—the typhoon was entirely under them and they got the most effective pictures of the current there. Movements from that height without being right in the turmoil of the typhoon. I can't be absolutely positive but I think it is the first picture of the U-2 ever taken.

Senator **Sparkman**. At the point Herter testified about it, he did not mention that. There is something deleted. What it was, I don't know. That may be it. That is on page 74 of the hearings.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. You can very easily check it with the CIA in a minute. They will be able to tell that it was the first picture ever taken.

Senator **Sparkman**. If it is, it ought to be in.

Senator **Aiken**. If this was the first time they have been taken, it is worth bragging about.

Senator **Morse**. Sure.

Senator **Sparkman**. I think it is worth checking.

The **Chairman**. I think with that qualification, the first pictures taken from above—I do think there have been these Navy planes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They have taken pictures within the typhoon into the eye and into the silent zone of typhoons. That has been done repeatedly, but never over a typhoon, so far as I understand it. We can check that.

Senator SPARKMAN. That can be easily checked.

SOVIET KNOWLEDGE OF FLIGHTS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have gotten down to the bottom of the first full paragraph, the middle paragraph on page 10: "Prior to the ill-fated flight of May 1 there had been no losses over Soviet territory, though the Soviets had knowledge of the flights through radar trackings and otherwise." I think it is important and factual to put in there a reference to Khrushchev's statement that they had known about these flights since 1956.

Senator AIKEN. They claim to have had knowledge of them?

Senator MORSE. I think that is right. I agree with that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It fixes Soviet knowledge of these flights since 1956, and they never raised their hands.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, do you want to add, "and others since 1956?"

Senator HICKENLOOPER. "Though the Soviets had knowledge of the flights through radar trackings and otherwise since 1956, according to Mr. Khrushchev's own statement."

Senator SPARKMAN. If you can find his quote, how about putting it in as a footnote?

The CHAIRMAN. Put a footnote of his quote in.

Senator WILEY. You can follow right there, "According to Mr. Khrushchev"——

The CHAIRMAN. Then, in addition, put a footnote of what he said, giving the desired quote.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. My next suggestion is on page 12, so if anybody has one on page 11 or 10——

EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

Senator LAUSCHE. I have one on page 11, the middle paragraph: "In his address to the Nation May 27, President Eisenhower said that aerial photography had been one of many methods we had used to keep ourselves and the free world"—now, "the free world" is underscored—"abreast of major Soviet military developments."

I have no objection to that, but now: "Although this implies that the information obtained from U-2 photography was shared with our allies," and "Witnesses before the committee declined to answer specific questions on this point or as to the knowledge of our allies about the use of their bases for U-2 overflights."

The fact is that the witnesses said it is the practice and the rule in the diplomatic service to let other nations speak for themselves on these matters, and for that reason they preferred not to answer. This causes a cloud over the position taken by the witness, and I don't think that cloud is warranted. I think that this whole sentence ought to be stricken, "Although this implies that the information from" and so forth. I move that it be stricken.

Senator WILEY. I second that motion.

Senator **Sparkman**. I see no objection to striking it because the sentence above, quoting President Eisenhower, says that it was shared or at least it was helpful.

Senator **Lausche**. Yes, that is correct, and that is a factual statement.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I would support striking that sentence or, if it were determined to keep it in, modifying it by saying something like this: "Witnesses before the committee explained the inadvisability of discussing exchange of information with other friendly nations."

Senator **Lausche**. How does that serve either the conclusions or serve our country or our allies?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I don't think it does; I would just as soon see it out myself.

The **Chairman**. I don't see that it is necessary.

Senator **Sparkman**. Did you make a motion to strike?

Senator **Lausche**. Yes, I did.

Senator **Sparkman**. I will second it.

The **Chairman**. You have heard the motion. Any further discussion?

Without objection, that is stricken.

Mr. **Holt**. Just that one sentence, Mr. Chairman?

Senator **Lausche**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. Beginning with the words, "Although this implies."

CHANGE IN WORDING

Senator **Hickenlooper**. My next suggestion is on page 12, if nobody has anything before that. The first paragraph of page 12, the last sentence: "It was customary, however, for CIA to touch base,"—the phrase "touch base" I don't believe ought to be in this report.

Senator **Aiken**. "Consult."

Senator **Hickenlooper**. It is a very apt expression and we use it a lot. I don't know whether it should be in here.

The **Chairman**. Is "consult" a proper word? "Consult with the informal group?"

Senator **Capehart**. I so move.

The **Chairman**. Without objection, the "touch base" is changed to "consult."

All right, what is next?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. My next one is on page 15. If anybody has anything in between there——

The **Chairman**. If there is, speak up.

Senator **Lausche**. I have a question mark about this, but I am not clear: "It appears that although the President, the Vice-President"——

The **Chairman**. What page is that?

Senator **Lausche**. Bottom of page 12,

If a member of the National Security Council and the appropriate cabinet officers were knowledgeable of the programs of flights, they were not knowledgeable of individual flights in advance, nor did they specifically approve the timing of individual flights beyond a general approval within a given time span.

I think that is all right.

Senator **Sparkman**. It seems to be a very good statement.

PLANNING OF U-2 FLIGHTS

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Page 15, the first full paragraph on page 15, I can't quite get the meaning out of that.

> The record also indicates that if the flight of May 1 had not taken place on that day, there was no certainty that it would have taken place a day or two later, assuming favorable weather. It had in fact been planned for a few days prior to May 1.

That is kind of a confused statement I think.

Senator **Aiken**. There is no certainty that would not have taken place either.

Mr. **Holt**. Senator, that statement is based upon a statement Mr. Dulles made.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I know what you mean, but I am talking about the verbiage.

Mr. **Holt**. Oh, it is almost his verbiage.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. You see what I mean? I don't know whether you do or not.

Senator **Wiley**. He said that was the only day.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. The record indicates if the flight of May 1 had not taken place on that day, there is no certainty that it would have taken place a day or two later assuming favorable weather. As I understand it, the testimony was clear that the number of days upon which such a flight with sufficient comprehension could take place were extremely limited. I think there is evidence in the record, what was cut out or not, that only 2 or 3 days in May——

Senator **Wiley**. One.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Or maybe 2 or 3 days in June, or 1 day in August where there were weather conditions that would be likely. That is a rather confusing paragraph to me.

The **Chairman**. That last part of that sentence is——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. It is the confusion of the language that bothers me, is all. And the last sentence in that paragraph is just dangling there. It says, "It had in fact been planned for a few days prior to May 1." There is no justification or reason one way or the other for why it had been planned for a few days prior. I think we can fix that up.

Mr. **Marcy**. I think you can pick it up.

Mr. **Holt**. I think I see your point. I am not sure at the moment how to fix it.

Mr. **Marcy**. I think we can say that the record also indicates that the flight had been planned for a few days prior to May 1, and could it not have taken place on that day there was no certainty that it could have taken place a day or two later.

Senator **Sparkman**. In other words, it was a narrow limitation within which it could be made.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Well, there is no certainty that weather conditions would have permitted the flight.

CONTEXT OF PASSAGE

Senator **Sparkman**. It doesn't say that, however. It says even if the weather were good—isn't it really what the implication is? There was something said in the press about flying over the Communist May Day. Now, aren't you really striking at that, rather than the fact that it was flown over just to be on the eve of the summit conference?

Mr. **Holt**. That, plus the fact that this is in the context of whether or not there had been a moratorium ordered for the period of May 1. The record indicates that there had not been, although Mr. Dulles said if it had not gone on May 1 there is no certainty that it would have gone, even if we had favorable weather. This implies that it might have been suspended for reasons other than weather.

I see what Senator Hickenlooper's point is, and I think we can fix it up.

Senator **Aiken**. I think they may have wanted to get the picture of the Russian satellite taking off because they had half expected that it would have been launched at that time. It would have been a wonderful picture if the Russians had sent it and we photographed it. It would have been a remarkable feat of photography.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Do you think you can fix that paragraph up all right? It is just that it is a little confusing.

Mr. **Holt**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Wiley**. What are you going to do with the paragraph?

The **Chairman**. He's going to rewrite it.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Aren't you going to fix it up so it will read better?

At the bottom, the next to the last paragraph on page 15, this statement: "Both the Secretary of State and the Director of the CIA refused to tell the committee what this information was."

THE COMMITTEE DID NOT INSIST

I think it is much better to say that both the Secretary of State and the Director of CIA asked to be relieved from telling the committee what this information was on the grounds of its high sensitivity. I think they made clear that they would tell us almost anything that we insisted on, but they said this was high sensitivity and they would prefer not to. The committee relieved them from testifying to that point, and did not demand testimony on this point.

The **Chairman**. Mr. Dulles in his letter says, "I do not consider that it is consonant with the national interest to give further precise detail with respect to the objective of this flight."

Senator **Hickenlooper**. That is right.

Senator **Sparkman**. Why don't you just change the word "refused" to "declined"?

The **Chairman**. For reasons of security.

Senator **Lausche**. Yes, for reasons of security.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. All right, "declined to tell the committee what this information was for reasons of security."

The **Chairman**. "Declined for reasons of security". Isn't that right?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that conveys it pretty accurately.

All right. Have you got anything else?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have something on page 19.

The CHAIRMAN. Pages 16, 17?

MEMORIES OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS

Senator LAUSCHE. Here, on page 16, the last sentence of the first paragraph: "On this point as well as upon others the memories of the executive branch officials were highly inexact."

Now, I haven't studied the testimony, but on this point the memories of the executive branch officials were highly inexact. That would be all right, but when you say "as well as upon others," I don't know what you are talking about.

Senator WILEY. Where is that?

Senator LAUSCHE. Here, the last sentence of the first paragraph on page 16.

"On this point the memories of the executive branch officials were highly inexact." That is all right, but leave out the part about the others.

Senator AIKEN. I don't think "inexact" is the right word. Inexact means their memories told them the wrong things. As a matter of fact, they said they didn't remember. They were vague rather than inexact.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Why not say the executive branch officials were vague?

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And you cut out "as well as upon others".

BLAME FOR SUMMIT'S FAILURE

Senator WILEY. May I ask, Mr. Chairman, because I started from chapter 4, and after looking very thoroughly at that chapter, "May 1 Failure and U.S. Reaction," it occurred to me that it should be omitted. The chapter gives——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Chapter 4? What are you reading from?

Senator WILEY. I am reading from chapter 4. I am now giving what I want to get in the record, at the top of page 16.

You have six chapters. I want to make a point now for the record, so that there will not be any misunderstanding of my position. I feel that chapters 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 present and sum up the case.

Chapter 4, entitled, "May 1 Failure and U.S. Reaction," why shouldn't this be omitted? The chapter gives the impression of trying to find evidence, by microscopic scrutiny of departmental operations, to blame somebody in the administration for the U-2 accident of May 1, and consequently the failure of the Paris conference.

From all evidence, Khrushchev alone, I feel, was responsible for the blowup. The program of overflying the Soviet Union in accordance with basic law of national life, and that is the law of self-preservation, was deemed essential for national security. The policy of carrying on such flights has been almost unanimously approved as serving our and the free world's interests.

Moreover, there is serious question as to whether the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should constitute itself as the watchdog with responsibility for the operation of the Department, except on top-level policymaking and planning protecting the national interest.

I believe that we need more time for careful examination of chapter 4, but now that I have made that little statement, I will let it go for what it is. You fellows have your suggestions, and, why, we can go on with the corrections.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I say for the record that the meticulous presentation of all of the testimony dealing with this issue is not in conformity with the scarce presentation of the facts that were contained in the item that I objected to before. This goes into it in great, great detail, date after date, and fact, supposed fact, after supposed fact.

REASON FOR HEARINGS

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say this: I get the point that Senator Lausche makes. However, these hearings were precipitated by reason of the failure of the flight of the U-2, plus the statements that were made thereafter.

I think it was the statements that caused us more embarrassment than anything else. This chapter deals primarily with the events covering those things, and I think it is a highly proper chapter. Frank, I think it deals with the thing that really produced the hearings by this committee, and I think the handling of the other was perfectly proper because it points up that this was not the only thing that dimmed the prospects of the Summit Conference.

But again, as is said in here, it did constitute the straw that broke the camel's back. This deals, in large part, with the statements that cover up, and the terrible confusion that we are in down there. To me, that was the most embarrassing part of all.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I have no notations on that page, because I do myself consider that one of the greatest areas of the public interest was the aftermath area. I raise no objection on this point.

I have something on page 19, but I have a slight suggestion.

The CHAIRMAN. Which page?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Page 19.

Mr. HOLT. Could I be clear on page 16 before you move on? In that last sentence, in the first paragraph, when you changed "highly inexact" to "vague," is the rest of the sentence intact?

The CHAIRMAN. No. Leave out "as well as others."

"On this point the memories of executive branch officials were vague."

If the others were vague, they could be identified wherever they occur in the record.

Senator WILEY. All right.

MEETING OUTSIDE WASHINGTON

Senator HICKENLOOPER. This is of, perhaps, no consequence at all——

The CHAIRMAN. Which page?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Page 19.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The second line:

> On the morning of the fifth the National Security Council was meeting at a secret place outside Washington.

I presume that has been published in the record, "a secret place," but just the phrase "secret place"——

The CHAIRMAN. That has been in the paper.

Mr. HOLT. It is in the public record.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. ". . . was meeting outside Washington." I do not care one way or the other.

The CHAIRMAN. I have seen that in the newspapers.

Senator AIKEN. It does not add anything to include "secret place."

The CHAIRMAN. Well, "was meeting outside Washington." Leave out "secret," if you do not care to have it, and say "at a place outside Washington."

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Dillon just said, "somewhere outside Washington."

Mr. HOLT. As part of a civil defense exercise.

The CHAIRMAN. Leave out "a secret place."

Senator CARLSON. Make it "as part of a civil defense exercise," if you want to leave it in. At a secret place outside Washington, it could be a part of the civil defense exercise.

Senator SPARKMAN. Keep out "at a secret place" and say, "was meeting outside of Washington as part of the civil defense exercises."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. My next question is on page 24, unless somebody has something in between there.

NASA'S ACTIONS

Senator LAUSCHE. Let me see what I have on page 22. I have a question mark in front of the sentence in the middle of the first paragraph:

> Despite the surprise and the fact that it had been decided that the State Department would make all statements, Dillon felt that NASA was acting within the proprieties when it issued its statement.

Well, one way or the other, it is argumentative. There is an argument inserted in there, in what are supposed to be facts.

The CHAIRMAN. That is cited at page 24.

Senator SPARKMAN.

> Therefore, NASA, in your opinion, was acting within its proprieties when it issued the statement that it issued?
>
> Mr. DILLON. I think so, yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. But I say this is argumentative and not a factual statement. That is, when you say, "Despite the surprise and the fact that it had been decided that the State Department would make all statements, Dillon felt that NASA was acting within the proprieties when it issued its statement"——

Senator AIKEN. It was acting properly, is what they meant.

Senator SPARKMAN. He used that term.

Senator AIKEN. He used it.

Senator LAUSCHE. I would want to study that further. Let's go.

EVENTS IN AFTERMATH OF CRASH

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Page 24, the bottom paragraph there, talking about the picture of the U-2. It says:

"This picture was quickly identified as not of the U-2."

My personal preference would be to emphasize it, to say,

"This picture was quickly identified as fraudulent and not of the U-2."

Senator AIKEN. Was a fake.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Was a fake.

The CHAIRMAN. As a fake, and not of the U-2.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What was that?

The CHAIRMAN. As a fake, and not of the U-2.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all on that page?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What is next?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, the first full paragraph on page 25, just the first sentence: "But not all of the State Department." That kind of dangles there, but I do not know just what it is. You have to read the paragraph ahead.

> From this time on the State Department acted on the assumption that they probably had the pilot and they possibly had a good deal of the plane.
>
> But not all of the State Department.

Does that mean that not all of the people in the State Department acted on that, or what?

Senator SPARKMAN. Not all of them believed they had the plane. I believe I would cut out that sentence and say, "At his noon briefing, however," or "However, at his noon briefing on May 6, Mr. White told the press," or "Nevertheless."

The CHAIRMAN. Strike that sentence and put in, "However."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It was just not quite smooth.

The CHAIRMAN. "However, at his noon briefing, Mr. White told the press"—

Senator LAUSCHE. "However, but not all of the State Department"—

The CHAIRMAN. We cut that out, and we substitute "However" in place of it.

What is next?

THE STATEMENT OF MAY 7

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You have me on the run here. My next notation is on page 34.

Senator LAUSCHE. How long are we going to work?

The CHAIRMAN. Let us go until about 6 o'clock. You cannot leave anyway; there are going to be some votes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Frank said he had something. On what page, Frank?

Senator LAUSCHE. Page 26, the last full paragraph:

> Although Khrushchev has said the U-2 was shot down at Sverdlovsk, some 1,200 miles inside of Russia, the statement of May 7 limited the admission to "flights

along the frontiers of the free world." It sought to justify the flight on the grounds of Soviet secrecy and, at the same time, it disavowed authorization of the flight.

I just made a notation pointing to falsehoods on the part of our country. What good does it serve anybody except Khrushchev? I raise the question. It may be factual, but it serves no purpose. It just says that we were lying, and the world should know we were lying about it.

Senator **Wiley**. I agree fully with you. We are here sitting as a committee involving a basic question as to the right of our country to defend itself under the law that is as old as Methuselah, the right of self-preservation. You have not any international law on heights, you have not any international law on anything of that kind, and we are here going ahead and taking a crack at our officers who did not know the fact, who got some of the facts, and it came out that we do not know all the facts now.

We do not know certainly whether they have the plane or how much of the plane or anything of that kind. But if we are going to form a conclusion here, I think there is no need of our littering up the record with statements like this.

OFFICIAL FALSEHOODS

Senator **Sparkman**. We do know that the statement of May 7 was not truthful, and the world knows it. It seems to me honest confession is good for the soul, and certainly there ought to be a lesson in this that they ought to be more careful.

Senator **Wiley**. I agree that we should strike this sentence. I do not think it has any place in the findings or in the statement of facts.

The **Chairman**. That is a statement of fact. It is in the record, and in the public record.

Senator **Sparkman**. It is put there, I think, to show the accumulation of factors that made for the confusion, a confusion that certainly we ought not to be called upon to go through again.

The **Chairman**. These initial statements, especially those on the fifth and the seventh, really led to the final one. I mean it was a progression of events leading up to it. I do not see how you can leave out one of them any more than you can leave them all out, if you want to leave them all out.

Senator **Gore**. Mr. Chairman, I suppose Senator Lausche and I have a different point of view. My biggest criticism of the draft report is that it has played down, instead of played up, what I consider to be the most serious of the consequences of this whole episode, which is to hold the credibility of the United States up to scorn as a result of a whole series of official falsehoods.

I realize Senator Lausche thinks we should not mention those, and that it does not serve us well if we do. But, on the other hand, how do we make a factual report unless we do report it? We were humiliated and our credibility was put to question around the world.

REACTIONS TO INCIDENT

Senator **Wiley**. Did you see the two actors who have returned from Russia and who appeared on television last night?

Senator Gore. No, I did not.

Senator Wiley. What is that play that is playing here now?

Senator Aiken. "My Fair Lady."

Senator Wiley. "My Fair Lady," all right.

They have been over there for 4 months, and the question was asked, "How did the Russian people take it, this U-2?"

"It didn't make any difference. They were just as friendly" and so forth and so on. If we are here just trying to play it up as if everything has gone haywire because of it, and I personally feel that we owe a little responsibility to our public servants, the same as——

Senator Sparkman. I am much more concerned with the reaction of our friends and allies than I am with Russia.

Senator Wiley. All you have to do is——

Senator Sparkman. I think that we bungled in such a way in connection with the handling of that, that we weakened our stand with our own people. That is what causes me concern.

Let me say along the line that Albert was saying, my objection to this report, as a whole, is pretty much his.

I felt that we were glossing over a whole lot of this thing; it was not strong enough. However, let me say, when I got in here and we started making these changes, it seemed to me that we had a good chance of getting a report. I would much rather see a report go out of here that all of us could agree upon than to see one that meets my views 100 percent.

I had felt there were some things in here we had dealt with entirely too lightly, but I would be glad if we could get a report that might point up some of the errors that might lead in the future to the avoidance of such pitfalls. I would much rather see that kind of report go out than to see one that simply agrees with me 100 percent.

FAITH IN GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, I think I share what Senator Sparkman has said. In support of my view, I would like to read a paragraph here from an article in the Sunday New York Times by Mr. Hanson Baldwin, who has obviously studied our hearings, in fact, he says so:

> The two principal victims of the incident, besides the pilot, were the reconnaissance plane program and the credibility of the United States Government. The faith of the United States and world public opinion in the truthfulness of the United States Government spokesmen has certainly been badly shaken by what are now admitted to have been outright falsehoods.

Senator Wiley. May I answer that?

Senator Gore. Sure.

Senator Wiley. We are children in this world of spying. The English people today—and I have it right from the mouth of someone who told me yesterday—admit clearly that they know all about this. They know what the effect of this has been, and they are sorry that the situation is as it is.

But they have not made a mountain out of a molehill like some of us are doing. They recognize that we are in a fight for the preservation of our own system, of our own way of life, and when we have the nerve to create this U-2 and put the money up and then the accident happened, they do not fall for this other stuff. They realize that the Russians today are lying, and all through time—as this person said and as I said at the hearing—I was proud of the President when he came up and assumed the responsibility, and the British are proud of that fact, too.

TRUTH IS MORE POWERFUL THAN LIES

Now, what are we trying to do here? We are trying to slap our own officials in the jaw. Instead of making good servants of them for carrying on the U-2 for 4 years and getting results—and I had seen those maps, and I know what they got, and it is the best defense we have—we think our business now, because it is a political year, is to go out and slap these very people right in the jaw with everything. I personally feel that we are not living up to our responsibility as Senators of the United States.

Senator GORE. Well, you are replying to something I read, not from a Member of the Senate, but a reporter, writing for the New York Times.

Senator WILEY. I know Baldwin. I know he had a duty to fill a sheet, like every reporter, and he says there were two catastrophes. He mentioned one, the U-2. That policy which we carried on so successfully has given us the information necessary for our defense. Then he tries to say that—the other related to what? Let us get it.

Starting from the beginning we did not know what happened. So they had a policy that they put out a cover story, and the cover story did not give all the facts.

Next, something else goes out. Of course, we are novices in that. We have not carried on like the foreigners have, like Russia has. Do they ever admit that they have 300,000 spies working in this country, and whenever in the world one of them gets caught, do they admit he is a spy?

But we, thank God, are practicing a new diplomacy in this line. We are saying the truth is more powerful than lies. The world recognizes it, and the people in Europe and elsewhere recognize it, including—these two witnesses, who were acting in this play that is playing here now, told the truth—including the Russian people. They have got Khrushchev's number, and the number of the folks of the Kremlin.

A SPRINKLING OF FACTS

Senator GORE. The only thing wrong with what you said, Senator Wiley, is that it took us 9 days to decide to tell the truth, and while we were not telling the truth, we were humiliated around the world.

Senator WILEY. That, of course, I diasgree with. I disagree when they have been lying for centuries over these things. When the truth comes out, it is the truth, and they say, "Thank God for someone who will speak the truth."

Here is another thing: You say lying. That it not fair to these people. They did not know the facts any more than you did. They got a sprinkling of the facts and they got it day after day or week after week, and they put it out, yes.

Probably they did not do it as well as you and I might. It would be terrible to say that they could do a better job than I can, but that is what we are saying, brother. We are filing a report like this. We are saying, "We could have done a better job."

Senator AIKEN. They did not know the truth for 5 days.

Senator WILEY. My motion was to strike that sentence.

Senator LAUSCHE. I second the motion.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is on page 26, is it?

The CHAIRMAN. Page 26.

Senator WILEY. "Sought to justify the flight on the ground of Soviet secrecy at the same time it disavowed authorization of the flight."

Senator LAUSCHE. I second the motion because, in my opinion, under the secrecy and the walls that Russia built about itself, it was indispensable that we obtain information.

Senator WILEY. Why, of course.

Senator LAUSCHE. And the means of obtaining it were this U-2, and the Congress authorized the U-2. Based upon my analysis of it, I do not know what the U-2 was to be used for if it was not for this purpose.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think it is a statement of fact that ought to remain in, and I certainly shall oppose the motion.

Senator GORE. Well, do I understand that no suggestion is made that it is inaccurate, but it is a question of the advisability of reporting it?

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think there is any doubt about its being factual.

JUSTIFICATION FOR FLIGHTS

Senator SPARKMAN. You can get the statement on page 187 of our hearings. This is a statement given clearance by President Eisenhower, issued by the State Department:

> The necessities for such activities as measures for legitimate national defense are enhanced by the excessive secrecy practiced by the Soviet Union in contrast to the free world.

That shows about the grounds of Soviet secrecy.

> There was no authorization for any such flights as described by Mr. Khrushchev as part of his statement. It is in relation to the danger of surprise attack that planes of the unarmed civilian U-2 aircraft have made flights along the frontiers of the free world for the past 4 years.

All of those quotes are shown in that paragraph, and it is amply justified.

Senator GORE. Let me ask you this question: Would it satisfy you gentlemen if after "May 7," you strike out the remainder of the paragraph and say, "The statement of May 7 was as follows," and quote what the Senator has read?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, that is all right. I have no objections to that.

Senator AIKEN. You would blame them for not telling the truth, and you would blame them for telling the truth in the same article.

Senator GORE. I am satisfied with this as it is, but if you want the exact words of the statement——

Senator SPARKMAN. I would leave that in, "limited the admission to flights along the frontiers of the free world," and then have a footnote and put the statement in the footnote.

The CHAIRMAN. How would it be if you struck out "sought" and said, "justified flights over the Soviet Union on the ground of secrecy."

Senator GORE. I think that is a good suggestion.

MOTION DEFEATED

Senator SPARKMAN. I read you the three statements. There were flights along the frontiers of the free world. Second, they justified the flights on the ground of Soviet secrecy.

They disavowed authorization of the flight, and I have read you those three things from the President's statement. Of course, they are very brief excerpts from the three paragraphs.

The CHAIRMAN. Would this be a case of taking out "it sought" and saying, "it justified", and putting a footnote in there, giving the President's statement? Would that suit you?

Senator WILEY. Let me see what it is. There was a motion pending, and now there is another suggestion made. I thought that you said to leave that all out and just put in the first sentence, "Although Khrushchev had said the U-2 was shot down at Sverdlovsk, some 1,200 miles inside Russia, the statement of May 7 limited the admission to flights along the frontiers of the free world."

That is what you want in there, and leave the other out.

Senator GORE. I was just making a suggestion that perhaps you might be satisfied with taking the exact quotes.

Senator SPARKMAN. By the way, may I call your attention to the fact that the four paragraphs above are exact quotes from the President's statement, and I believe all of these are stated there.

Yes, the first relates to authorization; the second to——

Senator GORE. As a matter of fact, what you are talking about is quoted here.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is what I say.

Senator GORE. This is only an interpretation of it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, that is all.

Senator GORE. I am ready to vote.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the motion is to strike that.

All in favor of the motion say "Aye."

[Chorus of "Ayes."]

The CHAIRMAN. Opposed, "No."

[Chorus of "No'es."]

The CHAIRMAN. The motion is lost, 3 to 3.

Senator AIKEN. It is unnecessary, however, because it quotes all that is above.

Mr. MARCY. While we are waiting for Senator Hickenlooper——

Senator WILEY. You have not got a quorum. I do not know how you are going to do business.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the suggestion?

Mr. MARCY. He said page——

DEMAND THAT UNITED STATES DENOUNCE FLIGHTS

Mr. HOLT. While we are waiting on Senator Hickenlooper, Mr. Chairman, there is one minor inaccuracy on page 34 that the State Department has called to our attention. In the last full sentence of the last full paragraph which reads:

> The conditions given to de Gaulle and Macmillan were that the United States apologize for the U-2 flights,

et cetera—

Senator WILEY. Where is that?

Mr. MARCY. Page 34.

Mr. HOLT. The last full sentence of the last full paragraph on page 34,

> The demand for an apology did not occur until May 16. In his statements to de Gaulle and Macmillan on May 15, Khrushchev demanded that the United States denounce the U-2 flights.

I suggest, therefore, that the word "denounce" be substituted for "apologize" in this sentence.

The CHAIRMAN. "Denounce."

Senator AIKEN. Are you sure he said he did not express regret?

Senator WILEY. Where do you find that in the record? Repeated by Khrushchev to Prime Minister Macmillan that afternoon. They were——

Mr. MARCY. He did not use the word "apologize," not at that time. The truth is, he did ask for an apology a day later. It is the Department of State's suggestion that the word "apologize" is misleading, and the word should be "denounced."

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator SPARKMAN. I move it be made.

The CHAIRMAN. The apology was requested the next day.

CONSIDERATION OF REDRAFT

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Chairman, if you want to wait for Senator Hickenlooper, you might want to go back and take a look at the redraft on page 2. We have that, if you wish to look at it.

Senator WILEY. Page 2?

Mr. MARCY. I think the last sentence of page 2, and practically all of page 3; you asked to try to get a redraft. Here is the redraft.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not like the words "grand policy." How about "high policy"?

Senator WILEY. This is the page where the Senator from Indiana moved to strike out the whole page. I wonder whether we are getting our foot in our mouth here by writing this thing up.

Senator GORE. Instead of "grand policy", why not "policy and principle"?

Senator CARLSON. Just the word "policy"; I mean, after all, that is what it is.

Senator GORE. OK. I think that is right.

The CHAIRMAN. I think "grand" is too grand.

Senator CARLSON. I do, too.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think Capehart ought to be here before we finally pass on it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that improves it.

ASSUMPTIONS SHOULD BE REMOVED

Senator **Sparkman**. I would like to suggest for your thought a little change in the last sentence.

It reads:

> The committee has proceeded on the assumption that the American people are able to make their democratic government work on the basis of full knowledge and understanding of the facts.

I would like to suggest that we take out the "assuming" part of it. Let us state it as a positive fact.

Senator **Gore**. ". . . has proceeded in the belief."

Senator **Sparkman**. I had thought of this, but I am not sure this even meets my suggestion:

"The committee, in its proceedings, has taken for granted," but I am not sure. I do not want to leave any room for doubt at all; that is the thought I am trying to get across.

Senator **Lausche**. Yes.

Senator **Sparkman**. That is the reason, let us take out the assumptions.

Mr. **Marcy**. "The committee recognizes the fact that the American people are able to make their democratic government work on the basis of full knowledge and understanding of the facts."

Let us state it as a fact and not as an assumption.

Senator **Carlson**. It sounds good to me.

The **Chairman**. I agree with that. It is just a matter of degree. An assumption is a belief.

Senator **Sparkman**. I know, but you kind of leave the door open that we may be wrong. We do not want to admit that.

The **Chairman**. You mean you do not want to admit you can ever be wrong? [Laughter.]

Senator **Sparkman**. No, not quite that. This is a little different. This is a question of making our Government work.

The **Chairman**. What was that last suggestion?

Senator **Sparkman**. "The committee recognizes the fact that the American people", and so forth.

NECESSITY FOR UNDERSTANDING

The **Chairman**. I see no objection to that.

Would it strengthen it any to say, "able to make a democratic government work only on a basis of full knowledge and understanding"? If they do not have full understanding of the facts, why, they cannot make it work in ignorance of the facts. You do not think it is going to work because of Divine Providence? [Laughter.]

Senator **Wiley**. What did you write in there?

The **Chairman**.

> The committee recognizes the fact that the American people are able to make their democratic government work on the basis of due knowledge and understanding—

You do not think that "only" adds anything to it?

Senator **Sparkman**. I do not believe it does.

I will tell you what you could say: "That the American people are able to make their democratic government work if they have full knowledge and understanding of the facts."

The **CHAIRMAN**. To me that is about the same.

Senator **SPARKMAN**. That would suit me all right.

The **CHAIRMAN**. You prefer "if"?

Mr. **MARCY**. "If they have full knowledge."

Senator **SPARKMAN**. Yes, "if they have full knowledge and understanding of the facts," or "when they have full knowledge and understanding of the facts."

The **CHAIRMAN**. I think "when" is better. It would read:

> The committee recognizes the fact that the American people are able to make their democratic government work when they have full knowledge and understanding of the facts.

Senator **GORE**. If you cannot say that, we would have to deny the efficacy of our whole system.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Yes. We will leave that.

Senator **SPARKMAN**. While waiting for Senator Hickenlooper to come back——

POSSIBILITY OF CONSENSUS

Senator **LAUSCHE**. Gentlemen, I cannot think and I cannot talk any longer. I want more time to study this report from this point on.

Senator **WILEY**. I move we adjourn.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Tell me this: What this meeting really was for was that I hoped we could get some consensus. There is no use in our struggling on this page by page if any large segment of the committee does not wish to join in a report.

You have seen enough of it; you have a feel of it. Everybody has to make up his own mind on it. Is it proper to ask at this time, do you believe, Frank, that, as you have seen how these changes have been made, you will be able to join in a report or not?

Senator **LAUSCHE**. I will not join in a report that will say that the United States Government wrecked the summit conference, because I do not believe that to be the truth.

The **CHAIRMAN**. What I meant is, I gathered that you would not be interested in joining in a report at all, or in any way like this.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. No. I am moving through this report with the purpose of issuing one. I have definite views about this matter.

The **CHAIRMAN**. I think you made your views pretty clear.

My point is, I would hate to ask the committee to spend a lot of time here—everybody has other things to do—if we are not close enough to getting it. I would assume that there is such a wide divergence of approach from certain of your views, and certainly Senator Wiley's that you would not want to sign the report.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. No. I—off the record.

[Discussion off the record]

CALL FOR CAREFUL EXAMINATION

Senator **WILEY**. Mr. Chairman, you just made a statement about——

The **CHAIRMAN**. I made an inquiry. I have made no statement.

Senator **WILEY**. It is almost in the nature of a statement. But, be that as it may, let me make my position clear.

I think we should have more time for careful examination of chapters 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 in light of what I consider slanted views and selection of facts in the above-mentioned chapters, 4 and 7.

Now, I believe that chapter 7 should be omitted. The reason is that I feel, for the most part, the conclusions are falsely premised, illogical, and politically loaded, with emphasis on politically loaded. With the necessary facts presented in other chapters, a reader could draw for himself better and more accurate conclusions without the ambiguous flights of fantasy and conjecture as presented as conclusions in the final chapter.

Now, we have not gone over these other chapters. I want to go over them. But I agree fully that the thing is serious, and if it were not for a political year, I do not think we would have any trouble. I raise one question: What was the purpose of these hearings? Was it to dig in and try to smear the employees of our own Government, or was the purpose to get some facts and from them draw enlightening conclusions and give that to the public?

I think, frankly, that if I were to vote again I would vote against holding a hearing in a similar case, because I think it will have no particularly constructive results. I think that the facts that came out clearly, in the newspapers and over the wires, told the people all that they want to know and should know, and now we want to say that some of our public servants are remiss.

If the Congress of the United States will make it plain that it is their responsibility, they appropriated the money, they created CIA—CIA did a grand job. And in view of those facts, I think if we would do that, we would give the conclusion that is necessary.

On the other hand, I believe that we should now adjourn, and I think we should try to have at least a day to go through the rest of these chapters and bring back our own suggestions on the same.

I have said my little piece, and I guess I can conclude.

ITEMS MISSING FROM REPORT

Senator SPARKMAN. When, Mr. Chairman, will that next meeting be?

The CHAIRMAN. Wait just a minute. I wonder, Frank, do you and Bourke have any questions?

Senator CARLSON. I was going to ask the Senator from Ohio if he feels satisfied with the progress we have been making this afternoon on these first four sections.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, I do. There have been some thoughts that have come into my mind that are very important, and that is why I want more time.

For instance, the President's request for an open sky in 1955, and his request for the exchange of observers, and his request for the liberalization of the right of our people to go to Europe, and its people to come to our country to see what is going on, is a part of this whole issue, and there is no mention in the report. There are many things that ought to be in there.

Senator WILEY. That is right.

Senator SPARKMAN. But, Frank, there is, on the other hand, no word of condemnation of the President for authorizing the U-2 flights. There is not one single word of criticism.

Senator **Morse**. There ought to be.

Senator **Sparkman**. But there is not. Why insist on the one when we do not play up the other?

Senator **Morse**. A shocking performance.

Senator **Sparkman**. I am glad we developed the U-2. I am glad we developed it. I do criticize the timing of this particular flight.

Senator **Carlson**. I regret we canceled out the flights.

Senator **Sparkman**. There are two things that I think we ought to criticize in here and, as I said earlier, more strongly than in the report, but I am pleased with the progress that is being made.

I think you mentioned constructive criticisms.

Senator **Lausche**. Yes.

Senator **Sparkman**. But I think the timing of the flight on May 1, not on May 1—I did not think anything about it being May Day—but immediately prior to the summit, I think was bad. I think there should have been a moratorium, as there had been in other instances.

And the second thing—and this has not been touched because it did not come until right at the end—I think the giving of that alert from the scene of the summit conference was one of the most bumbling things that ever happened there. We certainly do not condemn that in here, and that is one of the criticisms I have to offer.

Senator **Morse**. That is correct.

CAN AGREEMENT BE REACHED?

The **Chairman**. What I was wondering about is, here we are; everybody is very busy. Can we get a sense of whether there is any real purpose? I am perfectly willing to have some more meetings, but you have seen enough of it so as to know whether you feel we can get together on a report.

I visualize that there are two possibilities. Either we could go up to the point of chapter 7—I doubt seriously that we can get agreement on the conclusions. It might be worthwhile for the committee to issue a report of the factual findings and let each man draw his own conclusions, because I think it is going to be impossible to get agreement on the conclusions.

Senator **Morse**. I am willing, Mr. Chairman, to sign the report as it is, as I think it a pretty good middle position. But if we are going to start building up the report on the basis of some of the suggestions made here this afternoon, I could not sign the report, and I would have to then say what a horrendous mistake I think was made regarding the use of this plane.

The **Chairman**. That is exactly the point I am trying to get at. I cannot sign the report if it goes beyond what we inquired into. I do not mean that I am not willing to accept changes, as we have done today. But if it goes off on a completely different approach, I would not be interested in such a report; I would just make my own report and use this factual basis which, I think, is generally accurate and make my own conclusions.

Everybody is entitled to do that. I just want to get the feeling. There is no use in our wasting all of our collective time if we are not going to get any agreement.

Senator Gore. May I ask a question? What do you mean by agreement? Do you mean unanimous agreement?

The Chairman. Well, fairly so. I do not think it would be wise for this committee—and I would not want to be a party to signing it as just the Democrats, either.

Senator Gore. I would not either.

The Chairman. And unless we have some agreement—I do not think it has to be unanimous, but I would say it ought to be nearly so, and at least bipartisan—I think it is better not to have a report.

PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE

Senator Gore. If that be the case, I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we have made significant progress here this afternoon. Senator Lausche has suggested that he is very pleased with the progress we have made.

The Chairman. I did not interpret it to be so.

Senator Sparkman. Yes, he said it was.

Senator Lausche. Yes. I think we have made progress.

Senator Sparkman. He said he was pleased.

Senator Lausche. I have distinct views. I think Khrushchev never intended to have the conference, especially after he found we were solidified. I believe the Congress approved the use of the U-2's; I believe that the information acquired was indispensable and essential. I believe that the report ought to contain the background of all of the ramifications that caused us to develop the U-2.

I feel that there has been culpable confusion in the stories that were handed out. But I sort of censure myself in coming to that conclusion because I am forming my judgment upon facts already accomplished, that is, on post factum judgment.

I believe that if I were in charge, the May 1 flight would not have been made. But if it were to be suspended, I would have been bothered as to the time when the suspension should have begun. Should it have begun back in September when they met at Camp David? Should it have been continued through to May 16?

Then I have, of course, this third item which you mentioned.

Senator Wiley. Whose business was it to make the decision? Was it the Congress?

Senator Lausche. There may be some other items.

Senator Morse. That is right.

FURTHER MEETINGS SHOULD BE HELD

Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I have to go. You will notify us when a meeting will take place?

The Chairman. I am trying to determine whether we should have another meeting.

Senator Sparkman. I think we should.

Senator Gore. Because we have made progress.

The Chairman. Before anybody leaves, we should not leave these copies that we have out at all.

Senator Lausche. I will take mine.

The Chairman. Just be sure you do not let it out, Frank.

Senator Gore. Just to ask Senator Lausche, what you say you would like to state—of course, some of those things were not the subject of our inquiry, and the staff would have been subject to reprimand if they had drawn a report outside of the subject matter of our hearings.

There is no reason, however, why you could not have supplemental views. There is no reason why, after we agree on this portion which we can agree on—and I think that which we have covered today represents substantial agreement—we could not agree on that part. Then I may make a supplemental statement of my views, and you and I might join in a supplemental view.

COMMENDATION OF COMMITTEE STAFF

Senator **Morse**. Will the Senator yield? I want the record to show that I think this staff did a remarkably fine, efficient job in writing a report that stayed within the record.

Frank talks about judicial opinions. Judicial opinions should never be outside the record. A lot of the things that he wants included in this report, in my judgment, are not a part of this record.

Senator **Lausche**. Oh, yes, it is.

Senator **Morse**. It is based upon his feelings about Russia and about his feeling about what Russian policy is, and it is not in the record.

Senator **Lausche**. I propounded 12 questions to the State Department, and Senator Fulbright got a statement on the 350,000 spies that they have around the world. It is all in the record. But more than that——

Senator **Gore**. You are complimenting the staff, Senator Wiley. I just heard you complimenting the staff.

Senator **Wiley**. Yes.

Senator **Gore**. But I want to call to your attention when you said that chapter 7 was politically slanted, you were accusing the staff of presenting a biased and politically slanted report. I do not think that on careful consideration you want to do that. It would not be typical.

Senator **Wiley**. I make this statement to that effect. The staff is no more human or less human than Senators, and they reflect the attitude of the chairman in many respects. I found that out. And I also found out that they are brilliant, able, capable, and do things wonderfully well. I have no objection to them. I only wish I had one of them who was serving my interests. That is all I ask.

Senator **Morse**. It is a very non-political report, I want to say to the staff.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Senator **Gore**. Mr. Chairman, I suggest we try again.

Senator **Carlson**. I would, too.

The **Chairman**. We are going to have a hard time getting a meeting time. We have a regular meeting tomorrow?

Mr. **Marcy**. Mr. Chairman, tomorrow at 10 o'clock we have some conventions coming up.

Senator **Morse**. Do we have permission to meet? McClellan has announced he is blocking all committee meetings.

Mr. **Marcy**. I guess we will not probably have one. We have not asked for permission yet to meet tomorrow. We would be able to meet again Friday, at the earliest.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I think we have made some progress here. I want to say generally, the general color of this report is not the way I would have written it. I think it contains factual information down the line. I think it is an arduous job, but I do sense, frankly, out of the report, a down-grading, a belittling of the United States which I do not like. Nevertheless, it is basically factual.

I go on the basis of, who was it, Nathan Hale—I was not there when he said, "My country, in dealings with foreign nations, may she always be right, but right or wrong, my country." I do not want to see a report that unduly downgrades us as an official operation of this committee, any more than necessary.

DESIRABILITY OF WORKING OUT A REPORT

Basically, that has been behind some of the suggestions I have made. I thought they were a little harsh. I thought we could soften them and we could say the factual things. I think maybe we have to make a report. We held hearings. It is an emotional thing.

Senator **Morse**. I think we should make a report.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I go along with a lot of other people. I find a lot of reports I did not agree with 100 percent. One lawyer is never able to draw a petition that ever suited another one, and I suppose, like any lawyer, no report ever suited me 100 percent unless I wrote it, and then it did not even suit me.

The **Chairman**. Frank, what do you think?

Senator **Carlson**. I agree with Bourke.

The **Chairman**. You think we ought to have one?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Yes, we ought to try to work out a report.

Senator **Carlson**. I think we ought to try to work something out. I think we will be criticized if we do not.

The **Chairman**. I wanted to see if you thought this was close enough.

Senator **Carlson**. It is with me.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. As a matter of reasonable compromise, that is close enough. I am perfectly willing to go along with what we have done thus far. I do not know what you did while I was out.

The **Chairman**. Nothing.

Senator **Aiken**. Nothing.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. We cannot have our own way in everything and I do not expect mine, and so on.

Senator **Wiley**. When is the adjournment date?

The **Chairman**. Since we cannot have our regular meeting in the morning to consider these other items, let us come back here and do this. We can do this while they are talking, at 10 o'clock, or 10:30. Can we start at 10 o'clock? We can do this and use that time.

[Discussion off the record.]

The **Chairman**. All right. At 10 o'clock in the morning.

[Whereupon at 6 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, June 16, 1960.]

TO CONSIDER REPORT ON HEARINGS REGARDING EVENTS INCIDENT TO

THE SUMMIT

CONFERENCE

THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:45 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol, Hon. J. William Fulbright presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Newhouse and Mr. St. Claire of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Shall we get back to the other problem while we have time?

Senator WILEY. I understand Senator Morse and Senator Dirksen had a little altercation on whether committees could sit. Morse and Dirksen objected, but I think we might get an explanation of that situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, our position is that we are not here to take action, to vote, or anything else. We are here just to consult among ourselves as Senators upon the language of this report. We don't expect to vote on it or take any action.

Senator WILEY. Then we are not sitting as a committee, as someone called it, kaffee klatsch?

Senator MORSE. I think we ought to have some coffee. [Laughter.]

Senator CHURCH. I second that motion, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WILLIAMS. Charge it up to Alex Wiley.

The CHAIRMAN. When we signed off last night, as I recall, we were on page 34.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, I have an item on page 31.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

IMPLICATIONS THAT FLIGHTS WOULD CONTINUE

Senator LAUSCHE. It deals with page 31 and also page 63. On page 31, the second full paragraph: "Herter subsequently was to argue that it was very farfetched to interpret his statement as implying that the overflights were to continue."

Now, on page 63, the same item is dealt with. That is in the first full paragraph, the second sentence: "This argument, however, is highly technical, and the fact is that Khrushchev as well as most of the free world's newspapers did so interpret the statement."

My belief is that we ought to put in Herter's statement if we are going to deal with this. Different minds may draw different conclusions from the actual statement and, as far as I have been able to observe, the statement is not included in this document. Am I correct in that? There is no quotation of what he actually said.

Mr. HOLT. On pages 28 and 29, Senator.

Senator WILEY. What page?

Mr. HOLT. Pages 28 and 29 of the draft.

Senator GORE. If it isn't in, it ought to be. There it is.

Senator CHURCH. Yes, there it is.

Senator LAUSCHE. Where is it? What paragraph on page 28?

Mr. HOLT. It starts at the top of page 28 and goes to page 29.

Senator LAUSCHE. Oh, yes, that's fine.

Senator CHURCH. That is the complete statement, is it not?

Mr. HOLT. That is not the full text. Those are the paragraphs that gave rise to this dispute.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is the pertinent part of it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What is the pertinent language?

The CHAIRMAN. In quotes on page 28.

Senator LAUSCHE. The particular language he relied on was this:

> The Government of the United States would be derelict to its responsibility, not only to the American people but to free peoples everywhere, if it did not in the absence of Soviet cooperation take such measures as are possible unilaterally to lessen and to overcome this danger of surprise attack. In fact the United States has not and does not shirk this responsibility.

That is the paragraph that he relied on.

DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Based on that statement of Herter's I disagree with the interpretation.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that isn't the only statement. There was the President's subsequent statement, and then the Russians sent a note which so interpreted it, and we did not deny it. We just accepted the note.

It was not just this alone. It was one of about three statements. The idea was not changed until the 16th, after the first meeting in Paris.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think that the Herter statement is susceptible to the interpretation which he gave to it, and here you have this second one on page 31: "Herter subsequently was to argue." The implications are there that he is improperly arguing.

Senator MORSE. Frank, I want to make a suggestion on the form of that language as follows: "Herter subsequently stated that he considered it was very farfetched to interpret his statement as implying that the overflights were to continue."

Senator GORE. I will agree with that, and put in the actual date when he said it.

Senator LAUSCHE. Put in another line referring to page 34, or whatever it is, of this report so they can look back.

Senator GORE. Yes.

The **Chairman.** Here is what he said, in short: "It might be, if one wanted to interpret the words that I spoke that way. There was no need of his interpreting those words that way. Certainly from what I said, that is a very farfetched interpretation. I think he was interpreting it for his own purposes that way."

Senator **Morse.** Would it cover it, Bill, if we simply said that Herter subsequently stated that he considered it farfetched to interpret his statement that way?

The **Chairman.** That is all right.

Well, he says to see page 85, which is the exact statement.

A HIGHLY TECHNICAL ARGUMENT

Senator **Lausche.** Let's go to 63. That is thoroughly acceptable to me.

Senator **Gore.** We haven't gotten to 63 yet.

Senator **Lausche.** Right. But it deals with the same item.

Senator **Hickenlooper.** You are going to 63 in connection with 31.

Senator **Lausche.** I may not be at your next gathering, and I would like to point out at page 63 you see "this argument." You are referring to Herter's argument. "This argument, however, is highly technical, and the fact is that Khrushchev as well as most of the free world's newspapers did so interpret the statements."

The **Chairman.** I think that is factual.

Senator **Hickenlooper.** I don't agree with that. I don't agree it is highly technical.

The **Chairman.** But it is highly factual that Khrushchev did interpret it that way, and so did the press, and so did I.

Senator **Hickenlooper.** I think it is factual for us to say it was factual, but for us to include that Herter's language was highly technical here—I don't agree it was a highly technical interpretation.

The **Chairman.** What do you think is a better way?

Senator **Hickenlooper.** I would just leave it out. We are saying that Herter's argument is highly technical when he says that it should not be interpreted that way, and I don't agree that it is highly technical. In reading the language on page 30 or 31—where is that language?

The **Chairman.** Page 28.

Senator **Hickenlooper.** Page 28. I don't see anything in there that justifies a specific interpretation that these U-2 flights are going to continue. He says frankly that we will continue to gather intelligence, and I don't think anybody has denied that.

KHRUSHCHEV'S INTERPRETATION

Senator **Morse.** Could I make a suggestion to change page 63?

The **Chairman.** What do you have?

Senator **Morse.** I would suggest that we say, "However, the fact is that Khrushchev so interpreted Herter's statement and many of the world's newspapers shared that interpretation."

Senator **Hickenlooper.** What proof do we have of that, now?

Senator **Sparkman.** Our own papers here at home did it.

Senator **Aiken**. Mr. Khrushchev chose to make that interpretation. He elected to make that interpretation.

Senator **Morse**. Yes.

Senator **Aiken**. We don't know whether he did that or not.

The **Chairman**. No, he did that in a formal note to our Government on the 11th. It is somewhere in the record.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I think it is factual to state Khrushchev's own interpretation.

The **Chairman**. He sent the note to us and we did not deny it.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I guess it is factual to say some newspapers in various parts of the world.

Senator **Sparkman**. Let me make this suggestion, drop out the words, "This argument, however, is highly technical and the fact", and just say, "Nevertheless Khrushchev as well as most of the free world's newspapers did so interpret the statement."

Senator **Williams**. Instead of the word most, why not use "many of the free world"?

Senator **Morse**. "Some."

Senator **Sparkman**. "Some" or "many."

THE SOVIET REACTION

Senator **Lausche**. May I point out to you the first or the second full sentence: "It seems reasonable to suppose, however, that the Soviet reaction was greatly intensified by two aspects."

The **Chairman**. Where are you reading from now?

Senator **Lausche**. Page 63. "One, the implication that the flights were going to continue, and two, the assumption of personal responsibility by the President."

Now, the implication that the flights were to continue again has a relationship to Herter's statement. I think you will have to consider both of these paragraphs in trying to deal with this. And whether you want to do it now or wait until you get to the conclusions——

Senator **Williams**. Couldn't you, on page 63 in part 1, instead of "implication," say the "interpretation" that the flights were going to continue, and change the word later from "most" to "many," and strike out the other language?

Senator **Lausche**. "The interpretation." That is what it is; that is how they interpret it.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Yes.

Senator **Morse**. "Interpretation" instead of "implication."

The **Chairman**. All right. Then, if I understand it, "implication" is changed to "interpretation," and this other sentence reads: "Nevertheless, the fact is that Khrushchev, as well as many of the free world's newspapers, did so interpret the statement."

That, I think is factual.

Senator **Aiken**. Well, it was an assumption on the part of the Soviets that the flights were going to continue.

THE PARIS MEMORANDUM

The **Chairman**. Are we back to page 34 now? OK, Bourke, you had something we were discussing at the time we quit.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Yes, I have a notation here. I think that my suggestion there has been taken care of. In the middle of the page, where it says that Khrushchev, Gromyko and Malinovsky called on de Gaulle and left a memorandum in French setting forth the conditions. I thought we ought to put in there a rather pointed statement suggesting that his statement had been prepared, because it was already translated into French, suggesting that it had been prepared in Moscow. Point out on the next page—where is that, Pat?

Mr. **Holt**. It is at the botton of page 34.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. In the next paragraph that I apparently missed, that is clearly set out, so that would take care of it.

The **Chairman**. Yes, it is clearly set out, and we also changed the word "apologize" to "denounce." Everybody got that?

Senator **Morse**. Say that again, Bill, I didn't get that.

The **Chairman**. They were that the United States apologize. That is wrong. Factually, that should be denounced—"denounced the U-2 flights."

TIMING OF EVENTS

Senator **Lausche**. Would you have any objection to putting "that afternoon at 4:30" in the second paragraph, because it was 11 o'clock in the morning and 4:30 in the afternoon. It is down at the end of the second paragraph. "These conditions were repeated by Mr. Khrushchev to Prime Minister Macmillan that afternoon at 4:30 p.m."

The **Chairman**. I have no objection.

Senator **Aiken**. Paris time; U.S. time.

Senator **Lausche**. Well, it is correct.

Senator **Morse**. Their time.

Senator **Sparkman**. At 4:30 that afternoon.

Senator **Lausche**. Above you have 11 o'clock in the morning, and this is 4:30 in the afternoon.

Senator **Morse**. I think that is a good insert.

The **Chairman**. All right. Is that all on page 34?

Senator **Wiley**. At 4:30 p.m. Paris time.

Senator **Sparkman**. It is understood it is local time.

Senator **Lausche**. Mr. Holt, do you have anything in here that he was supposed to arrive there on Sunday, but changed his plan and came there on Saturday, and why he changed his plan?

Mr. **Holt**. No, sir, there is a statement here that he arrived on Saturday.

Senator **Lausche**. That is very important, very important, because he wanted to be there one day ahead of time. In my opinion, it was to get ready for seeing de Gaulle and Macmillan, and I think that ought to be put in here.

Mr. **Holt**. It would be a simple matter, Senator, at the top of page 34. The second sentence now reads, "Chairman Khrushchev arrived on Saturday May 14". The phrase could be added, "a day earlier than had originally been scheduled."

Senator **Lausche**. There has been no explanation given as to why he saw fit to be there one day earlier.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Add after May 14, "one day earlier than planned."

Senator **LAUSCHE**. "Than planned."

The **CHAIRMAN**. All right. What is the next? Anything on page 35?

Senator **SPARKMAN**. Nothing.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Speak up.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. I have nothing further until we arrive at the conclusions.

Senator **GORE**. I have nothing until page 39.

PRESENCE OF MALINOVSKY AND GROMYKO

The **CHAIRMAN**. Page 39. What is it?

Senator **GORE**. The paragraph in the middle of the page refers to the presence of Malinovsky and the constancy by the side of the Premier. The third sentence in that paragraph is incorrect: "The Secretary interpreted the constant presence of Gromyko and Malinovsky in Paris to mean that Khrushchev had less leeway."

Now, actually the first interpretation that the Secretary placed upon the General's constancy by the side of Khrushchev was a demonstration of physical showing and reminder of the armed might of the Soviet Union. This interpretation was his number 2, and I don't know which is the correct one, but actually——

The **CHAIRMAN**. Well, it is probably both, is it not?

Senator **GORE**. Well, it probably is both, but I think it ought to be placed in the order in which the Secretary stated it.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Where is the reference? Is it on page 101 of the printed hearings?

Mr. **HOLT**. It is on page 101 of the printed hearings, Senator. It starts about two-thirds of the way down the page.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Where is the reference to demonstrating the armed might? Where is the first part you have reference to, Albert?

Senator **GORE**. Well, I don't see it, but I know he gave that interpretation. It may have been in his prepared statement. Suppose you pass this one up and I will search the record.

The **CHAIRMAN**. If you find it, we can put it in certainly. We don't want to put it in if we can't find it.

Senator **GORE**. I know it is so, because I questioned him about some other point.

Senator **SPARKMAN**. That is on what, page 39? Senator Green has something on page 39.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Senator Green, what do you have on page 39?

TECHNICAL CHANGE

Senator **SPARKMAN**. No, it is something on page 34.

Senator **MORSE**. What is it, Senator?

Senator **GREEN**. Down near the bottom it says: "These conditions repeated by Khrushchev to Prime Minister Macmillan at 4:30 that afternoon," and then it goes on, "promised not to do them again." You don't do them, you make them. You don't do a flight.

Senator **MORSE**. Change the word "do" to "make".

The **CHAIRMAN**. All right, "make them."

Senator **Sparkman**. I believe instead of "do", "make them," because it looks to me like you are getting your pronoun pretty far away from any antecedent. You ought to say "make such flights."

Mr. **Holt**. "Not to repeat such flights."

The **Chairman**. How would that be? "Repeat such flights."

Senator **Green**. I think that is better.

The **Chairman**. Do all the profs agree to that?

Senator **Green**. It is better.

Senator **Gore**. Mr. Chairman, I have found on page 12 of the Secretary's prepared statement——

Senator **Sparkman**. Page 12 in the hearings?

EVIDENCE OF SOVIET STRENGTH

Senator **Gore**. "The best guess as to the significance of this factor is that, one, in view of the brutal and threatening attitude he adopted at Paris, he considered it desirable to have some tangible evidence of Soviet armed strengths in the person of Marshal Malinovsky"——

Senator **Sparkman**. And second——

Senator **Gore**. Yes, the second one is cited on page 39. I think the Secretary's full statement, beginning with "the best guess" ought to be put in—those two points.

Senator **Morse**. I agree.

The **Chairman**. Yes, I think we just insert that at that point.

Senator **Gore**. I don't know which interpretation is correct.

Senator **Wiley**. That is important, because he said he has stuck strickly to the agreed position.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I don't think they are incompatible.

Senator **Gore**. I am not saying they are, but I think his full statement ought to be in there.

Senator **Sparkman**. You know, the statement in here is a general statement and could very well cover both meanings. Here is a case in which I believe a footnote can very well be used to quote his exact words.

Senator **Wiley**. That's right. Sticking strictly to the agreed position.

Senator **Sparkman**. He had less leeway, also, Albert. You see, it was simply that he was being watched from the standpoint of the Kremlin or being watched from the standpoint of the Army.

The **Chairman**. This "tangible evidence of armed strength" could be put in.

Senator **Gore**. I think it is a valid interpretation.

The **Chairman**. I think so. I think he can insert that statement in place of, or in addition to, that——

Senator **Gore**. This is a factual report, Mr. Chairman, and this is what the Secretary said.

The **Chairman**. That is right. I think we ought to pick up the two points on page 12 and insert them. Don't you, Bourke?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Yes.

PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE

The **Chairman**. OK, what is next? Any more on that page?

Senator **Sparkman**. Are we on page 39?

The **Chairman**. Yes.

Senator **Capehart**. I don't know why we are wasting our time, particularly going on here, when it is all in the paper. It is in the Herald Tribune and the Washington Post.

Senator **Morse**. Others can say what they want to for the record. Mine was delivered to me sealed, and mine came back to this committee in an envelope in the same package in which I received it. No one's eyes saw it but mine, and not one syllable ever passed my lips to anybody that I even had it.

Senator **Williams**. I will go further than that. They sent mine over to the office, and sealed it and put it in, and I didn't read it myself.

Senator **Carlson**. I want the record to show that I left mine here.

Senator **Capehart**. I want to say just this for this point in the report: I was here yesterday and have been here partially today, and I did read the report. I don't see how we can possibly print this report, not that it isn't particularly factual, and not that it isn't particularly a good report. But I don't see how we can possibly print a report in the face of world conditions, the Japanese situation, in which we say that the U-2 incident was responsible for the breakup of the summit conference.

Senator **Wiley**. Homer, I felt that way about the conclusions myself.

SHOULD REPORT BE ISSUED?

Senator **Capehart**. I don't see how we can possibly do it, even though it may be true and it is purely an assumption. No one knows what is in the mind of this gentleman. He probably would have broken it up anyway, but I am just thinking now in terms of the world condition. Mistakes have been made, and I think all we do here is give the enemy comfort and aid.

The **Chairman**. Homer, after we left yesterday, we discussed this very point at some length. You were not here, unfortunately, but those present thought that we should proceed to try to get a report. I raised this very question of whether or not we should spend any more time on trying to get one, and the consensus of those present, which included Senators Hickenlooper, Carlson, Aiken, Wiley—were you still here then?

Senator **Gore**. He was still here.

Senator **Wiley**. I heard part of that discussion. The idea was that we would come back and work on this manuscript.

The **Chairman**. That is right.

Senator **Wiley**. To see it we could agree. That is the whole thing.

The **Chairman**. That is all, Homer. If we can't, we can't.

Senator **Capehart**. I just wanted to give you the benefit of my thoughts, for whatever they are worth.

The **Chairman**. I understand that.

Senator **Capehart**. But that was a secret executive meeting, closed doors in every conceivable direction, and all this business was censored. Now we are going to issue a report which, as it originally came out—you may well change it, and if you do then there isn't much to the record—in which we assume that the thing that broke up the conference was the U-2 report which could be pinned directly to the United States, naturally because it was our plane.

WORLD CONDITIONS

I don't believe under world conditions we can afford to do that, gentlemen, and nobody is any more critical than I am of the President and those responsible for flying that plane prior to a summit conference. Nobody is more critical than I am of the fact that they changed their story on it and were not coordinated. But I am just thinking for the good of the country. I have been criticizing the administration. I was opposed to the Khrushchev-Eisenhower-Nixon visits, I was opposed to the President's going to Japan, and I have been quite critical.

I feel just as deeply on this matter here. I think all in the world you do is to give comfort and aid to your enemy, because I don't quite see how you can change this report to anything other than as you have now, stating that the U-2 was responsible for the summit failure.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say, as far as my position goes, I am perfectly willing, as I said yesterday, if we have already arrived at a point where we don't think we can have one, there is no use proceeding. But everybody who was here felt we ought to go on and proceed, and the decision of whether to have a report will be the final action. That still is open, but they thought that orderly procedure was to try to go through it, change it, and then decide whether or not we get a report.

Senator MORSE. Can I speak on that, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CAPEHART. Gentlemen, the things we are talking about, to my mind, ought to be changed. There are certain things that maybe would help the report, but the big overlying and underlying principle involved here is whether or not, in the face of world conditions, we are going to issue this kind of a report. I don't care how much how you change these little things as we go along; they are not little things but big things.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse?

FODDER FOR THE PROPAGANDA MILL

Senator MORSE. I would like to say this, I think we owe it to our work as members of the committee and our duties to the Senate to spend whatever time is necessary to see what we can do in reaching an agreement by the majority of us on releasing a report. We still have some problems in this report that we are going to resolve. I happen to think this is a very objective report, a very fair report, and as I said yesterday, I am willing to sign it in its present form.

But there is another angle of this I think we ought to consider before deciding not to issue a report. We are always concerning ourselves about playing into the hands of Russian propaganda. In my judgment, having had these hearings and having made the request for the study, to come out with no report at all is certainly going to make fodder for the Russian propaganda mill. They are going to say—and you can almost write their propaganda—that we didn't dare release the report after we went into secret hearings on this matter and got the facts; we were unwilling to tell the world what happened.

I think we owe it to our country to set forth what the facts are that we can agree on. There's nothing about these facts we need to apologize for, and I think our objective, truthful approach to this matter will win ourselves friends around the world, but if we hide behind a wall of secrecy, which is a Russian technique, we are going to lose.

Senator CAPEHART. I was one of those who advocated publicly holding the hearings and it was publicly stated so, but I thought we were doing it to inform ourselves as to what happened and not to come to conclusions as a result of the hearings that the U-2, for example, was responsible for breaking up the summit conference. I thought it was to inform us, we members of the committee, for our own information, and therefore, that is where I thought it was so secret.

PREMATURE DISCUSSION

The CHAIRMAN. Homer, is that argument we are making now premature? How can we make that decision until we get through with this and then see whether or not we can? We may not.

Senator CAPEHART. If you take out the fact that the U-2 was responsible for the break up of the summit conference, that will help a lot.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's wait until we get to that, and if we don't——

Senator CAPEHART. I just want to bring up my thoughts. I think the best thing to be considered here is a report at all, rather than this particular language in this form.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I can understand Homer's position, I think, but I do believe that we are a little premature at this time on discussing this matter. The fact is, we had hearings.

Senator MORSE. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The committee had hearings. The fact is that an outline of those hearings, which could be a public report by this committee, is before us. A lot of work has gone into it.

Some of it I have not agreed with. We have made some changes. Undoubtedly when it is through there will be provisions that I would not put in the way they are phrased, but I think we ought to try to get through with this and then decide whether or not we want a report.

Senator CAPEHART. Will the Senator yield? The reason I bring it up at this time is because I don't want to wake up later on this afternoon and find in later editions of the papers that we came to the conclusion in this committee that the U-2 incident was responsible for the break up of the summit conference. I think that may well happen, after reading what they already said.

PRESS ACCOUNTS

Senator HUMPHREY. What did they say?

Senator CAPEHART. The man who wrote this could only have seen the report, or someone who did see the report talked to him.

Senator **Lausche**. Read it.

Senator **Capehart**. Can I read the headlines? "U-2 Probe Report Said to Raise 3 Questions on Failure to Suspend Flights, Cover Story, Role of President." And, "The draft report, 66 pages long, was prepared after an intensive review of the printed record by top staff aides of the committee. Senator J. William Fulbright, D.—Ark., is the committee chairman."

Senator **Humphrey**. What does it say it says?

Senator **Capehart**. The 17-man committee went into closed door session. Each member was given one copy of the secret report and could consider modifying the draft report.

> Three principal concerns understood to be raised in the 15 pages of "conclusions" at the end of the carefully documented report were as follows:
>
> 1. The Administration failed to make a specific study of whether a moratorium should have been placed on the extraordinarily successful spy flights during a period of intense negotiation starting with the summit meeting in Paris in early May and extending through President Eisenhower's now-canceled goodwill visit to Russia in June.

Senator **Lausche**. That is horrible. I feel like walking out of the room.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I will say this, if J. William Fulbright said it, he didn't say it in the news conference because I sat through the whole business.

ISSUES RAISED IN HEARINGS

The **Chairman**. This is a published document and they can get it.

Senator **Capehart**. They state here that Fulbright didn't say it. All they state here is that Fulbright is the chairman of the committee.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I am not chastising you.

Senator **Capehart**.

> 2. The Administration failed to coordinate its public relations machinery after the flight of pilot Francis Gary Powers was known to have been downed 1,300 miles deep in the Soviet heartland.
>
> 3. The decision by the President, acting on the advice of all his senior advisers, to assume personal responsibility for the policy of sending the U-2 spy planes over the Soviet Union was open to serious question. In the past, the heads of nations have studiously avoided personal assumption of responsibility for the "black art" of spying.

Senator **Humphrey**. This is just a cock-and-bull story.

Senator **Morse**. It doesn't say anything about a report, Homer.

Senator **Capehart**. It certainly does. "U-2 Probe Report to Raise 3 Questions."

The **Chairman**. They are raised in these published hearings.

Senator **Morse**. These hearings are public.

Senator **Humphrey**. This is one of those "Who done it" that they are talking about.

Senator **Morse**. You got the hearings out to the public. We are to evaluate the hearings.

Senator **Lausche**. But it says there are 66 pages, 51 are a preamble and 15 are findings of fact. Somebody told the story.

Senator **Morse**. I think, Mr. Chairman——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Let me say this, at the chairman's request I sat here through the entire press conference yesterday afternoon. There was not the slightest disclosure by the chairman in his interview with the press yesterday afternoon of any details of this report at all.

QUESTIONS FROM NEWSMEN

If there is any sin committed I will plead completely guilty, because—and there is the only thing that I said—one of the pressmen said, "Well, how long is it going to take you to go through the 35- or 40-page document?" I said, "Hell, 35 or 40 pages, we are trying to work on a 60-some page document."

Senator **Gore**. That is nothing.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Everybody knew we had it and everybody knew it was here. I indicated it will take some time; we haven't come to any conclusions. But if the 66 pages was mentioned, perhaps I did say 66. I said either 66 or 60-some pages, which I think is true. I would have no bones.

The **Chairman**. Here is the transcript of exactly what was said right here, if anybody is interested in it.

Senator **Morse**. I think this, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Here it is:

> **Question**. What I mean was if we get a 20-page report at 4 o'clock and say it is released now, you don't have time to read it before you can use it. Why are you working on a 60-page draft?
>
> Senator **Hickenlooper**. You have a 66-page preliminary draft.
>
> **Question**. These are the questions of the press—
>
> Three times as bad, yes.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. They were talking about getting a release about a 20-page draft.

Senator **Morse**. I don't think there is a thing in that story that a smart newspaperman couldn't have taken the hearings.

Senator **Williams**. He could have taken those hearings and really made a more accurate job.

Senator **Gore**. So far as its being unprecedented for the President to take the responsibility, the chairman said that in the open hearing.

The **Chairman**. That is all in the open hearing.

NO LEAKS

Senator **Morse**. I am satisfied, Mr. Chairman. If anybody questions it, they ought to say so. I am satisfied that these secret documents that were given to members of this committee were fully protected by each member of this committee.

The **Chairman**. There is nothing in that story that indicates to the contrary.

Senator **Morse**. Dr. Marcy can tell us whether there is any basis at all for any possible leak out of the office of the committee. I am satisfied that there wasn't, and I think all you have here now is a dope story by a smart newspaperman who came in here to a press conference and found you had a 66-page document you were working on. They had these public hearings and the three issues that they cite, any dummy could find out.

Senator **Capehart**. It is a little more than that.

Senator **Morse**. What is it?

Senator **Capehart**. It is a little more than that.

Senator **Morse**. What is it?

Senator **Capehart**. You can read it yourself.

Senator **Morse**. I don't know what it is in it that could not be put together.

The **Chairman**. Gentlemen, shall we try to get through this and the decisions as to whether anything is done may be made.

Senator **Lausche**. May I make one comment with regard to what Senator Capehart says? If the Soviet begins saying that we tried to conceal this, the answer is that here is a public book, with all of the testimony in it, and anybody can read it.

Senator **Morse**. It is not all of it.

Senator **Sparkman**. There are lots of deletions in it.

OBLIGATION TO GIVE REPORT

Senator **Morse**. Not all of it, and that is why it is important from the security considerations of the country that we give a report. That does not contain all the testimony; a lot of questions and answers were deleted. That is the reason you have the obligation to give an evaluation.

Senator **Sparkman**. I don't see this report is being super-critical. In fact, I think in some respects it is shushing too much.

Senator **Church**. I should think the real question is what responsibility we owe to ourselves and our constituents, rather than what the Russians are likely to say or do about it. The world has already made up its mind about the U-2 incident and the summit conference. What this committee says is not going to have any great impact on world opinion, but it is a discharge of a responsibility we owe to ourselves and our constituents.

Senator **Morse**. That is right on the button.

Senator **Sparkman**. As a guideline for future conduct.

We are on page 40.

Senator **Gore**. We were on page 39, and no one had a point on page 39.

Mr. **Marcy**. Well, we will rewrite that to coincide with your suggestion.

Senator **Gore**. Yes.

COMFORT TO KHRUSHCHEV

Senator **Capehart**. May I just call your attention to one more thing, and then I will be still. On page 62 of the report it says, "But the crucial point here is that it is by no means certain that Khrushchev would have wanted to scuttle the conference as a matter of deliberate policy if the U-2 incident had not occurred."

If that doesn't give comfort to Mr. Khrushchev, then I don't understand it.

Senator **Wiley**. We are going into all of these.

Senator **Capehart**. I don't understand the English language.

Senator **Sparkman**. We will go into that.

Senator **Lausche**. May I go to page 39? It is the last part of the paragraph. "The record is less consistent on the more important question of why the Soviet Government decided to wreck the conference." That is, we are implying that we wrecked the conference.

Senator **Humphrey**. No.

Senator **Sparkman**. Why the Soviet Government decided to wreck the conference.

Senator **Lausche**. "The record is less consistent on the more important question of why the Soviet Government decided to wreck the conference." That means someone has said the Soviet Government wrecked or decided to wreck the conference, but we say the record does not prove that——

Senator **Sparkman**. No.

DIVERGENT VIEWS

Senator **Humphrey**. What it shows is there were several points of view as to why the Soviet tried to wreck the conference. Some of them thought they tried to wreck it because of the stand of de Gaulle and Adenauer. Others thought because of the speeches that had been delivered in the United States, but there was no disagreement amongst anybody that the Soviet tried to wreck the conference.

The **Chairman**. And did wreck it.

Senator **Humphrey**. And did wreck it.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Frank, would you accept this language: "The record discloses some divergence of views on the important question of why the Soviet Government decided to wreck the conference."

Senator **Lausche**. Yes, I think that is much better.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I think that is a factual statement. The word "consistent" is a bad word there, I think.

The **Chairman**. "The record discloses"——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. "The record discloses a divergence of views on the question."

Senator **Gore**. You said "some divergence."

Senator **Hickenlooper**. "Some divergence of views on the question of why the Soviet Government decided to wreck the conference."

The **Chairman**. That is all right.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Is that satisfactory?

The **Chairman**. Certainly, I think that is putting the same thing positively.

Senator **Sparkman**. Yes.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. But I think the word "divergence" is a little less harsh than "inconsistent."

MR. BOHLEN'S STATEMENT

The **Chairman**. I think that is all right. Without objection. We will now—on this particular point, Senator Kennedy asked me to bring up one question.

He would like at the proper point, and that will be on page 41, the best I can think of, to insert part or all, depending on how much you think is necessary, of Mr. Bohlen's views on this question. Those views are found on page 94 of the printed record.

Senator **Wiley**. What is the correction now?

The **Chairman**. Well, he asked that it be inserted somewhere, and this would seem to be the proper place because there is the subject "U-2." Do you see "against this background Herter said." I am reading page 40. "The U-2 may have been a contributing factor in the quote. It must have been a great shock to both the civilian and military leaders that they had been as open as they were for such a long period of time."

Reading from our draft here: "This exposure may well have had very real effects on the attitude within the Kremlin and Khrushchev's reaction in the past was in part the result of frustration that he had not been able to stop the flights for 4 years." That is from page 38.

Now, on page 94, in the printed record you will find a statement by Assistant Secretary Bohlen on this same subject.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is that the italicized material?

The CHAIRMAN. That's right.

Senator CAPEHART. I move we make it a part of the report.

Senator LAUSCHE. Wait, I don't know what it is.

Senator GORE. It is from the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the proper place, Mr. Holt, should be right at that point, is it not?

Mr. HOLT. I think at the end of the paragraph you just read.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

UNIFORM TREATMENT

Senator LAUSCHE. Yesterday I tried to get in some direct testimony and it was put in a footnote, and this is going to be dealt with differently. May I ask why the difference in the treatment?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It will accomplish the same thing to put it in a footnote.

Senator LAUSCHE. But, still, yesterday there was opposition to including statements made by Herter. Why is this treatment given to Bohlen?

The CHAIRMAN. I don't care whether they are both in the body or in the footnote, it doesn't matter to me. I said, he asked that this be put in. He couldn't be here and he asked me to put it in.

Senator CAPEHART. I move we place it either in the body or footnote.

Senator CHURCH. May I make a suggestion, Mr. Chairman? Since in the text we apparently extracted the key sentence in the case of other quotes for purposes of brevity, if we are going to enclose a statement that is as long as Bohlen's, maybe it would be wiser to put it in the form of a footnote rather than to put a statement of that length into the text of the statement.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be quite all right. I don't care.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think it would be more consistent to put it in a footnote.

Senator SPARKMAN. He might have a simple sentence that Mr. Bohlen——

Senator CAPEHART. I amend my motion to state that it will be placed in the footnotes.

U-2'S IMPACT ON CONFERENCE

Senator GORE. I would like to read to the committee a portion of Mr. Bohlen's statement that was not included in the record, which is even more pertinent than perhaps this:

> **Question.** In other words you are saying that if it had not been for the plane incident we might have made some progress?
>
> Mr. **Bohlen.** No, I didn't say that.
>
> I said that there would have been a conference. There is a great difference. I think that if you want I would like to just briefly say this is a personal opinion, gentlemen, which is all I can give you, but there were three elements

and so forth.

Excuse me just a minute.

Senator **Sparkman.** That is all in. Yes, I am reading it. It is in that small print.

Senator **Humphrey.** Not the first part, but that.

Senator **Gore.** Now wait just a minute.

Senator **Carlson.** Mr. Chairman, is it your intention just to put in this small type print of Bohlen's later statement or the entire testimony?

The **Chairman.** Kennedy said from Bohlen's statement that he wants this statement somewhere, "But had there been no plane incident, I believe the conference would have run its full course." That is on page 94. It is in the small print, the third paragraph.

DECISION TO TORPEDO THE SUMMIT

Senator **Gore.** Here is what I wanted to read; it is on the previous page. I wanted to read to you that which was not included:

> **Question.** Mr. Bohlen, do you think that the Russians had decided to torpedo this conference, to use the President's words, before the plane incident?
>
> Mr. **Bohlen.** No, I don't think—I am sorry the indications now were not that they had planned to torpedo it before the plane incident.
>
> What the President said was that they came to Paris with the intention to torpedo it, which is quite different.

In other words, Mr. Bohlen is saying just after the blow-up, that he agrees that they came to Paris with the intention of torpedoing it, but they did not have such an intention before the plane incident.

Senator **Sparkman.** Well, in this part that is printed, he bears that out. He said, "But had there been no plane incident, I believe the conference would have run its full course," and then dropping down, "The plane incident, the whole development connected with that, moved things into totally new dimension."

I think that really sums it up.

Senator **Gore.** Yes. I wanted to point out that he had emphasized the difference in deciding after the plane incident and before reaching Paris.

Senator **Aiken.** Well, we are putting that whole statement in the footnote, I take it.

Senator **Capehart.** My motion covers everything by Bohlen that is printed on page 94 and no more.

Senator **Gore.** I was not suggesting anything.

Senator **Capehart.** I know that.

The **Chairman.** Put it in a footnote with the proper page identification.

Mr. **Holt.** The full statement of Mr. Bohlen?

The **Chairman.** Yes.

Senator **Capehart.** On page 94.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. You are confining it to the small print, is that it?

Senator **Capehart**. Yes.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. There are other statements by Mr. Bohlen up above, which are not particularly pertinent. I don't know.

Senator **Sparkman**. It seems to me the whole thing is embodied in the small print.

Senator **Capehart**. Certainly there could be no objection to putting something in a report that is printed in a public document.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEE SESSIONS

Senator **Morse**. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to be charged with whipping a dead horse, but I don't want the record to be made here this morning, following Homer's comments, to be placed in a position of saying, because somebody is going to read it some day and clarify it.

Homer has asked me to read this whole newspaper article and I have done so. I want to make this brief comment. I want to say that whatever Fulbright, Hickenlooper, Aiken, or anybody else said to any newspaperman yesterday, if they said anything, with reference to what appears in this story. I want this record to show that the senior Senator from Oregon talked to no one about this report, newspaperman or otherwise. No one ever saw his copy of the report, other than his own eyes. I brought it directly to this committee and discussed here and here only.

I assume that what the Senator from Indiana has in mind is this part of the story which we have not had read to us yet, which says,

> Senator Fulbright called the Foreign Relations Committee together in early afternoon to start the delicate job of tailoring the report to the will of the majority. In early evening, the committee adjourned until tomorrow, having made substantial progress, and having adopted several changes.
>
> During the hearings, Sen. Alexander Wiley, Wis., senior committee Republican, and Sen Frank J. Lausche, Ohio, the junior committee Democrat, made it clear they opposed any committee study at all of the U-2 incident. It was regarded as unlikely that these two Senators would agree to any report critical of the Administration.
>
> After today's session, Sen. Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Iowa, the second-ranking committee Republican, said he saw a 'probability' that a strong majority of the committee would be able to agree on a report. Sen. George D. Aiken, R.,-Vt., expressed the same view.

CLEARING THE RECORD

Now, Mr. Chairman, I can't find a word in this newspaper story which gives the slightest indication that any newpaperman had any access to this report at all, or was told by any member of this committee anything about this report as to its contents. I want to say this for the record, because I do not think there is a scintilla of evidence that is available to this committee that any member of this committee violated his honor by leaking any part of this report or giving any information as to the substance of this report to any newspaperman. I think the record ought to so state here this morning.

I think it is perfectly clear that what you gentlemen said to the press yesterday was perfectly proper.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Well, the whole transcript of what was said yesterday is a matter of the record.

[Excerpt of the June 15 press conference follows:]

Participants:

SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, AND MEMBERS OF THE PRESS

Question. We make up in quality what we lack in numbers?

Senator **Fulbright**. All right, gentlemen.

Question. You worked three hours. You are going to meet again at 10 tomorrow, is that on the same thing?

Senator **Fulbright**. Yes.

There isn't much to say actually because we are just going over the draft and there are many changes, you know.

Question. When you do get ready to give out a report will you leave time enough to have plenty of copies?

Mr. **Marcy**. Our problem is going to be, for example, if you say Okay at this time some night, Friday night or Saturday night or Monday night, then we would need at least overnight to get it out. But I think we will be able to get it out then, say, the next morning 10 o'clock, something like that.

Mr. **Holt**. If it is done initially as a formal report to the Senate, as you know, we have no control.

Question. No control over it after you file it. But you can get permission to file it up to midnight.

Senator **Aiken**. We crossed several "t's" this afternoon.

Senator **Fulbright**. Yes. We made a good deal of progress so far as the first part of the report goes. But we still have got a lot to do.

Question. What I mean was if we get a 20-page report at 4 o'clock and, say, it is released now, you don't have time to read it before you can use it.

Question. You are working on a 60-page draft.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. You have a 66-page preliminary draft.

Question. Three times as bad.

Question. Yes.

Senator **Fulbright**. This is just the first meeting, and there is not a lot to say except we did work on it, and there is still a lot to be done and, finally, a Member may go back and say, "On page 10 we think this ought to be changed this way," and so on, so that there is really not much.

Question. They are working on a 66-page draft, and the Chairman said they made progress.

Senator **Fulbright**. We went over it, but it is not final. We are trying to tighten up the language here and there, occasionally delete a passage and so on. That is the usual way. We have not got down to the most difficult part, of course, as to the final conclusions that may be drawn.

Question. This is a statement of fact you are working on?

Senator **Fulbright**. But even on factual, there is always a difference of opinion as to emphasis. Obviously you are not going to take every fact out of these printed hearings, with which you are all familiar. It is a question of judgment on the significant facts, and there is legitimate difference of opinion as to which ones are important and significant.

But there have been enough remarks, and there has been enough discussion here of a general nature to indicate the possibility, at least, that we may reach agreement upon a report, but I think it is premature.

Question. Indicated at least a possibility?

Senator **Fulbright**. Yes. We had good working cooperation here today.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Bill, I think you can put it a little stronger than that, it is a good probability.

Senator **Fulbright**. What I mean is we haven't gotten to the conclusions that you draw from it, which will be the most difficult.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Of course, I think in my viewpoint any report of this kind that is a summation or a condensation or an expression, every once in a while what is said in one paragraph may be altered by what you do later in the report, and you have to go back and change it occasionally.

Question. You say at least you agree there is at least a possibility unless you run into difficulties in conclusions?

Senator **Fulbright**. That is right.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. As I say, I think——

Question. There is nothing to prevent you individually from agreeing on a report and then individually going on and adding your interpretations on the floor.

Senator **Fulbright.** That is right. Any man, when he makes a speech, can say, "In addition to the report I think this is significant," and this can be done.

As I say, only part of what is now involved could be agreed upon, but additional facts or opinions would be given by the individual Members.

I hope we get a fairly complete report that most, if not all, the committee members can sign.

Question. Have you had preliminary discussion of the conclusions as yet?

Senator **Fulbright.** No.

Question. I was thinking about your own view, such things as the precedent involving the——

Senator **Fulbright.** That is the last section, and we have not gotten to that.

Question. You haven't gone through the entire 66 pages?

Senator **Fulbright.** No. We went through half of it or better than half.

Question. You would not necessarily complete work tomorrow then?

Senator **Fulbright.** I don't know. I hope so. But if we have it interrupted by votes and so on——

Question. But you would not necessarily release the report the day you finish work?

Senator **Fulbright.** No, and I doubt if it would be tomorrow. Tomorrow is Thursday, we have got the Japanese Treaty up, and as soon as that comes up we will probably have to——

Question. Is there any thought you can give me an idea of the time that it will be released with regard to the President's trip?

Senator **Fulbright.** I hadn't even thought about that at all. I would guess it will be next week, wouldn't you, George? It will be next week. The President gets to Japan on Sunday.

Question. Yes.

Senator **Fulbright.** My guess would have been, although nothing was said about that. This doesn't have anything to do with it.

Senator **Hickenlooper.** There was no discussion about it.

Senator **Fulbright.** It would have nothing to do with the trip; it would be purely coincidental, but I would think it would do next week.

Question. Even at best——

Senator **Fulbright.** Yes.

Qestion. Before you would reach a report?

Senator **Fulbright.** Yes.

* * * * * * *

Senator **Capehart.** Mr. Chairman, I ask that every word in that newspaper article be made a part of this record this morning.

[The article referred to follows:]

[From the New York Herald Tribune, June 16, 1960]

U-2 PROBE REPORT SAID TO RAISE 3 QUESTIONS ON FAILURE TO SUSPEND FLIGHTS, COVER STORY, ROLE OF PRESIDENT

(By Rowland Evans, Jr.)

Washington, June 15—The draft of a proposed Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on the Government's handling of the Abortive U-2 spy flight and the summit conference fiasco was reported tonight to contain three major questions of the Eisenhower administration, couched in moderately non-partisan language.

The draft report, 66 pages long, was prepared after an intensive review of the printed record by top staff aides of the committee. Sen. J. William Fulbright, D., Ark., is the committee chairman.

The 17-man committee went into closed door session this afternoon, each member was given one copy of the secret report, to consider endorsing, modifying or ignoring the draft report.

Three principal concerns understood to be raised in the 15 pages of "conclusions" at the end of the carefully documented report were as follows:

1. The Administration failed to make a specific study of whether a moratorium should have been placed on the extraordinarily successful spy flights during a period of intense negotiation starting with the summit meeting in Paris in early May and extending through President Eisenhower's now-canceled goodwill visit to Russia in June.

2. The Administration failed to coordinate its public relations machinery after the flight of pilot Francis Gary Powers was known to have been downed 1,300 miles deep in the Soviet heartland.

3. The decision by the President, acting on the advice of all his senior advisers, to assume personal responsibility for the policy of sending the U-2 spy planes over the Soviet Union was open to serious question. In the past, the heads of nations have studiously avoided personal assumption of responsibility for the "black art" of spying.

FULL RECORD OF EVENTS

The first 45 pages of the report contain virtually a complete record of the events and attitudes leading up to the key decisions on how to handle the U-2 affair as taken from the testimony of Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, Deputy Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and Allen W. Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, which had virtually complete control over the U-2 reconnaissance flights.

Much of the testimony of three of these witnesses was made public, although all of it was delivered behind closed doors. Mr. Dulles' testimony has never been released.

The draft report brings together in the nature of a chronological sequence, the principal testimony of Messrs. Herter, Gates and Dryden on all the major points at issue.

PROGRESS MADE

Sen. Fulbright called the Foreign Relations Committee together in early afternoon to start the delicate job of tailoring the report to the will of the majority. In early evening, the committee adjourned until tomorrow, having made substantial progress and having adopted several changes.

During the hearings, Sen. Alexander Wiley, Wis., senior committee Republican, and Sen. Frank J. Lausche, Ohio, the junior committee Democrat, made it clear they opposed any committee study at all of the U-2 incident. It was regarded as unlikely that these two Senators would agree to any report critical of the Administration.

After today's session, Sen. Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Iowa, the second-ranking committee Republican, said he saw a "probability", that a strong majority of the committee would be able to agree on a report. Sen. George D. Aiken, R., Vt., expressed the same view.

STATEMENT QUESTIONED

During the hearings, one of the chief complaints by the Senators was why the NASA was permitted to issue an elaborately drawn statement that the U-2 plane flown out of Peshawar, Pakistan, by pilot Powers on May 1 was engaged in high level weather research when in fact it was known in Washington that the Russians had already claimed to have shot down the craft. At a meeting of the National Security Council that morning, the State Department was designated as the central clearing house for all official statements and reactions by the government.

Despite this, reporters were sent by the White House to the NASA for information and NASA did not get the word from the State Department until at least a day later.

It was regarded here tonight as doubtful whether the Fulbright committee would be ready to make a report before next week.

Senator LAUSCHE. In defense of myself, I have to protest vigorously against whoever released any part of what is in there. Whoever stated that I would oppose any report that would be critical of the administration did some fabricating on his own. Someone in this room made the statements.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know who did.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I don't know why all of us should be called upon to disrobe ourselves just because someone makes statements. I don't think Senator Lausche ought to make a charge that somebody in this room made that statement.

Senator **Lausche**. Where am I listed, and where is Wiley listed? I made no statement.

Senator **Gore**. You're asking me a question that I can't answer. I don't know who said this. I don't know on what basis the reporter wrote his story, but what you charged is that somebody sitting here has violated the injunction of confidence of this committee, and I don't think you ought to do that.

NO DEFENSE NECESSARY

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Mr. Chairman, I was about to rise to some degree to the defense of Senator Wiley and Senator Lausche as far as that statement goes, because the statement is not factual. The statement as I understood it, as the Senator from Oregon read it, alleged that Senator Wiley and Senator Lausche were opposed to any inquiry.

Senator **Morse**. What I read is factual, but the meaning may not be factual.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Any inquiry into this matter. That is not true. They both supported the inquiry into that matter. The question of details in this report has been the subject of objection of many of us. All of us have raised objections, I have raised objections, but I again reiterate there wasn't the slightest thing said in the news conference yesterday—and the whole transcript is right here—about any details of this matter. Probably I gave the only specific detail when, after somebody said something about 20- or 30-page report, I said it is a 66-page report.

Senator **Aiken**. I told that too.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I spoke to no newspaperman about it before or afterwards, and I think it creates a completely distorted statement of their views because they supported the inquiry, both of them, and I——

Senator **Lausche**. I need no defense of myself, I will speak on this subject.

Now if I am raising questions and raising challenges, it is in the direction of not making a saint out of Khrushchev and a devil out of my country. That is the only basis on which I am making it.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. You don't need any defense by me or anybody else.

Senator **Lausche**. I will handle this myself when the time comes, and I will handle it effectively if I am compelled to. I can say that I am of the opinion that what happened here this morning is intended to be used as the premise of a national debate charging that we wrecked the conference, and I don't believe we did.

DELIBERATIONS QUESTIONED

Senator **Sparkman**. I don't believe there is a word in this report that indicates that. Every time there is anything said about wrecking the conference, we say the Soviet wrecked the conference.

Senator **Capehart**. Mr. Chairman, the last thing in my mind, when I brought up this issue about the newspaper, was to cast any reflection on anybody. I didn't have that in mind at all.

I simply wanted to bring up the issue as to whether we should or should not issue a report. I was fearful, if we went on here for possibly today and tomorrow, that details would get out and therefore, if we were not going to issue a report, why, they would already know about it anyway.

I want to read part of the newspaper article. "Three principal concerns understood tc be raised in the 15 pages of 'conclusions' at the end of the carefully documented report were as follows:" and it lists the three of them. All of them are part of the report.

Senator **Wiley**. What did they say?

Senator **Sparkman**. All they say, all three, are in these hearings.

Senator **Capehart**. Possibly so, but all these are in the secret report we are considering.

Senator **Gore**. It is understood. Who understood it?

It doesn't say any committee member said it.

The **Chairman**. It is based on the printed record.

Senator **Capehart**. Please, I didn't say that.

The farthest thing from my mind is any Senator or any member of the staff, but just in this Congress of ours things have a way of getting out.

Senator **Morse**. You left me with the impression, and if mistaken, I apologize to you, that there was some leak out of this committee.

Senator **Capehart**. I didn't intend to.

Senator **Morse**. Well, the record will have to speak for itself.

Senator **Capehart**. I just brought up the matter because newspapers will put two and two together. I have been here 16 years, and my point was if we are not going to issue a report, we ought not go on with these deliberations. I am one who believes we would be better off, that our country would be better off, if we did not issue a report.

DECISION TO PROCEED

The **Chairman**. So far as I am concerned, I am willing to submit it to the committee now as to whether we will proceed. I am not committed to a life and death struggle over this report. If you wish to make a motion to discontinue consideration, I will entertain it. I said this yesterday afternoon.

Senator **Capehart**. I don't want to do that unless the majority of the committee are interested in it. I don't want to embarrass anybody.

The **Chairman**. As I said, some were drifting away, but everybody present said, "Well, I think we ought to go ahead." I am not anxious to spend a lot of time on it. If that is true, let's go ahead and see if we can get through.

How about it? Now, after page 41, is there anything more?

Senator **Wiley**. You are inserting this then.

The **Chairman**. That is inserted right after the first paragraph. That is in the footnote. What is next? Has anybody anything further?

Senator **Gore**. I have a little one on page 45.

The **Chairman**. Is there anything in between?

Senator **Humphrey**. So that nobody will be distrustful, I just am going to speak to my secretary. [Laughter.]

I had to leave here yesterday and I left on page 6.

COOPERATION OF WITNESS

Senator **Lausche**. Page 44. "Although Secretary Herter refused to discuss the position of our allies"—That leaves the implication that he was trying to conceal something.

Senator **Sparkman**. We had changed a similar statement earlier.

Senator **Aiken**. All "refused's" to "declined" goes?

The **Chairman**. "Declined."

Senator **Lausche**. That carries with it an implication. I don't know how you are going to change it.

Senator **Sparkman**. I think we changed it before by making "refused" to "decline."

Senator **Lausche**. That is all right.

Senator **Sparkman**. We had that once before.

The **Chairman**. We had it earlier. "Declined to discuss."

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I think that you ought to modify that: "Although Secretary Herter declined to discuss the position of our allies regarding the U-2 flights on the basis of international comity," or something of that kind.

Senator **Lausche**. Yes, I think that should go in there, because he said——

Senator **Morse**. It ought to be "on the basis of executive privilege."

Senator **Lausche**. No, he said that it is sort of an unwritten law that you never divulge what the other nations are doing, and I think his words ought to be put in there.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. From time immemorial, discussions between authorized officials of various nations have been held in the highest confidence.

Senator **Gore**. Mr. Chairman, I think we ought to put in his actual words.

Mr. **Holt**. His actual words, Mr. Chairman, were deleted.

Senator **Capehart**. Mr. Chairman, I move we strike that paragraph. He did say we had received no criticism from Britain or France. I move that be struck from the report.

Senator **Sparkman**. I think it is a pertinent statement, that we did not receive criticism from our allies.

Senator **Gore**. That is in Herter's favor.

CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIPS AMONG HEADS OF STATE

The **Chairman**. I don't think you want to strike that.

Senator **Aiken**. Let's say "declined to discuss" instead of "refused to discuss." Even Khrushchev declined to discuss other countries.

Senator **Morse**. "On the basis of international comity."

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I think we ought to put in there that it is an international——

Senator **Capehart**. Why put anything in it?

Senator **Morse**. That is what he said.

Senator **Capehart**. Is that in this printed report?

Senator **Morse**. It is not in the printed report.

Senator **Capehart**. We are breaking faith with those who testified.

Senator **Morse**. We are evaluating the whole hearing.

The **Chairman**. I may say, on grounds of security, I read the letter yesterday from the Department. They have reviewed this part all up to page 51 and said there is no objection on grounds of security.

Senator **Capehart**. OK. I withdraw my motion then.

The **Chairman**. Change it to "declined."

Senator **Aiken**. Let's change it the way it is suggested and leave it in here.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. "Although Secretary Herter declined, on the basis of confidential relationships between the heads of governments" or something like that.

Senator **Lausche**. That is it.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. And close your parenthesis, "to discuss the position of our allies."

The **Chairman**. What do you want?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I can't think of what I said now. "On the basis of confidential relationships between the heads of state."

Senator **Sparkman**. "Among the heads of state."

Senator **Hickenlooper**. "Among."

The **Chairman**. OK, what is your next one?

USE OF "EVIDENCE"

Senator **Gore**. It is on page 45, the last full paragraph. I object to the use of the word "evidence."

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Where is that?

Senator **Humphrey**. "There was a body of opinion," is what you mean.

Senator **Gore**. Or, "There were considerable indications." We really have no evidence there.

Senator **Aiken**. I think "indication" is all right.

The **Chairman**. "There is indication."

Senator **Sparkman**. "Strong indications."

Senator **Gore**. Change "evidence" to "indication."

Senator **Sparkman**. "Strong indications."

Senator **Morse**. "There is strong indication."

Senator **Capehart**. Why do you want to water this statement down?

Senator **Gore**. "Evidence" is a strong word.

Senator **Aiken**. You don't have it.

Senator **Capehart**. Of course, this whole report is purely assumptions, too. You don't have any evidence.

Senator **Sparkman**. This is only on an inferential basis. Isn't that right, Judge?

Senator **Lausche**. Apparently—may I point out——

Senator **Sparkman**. An inference based on an inference.

Senator **Lausche**. I am trying to get the definition of "evidence." On page 46 you have "evidence of dissatisfaction."

Senator **Gore**. "Evidence" is an overworked word.

Senator **Morse**. "There is reason to believe there was dissatisfaction."

The **Chairman**. What page, 46?

Senator **Lausche**. Page 46.

The **Chairman**. Where?

Senator LAUSCHE. *First full* sentence at the top.

Senator MORSE. "There is reason to believe there was dissatisfaction among Russian"——

Senator HUMPHREY. There have been some good riots that have been reported. That is pretty good evidence.

Senator CAPEHART. Why not leave the word "evidence" in?

The CHAIRMAN. "Reason to believe," is that satisfactory?

Senator MORSE. "Reason to believe," "cause to have been."

Senator SPARKMAN. There has been dissatisfaction among the Russians youth.

Senator GORE. The same word on page 46 should be modified.

CONFLICTING STATEMENTS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I want to suggest that the next sentence in that paragraph——

Senator MORSE. Which page?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Page 45.

Following our discussion on "strong indication" or "there is reason to believe" or something, the next sentence: "This should be approached, however, with great caution. It is highly speculative and such developments in any case are relative."

I would like to see those two sentences stricken.

Senator WILEY. I second the motion.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We make a statement that there is reason to believe and then we pull back from it.

Senator MORSE. I think they should be stricken.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think they should come out.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, without objection the last two sentences are stricken.

Senator GORE. Then on page 46 you also find——

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. Have we disposed of page 46?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So far as I am concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, page 46a. Where is it?

Senator GORE. You find "evidence" used twice. Let the staff put in the proper word.

Senator MORSE. "The record conflicts."

Senator GORE. It is a loose use of the word.

Senator MORSE. "The record conflicts."

The CHAIRMAN. Page 46a. "The evidence conflicts." He says the record conflicts. That is all right.

You have "evidence" down on the next—" On the other hand it is noted that there is evidence that Khrushchev is under considerable pressure." Do you want that changed to "that there are indications"?

Senator GORE. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. On the word "conflicts," conflict connotes a diametrically opposite point of view.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is that?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It says here "evidence conflicts."

Senator SPARKMAN. I am not sure that "record" there is a good word, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would it be better to say that the record varies?

The **Chairman**. Why not say it is not clear from the record.

Senator **Morse**. Much better.

Senator **Capehart**. Mr. Chairman, I want to also call your attention that these pages we are discussing at the moment are full of assumptions, not evidence. Full of assumptions. If the assumptions are wrong, Mr. Khrushchev is going to get an awfully big chuckle.

Senator **Sparkman**. They are based upon things Herter and Gates said.

Senator **Morse**. All this is our evaluation. It is full of our evaluations, and we ought to evaluate the situation.

The **Chairman**. This part here is taken from the record. You can look on page 40, and I think this is supported.

Senator **Capehart**. I can understand that most of the testimony was assumptions.

Senator **Morse**. Sure, you are reporting on it.

Senator **Capehart**. That's right. That is why I don't like assumptions.

SINO-SOVIET CONTROVERSY

Senator **Hickenlooper**. On this particular paragraph, page 46a, the first full paragraph. The middle there. "The Chinese in particular have long made it plain they view peaceful coexistence with skepticism", and the rest of it.

Subsequent events since we held this hearing make that even stronger.

The **Chairman**. I was going to say, that is even clearer.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Would it be wise to put in parenthetically, on behalf of the committee, just some statement here that events subsequent to the hearings of this committee——

Senator **Morse**. Footnote that.

The **Chairman**. Let's put that in a footnote.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Increase the validity of that assumption.

The **Chairman**. That is a proper thing for a footnote, Bourke. I think today's paper has further indication of that.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Yes, because I think subsequent events have strengthened this view.

The **Chairman**. Staff, you have seen those reports. There is controversy now, that is reported this morning, between Pravda and the Chinese papers on this very point.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Mr. Chairman, I have some appointments that were made yesterday.

Senator **Wiley**. I move we adjourn until 2 o'clock.

The **Chairman**. Make it 2:30.

All right, we will adjourn until 2:30.

[Whereupon, at 12 noon the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m. of the same day.]

Afternoon Session

Present: Senators Fulbright, Green, Sparkman, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, and Carlson.

The **Chairman**. I guess we waited long enough and we might as well see if we can make progress. The committee will come to order.

We left off at the middle of page 46a.

Senator WILEY. I have got a notation there. "Subsequent events" and so forth. Have you got that written out in any way?

The CHAIRMAN. No. The staff was instructed to put in the footnotes reference to recent statements from Peking, favoring and lauding this breaking off of peaceful coexistence.

Did you find anything specific?

Mr. HOLT. The papers have been full of it the last few days, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. HOLT. I wanted to ask if in the footnote we want to say simply, that events subsequent to the hearing will lend strength to this point, or do you want to mention, at least in general terms, what the events are? The publications in Communist Chinese periodicals, the ideological quarrel they are apparently having with Moscow, and the New York Times, I guess, could be cited as the best source of them.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, why not just have that short statement and cite it, see the New York Times, date of so and so. I don't want to burden it with too much.

ANOTHER LINK IN THE CHAIN

Senator WILEY. My thought was that subsequent events proved conclusively that this is just another event in the chain that had been evolved months before even the U-2 happened. Subsequent events, what has happened in Japan—I saw something in the paper today, confirming what I thought was my statement that today's event is just another step of what had been in the minds of the Kremlin, Khrushchev, and the rest of them long before the U-2 incident.

If that is valid, and that seems to be not my idea, that is, not the idea that confirms my idea, but the idea that others now are seeing—what Lausche has so well described several times here—that while the U-2 incident was an incident, it wasn't the determining factor in canceling the summit conference.

It might have given them something to hang on to, but it was not the determining factors in the least. This had been determined long before, and subsequent events now seem to confirm it.

The CHAIRMAN. This statement says the Chinese in particular have long made it plain that they viewed peaceful coexistence with great skepticism.

Senator WILEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, in a few words expressing that. It is proposed that subsequent events—that means these articles have confirmed this—strengthened this statement. Nobody, I think, questions that the Chinese have not been in agreement with Khrushchev's policy.

Senator GREEN. Are these references to the subsequent pagination?

The CHAIRMAN. In this printed document.

Senator GREEN. In that.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that pretty well covers what the point is here.

Senator WILEY. You notice he kicked out someone else again today?

The CHAIRMAN. Who did?

Senator WILEY. I have not.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He what?

Senator WILEY. He kicked out one of their leaders.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was it? Do you remember who it was?

Senator WILEY. No, these names, I don't keep in mind.

The CHAIRMAN. We changed "evidence" also. "On the other hand, as noted, there are indications that Khrushchev is under considerable pressure." We have already changed that.

Is there any more on page 46?

Senator WILEY. What did you put?

The CHAIRMAN. "Are indications." This is page 46a.

All right, page 47. Has anybody any suggestion on page 47?

Senator GORE. Nothing from me.

CONSIDERATION OF REWRITE

The CHAIRMAN. Page 48?

Senator WILEY. Wait a minute now. Let's see.

Senator GORE. I have no suggestion with respect to page 48. That second full paragraph seems to me to be stating what would be one of the major points in the whole episode. It is correct insofar as it goes. I have no suggestion on it.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't have any suggestion.

Senator GORE. I have no suggestion.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything on page 49?

Senator WILEY. You have the words, "The failure of the summit".

The CHAIRMAN. Page 50?

Senator SPARKMAN. That brings us to the conclusions, does it not?

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Chairman, we do have two paragraphs that you might want to take a look at before you get into the conclusions. One is the rewrite of pages 1 and 2, which we sort of looked at and wanted to hold until Senator Capehart was present.

The CHAIRMAN. Pages 2 and 3, wasn't it?

Senator SPARKMAN. I thought we agreed to that yesterday.

The CHAIRMAN. No, we didn't agree to it. We said we would wait until Senator Capehart came down here.

Mr. MARCY. And Senator Hickenlooper has a rewrite of another paragraph. Maybe we had better take that one first, and wait for Senator Capehart to get in.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We agree we would work on the paragraph which they just gave me here. The page is page 15. The paragraph, as I understand it, is to take the place of——

The CHAIRMAN. The first full paragraph.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Has everybody got a copy of what you gave me?

Mr. MARCY. Yes, sir.

SUSPENSION OF FLIGHTS

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I am not personally satisfied with this verbiage but with some changes, I think it would be all right.

"The first flight had in fact been planned for a few days earlier."

"Although the record indicates, as stated above, that there was no affirmative decision to suspend flights after May 1"—I wonder if we want to put in there, "Prior to the President's announcement." The record does show that the President announced afterwards that flights would be suspended, and there might be a little confusion.

The **Chairman**. That would be all right.

Mr. **Holt**. Change "there was" to "had been." "there had been no affirmative decision prior to May 1 to suspend."

Senator **Hickenlooper**. That is all right.

Then it goes on to say, "It also indicates there was no certainty the flight would have taken place if the weather had been bad on May 1 but good a day or two later." To me, it would be clearer to say there was no certainty, even if the weather had prevented the May 1 flight, that it would have taken place a few days later with good weather or "given good weather". That makes it a little more clear to me.

The **Chairman**. Have you got that written down?

Senator **Wiley**. What is the evidence on that? Can you refer us to that?

My recollection is that they said that in the month of May, this was the only day, and they had given us so many days in subsequent months. They had tried to go before May 1 and the weather was not fit.

I think this implies something which I don't think is in the evidence. It implies they wouldn't have gone subsequently if the weather was bad on May 1.

Mr. **Holt**. On page 313 of the executive transcript, Mr. Dulles says——

Mr. **Marcy**. You don't have this. This is the executive transcript.

POSSIBILITY OF ALTERNATIVE FLIGHTS

Mr. **Holt**. He said, "Say the flight had been postponed because of weather a day or two. I would have got together with this small group and I would have said , 'what shall we do now?' I don't know what their decision would have been if we had done that, say, on Monday."

Senator **Wiley**. Who said that?

Mr. **Holt**. Mr. Dulles.

Senator **Wiley**. But that does not establish the fact that they would have done it. Someone was in charge of the plane, in ordering it and so forth.

"If the weather had been bad on May 1, but good a day or two later, there was no certainty that the flight would have taken place if the weather had been bad on May 1 but good a day or two later." I don't know what that is in there for anyway. It did take place on May 1, that is the fact. You don't need any philosophizing about what would have happened afterward. You know they tried to get it for a day or two before, but the weather wasn't fit.

Senator **Gore**. There is an inaccuracy on page 15 as written, the middle of the last paragraph: "Very important information which would not be available later" might not be available later.

The **Chairman**. Which might not be.

Senator **Gore**. That is according to the testimony, I am sure.

Mr. **Marcy**. None of Mr. Dulles' testimony is in.

Senator **Lausche**. None of it is in.

The **Chairman**. I think "might" is better grammar.

Senator **Gore**. It is not only better grammar in this case, but it is correct.

The **Chairman**. It reflects more accurately what is said.

Well, now, I have forgotten what you said on yours—what you said you thought would clarify it.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. There is still a slight roughness in this, but I propose to change this printed submission to read, "Although the record indicates, as stated above, that there had been "—I took the words "had been"— "no affirmative decision to suspend flights after May 1, it also indicates that there was no certainty that even if the weather had prevented the May 1 flight, it would have taken place a few days later with good weather."

The **Chairman**. That is all right.

Senator **Gore**. That is all right. "That even though"——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. After "certainty", "that even if the weather had prevented the May 1 flight, it would have taken place a few days later with good weather." It just says there is no certainty that it would have.

INFERENCE DRAWN

The **Chairman**. Don't you think that last sentence leaves the implication that there is some evidence to support?

Senator **Gore**. I have a suggestion on one—"From this it is possible to draw the inference that".

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Well, do we accomplish any purpose by drawing an inference? That is the whole point, I think about this whole business.

Senator **Gore**. You only draw an inference that, if it had not gone on May 1, consideration may have been given to suspending it for reasons other than the weather.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. What I mean by that is, what does that accomplish in our report?

Senator **Wiley**. Nothing.

The **Chairman**. It intends to give some excuse for having it on May Day.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I have no particular objection to it myself, but it is one of those things. It may be superfluous.

Senator **Gore**. It is, in the mildest and most indirect way, in support of the views which you just expressed off the record. I have no objection if you leave the sentence in, change it, or take it out.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I have no particular objection to leaving the paragraph in with those corrections, but at the same time, I just can't convince myself that it serves any really constructive purpose here. Maybe it does. If others think it does serve a purpose, I would have no objection to leaving it in.

The **Chairman**. I don't feel very strongly about it. I think it gives some——

Senator **Gore**. The point we are discussing is not only if it had been successful on May 1, but if it had gone on May 1.

Senator **Capehart**. What are you trying to prove, Mr. Chairman?

The **Chairman**. We are not trying to prove anything. We are trying to get the record accurate.

[Discussion off the record.]

PARAGRAPH STRICKEN

The **Chairman**. I don't see that it is so important that it must stays in, if you wish it to be taken out.

Senator **Gore**. What are your wishes, Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I am neutral on this particular point. If it stays in, I would hope that these corrections could be made.

The **Chairman**. Oh, yes, as corrected.

Senator **Gore**. We will accept the corrections.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. If anybody has any objection to it and wants it taken out, so far as I am concerned, I would take it out or leave it in. I am indifferent.

Senator **Capehart**. I make a motion to take it out.

The **Chairman**. The Senator from Indiana wants to take it out.

Senator **Gore**. Why have a motion? Take it out.

Senator **Capehart**. All right, then I withdraw my motion and suggest we take it out.

Mr. **Holt**. Is this the whole paragraph, Mr. Chairman?

Senator **Gore**. No, the last sentence.

Senator **Capehart**. No, I am talking about the whole paragraph: everything I am holding in my hand, as well as the substitute that this is for.

Senator **Gore**. I am not going to object.

The **Chairman**. I have no objection.

Now, let's return to Senator Capehart's section. Page 3, actually. This is a rewrite, the bottom of page 2 and top of page 3.

Senator **Gore**. He thought we approved this already.

Mr. **Marcy**. We did, except we said we wanted to wait until Senator Capehart was here.

Senator **Capehart**. I don't have any particular objection to it.

The **Chairman**. OK, then that is done. We are through page 50, unless somebody has something else.

PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED

Senator **Wiley**. Mr. Chairman, my understanding is that we are not now approving. We haven't really the authority to approve. What we are doing is seeking to find something on which we might agree at the appropriate time. I presume that after we have made these corrections there will be a rewrite, then the thing will come back to the committee for its approval. Is that right?

The **Chairman**. I think that is right, but are there any suggestions at this stage or any other changes of the first 50 pages?

Senator **Wiley**. On what is coming up, but I wanted to be sure I had a clear understanding there was not any estoppel here or anything.

The **Chairman**. You will not be estopped. I can't imagine anybody stopping you. [Laughter.]

Under any circumstances.

Senator **Gore**. Stopping or estopping.

The **Chairman**. I just wanted to ask if there are any further suggestions for the first 50 pages, so they can be incorporated in the rewrite. If not, then the staff can go on to try to move that out in accordance with the wishes.

Mr. **Marcy**. Mr. Chairman, do I understand that we are to reprint this thing at this point? We have only one copy now which has incorporated the changes we have made up to this point.

Senator **Gore**. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that the staff mimeograph a clean copy according to suggestion.

The **Chairman**. Clean up those pages and insert them in these.

Mr. **Marcy**. All right.

The **Chairman**. All right, let's proceed.

POSITIVE VIEW OF GOVERNMENT

Senator **Lausche**. With respect to page 51, directing your attention down to about the sixth or seventh last line: "Even if the pilot had survived, the Russians would not have had so much incriminating evidence from the plane and the pilot need not therefore have told them so much. What he didn't tell them could have been explained away as having been said under duress."

I will not go beyond that, but it looks to me as if you are making a Lady Godiva out of yourselves or, at least, making horses out of yourselves on which Lady Godiva is going to ride. Here we are as a Senate, stating publicly to the children of this Nation that the State Department could have lied away what had been said and could have declared that he was obliged under duress to tell the story.

I don't know of any——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Can I start at the top of the page, Frank, before we get down to that? I have an idea along that line that I had marked at the top of the page. Then we can come down to that and see how it fits in.

The first paragraph: "Let it be said at the outset there is no disposition to quarrel with the intelligence gathering activities of this country in general or with the U-2 program in particular." Personally, I would rather take an affirmative, vigorous stand and say we commend the intelligence gathering agencies of this country for the vigor and the success of this program in the national interest and the national security.

I would rather approach it this way. That is kind of damning them with faint praise, and I don't think we ought to approach it in that manner.

In the first place this document we are trying to write here, I view in some ways as, let's say, a type of white paper. When they get into difficult situations of this problem or that problem, countries will customarily develop a white paper. The purpose of that white paper, or whatever they call it, is to present in the best possible light the position of their country.

Now, I don't believe we should distort the truth in this thing, but I think that we should take reasonable opportunities to affirmatively defend the obligation on the part of the intelligence gathering agencies of this country to find out what the enemy is doing. I think that is pretty fundamental.

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ARE DIFFERENT

The CHAIRMAN. I have no objection to making that more affirmative, but I do want to point out that I think there is a difference between the ordinary white paper or any other governmental study of our activity and one involving intelligence. It is customary in this country and all others that not only the executive but also the legislative, does not discuss in a public way the activities of the intelligence agencies.

This is one of the key issues in this whole matter as to whether or not we in the future wish to continue a policy, which at least was followed in this case, of public acceptance or responsibility by the Chief Executive. As we have already gone over time and again, the Congress does not accept responsibility. We do not have reports from committees describing what the CIA is doing and justifying it like we do on public works, a river program or any other programs.

The only question in my mind is whether or not it is wise to again reiterate this public responsibility for it, because I anticipate that this country is not going to continue the policy of public acceptance of and recognition in a public way of intelligence activities. By its very nature, it is a covert activity. I think the reason it is approached this way is to more or less downgrade or keep more or less quiet this kind of activity. We don't keep CIA secret because we disapprove it, but because of the nature of it. It is necessary and yet we shouldn't trust 537 men with these activities. It would no longer be secret.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I agree with that statement, with this mitigating fact, we are presented with a situation here.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, that is why we have to mention it at all.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is the reason we have to mention it, and if we do mention it, the language I used may not be proper language, but I would favor an affirmative approval of our efforts in the national interest.

OBJECTION TO CONCLUSION

Senator CAPEHART. I have been reading this over and over and over, and to me it is so bad I would like to make a motion or like to have this committee consider whether we throw the whole thing out. For example, let me read a paragraph on page 59:

> In any event, it seems to the committee that in the statements of the State Department of May 7 and 9, and of the President of May 11, so much emphasis was placed on justifying the U-2 flights as to make it appear that the whole thing was the Russians' fault to begin with. If justification was needed at all, it would have been enough simply to say we were seeking intelligence, there was no need to belabor the Soviets about it. As Khrushchev himself put it in his May 11 press conference that this was like saying a burglar is not guilty but rather the owner of the house because he locked the house thereby compelling the burglar to break in.

Gentlemen, that is possibly the worst paragraph I find in it, but to me it is unbelievable that this committee would consider printing anything with a statement like that. Therefore, I would like to sincerely and conscientiously suggest that we have a vote on whether or not we will take a single word of this conclusion and have a new and complete conclusion rewritten, or whether we will issue no report at all in order to save time and effort. I just cannot go along with it; I think we are putting in the hands of our enemy and the world, at a place and time that we ought not be doing—just imagine that paragraph here. I wish everybody would read it.

COORDINATION OF STATEMENTS

The **CHAIRMAN**. I don't mind reading it. But before we go on, on this last point that Bourke made, it is very clear in our evidence as I read from page 10, "It is the uniform judgment of all officials involved that the U-2 flights were of very great value to the United States. They provide information, among other things, about Soviet airfields, aircraft, missiles", and so on.

I think that supports the view that we approve of the U-2 flights.

Now, this motion of Homer's is certainly in order. I said this morning, if the committee wishes to——

Senator **AIKEN**. I think, Bill, one fellow could take the text on page 10, and another fellow could take the text on page 59, and have two entirely different observations made of the same report. They certainly ought to be coordinated if they are all left in.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Well, I feel about the conclusions the same way I feel about the body of the document, and I feel that we ought to try to go through these conclusions. I think the paragraph that Homer read is certainly objectionable to me the way it is stated, but I personally think that we would be better off by going through the conclusions and trying to get them as nearly acceptable as possible. Then if someone wants to take a position against them, I might——

Senator **CAPEHART**. My position is that the conclusions are such that you just can't possibly correct them.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Well, maybe we can rewrite them here.

Senator **AIKEN**. I wouldn't go so far to say that everybody concerned was blamed by all means, but as Bourke said yesterday, we can take our kid into the woodshed, but as far as taking him out in the street for all the neighbors to see or letting them do the job that is something else.

DEFENSE OF INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

Senator **CARLSON**. The first sentence on page 51 would be of help to me if we left out the first few words: "There is no disposition to quarrel with the intelligence gathering activity in general or the U-2 in particular."

The **CHAIRMAN**. That suits me.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. My preference is to make a more affirmative defense of our policy. We always have and I would be willing to court martial, or whatever other heinous forum you could take them into, public officials who failed and neglected to take every reasonable means to get information about what the enemy is doing.

We have got to do it and continue to do it, and as long as this is a conclusion, I would personally prefer that we have a more vigorous defensive statement as to the policy of getting information, because I think it is true——

The **Chairman**. Bourke, what about the possibility that the President now has said that he will not resume or repeat the U-2 flights?

We come along and leave the implication, so far as we are concerned, we are going to do it or not. I mean, as of the moment at least, for the rest of this administration, there are no more U-2 flights.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. The U-2 flights have been compromised.

The **Chairman**. That's right.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. No question about it. Probably a substantial amount of the usefulness of this particular medium has been destroyed, but I think it has been amplified and made clear by everybody that whatever other successful intelligence gathering means that may be at our disposal will be continued.

Now, my own point is that I just feel we ought to say flatly that we, in whatever the proper words are, not only support, but we approve, we recognize the necessity of intelligence gathering activities.

U-2 PROGRAM WAS NOT UNAUTHORIZED

Senator **Lausche**. Bourke, I would like to get back to what I said this morning. In 1954 it was determined that we needed a high altitude plane. The administration and at least some leaders of Congress knew about it, and they decided that that would be developed.

The money needed for the development of the plane was appropriated by Congress. That is the fact, and that is the conclusion. I think we ought to eliminate from the minds of some people that this was an exercise without authority of the Congress or of the people. Whether you knew about it or didn't know about it, we appropriated the money. I was here in 1956 or at least back that far.

The proper conclusion would be to tell the facts. It was developed in 1954, and in 1955 they went to the Congress, and in 1955 the Congress appropriated moneys for the development of this plane, and it was used in intelligence activities. That is the conclusion.

Senator **Wiley**. Ever since July 1956.

Senator **Lausche**. You're not either embellishing or upgrading or downgrading. You are merely telling the fact.

The **Chairman**. Frankly, the only question is how far, as a matter of judgment, you want to go into this—whether we have to mention this intelligence because it is now public, or whether we ought to go any further than you have to even now in revealing it.

Mr. Dulles himself is very careful, you know, not to have his testimony out.

Senator **Lausche**. I go along with that. How far you are justified in going?

The **Chairman**. In my opinion, this country will revert in the future to again treating intelligence as a matter of security and not have public discussions of it. I think that, of course, is what makes this whole hearing extremely difficult, because it does involve intelligence. As a general policy, I would think we don't want to go any further in committing ourselves to public discussion of it than we have to.

DIFFICULTY IN ASSERTING SUPPORT

I don't quarrel at all with Bourke's idea because I am perfectly glad to admit I do think the U-2 was extremely valuable. But if you go too far, you seem to be asserting that we are going to keep on doing this. This is the same problem that is involved in Herter's thing which we had trouble with: the legitimate implications or inferences that may be drawn. If you assert it in one way, does it leave the impression we are going to keep on doing it when the President says we won't?

I would like to keep it vague, to where we are not committed. I regret that conditions developed to where we had to take this position that we are going to discontinue them. I hate to discontinue them until we know they just won't work at all.

If you make an affirmative statement too far, why, then you are either subject to saying that, you are going to continue to do it, contrary to the President, or if you make it too far the other way, then you commit yourself not to do it. In this whole area the fewer commitments and the less you say, the better for the future.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There is another element in the discontinuance of these flights that I think is very important. Up to the present time they have had to take off from allied bases, that is, bases of other countries.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, so long as the Russians could not produce absolute proof, then they were in no position to threaten or make reprisals upon their neighbors where these bases were located. The production of absolute proof here is one of the things that compromised the utility of these flights to the point where the Russians can now have concrete and defensible evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. What happens to——

Senator HICKENLOOPER [continuing]. To take reprisals against the neighbors who are just across the line.

The CHAIRMAN. What happens if we use an aircraft carrier anchored on the high seas, where it has a right to be, and launching from that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is a bird of a different color.

The CHAIRMAN. That is possible.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is possible, and I am not so certain that it may not be one of the matters that is being considered, but it might not be U-2's.

U-2 PROGRAM WAS IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST

The CHAIRMAN. If you make it more affirmative, then are we going to be subject to criticism that the committee is not of the same opinion of the President and wants to continue it? We are talking about the past here and it seems to me perfectly proper to say here that we don't quarrel with what was done and leave it at that.

Senator **Wiley**. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to be talking too much, but it seems to me that Bourke's suggestion is a good one. Let me say that we might well start out by saying that the CIA is a creature of the Congress.

Its purpose is to get intelligence for the preservation of America. It has done a good job and we are happy to praise it—something like that. Then go on with the rest of your findings, but I do think that to say we have no disposition to quarrel——

The **Chairman**. How would this approach suit you, Senator: "The committee believes the intelligence gathering activities of U-2 were in the national interests. A great deal of important information was obtained," that is supported by the section I just mentioned, and go right on.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. That would satisfy me.

The **Chairman**. Would that meet it? That is an affirmative presentation.

Senator **Gore**. I have no objection to that, but I don't think, Mr. Chairman, that our conclusion should begin with the U-2. This summit conference had more consequences, and it seems to me we should start out by saying that the policy of personalized summitry had failed, or to quote Secretary Herter's own words, suffered a serious blow.

The **Chairman**. I think this is probably dictated by the chronological approach. The first instance that is involved and the thing which set this train of circumstances off was the U-2 event. I think that is the reason. I don't think this is put here because it is more important.

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ARE JUSTIFIED

Senator **Hickenlooper**. What do you think about something like this, to leave the U-2 out of it at the very outset, starting at the top of page: "Let it be said at the outset that the gathering of intelligence with respect to foreign activities inimical to our security and that of the free world is fully justified by precedent as well as vital necessity"?

Senator **Gore**. Could I suggest instead of "inimical," "posing a possible threat". Unless we know about them, we don't know whether they are inimical or not.

The **Chairman**. That strikes me as a good approach.

Senator **Aiken**. They are potentially inimical.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. We want to gather information.

Senator **Gore**. "Potentially inimical" or "possibly inimical."

Senator **Aiken**. We don't know; that is why we want to find out. We don't know whether they are inimical or not.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. "Let it be said at the outset"—we pick up the first words there—"that the gathering of intelligence".

Senator **Gore**. Why not say, "The committee believes"?

The **Chairman**. Let him read that.

Senator **Gore**. All right.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. "Let it be said at the outset that the gathering of intelligence with respect to foreign activities, potentially inimical to our security and that of the free world, is fully justified by precedent as well as vital necessity."

The **Chairman**. I see nothing wrong with that. All this is doing is sort of putting it back——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. By precedent. We then go ahead and say—there is another sentence you can put in here—all nations have done it. I see you say it in another paragraph, too.

HISTORIC FACT

Senator **Aiken**. I don't think we need to segregate nations into greater or less great. I think all nations that have survived have had to do it.

Senator **Gore**. I will buy it.

The **Chairman**. I don't think these little ones support it. I doubt if Norway has got much.

Senator **Aiken**. I doubt that.

The **Chairman**. It is very expensive to carry on.

I think this is good. This is kind of an introductory thing. That suits me if it does the rest of you. I don't think it is necessary to mention the U-2 if you don't want to.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Then you can say, "Since time immemorial, nations have felt it necessary to engage in such activity that"——

Senator **Lausche**. Let me stop you there. The word "felt" is not adequate. They have been compelled.

Senator **Aiken**. They found it necessary.

Senator **Lausche**. They found it necessary.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. That is right, that is a good suggestion. "Since time immemorial, nations"—leave out "great"—"have found it necessary to engage in such activities of both the overt and covert variety." That is a statement of just plain historic fact.

The **Chairman**. That is good.

Senator **Lausche**. May I go to the next one? "The Soviet Union itself has probably engaged in covert intelligence activities on a wider scale than any other nation in the history of the world."

Senator **Hickenlooper**. On a wider scale in the world. Wider scale, you say, throughout the world.

Senator **Lausche**. Wider scale than any other nation. Then add, "in the history of the world."

Senator **Gore**. Let's buy that.

The **Chairman**. I have no objection to that.

THE COMMITTEE'S PRINCIPAL CONCERN

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Personally, I think the next sentence can then well follow, because, after making this affirmative declaration, charging the Soviet with the most widespread activities of any nation, then we say, "What the committee is concerned with here is not so much the propriety, desirability or necessity of such operations but the lessons, if any, which can be drawn from the failure of May 1 and the events of subsequent days."

The **Chairman**. I don't think there is so much in that which weakens it. We are not concerned with the propriety. We admit the propriety. We have just stated the propriety.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Having stated the propriety of it, then let's not be concerned with it further.

Senator **Gore**. Let's then leave it out.

The **Chairman**. I think this gives you a guide. There is what we are concerned with. It is not the desirability——

Senator **Sparkman**. I think it ought to stay in.

Senator **Aiken**. You ought to say, if it stays in, "as with the lessons of so many."

The **Chairman**. We have admitted the propriety, and we are not concerned with it.

Senator **Gore**. If you are going to leave it in, I will have to object to the word "here" right there.

The **Chairman**. Where?

Senator **Gore**. "What the committee is concerned with here." Why not say, "What the committee is concerned with, with respect to the U-2 program is not the propriety, desirability, or necessity of such operations but the lessons, if any, which can be drawn from the failure of May 1 and the events of subsequent days."

The **Chairman**. I have no objection.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. How did you say that?

Senator **Gore**. Instead of "here," I put "respect to the U-2 program."

THE MAY 1 FLIGHT V. THE U-2 PROGRAM

Senator **Aiken**. I think, Albert, you would want that down farther, to say, "We are not concerned with the necessity of such operations, but the lessons, if any, which can be drawn from the failure of the U-2 flight of May 1."

Senator **Gore**. You have two different things, though, George. In the first part of the sentence you are saying you are not concerned with the propriety or the desirability of the general program. As a matter of fact, one of our questions is the propriety of sending the flight on May 1. So you do have two separate things.

Senator **Aiken**. That is one phase of the general program.

Senator **Gore**. Yes. So what I suggest there is, "What the committee is concerned with respecting the U-2 program is not the propriety, desirability or necessity of such operations but the lessons, if any, which can be drawn from the failure of May 1 and the events of subsequent dates."

Senator **Capehart**. How can May 1 "fail?"

Senator **Wiley**. Why don't you say "what can be drawn from the operation?" Then you have the whole system, the whole idea.

Senator **Aiken**. You can say "the failure of the May 1 flight."

Senator **Wiley**. Well, the operation includes the May 1 flight.

The **Chairman**. I think it is all right. I don't think there is any substantial difference.

IMPORTANCE OF RELATED EVENTS

Senator **Lausche**. I think in substance, we are much in accord. I thought we ought to put in, let's say, "the operation of the U-2 on May 1 and the events of preceding and subsequent days," because from my standpoint, things that took place before May 1 are likewise important.

Senator AIKEN. That is what I suggested, "be drawn from the failure of the U-2 flight of May 1 and the events of subsequent days."

Senator LAUSCHE. "Of preceding and subsequent days."

Senator GORE. Or you can say, "and related events."

Senator LAUSCHE. "Related events."

The CHAIRMAN. That would be all right. "And related events."

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, anything that would——

The CHAIRMAN. "Failure of the May 1 flight and related events," is that all right?

Senator GORE. Page 51.

Senator WILEY. You don't need the next paragraph at all, it seems to me. What you are doing is doing a lot of guessing on things that are not pertinent.

Senator MORSE. What paragraph is that?

The CHAIRMAN. Page 151.

Senator WILEY. The second paragaph.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Have we settled on that language on this other?

The CHAIRMAN. So far as I am concerned it is all right, if it is with you.

"What the committee is concerned with respecting the U-2 progam is not the propriety, desirability or necessity of such operations but the lessons, if any, which can be drawn from the failure of the May 1 flight and related events."

Senator WILEY. "And events preceding and subsequent."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. "And related events."

The CHAIRMAN. That takes care of both.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. "And related events."

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right with me. What about the next one?

UNWARRANTED SPECULATION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The next paragraph, I think, is perhaps an unwarranted amount of philosophizing.

Senator GORE. I agree with you—all the way down to the end of the second full paragraph on page 52.

Senator AIKEN. "On the basis of." You would go down to that.

Senator GORE. To the end of the second paragraph, ending with "affair."

Page 52. "The" is stricken out. I think we are engaging in speculation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We are engaging in speculation which is not warranted.

Senator MORSE. I move you strike it out.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been suggested that it be stricken out, without any objection. Anybody object to striking?

Senator CAPEHART. That is the last paragraph on page 51, is that it?

The CHAIRMAN. Down to the words "the whole affair." That is out.

Senator AIKEN. Down to "on the basis of."

The CHAIRMAN. So we start at "on the basis of."

Senator **Wiley**. What about the last paragraph on page 52?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Let's see if we are satisifed with the other paragraph.

Senator **Wiley**. I am ready to accept that, as you say.

Senator **Aiken**. I don't know about the "bad luck," if that is the word for it or not, but I have no other suggestion. "Unfortunately."

Senator **Gore**. "Ill fortune." You take your choice.

Senator **Capehart**. That is one of our conclusions, isn't it? Bad luck.

The **Chairman**. Does anybody have any criticism of the first paragraph, beginning "on the basis of?" Without objection, then, we will take that one out.

The next one, what is the feeling?

WISDOM OF SENDING A FLIGHT ON MAY 1

Senator **Gore**. I was going to suggest at the end of the first sentence, "sending the flight at all."

Senator **Aiken**. "At this time."

Senator **Gore**. "There remains the question of the wisdom of sending the flight on May 1."

Senator **Aiken**. "At this time."

Senator **Morse**. You lose me there. I think this makes it possible for us all to join.

Senator **Gore**. All right. I will withdraw it.

Senator **Aiken**. There was not question of the wisdom of sending all those earlier flights which didn't get caught. It was wise as long as you didn't get caught.

Senator **Wiley**. Are you taking that out, that last paragraph?

The **Chairman**. No, we are just discussing.

Senator **Gore**. Well, then, having withdrawn that, I don't see in the next sentence the justification for the word "special." They didn't actually say it was special. They said it was important information, but——

Senator **Aiken**. I think they said "special," Albert, or something that meant the same thing.

Mr. **Holt**. General Cabell said it was well above average importance.

Senator **Gore**. Yes, but he didn't say "special." He didn't say specifically, "special." In other words, this was another flight but one of the more important ones.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Why not use his words "above average importance"?

Senator **Gore**. I agree.

Senator **Aiken**. Well above average.

WHEN DID FLIGHTS BECOME UNWISE?

Senator **Lausche**. On this subject, may I pose this question to you?

If you conclude that it should have not been set up on May 1, when is the time that you would begin forbidding it from going up?

We have approved everything up to May 1, but if you say it shouldn't have gone up on May 1, do you mean that it should have gone up in April, not in April, not in February or December?

Senator **Aiken**. I think because of the proximity of the summit conference that perhaps they should have taken no chance at all.

Senator **Lausche**. But they met at Camp David in September. They had friendly relationships after September.

Senator **Morse**. That does not mean that they approved this, though.

Senator **Lausche**. No, that is a carried on—we signed the Antarctic Treaty and other things, but if you say it should not have gone up on May 1, does that mean that it should have gone up on any day but May 1? If it doesn't mean any day but May 1, when should it have quit going up?

Senator **Wiley**. Whose job was it to make the decision, was it ours?

Senator **Lausche**. I would like to know. We know it shouldn't have gone up on May 1, because it was shot down, but we are looking backwards. Would you say it shouldn't have gone up after January 1, 1960?

Senator **Wiley**. No.

Senator **Lausche**. I don't know how you are going to answer it.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. We say there in the next sentence the committee cannot, therefore, come to any conclusion as to whether the importance of the information sought justified the risks which were taken.

Senator **Morse**. I can go along with that and still maintain my intellectual honesty. I happen to believe there never was any justification for sending any of them up at any time. I think it was a great mistake.

Senator **Lausche**. I am just throwing out my thought: if I were in the position and I was thinking about suspending flights, when would I have started suspending them and how long would I have continued suspending them? We know the May 1 one went down and we are looking backward, and on the basis of the plane's going down we are expressing great wisdom.

So I just throw that out; I think the question is pertinent. When should they have quit? I am not going to quarrel about it.

INFORMATION WITHHELD BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Senator **Gore**. I believe, Senator Lausche, if you would read that whole paragraph you would be satisfied with it.

Senator **Morse**. I think it is all right the way it is.

Senator **Wiley**. When I went over that paragraph I remarked that I thought it should go out because it is nothing but guesswork. The last sentence implies guesswork. Because we didn't get what we wanted to get, we are disappointed that the responsible officials of the executive branch did not see fit to confide in us this one piece of information which is crucial to reaching an informed judgment.

Senator **Gore**. That is not guesswork.

Senator **Wiley**. It sure is, in one sense. In other words, what we are assuming is that ought to have been given to us. They, as the people who make the decisions and carried out the program, said no. Therefore we reach the conclusion that it is just as stated.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I take a little different view of that particular sentence, "It is gravely disappointing that responsible officials of the executive department did not see fit to confide in it this one piece of information."

I take the position that that is the responsibility which we have. Now, at no time in these hearings did anybody flatly refuse to give any information. The committee itself, by its own action, excused the individual from giving the information, so the responsibility for not receiving that information lies ultimately in the committee.

Senator WILEY. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So I don't believe we are justified in making that criticism. You can fight out the legal right of this committee to compel certain information, but that is a different problem. We did not make the issue. In fact, if not in so many words, we excused the witness, by not pursuing the question, from giving this information.

LETTER FROM MR. DULLES

The CHAIRMAN. Let me read Mr. Dulles' letter.

Senator GORE. I don't know whether you were there, Senator Hickenlooper, but you recall I interrogated Secretary Herter on this point. He declined to answer, and after some repeated efforts, I referred it to the chairman. The chairman said he was not inclined to instruct the witness, I believe that is the word he used, to reply. Mr. Herter said the proper man to answer the question was Mr. Dulles, so when Mr. Dulles was before the committee I asked him pointedly for the information. I made the remark that the committee could not reach a determination as to the justification of this risk 16 days before the summit, except that it had some information as to the character of the intelligence sought by the flight.

He declined to answer, and I said "Well, I would be satisfied if you would but confide to the chairman of this committee." He said he would think about it. I remarked further that in my dealings with him, both in the House and in the Senate, if he declined to answer this question in a satisfactory manner, it would be the first time in the 10 or 12 years during which I had relations with him. He said that he wished to take it under consideration, and would reply further. I suppose that is the letter.

The CHAIRMAN. This is Mr. Dulles' letter,

> During the course of my testimony Senator Gore requested me to disclose to the committee the particular intelligence objectives which would be covered by the flight which was authorized on April 30. I have given this matter most careful consideration and have consulted, as I said I would, with others. As a result I have concluded that it is not in the national interest to go further than the testimony given in which I indicated the basic objective sought by the program, and gave certain reasons for the urgency of obtaining that information. Each and every flight had certain precise intelligence objectives generally based on collateral information as to vitally important targets. This was particularly true with regard to the May 1 flight. I do not consider that it is consonant with the national interest to give further precise details with respect to the objectives of this flight.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. My point is this, Bill: While he declines up to that point, based on the national interest, to give that information, we did not go further and make an issue out of it. The committee did not make a formal demand for that in spite of his objection. So in full effect, I think we acquiesced in his declining, and therefore I don't think we should express grave disappointment here when we did not make an issue.

I have had a little experience in this.

[Discussion off the record.]

A MATTER OF JUDGMENT

The CHAIRMAN. You want to take out "gravely"—if they profess to say there was a good reason for it and then refuse to give us the reasons.

Senator LAUSCHE. When did the impropriety of sending up the ships begin? If you say May 1 was wrong, what is your cutoff date on which we are right and which we were wrong?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, as in all cases of timing, it is a matter of judgment. The fact is that during the Camp David meeting, and the visit of Khrushchev, they did not have any flights.

That appears from the record. Somebody used their discretion not to do it. I don't know when they stopped them. They didn't tell us when they stopped them and started them.

I don't make too much of that particular flight. In fact, this particular aspect of it to me is not of particular importance. I am not concerned about this. The judgments of policy which occur later are far more important to me. This is to me quite unimportant, although it is a fact.

They did refuse to say it. What is the reason for the recital that May 1? They say there is some special reason and they refuse to say it. They are the ones who offer this excuse for May 1, by saying there was a special reason. That was to meet the inference that Gore and others were drawing as to why it wasn't stopped at some reasonable period before.

Senator MORSE. I have a suggestion to make, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. What is it?

THE ADMINISTRATION ACTED PROPERLY

Senator MORSE. I have a language suggestion to make. At the top of page 52 we say, "It is disappointed that responsible officials of the executive branch did not see fit to confide in it this one piece of information which is crucial to reaching an informed judgment.

"The committee recognizes"——

Senator WILEY. Read the next paragraph now.

Senator MORSE. I am going to put a sentence in there first: "The committee recognizes the administration was within its legal right to refuse to supply the information under the doctrine of executive privilege."

The CHAIRMAN. I have no objection to that, if that satisfies the rest. I don't think, as a practical matter, we could have at all forced Dulles to tell us, and we only get into a foolish position in this field to try, I think. It would have made the committee look foolish.

Senator WILEY. Would you take out the next paragraph? You see, that is the one where we Senators are saying this refusal inevitably raises some doubt as to whether the information sought was in fact as important as it was said to be. In turn, this casts doubt on the wisdom of sending the flight at all.

Senator **Morse**. I would be willing to take the paragraph out if you had the previous language.

Senator **Sparkman**. Mr. Chairman, before you do that, let me make an alternate suggestion, and that is to strike the sentence beginning at the bottom of page 54, "It is gravely disappointed"——

The **Chairman**. That is page 52.

Senator **Sparkman**. Page 52, yes.

"It is gravely disappointed that responsible officials of the executive branch"—strike that sentence. Then strike the words "this refusal" in the next paragraph and say, "The inability of the committee to obtain this information inevitably," et cetera.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Well, I don't agree with the assumption that is made there that the inability to get this information raises a doubt that it was as important as it was said to be. That doesn't necessarily follow to me. In fact, just the reverse would normally follow.

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

Senator **Sparkman**. We can't determine it one way or the other.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. We have already said——

Senator **Sparkman**. I would be willing to accept the language presented by Senator Morse.

Senator **Morse**. I would take that other paragraph out. "It is disappointed that the responsible officials in the executive branch did not see fit to confide in it this one piece of information which is crucial to reaching an informed judgment. The committee recognizes that the administration had the legal right to refuse the information under the doctrine of executive privilege." Then strike the next paragraph.

Senator **Gore**. I don't know why you want to recognize that.

Senator **Morse**. It just happens to be the law.

The **Chairman**. As a practical matter——

Senator **Gore**. I know, but the fact that it is does not require it to be stated.

Senator **Morse**. It does require us, when we say, "We saw you didn't give it to us and, in effect, you say you are not going to give it to us because it is executive privilege."

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Well, to me, that sounds all right, because we recognize that there is a basis for that refusal although we regret that they saw fit to use it.

The **Chairman**. That is right.

Senator **Morse**. The doctrine of executive privilege is not mandatory; they don't have to use it. Many a President hasn't used it, but they have the right, and——

Senator **Gore**. There is no harm done in restating it. I don't question its being legally sound.

Senator **Capehart**. What you just read is the fact that we in the Congress are responsible for it. We in the Congress can pass a law changing it.

Senator **Morse**. Executive privilege, we cannot.

The **Chairman**. We can't change it.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. It is just a recitation of the facts as they exist.

Senator CAPEHART. You mean you could not deny CIA the right to fly planes over another country?

Senator MORSE. That is not what we are talking about.

DOUBTS EXPRESSED

The CHAIRMAN. Does everyone agree? It is agreed with that sentence, the next paragraph comes out.

Senator GORE. I am not going to stand in the way, because I recognize that some people would not want to subscribe to that conclusion. I just must state to you that a refusal, even to confide alone to the chairman of this committee, raises doubt in my mind that there was any character of information sought——

The CHAIRMAN. That was in my mind too, as I stated.

Senator SPARKMAN. I agree, but I would not insist on stating it.

Senator CAPEHART. Mr. Chairman, it does in my mind. My point is, gentlemen, you dare not say this, in my opinion, in the face of world conditions. It does in my mind too, but there must be some information that this committee has, which its members ought not to make public to the world. That is my position.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think this paragraph has anything to do with the world position. This has to do with our own——

Senator GORE. I understand why you wouldn't want to go along with it.

The CHAIRMAN. He agrees it is out. Let's go on.

Senator WILEY. Let's find out what you agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. To take out the second paragraph here.

Senator WILEY. And leave in all the rest.

The CHAIRMAN. We have not come to that yet, we are down to that point.

Senator LAUSCHE. You strike out the word "gravely" in the second last sentence of page 52.

The CHAIRMAN. That's right.

Senator LAUSCHE. And then you add the sentence that he dictated a moment ago.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the reporter has the sentence. That is clear.

Senator LAUSCHE. On the matter of privilege.

The CHAIRMAN. That is clear. He has been over the record, and he has got it very clear, I am sure.

Now what about the next one?

THE LAW OF AVERAGES

Senator WILEY. OK, the next paragraph.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that is a factual statement.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, that is OK. What about the next?

Senator WILEY. I have that marked, "Omit."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, I am dissatisfied with that particular philosophy. I don't think we are justified in saying after six flights you have lived your life, or after one flight.

Senator GORE. There is also such a thing as law of averages that eventually operates against you.

Senator LAUSCHE. I read in Reader's Digest, or one of the magazines, a scientific discussion that it makes no difference how many times you throw pennies up in the air, the chances are always the same. The matter of averages does not operate at all.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Of course it doesn't.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't see that paragraph is very important. Dulles did himself happen to say it in the sense that we were flying on borrowed time.

Senator WILEY. Can we strike it, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. As far as I am concerned. Does anybody feel strongly that it should stay in?

The middle paragraph is agreed to and the next one is stricken.

CONSIDERATION OF SUMMIT CONFERENCE.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You say in approving the flight that little, if any, consideration is given to the proximity of May 1 to the date of the summit conference. I think the evidence was that some consideration was given to that, but the proximity to the conference was not the controlling factor.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, actually, it is true this is very difficult to put in precise language, but Herter, when tied down as to whether or not a decision had been made not to discontinue them, said there wasn't any such decision made, at least as far as he was concerned. I think that is pretty accurate.

Senator MORSE. I think it is, too. It is so important to hitch that first one onto the second one or the second onto the first, because you remember how Herter stressed that. "Argument was made to the committee that, if diplomatic considerations were taken into account, there would also be some reason for cancelling the flight." That is why they did not give much consideration to it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Personally, I feel that whole paragraph could stand hitched to it.

Senator LAUSCHE. "This argument is not really persuasive because it downgrades the summit conference."

That, of course, brings me back to what is the cutoff date when they should have quit, and——

Senator WILEY. Not only that, it assumes this blew up the summit conference. If our position is right, it had nothing to do with it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, we never would agree to that.

The CHAIRMAN. I am afraid we won't agree to that.

Senator GORE. Herter doesn't agree with you, nor does Bohlen.

Senator CAPEHART. I suggest that we strike out both paragraphs, since you don't like the word "move".

Senator MORSE. I think it is a pretty good paragraph.

Senator SPARKMAN. I do, too.

Senator WILEY. I think we could start on page 54: "The question here is whether the information sought by May 1," and so forth.

Strike all out, way down to the bottom of page 55, because you are getting into some more of this philosophizing, which in my humble opinion isn't found generally in conclusions.

IMPORT OF THE SUMMIT

Senator **Gore**. I think the meaning of the first paragraph on 54 is essential to a conclusion. Maybe you change the wording in some way.

The **Chairman**. I don't see anything wrong with it.

Senator **Sparkman**. I think the others support it and are, in turn, supported in fact.

Senator **Morse**. By the record.

Senator **Sparkman**. Yes.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. You have a statement in here I don't agree with: "This argument is really not persuasive because it downgrades the summit conference." I don't quite agree with that. I think the matter is covered.

The **Chairman**. The only way, it seems to me, Bourke, that you could offset that sentence is to have given affirmatively some reason for its being of special importance, which they didn't do. They took their privilege, as we have stated. If you take the view that I think people like Gates testified he did, that he didn't think the summit conference was important because he didn't expect anything to happen, why, then you wouldn't cancel it.

Senator **Gore**. Maybe you could make that, "This argument is really not persuasive because it equates the summit conference with the run-of-the-mill diplomatic affairs."

The **Chairman**. That is what you mean.

Senator **Gore**. If you don't like the word "downgrade" what he really said was there is no time to stop a flight because there is something going on.

This summit conference, when the heads of state were meeting, was something special. I don't believe that you can equate that with——

The **Chairman**. That's right.

Senator **Gore** [continuing]. The Geneva conference on nuclear weapons tests.

The **Chairman**. They are going on all the time.

Senator **Gore**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. I think that is the thought that is sought to be conveyed.

CHANGE OF LANGUAGE

Senator **Gore**. What do you think about that language?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Well, I am thinking about something here in the next to the last sentence in that paragraph, which I think we might be able to cut out and put this in.

The next to the last sentence says, "The question here is whether the information sought by the May 1 flight was of sufficient importance to justify jeopardizing the prospects of the summit conference." That, I do not agree with, and I would prefer the statement: "The question here is whether the information sought by the May 1 flight was of sufficient importance to justify," or instead of "jeopardizing the prospects of," put in "to justify the hazard of a failure prior to the summit conference."

Senator **Morse**. "Justify the hazard of giving Khrushchev an alibi."

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Well, I say "justify the hazard of a failure," which is a hazard, of course.

Senator **Morse**. I think we ought to be more specific than that and put the monkey on Khrushchev's back.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. We say the question can't be answered, of course.

The **Chairman**. How about this up there, which I think has some bearing in line with changing that "downgrades." Say, "It fails to recognize the importance of the summit conference," which is a more affirmative way of saying it.

Senator **Gore**. It would be agreeable with me.

Senator **Sparkman**. I think it would be an improvement.

Senator **Gore**. "Special importance" I would rather prefer, but what you say is all right.

The **Chairman**. Well, I think that makes it a little bit clearer if you don't like "downgrades." "Because it fails to recognize the importance." Do you want "special importance?"

Senator **Morse**. I would say "recognize fully the importance."

The **Chairman**. Well, either one, but not both. "Fully the importance."

Senator **Morse**. Yes, "recognize fully the importance."

Senator **Gore**. "Fully recognize," if you want to be correct.

Mr. **Holt**. You are splitting infinitives.

Senator **Gore**. "It fails fully to recognize."

The **Chairman**. "It fails fully to recognize the importance of the summit conference." That, I think, is more accurate.

Senator **Morse**. Yes, it is better too.

HAZARDS POSED TO CONFERENCE

The **Chairman**. "Further, the record is extremely obscured as to whether or not flights in fact had been canceled and postponed in the past for diplomatic reasons."

They never said they were canceled for diplomatic reasons, but the fact was they never did take place, so that is a fair, accurate statement.

Senator **Lausche**. With respect to the next sentence, "The question here is whether the information sought by the May 1 flight was of sufficient importance to justify jeopardizing the prospects of the summit conference," I can say to you that is in conflict, in my final judgment.

In my judgment, in November—November 5, November 14, 1959—Khrushchev was already proceeding to wreck the conference. That is, after he knew that we were solid in our judgment. This implies that the flight wrecked the conference, and I can't subscribe to it.

Senator **Wiley**. There were 4 years of successful flight preceding that.

Senator **Morse**. So what?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Of course, I suggested that in place of the words "Jeopardizing the prospects of"——

The **Chairman**. What was that you suggested?

Senator **Hickenlooper** [continuing]. That we might say "was of sufficient importance to justify" and then substitute "to justify the hazard of a failure prior to the summit conference."

Senator **Gore**. I am willing to buy that.

The **Chairman**. I would offer this purely for consideration, to say it in a little different wording: "The hazards to which the summit conference would be subjected."

Senator **Morse**. That is better.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Well, "in event of a failure."

Senator **Gore**. "Hazard"——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. The summit conference would not be subjected to hazards if it were a failure.

Senator **Gore**. "Subjected to a hazard by failure."

The **Chairman**. Yes, that is right.

SUCCESS WAS NOT EXPECTED

Senator **Capehart**. Mr. Chairman, I again want to say there is no question in my mind but that Khrushchev intended to scuttle the conference by any means that he could. The failure of the U-2 flight, of course, made it easy for him to do it. It gave him a specific, plausible excuse in his own mind.

Senator **Morse**. That is right.

Senator **Capehart**. I believe that and I know those are the facts, but I don't think we ought to say so in a public statement in this committee. Maybe I am wrong, but I don't think we ought to say so. You may not like the idea, when I say due to world conditions, but I think world conditions today are very, very explosive.

Senator **Gore**. Well, you have the opinion of our Russian expert, Mr. Bohlen,[1] who said flatfootedly on the night after the blowup in Paris, that except for the U-2 flight there would have been a summit conference which would have run its full course.

The **Chairman**. That doesn't say it would succeed.

Senator **Aiken**. That is open to question.

Senator **Capehart**. I think that is right, but it would not have been successful.

Senator **Gore**. In fact, no one expected it to succeed.

Senator **Capehart**. We might have been better off.

Senator **Gore**. You and I would quarrel as to whether they could have gone to conference with any hope of success.

Senator **Capehart**. But my position is that, due to the explosive situation as I see it, at the moment, we ought not to do anything here in a public document approved by 17 Senators that helps the cause of our enemy.

The **Chairman**. Senator, don't you think it is again the proper procedure to try to make this statement as accurate as if you were going to make one, and then finally decide whether or not you will sign it or the committee will issue it.

Senator **Capehart**. I appreciate that and as I say, I know that. I am perfectly willing to print this report—that which we have already approved—but I do not think we ought to come to a conclusion.

---

[1] Charles E. Bohlen, former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, then serving as special assistant to the Secretary of State on Soviet affairs.

INFORMATION NOT SUPPLIED TO COMMITTEE

Senator **Wiley**. Mr. Chairman, if you are going to leave in what you have just read, I move that there be printed as a footnote that paragraph you read to us that came right from the Secretary. That determines definitely the issue, but I don't think it is very relevant myself at this time.

Senator **Morse**. What is that paragraph?

The **Chairman**. What paragraph you are talking about?

Senator **Wiley**. Over in that letter discussing information.

Senator **Sparkman**. That is a confidential letter.

The **Chairman**. That is a confidential letter from Mr. Dulles and we couldn't print it.

Senator **Wiley**. Yes, that paragraph there.

Senator **Sparkman**. It is marked "confidential."

The **Chairman**. Marked "confidential" by Mr. Dulles.

Senator **Wiley**. Can't you find out whether he wants to say that? It doesn't say anything, except he can't release the information to you.

Senator **Sparkman**. We have already said that in the report.

The **Chairman**. That is what we said in the report.

Senator **Wiley**. You were not satisfied with the report and you wrote him and you got this in return.

The **Chairman**. I mean we said in the report—page 52, there.

Senator **Gore**. Senator Wiley, as I recall it, the committee gave Mr. Dulles complete leeway to allow any of his testimony to be published or suppressed it in its entirety. He chose the latter, and we didn't object.

Senator **Wiley**. I am sorry if I have not made my position clear. Here you are jabbering about the lack of information, and he tells you why he didn't give you the information—because it is so important we are not entitled to it.

Senator **Sparkman**. We are not talking here about lack of information, are we?

Senator **Wiley**. It says right here——

Senator **Sparkman**. "Whether the information sought by the May 1 flight."

LACK OF KNOWLEDGE

Senator **Wiley**. "The question here is whether the information sought was of sufficient importance to justify jeopardizing the prospect of a summit conference."

The **Chairman**. It would read this way: "The question here is whether the information sought by the May 1 flight was of sufficient importance to justify the hazards to which the summit conference would be subjected by failure of the flight."

Senator **Capehart**. It is better than the way it reads.

Senator **Sparkman**. I think that is good.

The **Chairman**. Is that all right?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. It is all right with me.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. The question cannot be answered, of course——

Senator WILEY. I will have to say it isn't all right with me, because you have the same proposition in another language. You are raising the question of lack of information.

Senator GORE. Well, make a reservation in your margin there.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what is the view of the committee?

Senator GORE. I don't like the word "ignorance."

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you put in a substitute for that.

Senator CAPEHART. It is a pretty good word, I think.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. "Absence." How about that? That is what affects the heart, you know, absence.

Senator GORE. What you want to say is "for want of knowledge as to the character of the information sought by the flight."

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right.

Senator SPARKMAN. I will say the use of "ignorance" here is a little different from the other place. The other place said the ignorance of the committee. [Laughter.]

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Why don't you just leave the language as it is, and say "the question cannot be answered, of course." Strike out "in ignorance," and then say "for want of knowledge." Of what, the information was sought by the flight?

Senator GORE. All right, "for want of information sought by the flight."

Senator LAUSCHE. "For want of knowledge of the information?"

Senator HICKENLOOPER. "For want of knowledge of what information was sought by the flight."

The CHAIRMAN. That is right, "for want of knowledge of what the information"——

Senator GORE. That is what I said in the first place.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I'm sure you did.

SOVIET REACTION WAS NO SURPRISE

The CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead. What is the next one?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The next paragraph.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is all right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would put a period after the word "become" and strike that last conclusion, to put the best face on it or to put something on it.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree.

Senator GORE. I would agree.

Senator SPARKMAN. I would agree.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator SPARKMAN. I agreed merely for the purpose of trading. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the next one?

Senator WILEY. The next paragraph is a corker. Let's find out just exactly what it means. I didn't know the Soviet experts have appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee. Maybe they have. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. That is pages 54 and 55.

Senator CAPEHART. What does it mean?

Senator **Morse**. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that the next paragraph be stricken and there be substituted for it—I don't have the language at tongue's tip but I have the idea—new language which simply says that the discovery of the U-2 plane by the Russians over their territory produced a violent reaction which should have been anticipated by us. What we are trying to say here is that nobody should be surprised about the violent reaction of the Russians when they found the U-2 plane and shot it down.

Mr. **Marcy**. That is on page 55, the next paragraph.

The **Chairman**. He says that is in the next paragraph.

Senator **Morse**. Isn't that what this paragraph is trying to say?

U-2'S EFFECTIVENESS UNKNOWN TO SOVIETS

Senator **Sparkman**. The next paragraph really expands on what Wayne is saying.

Senator **Morse**. Why not say "a better perspective of the Soviet reaction is gained if one would imagine what our reaction would have been."

Senator **Sparkman**. It is nothing more than what should have been expected.

Senator **Morse**. It should be taken for granted. There should not be any surprise about this violent reaction. I don't think you need this language about the psychopathic addiction to secrecy. We are trying to say we know the history of the Russians and we could have expected this violent reaction from them and we got it.

The **Chairman**. You can say "in view of the well-known history of Russia, we could well expect the violent reaction to the U-2 flights and the clear proof of how effective they had been." I think the actual discovery of the camera and the pictures is probably something which contributed a lot to their violent reaction.

Senator **Morse**. More than the plane.

The **Chairman**. They had known some of these planes were wandering up there; I dare say they had no idea how effective they were.

Senator **Lausche**. Why not say that?

The **Chairman**. That is what we are trying to do.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Can we say something of this kind?

Senator **Lausche**. "The discovery of the cameras and the effective use to which they were put."

Senator **Morse**. Say, "In all probability the discovery of the cameras"——

Senator **Sparkman**. Why not start the paragraph by saying, "Even though the Soviet Union had known or stated it had known of these flights in the past, the reaction was only what might have been expected by reason of bringing the plane down, and discovering the elaborate setup of what was being done."

The **Chairman**. That is the idea.

Senator **Morse**. Put that in there and you have got it.

EXTENT OF RUSSIAN KNOWLEDGE

Senator **Gore**. Now, the actual testimony about the extent of the Russian knowledge is rather nebulous. I believe they said that they knew there had been flights but they had not been able to identify the planes.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is right.

Senator GORE. And it flew so high that their radars were unable to track it, or they would lose track of it and they were never able to positively accuse us, for want of specific information.

You remember the picture the U-2 made of some Russian fighters?

Senator SPARKMAN. You can say "even though Khrushchev stated that they had known that these flights were being made," tied into his statement.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I make a suggestion here? Cut out that first sentence and begin with the sentence at the top of page 55, and say, "In view of the almost psychopathic addiction to secrecy which has characterized Communist Russia"—let's leave out Czarist Russia—"and which is a cultural attribute of the Russian Government"——

Senator GORE. Let's leave out "cultural attribute."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let's just say "an attribute."

Senator GORE. "Characteristic."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, "characteristic" is better; "characteristic of the Russian Government." "A probing of this secrecy such as that involved in the U-2 operation, coupled with the frustrations and chagrin of the Soviet over a period of almost 4 years, could only have been expected to result in the most violent reaction when this penetration of their territory was made public."

Senator MORSE. That is all right.

The CHAIRMAN. That suits me.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think that is all right.

Senator MORSE. That is all I was trying to say, in effect.

INCIDENT MAGNIFIED BEYOND PROPORTION

Senator SPARKMAN. My only suggestion would be this now. You have cut down over there where it says "characterized the Russian Government" and then again used "a characteristic of the Russian Government." You have a duplication.

Senator GORE. Well, change that. Let Marcy change that.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all right.

Senator GORE. Leave out the last sentence. I think as a matter of fact, they did magnify that beyond its scope.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In view of their knowledge of the 4 years that these flights were going on, I think they magnified this out of all proportion.

Senator AIKEN. Khrushchev knew it was going on and undoubtedly other top officials knew it had been going on, but evidently they kept it from the people. That is what you raised——

The CHAIRMAN. The surprise was.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They claim rape and robbery and everything else, because we penetrated their territory. We have been penetrating it 4 years and they haven't made the claim, but made the outcry.

Senator LAUSCHE. I found his statement on page 175, and I would like to ask the staff—Khrushchev says, "Its last but one aggressive act was perpetrated by the United States of America on April 9, 1960."

Somewhere in this book is Khrushchev's statement that he knew at Camp David that our——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I think that comes from his statement at his press conference in Paris.

Senator **Gore**. His press conference in Paris. Or Berlin?

Senator **Lausche**. Why shouldn't we put that in as supporting material?

Senator **Sparkman**. Footnote "tied in with frustration."

Senator **Lausche**. Three events: July 16, 1956, April, and this, when he said in his press conference that he knew these planes were flying over when he was at Camp David. Camp David was last September. Footnotes of those three things, I think, ought to go in there.

The **Chairman**. All right.

Mr. **Holt**. Footnotes of Khrushchev's statements indicating his knowledge of previous flights. All of them.

Senator **Lausche**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. That is right.

Senator **Sparkman**. "Tied in with the 4 years' frustration."

RUSSIAN SECRECY

The **Chairman**. All right, if that is agreeable. Now, go ahead.

Mr. **Holt**. Can I make sure I got what you want to do with that paragraph?

Senator **Gore**. Make it a footnote.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Take out the first sentence.

Mr. **Holt**. Take out the first sentence and revise the second sentence to read as follows: "In view of the almost psychopathic addiction to secrecy which has characterized Communist Russia and which is an attribute of the Russian Government"——

The **Chairman**. No, that is right.

Senator **Sparkman**. A while ago you used "characteristic." That is the reason I raised the question. I can't quite see why you have to say that.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I am perfectly willing——

Senator **Gore**. "Which characterized Communist Russia."

Senator **Sparkman**. Looks to me like that covers it.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. "Which characterizes the Russian Government."

Mr. **Holt**. "Which has characterized Communist Russia and the Russian Government, a probing of this secrecy."

Senator **Lausche**. May I say something to you on that? Why not confine it to Communist Russia, because you have a lot of good Russians.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. We do.

Senator **Lausche**. Well, the Czarist Government——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. We knocked that out.

Senator **Morse**. Mr. Chairman, I have our guest out there and he is going to wait until we are through with our meeting. Then we will have coffee with him and let him go.

The **Chairman**. Let Pat finish that.

Mr. **Holt**. The paragraph would now read in its entirety:

> In view of the almost psychopathic addiction to secrecy which has characterized Communist Russia and the Russian Government, a probing of this secrecy such as that involved in the U-2 operations, coupled with the frustration and chagrin of the Soviets over a period of almost 4 years, could only have been expected to result in the most violent reaction when this penetration of their territory was made public.

Then there is a footnote to Khrushchev's statement indicating his knowledge of prior flights.

Senator **Morse**. That covers it.

The **Chairman**. Excellent.

COMMUNIST RUSSIA V. RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT

Senator **Sparkman**. Let me raise one word: The distinction between "Communist Russia" and the "Russian Government". Why do you put both in?

Senator **Lausche**. "Communist Government" is what it ought to be.

Senator **Sparkman**. I don't care myself.

Senator **Lausche**. "Communist Government."

Senator **Gore**. Either way you want it.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I could have taken out "Communist Russia," as a matter of fact. I think it has been characteristic of the steppes of Russia from time immemorial, they are secretive.

The **Chairman**. For 500 years.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I could take it out and just leave it "the Communist Government."

Senator **Sparkman**. I have no objection to it, but was just asking why.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I think it says the same thing. It is the Communist Government. Let's take out "Communist Russia" and say "characterized the Russian Government."

Mr. **Holt**. "Characterized Communist Russia and the Russian Government."

The **Chairman**. No, just "Russian Government."

Mr. **Holt**. "Which has characterized the Russian Government."

The **Chairman**. It has been characteristic.

Senator **Lausche**. Put in the words "Russian Communist Government," because I don't want to hit the Russian people. I think there are too many of them who want to get rid of it. Many of you may not agree with me, but I think they do. It doesn't make much difference, but——

Senator **Morse**. But the historic record of the Russian people with regard to secrecy and with regard to their land and their country—it was true in Czarist Russia and this country. The whole record of Russia is that they laid down their lives by the millions for their land, the Czars and Communists.

JUSTIFICATION FOR RUSSIAN REACTION

Senator **Gore**. The next paragraph, I suggest we strike out the word "better."

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Wait a minute.

Senator **Capehart**. What page is it?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I was going to suggest we strike the whole thing out, for this reason: This whole paragraph to me is in the nature of an argumentative justification for Russia. I don't believe it ought to go in this particular document. I don't think it is essential.

By justification for Russia, I think what is said in this paragraph probably is true. I think we would have 17 fits and 18 baby cats if a plane came down over Kansas City but I don't believe we ought to put it in this document. I don't believe we ought to say, "Well, we would feel the same way as the Russians do." You see, that is my point.

I don't quarrel with the truth and the factual statement in the paragraph, but I just question the judgment of putting it into this document.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am sorry Frank Carlson is not here, since this involves Kansas. [Laughter.]

Senator CAPEHART. Kansas City, that is Missouri.

The CHAIRMAN. There are both. There is Kansas City, Kans., and Kansas City, Mo.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We discuss the fact that we capture Russian spies without too much trouble and they capture Western spies without reacting so violently. They don't react so violently; all they do is kill them. When they capture them, they shoot them.

Senator SPARKMAN. I don't think that paragraph particularly contributes very much.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I just feel that whole paragraph ought to come out.

PERSPECTIVE ON SOVIET RESPONSE

Senator MORSE. I have a suggestion.

My suggestion is that we put it this way: "A perspective on the Soviet reaction can be gained if one imagines what the reaction would have been in the United States if a Soviet counterpart of the U-2 had been brought down in the vicinity of Kansas City." Say nothing more; take all the rest out down to the bottom of page 56, "given the bad luck which we feel the U-2 on May 1 the next question which arises," and so on. I don't think we need any part of——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Where is that on page 56?

Senator SPARKMAN. The last paragraph on page 56.

Senator MORSE. Strike everything down to the last paragraph on page 56.

The CHAIRMAN. I am tempted, because that is real progress if we can do that.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think it is a good suggestion.

Senator MORSE. I don't think the other has anything to do with the record.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What do you say?

Senator MORSE. I would say leave what you have there, but strike the word "better." "A perspective on the Soviet reaction can be gained if one imagines what the reaction would have been in the United States if a Soviet counterpart of the U-2 had been brought down in the vicinity of Kansas City on May 1." That has been said over and over again in editorial after editorial. Strike all the rest down to the beginning of the last paragraph on page 56.

ACCESSIBILITY OF U.S.

Senator LAUSCHE. I would like to make a comment on that.

That presupposes that circumstances are identical for penetration in the Soviet as they are in the United States. There is no need for their flying a plane over the United States. They can get it on foot, on train or plane, through the statements we have made, and through the statements commentators and columnists make.

Senator GORE. That is the point made in the second paragraph.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Why not put in a statement after what Wayne said there, which I agree with? Just say, "In connection with this point, however, there is ample evidence that the Soviet Union, because of the open availability of this country" or something of that kind——

Senator MORSE. You summarize the second paragraph on page 56.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Summarize that second paragraph, which would bring out the point Frank raises.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do we actually have open skies in this country?

The CHAIRMAN. No, we don't.

Senator SPARKMAN. Aren't they saying that in that paragraph?

The CHAIRMAN. Actually those photographs were better than any observer can get looking at those things from the ground.

Senator SPARKMAN. But, as I interpret that paragraph, we are virtually saying they can fly over our territory.

Senator LAUSCHE. They can by commercial plane.

Senator SPARKMAN. Not unless they have a visa.

Senator GORE. You can drive to a mountaintop and photograph Oak Ridge.

Senator SPARKMAN. You can photograph almost as much in Russia as you can in this country. That was a surprising experience I ran into. They give you instructions that there are four things you are not to photograph in there, and they are almost identical with things that are forbidden in this country.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They don't allow you to go where you want to go. You can't get to places in Russia.

RESTRICTED AREAS

Senator MORSE. I don't accept the major premise that you all seem to be arguing from: The same kind of aerial photographs we were getting from U-2 planes in Russia would not be helpful to the Russians in their own plans for offensive against the United States, if they could get them in the United States, and they can get them in the United States.

Senator SPARKMAN. If we found a plane flying up there, we would force it down and yet, as I interpret it, the paragraph seems to say otherwise.

Senator LAUSCHE. Let's assume you have a Communist in the United States and he buys a private plane and he flies. He has a right to fly.

Senator **Capehart**. He can't.

Senator **Sparkman**. If he is a pilot, he can.

Senator **Lausche**. If he is a Communist, he can. I can get a plane and hire a pilot. I don't think you can go over Oak Ridge.

The **Chairman**. When you look at the maps these pilots have, there are many restricted areas they are not supposed to fly over.

Senator **Sparkman**. But you can fly over Kansas City.

Senator **Lausche**. I do not subscribe to the inclusion of this paragraph. You give it to Khrushchev and say, "Here take it, this is what the Senate has said about." It is true.

Senator **Gore**. We will—well, Wayne suggested it go out.

The **Chairman**. I am perfectly willing to leave it all out, down to what Senator Morse said.

Senator **Gore**. What about you, Frank?

The **Chairman**. Wayne's suggestion would be all right.

Senator **Morse**. I think my suggestion is all right.

Senator **Lausche**. Take it all out.

Senator **Morse**. He doesn't go as far as we all go.

The **Chairman**. He wants to throw out your first sentence.

Senator **Morse**. I don't think we should do that.

CONSENSUS REACHED

Senator **Lausche**. I'm talking about the whole sentence: "A better perspective of the Soviet." That is the whole thing.

Senator **Wiley**. Is page 55 out?

The **Chairman**. What was Wayne's first proposal, which was all right with me if it was with you all?

Senator **Gore**. If you get rid of three paragraphs and accept one sentence, aren't you making progress?

The **Chairman**. That is what appeals to me.

Senator **Morse**. I am perfectly willing to take a couple of sentences of the nature that Bourke talked about, and he can write them.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I am satisfied with your suggestion there to leave the rest of it out. I only suggested that they condense that middle paragraph on page 56 if it would help Frank in his view on this.

Senator **Morse**. That is what I am willing to do.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. If you want to take it all out, it is all right with me.

The **Chairman**. I think it is better to take it all out.

Senator **Gore**. I want Frank to be satisfied.

Senator **Wiley**. Next paragraph, too.

Senator **Morse**. You understand, the first sentence stays in?

Senator **Lausche**. Yes.

Senator **Morse**. I move we meet at 9 o'clock in the morning.

The **Chairman**. We have so few more, I thought we could finish. We got down to the last paragraph on page 56.

[Whereupon, at 5 p.m. the committee adjourned until Friday, June 17, 1960.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 1960

United States Senate,
Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs of the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 4:30 p.m., in an informal executive session in room F–53, Capitol.

Present: Senator Morse (chairman), and others.

The subcommittee discussed Peruvian matters with Jack Smith, Latin American representative of the Great Plains Wheat Development Association which has headquarters in Lima.

[No record was kept of the proceedings.]

TO CONSIDER REPORT ON HEARINGS REGARDING EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

DAY, JUNE 17, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met pursuant to recess at 2:55 p.m., in room F–53, U.S. Capitol, Hon. John Sparkman, presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Long, Gore, Lausche, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson and Mr. St. Claire of the committee staff.

GIVEN THE BAD LUCK

Senator SPARKMAN. We were down at the bottom of page 56.

Senator AIKEN. Now, "given the bad luck" is not the way to start that under the circumstances, is it?

Mr. MARCY. That is page 56.

Senator SPARKMAN. I was trying to see what the last was we said before that.

How would you start it, George?

Senator AIKEN. A little differently from what it is.

"Given the bad luck" isn't the way you want to start it.

Mr. MARCY. In view of what befell.

Senator SPARKMAN. In view of what befell.

Senator AIKEN. I guess that would be more like it. Or the misfortune, not following the misfortune, which befell it.

Senator SPARKMAN. In view of the misfortune which befell the U–2.

Mr. HOLT. A combination of circumstances really.

Senator AIKEN. It is a consequence of the misfortune which befell the U–2.

Senator SPARKMAN. It says the next question which arises——

Senator AIKEN. Concerns the reaction of the U.S. Government.

Senator SPARKMAN. What was your suggestion, Pat?

Mr. HOLT. "In view of the combination of circumstances surrounding the loss of the U–2", that was the original content.

Senator AIKEN. You don't in that need "combination" do you?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We ought to take out that word "hopelessly." "The first conclusion at this point is the cover story which was designed in advance to meet such contingency was inadequate for the circumstances."

Senator SPARKMAN. Cut out the word "hopelessly." Are you satisfied with the suggested language for the beginning of the language Pat gave a moment ago?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. "Was inadequate for the circumstances, which in fact existed. The main purpose of the cover story is to spread a mantle of innocence."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't think it was inadequate.

Senator SPARKMAN. You would substitute some other word for "inadequate."

That is a vote. We will come back.

[Short recess.]

TOO MUCH DETAIL

Senator SPARKMAN. Shall we start going over it in a most informal manner?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Can we make any progress here with just three of us here? I suppose we can make progress as far as three of us are concerned.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think it is entirely possible if we work this thing over that those who come in later may see the good work that has been done and be satisfied.

Albert, we changed——

Senator GORE. They showed me that.

Senator SPARKMAN. Then we are on page 57. Does either one of you have any suggestion?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, quite a bit.

Senator SPARKMAN. In that first paragraph?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, I think we have gone into too much detail here in condemning the United States.

Senator LONG. I had not participated up to now, so I am just going to acquiesce. I have read it but I can't get into it at this late date.

IDENTIFICATION OF PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What evidence then do we have this photographic equipment was precisely identified?

Mr. HOLT. Photographic equipment what, Senator?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It says photographic equipment had been damaged beyond precise identification. I say what actual evidence do we have that the photographic equipment was precisely identified?

Mr. HOLT. Khrushchev said so.

Herter said that pictures which the Soviets had shown as having come from the film in the camera seemed to him to be genuine. Herter and Cabell said substantially the same thing.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Didn't they also say they could have been taken by Soviet cameras?

Mr. HOLT. I don't recall that statement, no.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well,

The cover story which was used in regard to the U-2 for the period from May 1 to 7 would have served this purpose only if the plane had come down within a reasonable distance from the Soviet border and only if its photographic equipment had been damaged precisely for identification.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Why do we have to go into that kind of detail?

Why don't we just say that the cover story may have served this purpose under different circumstances? I don't think myself the cover story served the particular circumstances but we talk about within a reasonable distance of the Soviet border, and the photographic equipment——

Senator SPARKMAN. I gather the point tried to be made is this, that the cover story did not show much cleverness in its covering.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, it says that plainly.

Senator GORE. Yes, the shorter you can say it the better.

Senator SPARKMAN. All right. Come up with something, one of you.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think "The cover story which was used with regard to the U-2 for the period May 1 to 7 might have served this purpose, if the plane had come down under different circumstances."

Senator SPARKMAN. What do you think of the next paragraph?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, the next sentence "until May 7" I didn't mean to cut that out, necessarily.

Senator SPARKMAN. I see.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It says until May 7 it was not known in Washington where the U-2 had come down. The plane's flight plan was known however and it would have been a reasonable assumption that the chances were quite good that the plane was nowhere near the Soviet border. I thought I would leave that in.

Senator SPARKMAN. Why don't we change that sentence then?

Would you give it again, Bourke?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. "The cover story which was used in regard to the U-2 for the period May 1 to 7 could well have served this purpose."

Senator SPARKMAN. Could have.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Might have served, if you put it in the doubtful, might have served this purpose if the plane had come down under different circumstances.

And then go on and say "until May 7" and so on.

Senator LONG. Well, that same statement, I think would be handled better by saying "might have served this purpose if the plane had come down within a reasonable distance of the Soviet border or if its photographic equipment had been damaged beyond identification."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am just trying to get away from specifications. I don't think we are technically qualified to say just what circumstances necessarily fitted the cover story.

Senator LONG. I see.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not sure anybody is.

Senator SPARKMAN. It seems to me the suggestion that has been made is pretty good. It says the same thing without spelling it out.

Senator LONG. Yes.

Senator **Sparkman**. And the last sentence backs it up with half way identification, that is the flight plan was known and it could have been ascertained about where it had fallen.

What about the next paragraph?

FALSE COVER STORIES

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I don't think that next sentence is necessary at all because we have already said it.

Senator **Lausche**. What page are you on?

Senator **Sparkman**. Page 57, working on the middle paragraph, right now.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. We suggested some alterations in this which Carl can show you.

Senator **Lausche**. Where did you start, on what page?

Senator **Sparkman**. Page 56.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. We cut that out down to the bottom paragraph of page 56. We changed that somewhat. Instead of saying "given the bad luck which befell," we said "in view of the misfortune which befell."

Senator **Lausche**. I want to say to you I don't see what purpose we are going to serve in this matter and I don't want to be a participant in talking about cover stories and lying.

If this thing is going to say we should have lied, I am not going to be a participant in it, and I even don't know that I want to talk about cover stories although it is a realistic fact in the matter, but go ahead.

Senator **Sparkman**. I don't believe this does approve of false cover stories. But what it is leading up to is this: That they might have gotten away with the cover story if the plane had come down under different circumstances, that is the way we change it, but that it was not known just where it had come down until May 7, it was not known in the United States but if they had checked the flight plan probably they might have been able to guess pretty well where it had come down, and the story that was used in the light of the circumstances seems not to have been—it seems peculiarly unimaginative, is what it says here.

What about the second paragraph, Bourke? Have you got something?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Well, the change which was made I just want to bring Frank up to date—off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I would just as soon take out the whole sentence.

Senator **Lausche**. Doesn't it mean instead of calling it a cover story, a false story?

Senator **Aiken**. Doesn't something clandestine apply to something done in the flight?

Senator **Lausche**. Doesn't it apply to a false story and here we are Senators of the United States talking about they should have lied in a different way. I don't want to be a participant in that type of discussion. I don't want the children of this country to say that we, as public officials openly sat here and said they should have lied in a different way.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, up to that point in this paragraph, I don't think we have.

Senator LAUSCHE. You say the cover story—what is a cover story? Is it a true story or is it a false story?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. A cover story can be either true or false, I think. A cover story is a story designed to meet a circumstance. I don't see that it is necessary, for instance, the next sentence "The whole purpose of a cover story is to spread a mantle of innocence over a clandestine operation."

I don't see that we need to say that.

Senator LAUSCHE. That means the whole purpose of a cover story is to lie and say that a guilty course of conduct is an innocent one.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Why is it necessary for us to tell what a cover story is for? We said it was inadequate to meet the circumstances.

Senator AIKEN. Why don't we call it a cover story? Why wasn't it a release or a statement?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I support the reason the word "cover story" is used is because it was used throughout the testimony.

Senator AIKEN. The release of NASA turned out to be inaccurate.

Senator SPARKMAN. Unfortunately.

Senator AIKEN. I don't know whether we want to say it. It was beyond doubt but it was also inaccurate.

A MANTLE OF INNOCENCE OVER A CLANDESTINE OPERATION

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, instead of saying the whole purpose of a cover story is to spread a mantle of innocence over a clandestine operation, why not say "The whole purpose of the cover story was to spread a mantle of innocence over a clandestine operation. This particular cover story.

Senator AIKEN. Actually, John, the cover story was designed to protect the pilot in the event he was alive somewhere and trying to get out, was it not?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't think so.

Mr. HOLT. No, sir. I think the cover story was designed to mislead the Soviets.

Senator AIKEN. That is also true, but it seems to me that one of our witnesses indicated that they issued it for the protection of everybody. Sure it was to mislead the Soviet Government.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Why not say the purpose of a cover story is to explain a certain set of circumstances.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is better than what you have got.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If you have a cover story, you have a cover story in every newspaper office in the country on a variety of subjects, if such and such a thing happens here is the cover story.

Now that cover story may be a complete attempt of full factual honesty on it, but you have it ready, it is a cover story.

Senator SPARKMAN. What would you say here?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. A cover story is not necessarily a false statement. That is my view.

Senator SPARKMAN. What did you suggest?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I just say, the purpose of a cover story is to explain a certain set of circumstances in event of their happening.

Senator **Sparkman**. Well, if you pull it away from this particular operation, I don't see it has much force, so why don't you just leave the sentence out.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I would rather have it out. We get involved in this. It is an involved situation we work ourselves into here.

Senator **Sparkman**. If we leave it in, my suggestion would be, and it seems to answer the question, that the whole purpose of this cover story was to spread a mantle of, I don't know what I would say, mantle of innocence.

Senator **Lausche**. All right, for the time being let's leave it out. Then you have got to change a little bit the wording in the next sentence. We had already changed it.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. We said to cut that out, didn't we, or did we?

UNDER DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES

Senator **Sparkman**. The cover story which was used in regard to the U-2 for the period May 1 to 7 might have served this purpose "its purpose" may be would be better than "this" would it not?

Senator **Lausche**. Yes, "its purpose."

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Only if it came down within a reasonable distance of the Soviet border and only if it's photographic equipment had been damaged.

Senator **Sparkman**. We changed that, "its purpose, if the plane had come down under different circumstances."

Senator **Hickenlooper**. That's right, that is what we said. Only if the plane had come down under different circumstances.

Senator **Sparkman**. Let's move on down to the second paragraph, we have already gone into those other two sentences.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Yes.

Senator **Sparkman**.

> The circumstances which actually befell the U-2 in which uncontrovertible evidence was in Soviet hands; it is an open question as to whether any cover story would have sufficed. The story which was used, however, seems peculiarly unimaginative and certainly not in accordance with the talents CIA are widely reputed to have.

There you are, Frank, the CIA should have been able to tell a better one that that.

Senator **Lausche**. Yes, that is back where I am and I just don't like to be a participant in that.

Senator **Sparkman**. I have the same feeling. In fact, I don't like to have it talked about. I know the CIA is necessary but I wish we could operate it with very little said about it.

Senator **Lausche**. At the hearing you know I said it raises the question about whether the President ought to know anything about it at all but that is probably unrealistic. It is painful and foreign for me to try to participate in this discussion. At least publicly where I am telling people they should have lied differently. Go ahead.

"YOU COULD HAVE TOLD A BETTER ONE THAN THAT"

Senator **Sparkman**. Why not stop that last sentence after the word "unimaginative."

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I would like to see the word "positive" substituted for "uncontrovertible." "In the circumstances which actually befell the U-2 in which incontrovertible evidence," I would prefer the word "positive" in which "positive evidence."

Senator **Sparkman**. All right, I don't think there would be any objection to that, would there? Positive evidence was in Soviet hands, it was an open question whether any cover story would have sufficed, the story which was used, however, seems unimaginative.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. "It is an open question as to what story would have sufficed."

Senator **Long**. I am inclined to think that you do better to strike the whole thing.

Senator **Sparkman**. Strike the whole sentence.

Senator **Long**. I think I could perhaps think of a better story, but why should we sit here and tell them to say, "Fellows, I think you could have told a better one than that."

Senator **Sparkman**. All right. It suits me. And the next sentence, "responsible officials felt it was necessary to tell part of the truth."

OTHER COUNTRIES INVOLVED

Senator **Hickenlooper**. That raises the same objection. "Department officials felt it was then necessary to discuss the matter in greater details."

Senator **Aiken**. How is going into all this in the nature of a report going to set with England, France, Pakistan, Norway and those other countries involved. They have a tradition of clamming right up. How are they going to think if we come out and comment on it too much. I don't think we ought to put in anything that could be used in Japan or the other countries.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. There is quite a little that can be used, that is what bothers me.

Senator **Aiken**. And yet we have to report something.

Senator **Long**. Why report anything?

Senator **Aiken**. Because in the United States the people have the right to know, Russell. I think that is the answer, that is what got us in this trouble in the first place.

Senator **Lausche**. I think while Morse disagreed with me, this book here gives them an ability to know.

Senator **Aiken**. The report of the first 50 pages we have got here condenses the information in the book.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I would prefer to make conclusions based on the 50 pages or whatever it is, and then come to just some general conclusions that it was an unfortunate incident, but that the information obtained by the U-2 flights were invaluable in our national defense, something of that kind.

Senator **Sparkman**. Well, what should we do with it?

Senator **Aiken**. We don't want to compound our guilt, particularly the guilt of getting caught.

IT WAS ADMITTED BUT IT WAS DENIED

Senator **SPARKMAN**. Why couldn't we do this, let's see, make this look like this "at any rate the cover story was quite obviously outflanked on May 7 and the responsible officials felt that it was then necessary to discuss the matter in greater detail", and then say "Therefore, it was admitted that the U-2" and so forth. What about the suggestion I just made?

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Generally, I think that is all right. If you will just state that again.

Senator **SPARKMAN**. Read it, Carl, the way we would have it.

Mr. **MARCY**. All right. "Therefore it was admitted that the U-2 was on a reconnaissance mission but" et cetera.

Senator **SPARKMAN**. I believe you have a little bad grammar in there.

Mr. **MARCY**. "Therefore, it was admitted that the U-2 was on a reconnaissance mission."

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. And appeared.

Mr. **MARCY**. "But denied that it had been authorized"——

Senator **SPARKMAN**. It was admitted but it was denied.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Why admit it?

Senator **SPARKMAN**. Instead of "therefore," it is better to say "thereupon."

Mr. **HOLT**. As a result of their discussions.

Senator **SPARKMAN**. Say "as a result of further discussions" or "following further discussions."

Senator **LAUSCHE**. Yes, "it was admitted."

Senator **AIKEN**. That it was on a reconnaissance mission.

Senator **SPARKMAN**. That the U-2 was on a reconnaissance mission.

Senator **AIKEN**. You don't need the rest of that paragraph at all.

Senator **SPARKMAN**. Carl, again what was that you said?

Mr. **MARCY**. I was going to say "but denied that the mission had been authorized from Washington." I think that was in the statement, isn't that correct, Pat?

Mr. **HOLT**. Yes.

KHRUSHCHEV'S EARLY STATEMENTS

Senator **SPARKMAN**. Very well. Then if you strike out the next sentence, that would tie right in with the next paragraph.

Senator **HUMPHREY**. That's right.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Which paragraph?

Senator **SPARKMAN**. Starting "In Khrushchev's early statements about the plane he had implied doubt that President Eisenhower knew about the operation.", et cetera.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Where is that?

Senator **HUMPHREY**. Page 58.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Would you leave in but to deny——

Senator **SPARKMAN**. But it denied.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Why have that in at all?

Senator **SPARKMAN**. It ties in with the next paragraph.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Well, why get into these pro and con arguments? Why not just substitute for the rest of that page, and the next one, down to the last paragraph on page 60, why not just cut that out and just say "Thereafter, the President made a full factual disclosure of the incident and the purposes of this flight."

Senator LAUSCHE. On that subject I would like to make this comment. I do not believe that Khrushchev deliberately tried to give the President an out, and I could not——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am proposing to cut that out.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, but I could not concur with any finding that he wanted graciously to provide a means for our Government to have an out.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't think he did either. I point that out, but on page 5, beginning "In Khrushchev's early statement" down through that and to the last paragraph on page 60, I think we are arguing that then it might have been that way, and we are just indulging in speculative argument here in a report which I think should be taken out, in the whole interest of the situation.

Senator HUMPHREY. You wouldn't take out that paragraph where it says "In Khrushchev's earlier statements about the plane," would you?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't think it is necessary to put that in.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S UNPRECEDENTED ACTION

Senator HUMPHREY. I think the middle line is very necessary. Let's quit kidding ourselves, the Secretary of State did reverse the opinions or the expressions that had been made before.

When Secretary Herter corrected the May 7 statement on this point and said the program of flights had indeed been authorized by the President. This was the major point in this whole incident insofar as this one member is concerned.

I think this was unprecedented. I don't think there was any instance of it in the history of the world. For us to ignore that point, Bourke, it seems to me would be to ignore the one obvious feature of the hearing. I agree that a lot of this, did he do it this way or should he have done it this way, about what Khrushchev thinks, lends itself to all kinds of interpretations, but this is a factual statement here: the statement that confirmed the implied doubt or the implication that maybe Eisenhower had not authorized these flights. There were a couple of days in which this was talked about in the press.

Then all at once, wham, Herter said the program was authorized by the President and later on the President said he took personal responsibility. That is the sequence of events which I think needs to be listed in this document, at least without too much editorializing.

Senator SPARKMAN. I say this too. Of course, the chairman is not here. I suppose he could come if it is a matter of emergency, but I know none of us want him to come up here today. He has made statements on this, and I think he feels pretty strongly about that matter of the President assuming the responsibility.

He feels that he should not have assumed it. He feels something like Frank along the lines you said a while ago, that it ought to be something more or less separate and apart from the President and operated without his being responsible for every single flight and everything done.

Bill thinks a mistake was made in the President's assuming the responsibility and that it ought not to have been done.

Therefore, Bourke, I feel quite certain he would not want that stricken out. What changes might be worked I don't know but I am sure he would want to retain in it something on which to hang his hat on that hook. That is what you call mixing metaphores.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't agree with that philosophy but I don't want to do anything here in Bill's absence—I would want him to advance his own theories.

Senator SPARKMAN. I would not want us to take action striking that out in his absence because I know he has spoken strongly about it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In that case I would reserve my opinion on it but hold it up until he can present his views on it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, we may have to.

THE CHOICE FOR THE PRESIDENT WAS NOT CLEAR

Senator LAUSCHE. That is, you are talking about the paragraph on page 58, the top full paragraph.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, that is more or less introductory but it is really brought to a head down at the bottom of the page where it says "The choice for the President was therefore not a clear one. The course which he took is unprecedented in intelligence operations. So far as the committee knows, or the record discloses."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't agree with the statement that the choice for the President was not a clear one.

I think the fact that he did assume, whether one agrees with it or one doesn't, the fact that he did come out flatly and did assume the responsibility indicated that he had a clear choice, there was nothing cloudy about it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Maybe the word "clear" is not good. Maybe it ought to be "difficult" it seems to me it was a difficult choice for him to make. Now here at first the State Department——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't know that there is any evidence that it was a difficult choice.

Senator SPARKMAN. The Secretary had set it up on a different basis. He had set it up as being one that the President was not aware—I wouldn't say not aware, but he was not responsible—and then the President came along on his own and assumed full responsibility.

Now, as I understand it the chairman feels that the President made a mistake in doing that, and he feels very strongly about it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I will tell you, why don't we do this: Why don't we take this business and the next, which is to me mostly argumentative this way and that way on pages 59 and 60 down to the last paragraph on page 60, why don't we just kind of leave it in abeyance and see what can be worked out on that.

Senator SPARKMAN. I would rather he were here for that.

Senator LAUSCHE. You now are talking that there ought to be included the top full paragraph of page 58.

Senator **Sparkman**. I am not saying in the exact language, Frank, but the thought, what about the next paragraph?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. My suggestion—I would like to see the whole business go out, but we lay aside. It is all wrapped up on the same ball of wax and I think the chairman ought to have the opportunity to discuss his views on that.

THE WISDOM OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ALERT

Senator **Sparkman**. Down at page 60,

> Given the situation which existed by the time the President got to Paris, it is difficult to see what course of action he could have reasonably followed other than the one he took, a question has been raised about the wisdom of the communications alert which Secretary Gates ordered the night of Sunday, May 15.

And I certainly raise a question as to that, in fact, one objection I have to this report is that I don't like this sentence "A question has been raised about the wisdom of the communications alert which Secretary Gates ordered the night of Sunday, May 15." As described by the Secretary there seems little here to take exception to.

I don't like that statement myself. I think it was a terrible mistake to set this alert up. It was a dry run. Why set it up under the tense circumstances that it was done? If you are going to make a dry run, why don't you make it when people know it is a dry run?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. John, the Soviets have used that method also. Every time they have come up against a point of discussion they have started the dogs howling, they have started trouble just beforehand. It is the old philosophy that when you are going to negotiate show a sign of strength to negotiate from.

Here Khrushchev had come to Paris, he had made all these bombastic statements, and I think this may not be the exact reasoning or the verbiage but the philosophy of it was that "Well, we will show the world we are alert, we'll show them. We'll have this test alert on our communications", and he had all over the world. No special effort, just those that were on duty all over the world. It was a pretty forceful presentation that the United States did have an alert capability all over the world. I think that is the reason they did it.

In other words, not let Khrushchev deal from blunder and bluster all the time, but show them that we can huff and puff just a little bit, too, at the time.

Senator **Sparkman**. And blow the house down.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. No, but not be blown down because we are in a situation where we are not just going to be blown down.

A DANGEROUS DEMONSTRATION

Senator **Lausche**. Well, frankly, I don't think that I would have called the alert.

Senator **Sparkman**. At that time?

Senator **Lausche**. At that time, no. Now then, I can see though how other minds would conclude that way, that it should be called and as you say, if I had to make a statement viewing the whole matter now, I feel that I would not have called the alert. But I can see that other minds could have come to other conclusions to the basis of what happened at Honolulu and other places.

Now, I reread the transcript on that matter, and I concluded that I thought it was dangerous. It works out quite well, there was some deviation beyond what should have been done, but it had potential danger in it.

Senator **Sparkman**. Being given from that place and under the circumstances it just seems to me it was quite unfortunate.

It is pretty much like staging a demonstration of seapower in an area when some country starts kicking up. You do it for the purpose more or less of saying "You had better look out now, big boy, look what I have got" and there is pretty much the same thing. It is all right if you want to try out the system and see how it works but it ought to be tried out when things are not so tense.

I don't see why it couldn't have been tried out from Washington a week before instead of being tried from Paris, from the summit conference while the fuss was on.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I have got to leave. I have got to be in Iowa tonight, I have been trying to get a reservation at 6 o'clock out of here.

Senator **Sparkman**. All right, we shall let it go over. Let's meet on Monday at 10 o'clock.

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m. the hearing was recessed, to reconvene Monday, June 20, 1956, at 10 a.m.]

TO CONSIDER REPORT ON HEARINGS REGARDING EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

MONDAY, JUNE 20, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 11 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol, Hon. J. William Fulbright, presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Gore, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson and Mr. St. Claire of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's see, the last things we did was strike out almost all of page 56. We took the middle paragraph of page 55.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We struck out quite a little bit.

Senator AIKEN. We went over page 56 and struck out the middle of page 57.

The CHAIRMAN. No, according to my sheet we ended up down to the last paragraph of page 56.

Senator AIKEN. The first paragraph of page 56 is scratched. Then we said "In view of the combination of circumstances surrounding the loss".

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then we took out the word "hopelessly" down at the bottom.

Senator AIKEN. Took out "Hopelessly was inadequate to the circumstances which in fact existed."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We took out the word "wholly."

The CHAIRMAN. The whole sentence is marked out. "The cover story which was used with regard to the U-2," et cetera under different circumstances. Is that right?

Mr. HOLT. Strike out "only" on my copy.

Senator AIKEN. If nobody knows what a cover story is so much the better.

The CHAIRMAN. You took out "only"?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, because we said it might.

The CHAIRMAN. "Until May 7 it was not known in Washington where the U-2 had come down."

Mr. HOLT. That whole paragraph came out.

Senator AIKEN. That whole paragraph came out.

ANALYZING WHAT WAS IN KHRUSHCHEV'S MIND

The CHAIRMAN. What was wrong with the first sentence?

Senator AIKEN. "Might have served this purpose only if the plane had come down under different circumstances."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Cut out "only".

Senator AIKEN. Then you skipped the rest of it and go on "until May 7, it was not known" down to "The Soviet border." Then we cut out the next paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN. All of it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. Begin, "At any rate the cover story is obviously outflanked."

The CHAIRMAN. The whole thing is out.

Senator AIKEN. It was then necessary to discuss the matter in greater detail.

Mr. HOLT. The way mine reads "It was admitted that the U-2 was on a reconnaissance mission but denied that the mission had been authorized from Washington."

Senator AIKEN. "Therefore it was admitted," have you got a "therefore"?

Mr. HOLT. I don't have it.

The CHAIRMAN. This says "following further discussions, it was admitted."

Senator AIKEN. I think "therefore" fits in there. Where it says "They felt it was necessary to discuss the matter in greater detail. Therefore it was admitted." Unless we want to say "conceded." Then we say "the U-2 was on a reconnaissance mission but it was denied that the mission had been authorized from Washington."

The CHAIRMAN. Then you strike the next sentence.

Mr. HOLT. Strike the next sentence.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator AIKEN. That is where we left off.

The CHAIRMAN. That is where we stopped. So we start in the next sentence.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There was considerable philosophizing here, Bill, on Friday, as to how far we should go. That is true especially with respect to that last full paragraph on page 58 as to whether or not we are justified in trying to analyze what was in Khrushchev's mind.

Senator AIKEN. Or go into conjectures.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the first sentence before that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There was a feeling that that ought to go out.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not so much philosophizing as this next one is.

Senator AIKEN. We get into philosophizing in the second paragraph where we try to analyze what might be going on in Khrushchev's mind. That is kind of difficult to do.

NOT GIVE ANY PROPAGANDA TO THE ENEMY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Something like this, we say it is more puzzling, I like to try to get away from any propaganda we can give to the enemy, after the word "doubt" one might say "however, on

May 9", cut out the words "it becomes all the more puzzling as to why on May 9," say on "May 9 Secretary Herter in effect corrected the May 7 statement on this point," and so on.

Senator **AIKEN**. Then you could go down clear to the bottom line and say "The course decided upon", that it actually was unprecedented in intelligence operations so far as is known. And leave out that paragraph of conjectures.

The **CHAIRMAN**. "What do you say "corrected" or "changed", which is really right? What is the implication of "corrected"?

It isn't that he made a mistake.

He changed his statement, but he did it deliberately, I don't know which conveys his actual meaning more accurately.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Well, do you want to say clarified?

Senator **GORE**. What line are you on, Mr. Chairman?

The **CHAIRMAN**. Page 58 in the middle of the second paragraph there. The May 7 statement of the State Department seemed to confirm this doubt, then Bourke says "It becomes all the more puzzling" is taken out and to say "However, on May 9, Secretary Herter in effect"——

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Clarified.

The **CHAIRMAN**. I think clarified is a little better, don't you?

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. We could put a period after the word "mission," couldn't we, Pat?

Mr. **HOLT**. The period is after "Washington."

Senator **CARLSON**. At the top of page 58.

Senator **GORE**. I have no objection to Senator Hickenlooper's suggestion.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Then you come down "However, on May 9, Secretary Herter in effect clarified the May 7 statement on this point and said the program of overflights, but not specific flights as such, had been indeed authorized by the President."

Senator **AIKEN**. We take out the four lines——

Senator **GORE**. Well, now, "clarified".

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Well, we refer to the doubt of May 7 statement of the State Department seemed to confirm this doubt. However, it was clarified.

Senator **AIKEN**. Leaving in the first four lines in there.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Actually changed is what he did. He just changed it. He wasn't in any doubt.

A MORE FACTUAL STATEMENT

Senator **GORE**. Instead of clarified, why don't you just say "said" that is factual. We won't be arguing whether it was clarified or what it is, just say he says so.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. That is what is a fact.

The **CHAIRMAN**. That would be better. "However on May 9, Herter said" that is more factual, knock out all of the—"However on May 9, Secretary Herter said the program of flights, though not specific flights as such, had indeed been authorized by the President." I am not sure what the word "indeed" adds in there. Why doesn't "indeed" come out? "Had been authorized by the President. The substance of this statement was repeated by the statement the President made on May 11."

That is something factual, is it not?

Senator AIKEN. Cut out "indeed," and you are cutting out the words "It becomes all the more puzzling then as to why" and then——

The CHAIRMAN. That is out.

Senator AIKEN. You are cutting out "In effect corrected the May 7 statement on this point and" that comes out.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. After the period at the end of the word "doubt", do you see that there, the fourth line in the first full paragraph cut out all the words down to "on", and say "However on May 9, Secretary Herter in effect said the May 7 statement"——

The CHAIRMAN. Just say "Secretary Herter said."

Senator AIKEN. Cut that all out and say the program of flights had been authorized by the President.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is what we are saying "however, on May 9 Secretary Herter in effect said the May"——

The CHAIRMAN. No, "said the program of flights."

Senator CARLSON. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. Just said the program of flights, not specific flights.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is what I am suggesting.

SPECULATION WITHOUT FINDING

The next paragraph we go into trying to analyze what was going on in Khrushchev's mind. That whole next paragraph we are sort of floundering around there saying what went on or may not have gone on in Khrushchev's mind.

Senator AIKEN. I would go right on down and saying that the "choice taken by the President was unprecedented in intelligence operations."

The CHAIRMAN. I don't care about that paragraph of speculation on Khrushchev's mind.

Senator GORE. I don't either.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it comes out.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, it is speculation and there is no finding.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection let's just take that whole paragraph out.

A POSITIVE STATEMENT

Now we drop down to "The choice for the President was not a clear one." I think it was a clear one. "The course which the President took is unprecedented in intelligence operations." I think that is a clear one.

Senator GORE. That is factual. As long as we stick with facts we are going to have a report. If we start speculating we may not.

The CHAIRMAN. "The course which the President took is unprecedented in intelligence operations so far as the committee knows or the record discloses."

Well, that was a positive statement.

Senator AIKEN. So far as is known.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is a positive statement. When you get into that point we are again indulging in a high grade of speculation and the connotation of that whole paragraph there, most of it, is that we should have lied about this thing. Well, the fact is we didn't, I mean the President didn't.

The CHAIRMAN. What I think we should have done is we should have kept our mouth shut is what we really should had done and in effect maybe you say that is lying. That is we just don't discuss these things.

Senator AIKEN. Well, the free press would have had such caustic comments on keeping our mouth shut.

ALLEN DULLES WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now the statement that Allen Dulles was prepared to keep full responsibility for himself is correct.

Senator GORE. I don't know why you need to commend a man for that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't care. It is nothing.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is a factual statement though and he said so. I don't know that there is any need for it but on the other hand this is the traditional way and I think it is a factual statement.

Senator GORE. I am not raising any question about saying that he was prepared to accept it. I don't know why we need to commend him. Any subordinate——

The CHAIRMAN. It is known that Allen Dulles was prepared to accept full responsibility himself. I think we can say "which is the traditional procedure in these circumstances."

Is that all right?

Senator GORE. Yes, I don't mind commending him if you want to.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is immaterial to me. But I will tell you the final sentence in that paragraph, to me blows the paragraph out, blows it out of the water, I don't quite mean that but it justifies the idea that it is purely speculative. We say "it is of course impossible to know what the course of events would have been if the President had not assumed responsibility," and therefore I don't see why we should——

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to do this, "It is known that Allen Dulles was prepared to keep the full responsibility for himself which is the traditional procedure under these circumstances." End of paragraph, is that all right, with you?

Senator GORE. That is all right with me.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We cut out all the rest of that paragraph, did we?

The CHAIRMAN. That's right. Now we go to the next paragraph.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We start out "The course the President took is unprecedented" and after the word "discloses" we strike it down to——

The CHAIRMAN. "It is known that Allen Dulles was prepared to accept full responsibility himself which is the traditional procedure under these circumstances."

Senator AIKEN. We are leaving out everything after "circumstances" leaving——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. After the period on discloses, second line on the top of the page and cut out everything down to the words "it is known." Cut out those six sentences or something.

Now I don't think we ought to put in "one of the reasons the organizations such as the CIA exist."

The **Chairman**. That is out. I say that is the rest of the paragraph, circumstances.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Well, you make me very happy. [Laughter.]

Senator **Aiken**. If you keep the next paragraph as it is, you don't need the words "in any event." We have a more positive statement there.

TOO MUCH CREDIT TO THE RUSSIANS

Senator **Gore**. I don't like the end of that sentence there. It makes it appear that the whole thing was the Russians' fault to begin with.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I don't like the whole paragraph. Maybe we have got a lot of things coming but I think we ought to say it in our own way rather than give too much credit to the Russians.

Senator **Gore**. There is a valid point in the paragraph, Senator Hickenlooper, it seems to me. We unquestionably went overboard in justifying intelligence flights because of the secrecy that Russia maintains. Well, a nation has the right, the sovereign right of maintaining her secrecy. I think there is a valid point in the paragraph but I think we belabor it when we say we made it, the U-2 Russia's fault, to begin with.

Senator **Aiken**. Well, it was Russia's fault. If it wasn't we wouldn't have taken a flight and if we hadn't taken a plane it would not have come down. [Laughter.]

Senator **Gore**. I don't like quoting Khrushchev, either.

Senator **Aiken**. I don't like that burglar not guilty, but actually under our laws if a burglar comes into a house and he trips on your carpet and breaks a leg he can sue you for damages and probably collect.

The **Chairman**. Now, George. [Laughter.]

OVEREMPHASIZED THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE FLIGHTS

Senator **Gore**. What we really are saying in this paragraph, it seems to me, is that we overemphasized the justification for the U-2 flights, and in doing so we certainly gave the world the impression, including the Russians that they would be continued. It seems to me that is the point that is valid.

Senator **Aiken**. Just two lines are meaningful. It would have been enough simply to say we were seeking intelligence, but even that we are talking too much.

Senator **Gore**. Well, what you said is we overemphasized the justification from our point of view, the U-2 flights.

Senator **Aiken**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. How would this approach be, the statements of the State Department of May 7 and 9 and the President, May 11 justifying the U-2 flights sought to make it appear that the whole thing was the Russians' fault to begin with.

Senator **Hickenlooper.** No.

The **Chairman.** That is what they sought to do, isn't it?

Senator **Aiken.** No, I think the responsibility between us and Russia was probably mutual.

Senator **Hickenlooper.** I think they, what they probably said was, not that it was the Russians' fault, well you might say that because of Russian secrecy we were forced to this, but the whole thing was motivated by the vital necessity of securing information for our own safety.

The **Chairman.** I don't quarrel with that aspect of the thing. I think it was necessary. What I quarrel with is the way the statements were made about it.

I never have quarreled with the vital necessity of making the flights.

Senator **Aiken.** The President justified the U-2 flights by stating that the Russian secrecy——

The **Chairman.** You don't think he can justify them under the accepted principle. We ought to have said nothing, I still come back to that.

THE NATURE OF INTELLIGENCE

Senator **Gore.** The only way you can justify flying over another country that has secrets that you want is to say that they are not entitled to that measure of sovereignty and we cannot maintain that position in a public forum.

The **Chairman.** That is the whole thing. I think basic to this whole thing is the acceptance of the nature of intelligence, it seems to me. It is an illegal, extra-legal procedure we have to deal with for our security but you are in no position to justify it legally.

Senator **Aiken.** Well, the President did undertake to justify it.

The **Chairman.** I don't think it is a valid justification. I mean you can't do it. I suppose morally if a man is starving to death he is justified in breaking into a grocery store but we just don't accept it. I mean we don't accept it legally.

Senator **Aiken.** If he is starving to death he is justified in shooting a deer out of season under the old law.

The **Chairman.** I mean from the personal point of view, a fellow starves and says his child is starving to death, he has got to get a loaf of bread because his child is starving but he has got to take the consequences and here is where we get ourselves in a tough situation to do that.

Senator **Carlson.** We say "If justification was needed at all, it would have been enough simply to say we were seeking intelligence."

The **Chairman.** I think if we need it at all, that is all they should have said.

Senator **Carlson.** Yes. I don't know what you want preceding it.

Senator **Aiken.** If justification were justifiable that would have been enough to say. I think those two lines are all that are necessary.

Senator **Gore.** Let me try my hand at it, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman.** All right, go ahead.

Why don't you say the statements of the Department?

Senator GORE. All right, "The statements of the Department of May 7 and 9 and of the President of May 11"——

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Senator GORE. I am going to get in trouble now. [Laughter.]

Excuse me, I am not ready.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have tried my hand over it here with a little assist over my shoulder from Pat Holt.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, what is it?

INTELLIGENCE VITAL TO OUR SECURITY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Something of this kind, "The committee feels that perhaps too much emphasis has been placed on justification of the flights." Now that will take everything down to include the first 5 lines of that paragraph and then say "If justification were needed at all, it probably would have been enough simply to say we were seeking vital intelligence for our own security."

Senator GORE. Intelligence vital to our own security.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. All right, Professor.

The CHAIRMAN. I think "If justification was to be made" is better than "was needed at all," if it was to be made. There was some question in my mind as to whether it should have been made. But if some justification were to be made it would have been enough to say we were simply seeking intelligence vital to our own security. I think that is an improvement.

Senator GORE. I am ready.

The CHAIRMAN. I have forgotten the first part, Bourke, how did the first sentence go?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The committee feels that perhaps too much emphasis may have been placed on justification of the flight. Then "If justification were to be made at all."

Senator GORE. I would like to add right there, "on the basis of Soviet secrecy," just to your sentence.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You mean the first part.

Senator GORE. The sentence you read where you say, "To justify the flights, on the basis of Soviet secrecy."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, we know that the tightest system the world has ever seen is in the Soviet Government.

Senator GORE. What I am trying to say is factually that is how they sought to justify it. They sought to justify it, and both in the President's statement and in the other, on the basis of Soviet secrecy.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If we are going to itemize reasons, such as the basis for Soviet secrecy then I think we are going to have to amplify it by more explanation and we are trying to get away from it. This is a flat statement, "that perhaps too much emphasis was placed on justification." If we go into Soviet secrecy we may have to put in other things.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think it adds anything.

Senator GORE. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you need that "perhaps," can't you say "that too much emphasis was placed on justification of the flights"; "perhaps" weakens it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That modifies it and maybe it weakens it. I put it in because frankly I don't know that I agree flatly that too much emphasis was placed on it. Some members of the committee do I know sincerely feel about that. Some don't. I thought maybe that modified it sufficiently so that it would not do violence to either side.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. "If justification was to be made it would have been enough simply to say we were simply seeking intelligence vital to our security", is that correct?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. Then you take out "There was no need to belabor the Soviet." I don't think we need to say it.

Senator CARLSON. Leave the rest of the paragraph out.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

SOMEWHAT COMPLICATED

The CHAIRMAN. Now that "somewhat" that is unnecessary in the next page "It seems clear that the situation was complicated by the unnecessary", I know it was complicated, "somewhat" ought to go out.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. By the unnecessarily elaborate statement of May 5 and the unnecessarily categorical statements of the——

The CHAIRMAN. Leave out the second "unnecessarily," and the "categorical statements of the State Department."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Whom nobody had bothered to tell the truth.

The CHAIRMAN. "Who apparently didn't know the truth."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It was complicated by that and the categorical statement of the State Department press officers on May 5 and 6. Why don't you just say that?

The CHAIRMAN. All right. That is all right.

Senator AIKEN. "Nobody bothered to tell them the truth," nobody even bothered to lie to them up to that time.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that next paragraph is pretty good.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am just down to the bottom of it and I don't see anything bad about it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is a pretty accurate statement.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think it is fairly accurate.

Senator GORE. I don't see anything wrong with it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I accept the paragraph. Do you, George?

Senator GORE. I would up there put, "decided at highest level," but I am willing to take the paragraph as it is.

Senator AIKEN. I think that paragraph could almost be our full report.

The CHAIRMAN. It states it pretty well, I think.

Senator GORE. I will take it as it is. I have three places marked but I will let it go.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't see anything wrong with the next one, do you?

Senator AIKEN. Are you on page 61 now?

The CHAIRMAN. Bottom of page 60 and beginning of page 61, yes.

SOME COMMANDERS WENT BEYOND THEIR ORDERS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am reading it. I haven't seen anything wrong with it yet. Here is this statement, the first full sentence at the top of page 61, "The difficulty arose because some commanders went somewhat beyond their orders in carrying out the alert. This is a matter perhaps the military services should look into."

The evidence shows there were only about 2 or 3 pilots called back over the world from leave. They didn't intend for pilots to be called back but 1 commander or 2 called back a pilot or 2 because of the plane situation which seems to me to be at least or de minimis.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it happened in Denver.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think only a couple of pilots were called back which was a little beyond what was basically intended.

BY THE TIME THE PRESIDENT ARRIVED IN PARIS

Senator GORE. Before you get to that if I may make a minor suggestion in English, "given the situation which existed by the time the President got to Paris," why don't we say "by the time the President arrived in Paris"?

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right.

Senator GORE. And then the second sentence in that paragraph is a sentence that clearly should be the first sentence of the following paragraph. You have two entirely different matters.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I think that would read better, make that just one short sentence.

Senator GORE. What we are doing in effect there is approving the President's course of action after he arrived in Paris. Let that stand one sentence, one paragraph. I think he is entitled to it.

A PROVOCATIVE AND ILL-TIMED ALERT

The CHAIRMAN. "Question has been raised about the wisdom of the communications alert and as described by the Secretary there seems little here to take exception to."

I am not sure I will take that. I think it was ill-timed. They didn't know it was completely on the rocks. I think there is a good deal of question as to whether or not it was well-timed. I think it was provocative, and assuming it was not completely done for.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't know. On that point I just happen to think it was a wise thing.

The CHAIRMAN. He said there wasn't any doubt in his mind about their being on the alert already.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We discussed that a little on Friday, we didn't generally take any decision on it, of course.

The CHAIRMAN. I would rather leave the whole thing out than to say it was completely justified. I think it is questionable.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't see that the question of the alert is necessarily something which goes into this.

Senator GORE. So far as I am concerned you can just leave it out.

Senator AIKEN. That is a rather small incident in the whole affair.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, hindsight of course told us what it was done for.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Why don't we just leave that whole paragraph out.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right with me. I am ready to leave that out.

Senator GORE. I am ready. It is a collateral question.

The CHAIRMAN. Events proved of course that it was. I am not sure that it would have been wise if there bad been a real demand for it, then we come to the middle of page 61.

I think that first paragraph is a crucial question.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is a factual statement.

Senator GORE. Right at the bottom, "It can be accepted that they did play." I should say "probably did" is the only suggestion I have.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no objection to that.

SOVIETS WERE SEEKING TO AVOID A SUMMIT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The sentence "It would seem to follow that the U-2 was the straw that broke the camel's back so far as the Soviet Government is concerned," why not just cut that sentence out because we have the sentence just above.

> The Secretary also said prior to May 1 there had been no indication that Khrushchev intended to wreck the summit. The other factors which the Secretary mentioned as contributing to his attitude in Paris all existed prior to May 1st. It could be accepted that they did play a part in the Soviet policy formation and still be reasonably concluded that in and of itself

Et cetera, I am not sure about that. My own personal view is that the Soviet were going to blow this conference out of the water one way or the other.

The CHAIRMAN. By that you mean there was nothing constructive going to come out of it. Don't you?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They were seeking a way to avoid it, and whether they would have blown it up on the first day or the second or third day is somewhat beside the point.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with Bohlen that it would have followed a course which would probably not have resulted in any constructive contribution.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Why not say "without doubt the U-2 incident was a contributing factor in the break up of the summit conference."

"The other factors which the Secretary mentioned contributed to that all existed prior to May 1st."

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right, I think that is a very simple statement, "The other factors which the Secretary mentioned as contributing to that in Paris" and so forth. "It was contributing to the Soviet attitude in Paris."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We say "so far as the Soviet Government is concerned." It was not a factor so far as the allies were concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And then we say "The other factors."

The CHAIRMAN. Change it to "his attitude" instead of "its."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We say

The other factors which the Secretary mentioned as contributing to its attitude in Paris all existed prior to May 1. It can be accepted that it did play a part in the Soviet's policy formation and still be reasonably concluded that it would not in and of themselves have led to the Soviet policy which was followed in Paris.

If we want to say that, I would like to see us say

It is reasonable to conclude that they would not in and of themselves would not have led to the precipitate action of the Soviet Government prior to and on the 1st day of the conference.

The CHAIRMAN. Precipitate and violent.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, "precipitate and violent action of the Soviet on the 1st day of the conference."

Or, "At the beginning of the conference" is better, because I don't know whether we ever did have a first day.

The CHAIRMAN. They never had a first day. We say "precipitate and violent actions or policies."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Actions taken by the Soviet in Paris.

Mr. HOLT. Taken by the Soviet Government in Paris.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

THE U-2 INCIDENT WAS THE CAUSE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And we can cut out that next sentence.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not sure whether that ought to be taken out or not. "The U-2 incident," that is just a logical conclusion, is it not, "was, therefore the approximate cause of the course followed." I think the other course would have been to meet, argue and harangue and get nowhere, assuming all these other factors were accurately described, but you would have had a meeting.

Mr. MARCY. That needs to be read in connection with the next paragraph, which is the other side.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. In connection with the next paragraph, I think that is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't like that sentence, particularly, if we say "The U-2 incident thus seems to have been a major contributing factor."

The CHAIRMAN. We have said contributing, but as far as the actual course followed it was the approximate cause of the violent break up, and as the next paragraph clearly points out we don't mean to say that there would have been achieved anything of great moment if we had had a conference. I think you might say "The U-2 incident seems to have been approximate cause of the prevention of the conference" of the stopping of the conference before it got under way.

Senator AIKEN. The U-2 contributed to the premature break up.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the U-2 incident therefore was the approximate cause of the—premature.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The U-2 incident therefore seems to have been the immediate excuse used by the Soviet for producing the result which eventually occurred, or something like that, which broke up the conference.

The CHAIRMAN. The immediate what?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The immediate excuse used by the Soviet, for not proceeding with the conference. I think that is right. Yes, that is right. For not proceeding with the conference.

The **Chairman**. For not proceeding with the conference. I think that is an accurate statement. And then go on "This is not to say."

Mr. **Holt**. Would you read that again?

The **Chairman**. The U-2 incident therefore seems to have been or say "was the immediate excuse for not proceeding with the conference. Therefore, was the immediate excuse for not proceeding with the conference." Then you go on "This is not to say" and so forth.

SUMMIT PROBABLY WOULD HAVE DEADLOCKED

Senator **Hickenlooper**. It is simply to say it would have been. I think we are justified in saying that it would have been because of other things that the Soviet might have done and I think we could probably qualify that by saying probably would have been.

The **Chairman**. Probably there would have been a summit conference. No one would say what would happen if the conference had been held. At best it would have perhaps made some slight progress on disarmament and so forth. At worst it would have broken up in complete deadlock. It would be better to say "would have resulted in complete deadlock which was in fact Khrushchev's purpose. If it was in fact Khrushchev's purpose to scuttle the summit, then if the U-2 incident had not occurred he would have had to find other reasons to do so", isn't that right?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Let's just say "he would have found" because you say if it was in fact Khrushchev's purpose to scuttle the summit, then if the U-2 incident had not occurred he would have found others," that is if he had.

Senator **Aiken**. He would have found another excuse, wouldn't he?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. It is grammar or construction. The sentence starts out and says "If it was in fact Khrushchev's purpose to scuttle the summit," there we assume the premise that it was his purpose, then if the U-2 incident had not occurred, he would have found some other means, that is if it was in fact his purpose to scuttle the conference.

Senator **Aiken**. I think it was his purpose anyway.

The **Chairman**. When you use the word scuttle, there is a difference as to whether or not it was to break it up as he did or merely go through with it without its being productive.

AN AGREEMENT TO KEEP ON TALKING

Senator **Aiken**. I understand that the greatest product that could have come out of a summit conference would have been an agreement to have met some time in the future.

The **Chairman**. To keep talking.

Senator **Aiken**. That might have been progress by some, not breaking up in a violent disagreement could have been considered progress by some.

The **Chairman**. Or at least a status quo. It would not have been a deterioration. They might not have made progress but not gotten back to violence.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I am not quarreling about the statement one way or the other and you can change it with some better word if you want to. The only quarrel I have is "he would have had to find", I think we assume the premise that, in that statement, if it was a fact.

Senator AIKEN. Yes, I think so.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If it was a fact, if it was in fact Khrushchev's purpose, then he would have found some other means, not that he would have to find it. He would have found it.

The CHAIRMAN. He would, if he was to succeed, he might not have been able to find any. That is, any reasonable one. He might have been embarrassed.

Senator AIKEN. I think Bourke's "found" is better because it does not give Khrushchev much benefit of the doubt, so much benefit anyway.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. My theory is that he already had several reasons which he could have pulled out of his bag.

The CHAIRMAN. They were not reasons which would have appealed to anybody. They were bad reasons. It would have meant he would have to appear more unreasonable and arbitrary if he used the other reasons.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Of course, we get back to the fact that the U-2 incident was nothing new to Mr. Khrushchev. He knew from 1956 that we had been overflying but he could have raised that issue.

The CHAIRMAN. He didn't have any proof of it.

Senator AIKEN. Apparently he was not anxious to have the U-2 flights become generally known either.

The CHAIRMAN. Not particularly when he could not do anything about it.

WAS KHRUSHCHEV DETERMINED TO SCUTTLE THE SUMMIT?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not completely adamant on that point. I just think inasmuch as we assume, if it were a fact that he wanted to scuttle the conference he would have found some other means to do it rather than this.

The CHAIRMAN. He would have had to if he was determined to do it, but to scuttle it, what I mean is there is a difference between scuttling it deliberately, as he did here, or having to put him to the task of appearing at least reasonable in the eyes of the rest of the world. Whether it was to us or not, in what he did. He would have to look awfully arbitrary.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't care.

Senator AIKEN. I think if you say in this sense the U-2 incident made his task easier. The rest of you go into conjecture again, and I would not go with the final sentence, "It is by no means certain that Khrushchev would have wanted to scuttle the conference as a matter of deliberate policy."

I think he had to either scuttle it or maybe make it a little impotent, render it impotent, perhaps.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what we get back to what do you mean by scuttle? Whether it means just have it and not get anything out of it, or whether something might have happened. I guess it is a relative matter.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Why not use the word "nullify," instead of "scuttle"?

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know quite what nullify means in this connection. Let's see if there is not a better word.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Destroy.

Mr. MARCY. You could say "refused to meet at the summit."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I don't know.

Mr. HOLT. It was his purpose either to scuttle or deadlock the summit.

Senator AIKEN. To scuttle or deadlock.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you thinking about scuttle in the first place up there, "if it was in fact Khrushchev's purpose to scuttle," there are three scuttles up there.

What are good synonyms of scuttle?

Mr. HOLT. Wreck, torpedo.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. To wreck the summit conference might not be——

Senator AIKEN. Sterilize might be better. It would be barren of results.

The CHAIRMAN. I think there is a slight difference. In the first one, "The purpose to prevent the summit" would be closer to that one. Then in the second one, "to abort" I mean after it started. Let's see—"In this sense the U-2"——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aborted.

The CHAIRMAN. Sabotaged: Wanted to sabotage the conference.

THE CRUCIAL POINT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't like that last sentence.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Pat thinks that is the crucial point.

Senator AIKEN. I wouldn't give them that much credit. He wanted to do one or the other, in fact he had to.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Why not say but the crucial point here is that it is by no means certain of what the outcome of the conference would have been if the U-2 incident had not occurred.

The CHAIRMAN. That I think is all right.

Senator AIKEN. That is a little mild.

The CHAIRMAN. What the outcome would have been if the U-2 had not, I think that is all right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is, as a matter of deliberate Soviet policy. What about this: "But the crucial point here is that it is by no means certain what the outcome of the conference would have been as a matter of deliberate Soviet policy, if the U-2 incident had not occurred."

Senator AIKEN. It is very doubtful, rather than by no means certain.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I think by no means certain, to me at least it would appeal as a more expressive term.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that conveys the thought pretty well.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So it says, "but the crucial point here is that it is by no means certain what the outcome of the conference would have been as a matter of deliberate Soviet policy if the U-2 incident had not occurred."

The **Chairman**. I think that is an accurate statement. I believe that is all right.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I think we have given the Communists too much of an out there in that paragraph. I think we have stated it.

The **Chairman**. This is the one we went over once before earlier in this meeting.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. We have said practically the same thing and if you want to say it this way it is all right and then it leads up to the next paragraph.

The **Chairman**. Yes. Well, this is the one we went over in connection with something earlier.

Mr. **Marcy**. Senator Lausche.

The **Chairman**. We change "implication" to "interpretation". "This argument, however, is highly technical", we strike out and say "Nevertheless the fact is that Khrushchev as well as many of the free world's newspapers," we change "most" to "many" and then continuing "did so interpret".

Senator **Hickenlooper**. The Soviet position had already been set and Khrushchev would not depart from it. Why not say "And Khrushchev did not depart from it"?

The **Chairman**. All right.

THE PRESIDENT SHOULD HAVE SAID NOTHING

The **Chairman**. I am not too wedded to that. It is speculative.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Yes, why don't we just take it out or try to fix it up?

The **Chairman**. I don't know whether to try to knock it out or try to fix it up.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I think it is a perfectly sound statement. "This could have been embarrassing" rather than to compare it with something else.

The **Chairman**. I have never thought that he ought to disavow it. I think the right thing he should have done was to have said nothing for some time, that he was looking into it.

In other words, I never thought he ought to affirmatively disavow it. I don't know whether that was a reasonable position for him to take or not. I don't see that it adds anything.

I think that is all right. I would just as soon leave that paragraph out, and go on down. That is all right. "With regard to the first question"——

Mr. **Marcy**. Senator Gore wants to get rid of the word "ignorance" every time he sees it.

Mr. **Holt**. So does Senator Sparkman.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. "Lack of information."

Mr. **Holt**. "Lack of knowledge."

The **Chairman**. I think that paragraph is pretty good.

IF THEY HAD A GOOD REASON THEY WOULD HAVE TOLD US

Senator **Hickenlooper**. The second sentence there. "Then one must incline to the conclusion that the flight should not have gone".

The **Chairman**. When it did.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In view of the evidence and the facts that they were compelled practically to take advantage of climatic conditions on a comparatively few days that were available to them, and this happened to be one, the day before wasn't and probably the day after wasn't, and that it was reasonably essential for them to do some more checking on progress and advancement—I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. I am firmly of the conviction that if they had had a good reason they would have told us. They didn't have to speculate—I think the speculation was a vague feeling that on May 1, a festive day, they would try something. It would have been spectacular to photograph the preparations for the shooting off of a new man in flight or something.

I think it is human nature if they had had a real good reason, or they thought it was a real good reason, they would have told us. Dulles would have. Since they take the responsibility of refusing to tell us anything, it seems to me you are entitled to conclude that it wasn't much, and this same argument when you come down to the other meetings they did suspend them in these other times. It is hard to believe it was purely coincidence. They just didn't fly. The testimony was that when Khrushchev was over here, in a period when it was fairly good weather, and we asked them did they fly? No. It just happens they didn't fly during that period. They wouldn't say that they had suspended it.

There is a rumor, and it may be only a rumor but this fellow Cater[1] swears they were going to have a moratorium the next day he wrote this article and I read it, I asked him, "What authority do you have for saying that you know that?" He says, "Well, I know." I talked to one of the responsible people. They said it was very unfortunate, that they had a moratorium to go into effect the next day.

He wrote it in his article but the fact that they wouldn't say anything. After showing us all the pictures of the most secret sites and everything else, why wouldn't they say "We expected they were opening up a new file or something." I don't think they were. They told us so much, gave us a picture of it, which is going pretty far. I don't know whether they should have done that or not but they did, and I don't know what they could have had in mind except that this was May Day in Sverdlovsk. I believe that is not far from a very accurate analysis of what this situation was.

THERE IS REASON TO CONCLUDE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, temporarily what would you think about this: The sixth line of that paragraph you are talking about, the first word "must" substitute for that and say "Then one must incline" say instead of that "Then there is strength in the argument" or "There is strength in the conclusion that the flight should not have gone".

The CHAIRMAN. The reason to conclude.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I can't agree that I must agree.

---

[1] Douglass Cater, columnist for *The Reporter*.

The **Chairman**. Say there is reason to conclude that the flight should not have flown.

Mr. **Marcy**. Or if you want to say it is not too unreasonable to conclude.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. In other words, I can admit the strength of the argument on something, I may not agree with it but I admit it is a pretty strong argument that the flight should not have gone on under those premises but I don't agree with them.

The **Chairman**. Can't you say "There is reason to conclude," that is softer. "There is substance to the conclusion."

Senator **Hickenlooper**. You can say there is good reason to conclude.

The **Chairman**. That is all right. "Then there is good reason to conclude."

Senator **Hickenlooper**. That is the flight should not have gone.

The **Chairman**. That makes it much more——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Why not say this: "Then, in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, there is strength in the argument", or "There is great strength in the argument, that the flight should not have gone." I mean that is only hedging so if there was some compelling reason which we have already said we don't know about.

The **Chairman**. Will you put it again?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. "Then, in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary there is good reason to conclude that the flight should not have gone."

SOVIET FETISH FOR SECRECY

The **Chairman**. The next sentence, "should have been anticipated."

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Of course, they said they did anticipate there would be a failure at some time. They had a cover story, as they said, in event of a failure. What contribution is that first line in the sentence, "In view of the well-known Soviet fetish for secrecy", how does that contribute to the——

The **Chairman**. What I think it means is that you can expect a much more violent reaction from them than from other countries, because they take it so hard. We should have known that they are very sensitive about this. I don't know that that sentence adds a great deal to it.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I don't know that it does. It just kind of bothers me. We said it up above, why not cut it out?

The **Chairman**. I don't think it adds a great deal. You have said it, there was a good reason it should not have gone, and we will just as well take it out.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. What does that mean?

The **Chairman**. It means the conflicting statement, the NASA statement and the reaction is what is referred to.

KHRUSHCHEV'S VIOLENT ACTIONS

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Why not just put a period after failure in regard to the second question for the reason stated above: "It seems the U.S. reaction from the failure of the U-2 intensified the problems by the failure."

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The next paragraph down to the middle of it, the word "course"—that whole last part of that paragraph seems to me to be rather unjustified in the light of Khrushchev's unusual vitriolic and violent actions. He may have shown some slight surface indications of a slightly modified attitude but certainly he destroyed all of that position by the violence of his actions at that time and subsequently, and therefore I don't believe in giving him any particular assist here in the last half.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know that it gives him an assist. It is like we react to anything he says about us, this probably stabs him in the back if we say he is better than some of the others from our point of view.

I think the real problem that bothered him was that they were already accusing him of being soft on capitalism and being collaborator with Eisenhower and I think that is what made him turn so violent when it was turned down and that is what makes him so violent when we talk about the Chinese and the Stalinists. I mean if you try to turn this whole thing around the way we would react: You read in the paper when Khrushchev says Nixon was like a goat in a cabbage patch, everybody says why that will get Nixon elected. He is like old [Theodore] Bilbo who used to run Mississippi. Time Magazine would blast him and then he would go all over the State and say "See what they are saying about me, I am protecting your interest." I think the point is that he was identified with what they called cooperators.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Why don't we go down to the next sentence and just add it there; then cut out the rest. At the very least we should have avoided actions which would have made his position more difficult.

I don't know whether we could or would or what. I think that is getting pretty speculative.

The CHAIRMAN. It is. It is speculative.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is the last two sentences. Let's not give him anything to get him off the hook.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is all right to leave the last two sentences out.

Then we are up to the bottom paragraph of page 65.

CHARACTERISTIC OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Senator GORE. I don't like that "which has always been characteristic of the American people."

There is no need of indicting the people.

The CHAIRMAN. Say "which is not easy"——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Why not say instead of saying in the months ahead, actually it is years ahead, in my judgment.

Senator GORE. Sure.

The CHAIRMAN. Years ahead is better. The degree of maturity and discrimination which is extremely difficult for——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Just say "In the future" this may well require a degree——

Senator **Gore**. I think years are better,——

The **Chairman**. I think it is better. "Years ahead this may well require an unusual degree of maturity and discrimination, which is always difficult for us."

Senator **Gore**. "Which will challenge the discretion and intelligence of the American people and their leaders."

The **Chairman**. I think it is perfectly natural in a big continental country like ours far removed from the physical dangers in the past, it is natural and physically inherent with the people. It is no reflection on the people but merely a comment on our past history and our physical location which is I think true.

Senator **Gore**. You can say it will challenge the best and biggest without saying they haven't shown it.

The **Chairman**. I think that is all right that way.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. What do you propose to say?

Senator **Gore**. I don't know——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Why don't you just say "The years ahead will require."

The **Chairman**. An unusual degree of maturity and discrimination.

Senator **Gore**. That will challenge the intelligence and discretion of the American people and their leaders.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. That's right. That is a good statement.

Can you repeat it?

The **Chairman**. Unusual degree of maturity and discrimination which will challenge.

Senator **Gore**. The discretion and intelligence of the American people and their leaders.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Which will challenge.

Senator **Gore**. The discretion and intelligence of the American people and their leaders.

The **Chairman**. In their approach to foreign policy, is that right?

Senator **Gore**. That is OK.

The **Chairman**. It would read then:

> In years ahead this will require an unusual degree of maturity and discrimination which will challenge the discretion and intelligence of the American people and their leaders in their approach to foreign policy.

Does that sound all right?

Senator **Gore**. That is OK.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Yes, just cut out the next sentence, I think.

Senator **Gore**. I think the next sentence whittles down what we have just said.

The **Chairman**. Just leave it out.

ATTENTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Well, the next to last sentence in that next paragraph, "it is a question full of difficulties and one which it seems the committee can best approach through the United Nations".

I personally would prefer a statement something like this, "It is a question full of difficulties and one which must demand" or "which demands," the full attention and consideration of the

United Nations as well as multilateral and bilateral attention of the nations themselves.

Senator **GORE**. I agree with that because we don't want to preempt our own initiation of it.

The **CHAIRMAN**. That is all right.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. I think it does demand the vigorous attention of the United Nations as well as vigorous attention of individual nations.

The **CHAIRMAN**. I think that is all right. Have you got that, Pat?

Mr. **HOLT**. One which demands the full consideration and attention.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. The vigorous.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Of the individual nations themselves.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. As well as of individual nations themselves.

The **CHAIRMAN**. That is all right.

RARE QUALITY OF STATESMANSHIP

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. It says selah in the Bible when you end something.

Senator **GORE**. I want to congratulate you, gentlemen, and in this instance, I want to particularize the senior Senator from Iowa. You have demonstrated that quality of statesmanship here that is rare, particularly rare when the circumstances are as they are. I congratulate you, sir. My admiration for you is high.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. I thank the Senator from Tennessee for those kind words.

The **CHAIRMAN**. I will agree with that and more so if he can persuade his colleagues to go along with this. [Laughter.]

I agree with all you said so far as he is personally concerned but he will be a genius if he can.

Senator **GORE**. Well, most of them are going along.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. I think the whole committee has been extremely cooperative, those who have been here and said this is something——

The **CHAIRMAN**. I might hasten to add that doesn't mean just those on your side. There are some others who are going to be even more difficult, I think.

Senator **GORE**. You mean my congratulation of you is going to be qualified likewise.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. I will say to the Senator from Tennessee and Senator from Arkansas both helped me to make up my mind on several occasions here.

FINAL DRAFT

Mr. **MARCY**. Senator, what are your desires now? Do you want us to get a clean copy and then do you want to schedule a meeting for a vote or what?

The **CHAIRMAN**. We have our regular meeting in the morning.

Mr. **MARCY**. We have a regular meeting at 10 o'clock in the morning and we would like to have another one on Thursday.

The **CHAIRMAN**. We have got a lot of routine and not so routine business that ought to be voted on.

Senator **Gore**. Let me ask you, when we get this final draft which is cleaned up, and which is now at least a working copy of the tentative agreement, isn't it a matter now of the members affixing their signatures rather than any voting? This is nothing to vote out.

The **Chairman**. That's right, I mean unless we get a fair representation of both sides, I wouldn't want to vote it out, and as I said before, just the Democratic members of——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I think we ought to make as much of an effort as we can to get everybody, as much of a vote on this as possible. This doesn't go to the floor for any action.

The **Chairman**. It is a committee report, but just for its impact that the committee discharged its function properly. I think there may be some members who won't want to sign it at all, I don't know. I don't know whether Homer still thinks he doesn't want to sign anything.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Homer was pretty adamant the last time I talked to him Thursday or Friday.

A BIPARTISAN MAJORITY

The **Chairman**. I thought it ought to be issued with as many members as we can get to vote for it.

Senator **Gore**. Whether here or not, I authorize my signature to it providing it is a bipartisan majority. I want no part of a Democratic report in this field.

The **Chairman**. That is right.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I think it would be a mistake to have either a Democrat report and Republican and Minority report on this thing.

The **Chairman**. There can be people who simply say they have reservations.

Mr. **Marcy**. Do you think we would be justified in going ahead and getting, say, a hundred committee prints, confidential committee prints at this point.

The **Chairman**. No.

Mr. **Marcy**. Our problem is this. We can clean up about 15 copies of this kind of thing that you have been looking at but what will happen is if the committee votes on, say, Thursday of this week, and OK's it, then the press will be wild.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. You get a committee print out and a lot of people resent that at times. It looks too formalized because it is cut and dried.

They may take it if it weren't that way.

The **Chairman**. I think 15 clean copies would be all right.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I think if you can get 15 clean copies.

Mr. **Holt**. It can be done very easily. We have made a clean copy up to page 55. And we can have the others by the morning.

Mr. **Marcy**. Suppose we have it available by the executive session tomorrow.

The **Chairman**. Why not, if you can by tomorrow and if we have a chance and we have time we can take a shot at it tomorrow.

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JUNE 21, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session at 11:35 a.m. in room F-53, Capitol, on recess from a previous public session.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Lausche, Morse, Long, Church, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, Carlson, and Williams.

On motion by Senator Sparkman, seconded by Senator Carlson, the committee ordered for favorable report the Antarctic Treaty (Ex. B, 86th Congress, 2d Session), by voice vote. Senator Capehart dissented.

The committee next considered the Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property (Ex. D, 86th Congress, 2d Session). On motion by Senator Sparkman, seconded by Senator Long, the committee voted to report the Convention favorably. It also concurred in the favorable report of H.J. Res. 627, To authorize appropriations incident to U.S. participation in the International Bureau for the Protection of Industrial Property.

The committee next considered the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with the United States and Pakistan (Ex. F, 86th Congress, 2d Session). Senator Sparkman moved that the Treaty be reported favorably. The motion carried.

Senator Sparkman also moved that the committee report favorably the Convention of establishment between the United States of America and France (Ex. G, 86th Congress, 2d Session), which was agreed to by a voice vote.

The committee approved without objection all nominations pending before it to the United Nations 15th General Assembly.

The committee ordered favorably reported the nomination of Leland Barrows to be Ambassador to the Republic of Togo and Selden Chapin to be Ambassador to Brazil. It also approved a routine list of nominations for report.

The committee briefly discussed the clean draft of its proposed report on events leading to the Summit Conference of May 1960, and agreed to review same on the morning following.

The committee next considered S. 3008, To amend title IV of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, as amended. Final action was put off for staff consultations with Senator Long.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 12:35 p.m.]

TO CONSIDER REPORT ON HEARINGS REGARDING EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 22, 1960

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 11:25 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol, Hon. J. William Fulbright, presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Sparkman, Lausche, Church, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, and Mr. St. Claire of the committee staff.

The Chairman. We have to return now to this report. You all have it before you, the clean draft, and we are open for business. Does anybody have any suggestion?

Senator Hickenlooper. I have gone through this clean copy, Mr. Chairman, and I have made some notes, very few. There are six pages only, and they are not very extensive.

The Chairman. All right, you may proceed.

Senator Hickenlooper. I would be glad to give you my feeling on it. I went over it yesterday a couple of times and I didn't have time really to do much on it this morning. On page 25 down at the bottom of the page, beginning after the period on the word "camera."

The Chairman. Page 25 where?

Senator Hickenlooper. Page 25, the bottom of the page. The last three lines.

The Chairman. Oh, yes.

Senator Hickenlooper. Beginning with the sentence, "On the afternoon of May 7, Saturday, a further statement was issued by the State Department telling part of the truth."

Now, I only suggest here at this moment instead of the word "further," "a more elaborate statement," I think that is probably more accurate. It was a more elaborate statement.

The Chairman. It was.

Senator Hickenlooper. But cut out the word "further" and then I think in the public interest, in the interests of the United States, and that the words "telling part of the truth" should be taken out, because it was a more elaborate statement issued by the State Department.

I just feel that particular statement there can be used by Mr. Khrushchev.

The **Chairman**. Does anybody have any feeling about it?

Senator **Sparkman**. It seems to me it is all right.

The **Chairman**. Any objection?

All right, we will strike out "telling part of the truth," and we will stop after "State Department."

What is next?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. And you take out the word "further."

The **Chairman**. Yes, change it to "A more elaborate statement was issued by the State Department."

Does anybody object to that?

All right. What's next?

POSSIBLE USE AS PROPAGANDA

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Now I have a little notation on page 29 in the first full paragraph beginning "It is to be noted," let me see what this is here.

I am not too vigorous on this except I am not certain of any benefit that comes from the sentence beginning after the period on the figure "7", the third line.

Senator **Lausche**. What page?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Page 29, following the period after the words "May 7" in the third line of the first full paragraph. It says "One of the questions which the record does not answer is why they felt on Monday that a response was required different from the one which they had made on Saturday."

Now I think, Mr. Chairman, that that probably can be sustained as a factual statement. I question its benefit to the country to leave it in. We are speculating on something there. Of course, we speculate in several places in this report.

Senator **Wiley**. What about the whole paragraph? What good do you serve?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. My own personal feeling is that it does not contribute anything, but I could not raise any violent objection to the whole paragraph.

The **Chairman**. It is just a statement of chronological facts.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I just feel that is something which might be used in a propaganda defense by Khrushchev or somebody else.

The **Chairman**. I don't see that it is a vital contribution. The others are more factual statements than that. If you feel that is important, I would have no objection to taking that sentence out.

Senator **Church**. I think the narrative is complete without the sentence.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I believe it is complete without the sentence.

The **Chairman**. All right.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I approached these things this way: In the next 6 months or more, I am not just sure, what Khrushchev's attitude is going to be. I heard over the radio this morning news report that Khrushchev and his group are again in conflict with the Chinese Communists, and the Chinese Communists are accusing them of still leaning toward——

The CHAIRMAN. That's right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER [continuing]. More cooperative effort than the Chinese want.

The CHAIRMAN. That's right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, I don't like to put ourselves in any worse light by way of a report from the committee than is absolutely necessary. That is some of the reasoning behind that particular sentence.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's take that sentence out. What is your next thing?

NOT GIVE KHRUSHCHEV A WEAPON

Senator LAUSCHE. May I just give a thought in the same paragraph "As early as May 5 Gates had advocated that the truth be told and that the President assume full responsibility."

Then we go on and add "If it developed that the Soviets had the whole story," now Khrushchev can take that and argue that this is a demonstration of how they do things in the United States. They only tell the truth when they are caught, and I don't think that we ought to give him that weapon.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, this isn't designed to give him or anybody else. This is just to tell what actually happened, that is the only purpose of this report. I don't think we should take that out.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Frank, I read that sentence with much the same feeling that you have expressed there except the circumstance is that that statement is in the already published printed record.

The CHAIRMAN. It is already in it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Gates' position.

Senator LAUSCHE. On page 29 all I would say we ought to give thought to strike out the last clause, if it developed that the Soviets had the whole story.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that is what Gates said.

The CHAIRMAN. That is just exactly what he said.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is the reason that I didn't—I thought the sentence before was a conclusion on our part which we could well eliminate.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The next sentence I did read in the same general light of feeling which you have expressed but I came to the conclusion that inasmuch as Gates had said it and it is in the public record I don't know that it adds or detracts one way or the other. It is already in the public record.

Senator AIKEN. This information was largely in the nature of military secret anyway, and it would be presumed they would not release them unless we thought that Khrushchev had the story, if they had the story you might as well tell the rest of the world.

Senator LAUSCHE. I recognize the fact that it is a matter of public record and in our book of testimony. But that does not negative the proposition that we are providing the material for Khrushchev to use in his arguments as a description of our moral character.

Senator AIKEN. Well, I think his imagination will take him beyond this point anyway if he needed this excuse.

Senator WILEY. What purpose does the statement serve? That is the question we should ask. There are a lot of statements in here and if you ask yourself what purpose you will find there are certain answers. If you can find a purpose in reiterating this statement which you say has been testified to, tell me what it is.

Senator AIKEN. I think the purpose of this is for this committee to give our public the full facts to the limit permitted by national security.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. National interests.

Senator AIKEN. National interests which is a better word.

Senator WILEY. If that is your answer, I would disagree with the value of it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have expressed myself on that particular sentence, as I say I read it.

Senator LAUSCHE. I will bring it to a head, the clause if it developed that the Soviets had the whole story, be stricken.

Senator WILEY. I have expressed my view on it. I would strike out the whole paragraph because I think it serves no useful purpose except agitation and it does not answer the question of the U-2. It had nothing to do with that or whether you would continue it. The big argument now is that you should continue it but what good does it do to keep reiterating this?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, of course if you knock just that part out then you are misquoting Gates.

Senator SPARKMAN. It ceases to be an accurate statement.

The CHAIRMAN. It ceases to be and no longer is an accurate statement of the record and that is the trouble if you start chopping up their testimony then they do not——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. As I say that is the reason I did not raise the question on that sentence. But so far as I am concerned I would be very happy if it went out. But based upon Gates' testimony and his statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Here is the express statement of Gates just for the information of the committee on page 130 of the hearings. Secretary Gates, "I expressed the view on the 5th that if Mr. Khrushchev had the complete information and the pilot that the President should assert the true story."

Senator SPARKMAN. That was made public. That has already been made public.

Senator WILEY. It is in the record. Why do you want to put it in the report?

Senator AIKEN. If it develops the Soviet already had the information would be better than "the whole story," perhaps.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think the whole story is a little better than saying the true story.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Whole story.

The CHAIRMAN. The whole story is a little better. You can phrase it either way.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So far as I am concerned, I am indifferent.

Senator CAPEHART. Mr. Chairman, why don't you substitute the word "facts" for "truth," then I think it will help it a little.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no objection to that.

Senator CAPEHART. As early as May 5th if the facts be told that the President, I think there is——

The CHAIRMAN. If there is no objection we will change the word "truth" to "facts," that is right in the middle of the page.

Senator WILEY. Where is that?

The CHAIRMAN. Right in the middle of the page. It is the first sentence.

Just change the word "truth" to the word "facts."

Without objection that is done. I don't think that we can mutilate Mr. Gates' statement, it would be worse than nothing to put it in halfway.

Senator WILEY. I am not talking about mutilation but I am talking about delineation. There was a motion made.

The CHAIRMAN. As I said to the Senator the other day we don't have to put out any report at all.

Senator WILEY. I am in favor of that.

The CHAIRMAN. That is how I interpret that as the Senator's view and I respect his view and he will have an opportunity to vote against any report at all. But pending that decision is seems to me we should proceed to try to get what we do have in as acceptable a form as possible to those who believe there should be a report.

Senator WILEY. I think that is good philosophy but I think there was a motion made by the Senator from Ohio to delete this sentence and we had no vote on it.

The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator would like to act as chairman and doesn't like the way I am running it he could take over.

Senator WILEY. That is a hell of a statement, Mr. Chairman. I think when a motion is made a member of the committee should be recognized.

The CHAIRMAN. I recognized his motion. I am just discussing it.

Senator WILEY. If you are discussing it, I beg your pardon. I thought you were leaving it go.

The CHAIRMAN. No, I am making——

Senator WILEY. You are a little bit of an autocrat; you don't recognize it. They all say you are and I am willing to confirm it.

The CHAIRMAN. You are the only one who says so. [Laughter.]

I recognize the motion, I am merely commenting upon why I think the motion should be defeated and I think I have a right to comment like other members of the committee.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I say I am in complete agreement with you. It would not be a factual, accurate statement if that deletion should be made and therefore I think we ought to vote it down.

Senator CHURCH. I think also, Mr. Chairman, that with the change of "truth" to "facts" that such sting as there might be in the sentence has been removed.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think that is an improvement.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you have heard the motion.

Senator **Lausche**. I am not going to argue against any proposition that charges any one of us with trying to misstate the truth. I am not going to do it, but I am not going to join with—Senator Green?

Senator **Green**. Doesn't that apply to omissions as well as to statements?

Senator **Lausche**. Oh, yes, omissions, that is true. That is the omission of the part of the truth the equivalent of telling an enemy's truth.

I will not press it.

The **Chairman**. All right, the Senator withdraws his motion.

Senator **Carlson**. I was going to suggest he do that.

INAPPROPRIATE STATEMENT ON OVERFLIGHTS

The **Chairman**. Senator Hickenlooper was on page 33.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Page 33, that paragraph I feel is definitely inappropriate in the whole contention in reading the thing over again.

The **Chairman**. Which page?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. It is just a single paragraph on page 33. It reads as follows: "Incidentally although the statements which have been made about suspending overflights are in the context of the U-2 the committee interprets them as applying to all aircraft."

I don't think we ought to take that position.

Senator **Aiken**. I think that would be——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. We may be wanting to fly some other 6 months or a year or so on and I don't think we ought to put ourselves in that position.

Senator **Aiken**. I think the committee goes along with the premise that if you fly to the border on——

The **Chairman**. Is there any objection to eliminating it?

Senator **Sparkman**. It seems to be a gratuitous thing.

Senator **Church**. That is a gratuitous statement.

The **Chairman**. It is out without objection.

What is the next one?

Senator **Wiley**. That was a good phrase, a lot of them in here are gratuitous.

UNDERSTANDING THE RUSSIAN REACTION

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Going over to page 56, the first paragraph, that paragraph which reads "A perspective on the Soviet reaction can be gained if one imagines what the reaction would have been in the United States if a Soviet counterpart of the U-2 had been brought down in the vicinity of Kansas City on May 1."

Now I agree thoroughly with the truth of that statement. That our reaction would be violent but I can also imagine Mr. Khrushchev and the others saying that this absolutely justifies Mr. Khrushchev's blow up and all. If anything like that had happened to us we would have taken the same exact position he did. Maybe we would, I don't know but I don't believe in saying that.

The **Chairman**. Why don't you believe it? This is, I believe, an interesting point, because if we are to understand our relations and if there is any hope at all, and I am not sure there is much, shouldn't we pursue a policy in an overall manner of trying to understand what goes on and why? Isn't it proper for us to try to understand whatever the opponent's or the friend's point of view is, whether it is the British or it is the Russians. I don't know that it is vital but it seems to me it is educational because people who become too excited about these matters sometimes ought to stop and think whether this is a completely unreasonable and utterly arbitrary position without any justification at all.

It is helpful in the American people, in ourselves understanding the reaction of the other people.

Senator **AIKEN**. From all the reports the Russian people didn't get excited, whereas I think the people in the United States would have gotten excited if a Russian plane had been brought down in Kansas City.

The **CHAIRMAN**. All of those who are responsible get excited.

Senator **AIKEN**. The ones keeping it from the people got excited.

KHRUSHCHEV IS MINIMIZING THE DANGER

The **CHAIRMAN**. I notice in this morning's paper Mr. Khrushchev is trying to minimize the effect of these flights and say "Well, we took pictures of a lot of waste territory and we got nothing," those of us who saw the pictures know that is not so. What he is trying to do is to reestablish his own prestige and to minimize the damage to his own security that these flights have clearly made.

He is talking to his own people in this. He is not talking to us, he knows what we have got but he is trying to say to them "Well, we have been negligent or at least we have not been as effective as we should but it wasn't much harm done. They only took a lot of waste." It is a very interesting statement when you put yourself in his position. He is minimizing the danger, just as our first tendency was when Sputnik went up some people said "It is just a toy, it doesn't mean anything." Sputnik itself might not but the technology that it took to do it means a whale of a lot as to their progress and we ought to understand it.

I don't think it does us any good in the long run to hide the facts of life from ourselves, if we are ever to try to understand what we are dealing with. The only purpose of this, I think, is shouldn't we in order to understand the violence of his reaction try to say "Well, now, what would have been our reaction, what would have been the reaction of the Senator from Kansas if they shot down a Russian plane that fell in his state? His people would have been as excited as the devil and he would have been on the floor just raising hell that something be done about it."

Senator **CARLSON**. We would demand action.

The **CHAIRMAN**. That is all in the world this is, there is nothing secret about it. It is merely trying to get a proper perspective.

I don't think it is an all important thing, but I think it has its place in this document.

Senator **SPARKMAN**. Let it be remembered that that was the one sentence of a rather long paragraph, in fact it may have been a couple of paragraphs. We cut out all the rest and agreed to that sentence.

The **Chairman**. That is correct, out of two pages this is all that was left.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. That is true that sentence was left in but in reading it in perspective I raise that question.

If Khrushchev were an individual, or the Russians were individuals that any kind of cordial or friendly approach would influence any way, shape or form, I think we might be justified in saying, "Well, we can understand how the fellow felt. We might have reacted the same way," but here you are dealing with people whose basic philosophy is one of destruction so far as we are concerned and I think Khrushchev is just as much on that line as he ever was, and I——

The **Chairman**. This is not for his benefit. There is for our own benefit. I didn't mean I was going to educate him.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. No.

The **Chairman**. It is for our own benefit. I think there is a tendency that we judge everybody else by our motives, if we do something it is all in good purpose. If somebody else does it, it is bad, and their purpose is bad. I don't know that we carry this too far, we just don't understand what we are dealing with.

WHEN SHOULD THE FLIGHTS HAVE BEEN STOPPED?

Senator **Lausche**. Mr. Chairman, in my opinion the accumulated impact of the various statements that have been made in this document about the May 1 flight is that we declare that the May 1 flight should not have been projected.

Now then my query, I repeat it, if the May 1 flight should not have been projected when should we have stopped, and if this sentence is going to be in, I believe there ought to be another paragraph to this effect. We now come to the question if the May 1 flight should not have been projected when should the flights have been stopped?

Should the flights have been stopped beginning with the Camp David meeting, all of the flights between September and May 1 be stopped and how long are they to continue to be stopped?

The **Chairman**. I don't see as that question is involved in this sentence at all.

Senator **Lausche**. Well, now I will answer that. It is simple to say that the May 1 flight should not have been held.

The **Chairman**. We don't say this——

Senator **Lausche**. But if you say that should not have been held then you ought to pass judgment on all of them that were held since last September.

The **Chairman**. I am not particularly passing judgment. We are reporting the facts and trying to get out a report. The people will have to pass judgment. This acceptance has nothing to do with that point at all. It is whether or not the reaction of the Russians, Khrushchev was one which was utterly unrealistic and had nothing to do with the facts or was it one that you can understand that it is a rather normal human reaction.

KHRUSHCHEV'S BEHAVIOR AT THE SUMMIT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I can understand Mr. Khrushchev's irritation and blow up at the discovery of this flight.

I cannot justify Mr. Khrushchev's actions at Geneva based upon this and other things if he were really looking for ways and means to advance the cause of peace in a summit conference.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't justify them either.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. My feeling on that is that Khrushchev had known about these flights since 1956. If he were really interested in accomplishing something at the Geneva Conference, he could have complained bitterly about this, he could have raised the devil as much as he wanted to but he could have taken the position, in spite of this, "Our interest in advancing the cause of peace and the summit conference impel us to go ahead and see what we can do."

The CHAIRMAN. In the first place he had no proof at all, if he had made the allegation we clearly would have denied it with the usual cover story, which we should have. That couldn't arise at all. He would have made a fool of himself if he had made a big fuss about it and then we would have said "why, you're crazy, we have not done any such thing," and he couldn't prove it. He had nothing to go on.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I say, I understand the human motivation of his violent objection, violent reaction. But I think this paragraph can give him a weapon to say "Well, even the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate doesn't blame me for what I did in Geneva."

Now that is the point.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think this has anything to do with Geneva. This was the reaction of the Paris meeting.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Paris.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, it is getting pretty near time to where we are going to have to leave here. In fact I am going to have to leave now. I wonder if there are any other objections to be raised? So far as I am concerned, if this completes the list, I would be very glad to see the sentence go out. I don't think it is all important.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have two more.

The CHAIRMAN. What are the other two?

Senator AIKEN. Why don't we have the other two and consider them all together. Maybe we can have a little horse trade here.

BREAKDOWN OF COORDINATION BETWEEN AGENCIES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. On page 58, let me just take a look here.

The first sentence on page 58, I raise this question: In regard to this whole period of May 1 to 9 the record is full of references to coordination among the various agencies of the Government and yet at crucial points the coordination broke down as for example the NASA issue of a statement on May 5, within 2 or 3 hours after it had been decided that only the State Department would issue the statement.

That is a factual statement, there is no question in my mind about that. I can't dispute that it is a factual statement. I don't know how much of a disservice we give ourselves internationally by that statement, or not. I have no particular strong feeling on that point.

Senator WILEY. What is the purpose of it, may I ask?

The CHAIRMAN. The purpose is if we are to conduct a government like we have in the future, in the next administration and the other one that these, the coordination of these agencies should be improved and that particularly in my view the State Department should be recognized by all the agencies especially one like NASA's being primarily responsible as the agency and they ought to clear these statements with the State Department.

Senator AIKEN. Actually it is a misstatement because I don't think the coordination ever existed. How could it ever break down when it wasn't there?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if you put it that way, George, I wouldn't disagree with that. We are putting it in as mild a way as we can.

Senator CHURCH. We are being kindly.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. As I say so far as I am concerned, I merely made a note but I have no strong feelings on this.

The CHAIRMAN. I think in the future this is a burden of the hearings that are going on in the other part of the Senate.

Senator AIKEN. I think that is a very gentle slap on the wrist and I think they needed it probably.

The CHAIRMAN. Very gentle one.

Senator AIKEN. Because they are probably coordinating now more than they did 2 months ago.

The CHAIRMAN. As often happens I think in this sense it will have a beneficial effect.

Senator CARLSON. What is your next one?

The CHAIRMAN. What is your other one, now?

"IMMEDIATE EXCUSE"

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The next one is on page 61 which involves the paragraph beginning in the middle of the page which says "In regard to" and goes down through the next paragraph which begins "In regard to the second." Now those two paragraphs, the first one says "In regard to the first question the committee is handicapped as above stated by its lack of knowledge of the specific mission of the U-2."

Up to that point I have no objection to the sentence.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I interrupt at this time?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. Your material on page 61 is directly related to the last sentence in the full paragraph on page 59. That sentence is "The U-2 incident therefore was the immediate excuse for not proceeding with the conference."

That will be interpreted to mean was the cause of not proceeding with the conference, and I can't go along with that statement.

Page 59, "The U-2 incident therefore was the immediate excuse for not proceeding with the conference."

Then you go to your page 61 and you say "If one accepts the conclusion, however, that the failure of the mission was the approximate cause of the wrecking of the summit conference, then in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary there is good reason to conclude that the flight should not have gone."

Senator **Hickenlooper**. That is the one I am objecting to.

Senator **Lausche**. But I mean you have got to tie it in with 59 where you say the U-2 incident was the immediate excuse for not proceeding with the conference.

Senator **Aiken**. Excuse is the important word there.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. We quarreled over that word.

Senator **Lausche**. I am not going to indulge in that narrow and refined semantics. It says "Excuse" but the argument will be the U-2 incident therefore was the immediate cause for not proceeding.

Senator **Church**. May I ask a question?

A CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP

Do you mean when you take these two sentences together, the one using the term "immediate excuse" on page 59 and then you go to page 61 and find that "approximate cause" is used, that by taking the two together the conclusion will be drawn that it was causal?

Senator **Aiken**. It is given as a reason on page 61 and an excuse on 59.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. My proposal is that the second sentence in the middle paragraph beginning with "If one accepts the conclusion", I suggest that that be stricken.

That was my suggestion. I have no objection to the first sentence in that paragraph.

Senator **Lausche**. You have no objection to what?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. To the first sentence in the paragraph which reads as follows, "In regard to the first question the committee is handicapped as stated above by its lack of knowledge of the specific mission of the U-2."

I personally accept that as a factual conclusion, but then I think the other, the next one is not warranted.

The **Chairman**. I think in view of the sentence on page 59 which we did agree to after long talk there is no use of repeating this and it does not add a great deal to it.

I would have no objection to taking that second one out.

Senator **Lausche**. Mr. Chairman, on the page 59 sentence, there.

The **Chairman**. I cannot go along taking them both out. I would take out one of them.

Senator **Church**. In any case you could have the sentence on page 61 conform to the one on page 59.

The **Chairman**. I have no objection to eliminating it as long as you have it only once.

Senator **Aiken**. I think we should say Khrushchev's excuse rather than Khrushchev's sound reason.

Senator **Lausche**. What about this, the U-2 incident was the immediate excuse seized by Khrushchev for not proceeding with the conference.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Was seized upon by Khrushchev.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Don't mention his name. We tried to keep his name out.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Seized upon by the Kremlin.

The CHAIRMAN. Seized upon for not proceeding.

Senator CHURCH. Are you modifying the page 59 sentence?

The CHAIRMAN. Seized upon for not proceeding.

Senator SPARKMAN. I move that be done.

The CHAIRMAN. Seized upon for not proceeding. Without objection that is changed, and then on page 61, I have no objection and I don't know that anyone else has, of taking out that second one which in a sense is a repetition of the same point. "If one accepts the conclusion, however"——

Senator SPARKMAN. I see.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that is all right to take it out?

Senator SPARKMAN. "If one accepts the conclusion."

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all right?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

U.S. REACTION INTENSIFIED U-2 PROBLEMS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The next paragraph I raise a question on which reads as follows, page 61, that is the paragraph following the verbiage that we cut out, it is the last full paragraph on page 61, short paragraph, it reads as follows: "In regard to the second question for the reasons stated above it seems that the U.S. reaction to the failure of the U-2 intensified the problems which resulted from that failure."

I think that does not play into our interests at all to say that. Maybe it is true.

The CHAIRMAN. It is really true, Bourke.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Maybe it is true but we are dealing——

The CHAIRMAN. Would you prefer the word "complicated" or some other word than "intensified"?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't quite understand what the paragraph means in the first place. I don't know what our reaction was that was intensified.

The CHAIRMAN. What I think it had in mind is first the NASA statement which, I think was ill-advised, it was not cleared with the Department of State. Had no coordination which finally got them in the position of causing the President to assume personal responsibility.

I don't believe he ever would have got around to this point if they had said nothing for the first 2 or 3 days and let it clarify itself. But one thing led to another, and I think this is what the reaction we are talking about, it is that same lack of coordination that we mentioned a moment ago. "Intensified."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would you prefer the word "complicated"?

The CHAIRMAN. I said that to you. I would be perfectly willing. I don't think the whole thing ought to go out.

Senator AIKEN. "Confused." The problems were the same.

The CHAIRMAN. "Complicated the problems." "Were made more difficult."

Senator **Aiken**. "Complicated the problem" would probably cover that.

Senator **Capehart**. I move we substitute "complicate" for "intensify".

The **Chairman**. "Complicated" for the word "intensify" there.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. Any more, Bourke?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Those are all the suggestions that I have after reading this clean draft. I want to make it clear——

WEAKENING THE REPORT

Senator **Sparkman**. Mr. Chairman, I want to say a word about page 61. We have already stricken that sentence but I am a little disturbed by that because we say nothing in that paragraph now.

Senator **Aiken**. We mention two questions up above.

Senator **Sparkman**. The great part of the zip of what should have been our findings is gone.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. But John, we have already covered it.

Senator **Sparkman**. Here we are boiling it down to questions, if we were going to make the change to avoid duplication we should have made it on the prior instance rather than here.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. John, the point I am making is at other places we have said two or three times that we did not have specific knowledge on the purpose of this specific purpose and details of this U-2 flight.

Senator **Sparkman**. That is correct.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. We only repeat there what we have said before in answer to that number one question. We have already raised that question before.

So we just merely say "As stated above".

Senator **Sparkman**. I am not going to move to reconsider anything, but I just want to say that I think we have taken a lot out of it.

The **Chairman**. John, I think we have too, except for the fact that on page 59 we make the point.

Senator **Sparkman**. I realize that too, but here we are asking questions and we purport to answer them.

The **Chairman**. I thought of that angle and maybe it would have been better to strike it on page 59 if you want to and put it over there.

Senator **Church**. I agree with John. I don't think it answers the question.

The **Chairman**. I had not thought of that angle but if it is agreeable it is perfectly agreeable with me.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Why not just take out the question. We have already raised them before.

The **Chairman**. No, that is still weaker. I think it means something there. Anyone who is familiar with it knows that the lack of any reason for it there leaves it up in the air.

Senator **Sparkman**. It seems to me that the very essence of the report is contained in the last sentence, in the very sentence that we struck out on page 61. As I say, I am not going to move to reconsider but I want to state my views on it.

The **Chairman**. Would it——

Senator **Sparkman**. It tremendously weakens this thing.

The **Chairman**. Would it suit you——

Senator **Lausche**. Is it your conclusion that the approximate cause of the wrecking of the conference——

Senator **Sparkman**. No, it didn't say that. It said if one accepts the conclusion, however, that the failure of the mission was the approximate cause of the wrecking of the summit conference, I don't care if you say this did give Khrushchev an excuse which he used to wreck the conference and then we must conclude that the sending of the flight over on May 1 was a mistake. That is my feeling exactly, and I think it is amply conditioned on his seizing, using the language back on 59, if you want to, his seizing this as an excuse.

THE FLIGHT SHOULD NOT HAVE GONE ON

Senator **Church**. The one thing I want to say, is that if we said it once what objection is there in saying it the same way again at the place where it appears?

Senator **Sparkman**. Use the same language.

Senator **Church**. I wouldn't use approximate because we have said the U-2 incident on page 59 was the immediate excuse seized upon for the disruption of the conference I think we should say "If one accepts the conclusion, however, that the failure of the mission was the immediate excuse seized upon for wrecking the summit conference," then in the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary there is good reason to conclude that the flight should not have gone and I think that is the very heart of it.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I can't agree with that conclusion.

Senator **Green**. I second the motion if you make that as a motion.

Senator **Lausche**. If that is the judgment you finally reach I reassert we are indulging in post facto judgments in this one instance knowing that the flight failed but we are not expressing any opinion about the many flights that were held between the Camp David conference and prior thereto and down to May 1.

Senator **Aiken**. I think Frank's suggestion would be a little contradictory there because we already say we can't formulate a judgment for lack of information.

Senator **Wiley**. Are you going to finish this?

The **Chairman**. We ought to finish.

Senator **Wiley**. I don't have a chance. I am not satisfied with this. Everytime I raise something you say something and you go right ahead.

Let's get Frank. I am perfectly willing to raise objections.

Senator **Lausche**. On the point of the flights I might want to point out to the chairman that the day the thing occurred, at a meeting of the committee, I suggested immediately to call in the State Department, and the chairman answered "well, this is just a matter of espionage, it has been done all the time. We should have assumed it was being done by our country." I think the record will show, if it is examined that that is the dialogue that I had with the chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. I will leave my proxy with you, Bill.

WHAT THE COMMITTEE SAYS OFFICIALLY

Senator CHURCH. I have just one other point to make, Mr. Chairman. I think with respect to the sentence on page 56 that was passed over, it is my own view that that sentence ought to stay in the report.

Khrushchev has made this allegation many times already. It has been made to the United Nations. It is nothing new, and I think then it contributes immensely to the perspective from which the American people should view this situation.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it has been stated in the papers.

Senator CHURCH. We have stricken these other matters but I would be strongly opposed to striking that sentence because I think it does put this in perspective before the American people.

Senator AIKEN. You mean on this one.

Senator CHURCH. I am raising the one issue that Bourke raised which has not been settled as yet, on page 56. I am just putting myself on record as one who feels very strongly that this does bring this whole matter into perspective for the American people. I think it ought to stay in the report. Khrushchev has already said it many times, and it has been said many times at the United Nations, so I don't think it would have any alarming effect.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been in the newspapers.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There is a difference between what somebody else says and what this committee which is an official arm of the Congress says.

Senator WILEY. I thought there was a motion to strike it.

The CHAIRMAN. We passed over it a while ago.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We passed over it and we went on to some others.

THE EXCUSE FOR WRECKING THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Senator SPARKMAN. I agree with what Senator Church said and yet I don't think it is anything like as important as that on page 61, because on page 61 we are leading ourselves right up to answering the question and then we are saying, "Well, we won't answer this question."

The CHAIRMAN. Are we in a position to do trading on that? I would be disposed to trade that one on 56 and accept the amended version. It is an amended version which repeats the same language as the preceding page, instead of using approximate cause, to use—how did you phrase that?

Senator CHURCH. Well, I said, this way "If one accepts the conclusion however that the failure of the mission was the excuse seized upon for wrecking the summit conference, then in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary there is good reason to conclude that the flight should not have gone."

Senator SPARKMAN. Frank, wouldn't it be better, I am just thinking out loud instead of saying "was the excuse" of course we know it was the excuse seized upon, if it served to give him——

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. An excuse.

Senator CHURCH. Furnished the excuse.

Senator SPARKMAN. An excuse for wrecking the conference.

Senator CHURCH. Furnished the excuse.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no objection to that. I think that is all right.

Senator CHURCH. It is merely a restatement of what we have already stated but it answers the question posed.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you say that?

Senator CHURCH. "If one accepts the conclusion, however, that the failure of the mission furnished the excuse for wrecking the summit conference then in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary there is good reason to conclude that the flight should not have gone."

Senator GREEN. I wouldn't say the excuse but an excuse.

Senator LAUSCHE. Let's pass on the question on whether there were compelling reasons to the contrary that the flight should have been held. It is a simple declaration to make now that the flight of May 1st should not have been held. Everybody knows that. You are not giving any light to anybody in the world.

I think it is just ridiculous. The flight of May 1st should not have been held initially. Sure it should not have been held the way it happened.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I agree with that. But also I agree that with hindsight, if a man goes out and gets killed in an automobile accident driving from here to Baltimore, afterward you should say "Why any fool should have known that he never should have taken the trip to Baltimore he should have stayed off the highway, he got killed that day."

Senator LAUSCHE. That is the thing and that is what you are doing.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is really what I think.

POSTPONE FINAL VOTE

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, I want to be heard for one minute. I have got to leave anyway. I understood we were going to have time to go over this record. I haven't had time. I want to go over it. I didn't get a chance to go through on the floor of the Senate yesterday, the conclusions. I marked a number of them I don't agree with but in view of the fact that you have a luncheon here at 1 o'clock, I have another group luncheon at 1 o'clock, and the Senate is in session and I think we can make the point that you have no business of doing business.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that Senator Wiley feels rather strongly on this, we are going to have a meeting in the morning. Would it be possible to have a meeting at 10 o'clock on this thing prior to the Ambassador's meeting and let him have an opportunity to go through this?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And we can think about these things.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think we are pretty close together and I don't like to see it blown up on the rocks necessarily if I can help it.

Senator CARLSON. I don't think we have many problems really.

The CHAIRMAN. Why?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If you are going to vote this today I see what is going to happen and I would rather not have that.

Senator SPARKMAN. Ten o'clock in the morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we will meet at 10 o'clock in the morning here, but on these last two, I hate to give up that sentence on page 56, but in view of the attitude of Sparkman and Church, and I feel that way too, why can't we change that to furnish the excuse. That puts it just as mildly as it can be. Use his language on page 61 and keep that one in.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't——

The CHAIRMAN. Furnish the excuse, that is as mild as you can put it. Furnish the excuse.

It puts it as mild as it can be. If you will do that, I hate to take out that one on Kansas City because I think it is fully justified and it is educational.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let me think about it.

The CHAIRMAN. We will meet at 10 and we will vote it up or down.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m. the hearing recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, June 23, 1960.]

TO CONSIDER REPORT ON HEARINGS REGARDING EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:15 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol, Hon. J. William Fulbright, presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart and Carlson.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Denney and Mr. St. Claire of the committee staff.

The **CHAIRMAN**. The committee will come to order.

Do you, Senator Wiley, wish to say anything to start with? You said you had something to say yesterday, or shall we just start?

Senator **WILEY**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity, it is one I have long sought. It has been quite a while now that you have suggested that I say something.

KHRUSHCHEV BELITTLES U-2 FLIGHTS

First, I want to say that I was particularly interested in a heading in the Post of yesterday, "U-2 Success Belittled by K."

Among other things he said that we missed photographing Russia's strategic rocket bases, discovered nothing of importance to the United States defense and failed to uncover powerful military means the Soviet Union has developed. And he said as to the sky plane flights we know that 2 or 3 years ago they photographed the areas of the proving grounds where we conduct experimental rocket launching. It was a rocket weapon testing ground they photographed. And then among other things, the name of the spy pilot, Powers, though this is only a small poisonous bug in the service of the Pentagon brass, will go down to disgrace in the history of the United States, together with the names of those who sent him on this radical flight.

That is quoting Khrushchev. Of course, he was talking to his people.

Now I am going to start on the conclusions and I wish Senator Hickenlooper would take his particular file and turn to page 52. Is any of that taken out?

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Not as it appears here.

Mr. **MARCY**. No, sir.

Senator Wiley. No.

Mr. Marcy. None.

Senator Hickenlooper. No, it still remains.

Senator Wiley. I am going to call attention to this quotation,

> There remains the question of the wisdom of sending the flight at all. The committee is told that the flight was after information of well above average importance but was not told what this information was. The committee cannot, therefore, come to any conclusion as to whether the importance of the information sought justified the risks which were taken. Although the committee recognizes the necessity for secrecy in intelligence operations, it is strongly of the opinion that a government based upon separation of powers cannot exist on faith alone.

What purpose does that serve in view of the fact that Khrushchev has said what he has said? Is it our business in this committee now to question the decision of the group who had the power to make the decision, the group that we gave the power to, under our legislation, and appropriated money for, to question the wisdom of sending it. I don't think that that adds to this particular finding.

I practiced law for 30 years and I happen to know something about what findings are. To me, at least, this should go out, Mr. Chairman.

THE WISDOM OF SENDING THIS FLIGHT

The Chairman. Well, I never proceeded on the theory that the Executive is infallible whether it be Democratic or Republican and I think it is legitimate to question the wisdom of this particular flight, in the absence of any affirmative justification which they refuse to give, that is all this is.

I wouldn't be willing to take it out.

Senator Wiley. Is that the purpose of this?

The Chairman. I think it speaks for itself. The question of the wisdom of sending this particular flight is what it is talking about, not all flights. We are talking about only the May 1 flight.

Senator Wiley. Is it our function to question the flight that was ordered by the authorities who had a right to order it? What are we doing? Are we going into the position——

The Chairman. What do you think is the function of the Congress?

Senator Wiley [continuing]. Of a coordinate branch of government that it is our business to criticize the action of someone who had the authority to make the decision?

The Chairman. I don't know that it serves any purpose but I do recall a time when your Party on the eve of Mr. [Dean] Acheson's departure for conference in Belgium took a formal declaration condemning him and that he shouldn't go and that his failure and so on, I mean there have been instances of criticism in the reverse. This is a very mild, I would say, criticism. It really——

ABSENCE OF A QUORUM

Senator Wiley. I move it be stricken, and you haven't got a quorum here so you can't decide that issue.

The Chairman. Is it the Senator's position that he wishes to prevent this committee operating? We have had 12 meetings on this matter. We are all getting tired of it. If the Senator wishes to prevent the meeting of the committee functioning——

Senator WILEY. I will have to get down to sit next to you because your mumbling voice doesn't carry that far for me.

The CHAIRMAN. I said we have had 12 meetings on this matter, we are all tired of it. Is it the Senator's position that he doesn't wish to vote on this at all and he wishes to raise a point of no quorum?

Senator WILEY. I haven't made the point except that I think the record should show there isn't a quorum, and that I am now following out what I thought was my right and which I have not had the right to exercise before.

The CHAIRMAN. I have a number of proxies. It has been announced they will come when we get a quorum and we need it. Does the Senator wish to question the procedure so that we cannot have a meeting until the quorum is here? I don't know what the Senator's purpose is. Is his purpose to delay and prevent a vote or is he willing to proceed and try to—he doesn't, of course, have to agree to anything. I am not asking the Senator to agree to anything, but I am only asking what is his purpose as to the procedure he wishes to attempt to prevent the committee in acting upon this matter?

Senator WILEY. I am perfectly willing to answer that and get it right on the record. I want a report that is a report, and not one that is primarily attacking a coordinate branch of our Government.

Now you talked about a certain incident. My policy has always been from the time that I came here, when under the first President, I took the position then that as long as he tended to his own business and made a decision that was his right to make, it was his decision, and I didn't criticize him. But when he butted into packing the Court or when he butted into taking steps in the legislative branch, then I would criticize him.

That is the only rule I am applying here. I think we can make a finding without going into a lot of this what do we call it, political filth.

If you vote against this with the proxies you have, then that is that. I have another motion to make and I will keep on until I finish my position and then I have made the record, that is all I want.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all you want?

Senator WILEY. Yes, I want to make the record and have the right, of course, to vote on whatever comes out.

The CHAIRMAN. For the record I have eight proxies, people who have called here to the clerk saying they had other meetings. Some have said they would come. Mr. Gore said he would come back in a few minutes. Here is Mr. Aiken.

Is the Senator perfectly willing to have the record, vote on his motion using the proxies? Is that agreeable to the Senator?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I just——

Senator WILEY. Go ahead.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I just speak to this point for a moment? The statement that you have raised here, Al, we discussed and eventually after considerable discussion as to what that meant tentatively agreed to leave it in. I say tentatively, that is always subject to the final action of the committee is what I mean.

Now the statement says there remains the question of the wisdom of the sending the flight at all. I have not taken a position other than that we have a right to question some of these things, and this really raises the question but says we can't answer it. That is what it says.

That is the reason that I didn't think it took a positive position.

Senator AIKEN. I think that is one of the most important paragraphs in the whole report. Otherwise it leaves us in the soup.

Senator WILEY. I will go on with my second objection.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't understand what his procedure is. Does he want us to vote on each of these objections? I am perfectly willing to have a vote and use the proxies if that is what the Senator wants. He said he would like to make the record, and that he objected to this and I assume he has other points, is that the way he wishes to proceed?

Senator WILEY. Yes, I wish to proceed. I am going to make my objections and if you think it is necessary to have a vote by proxy, go ahead and do it. I want first to see if I can get, penetrate the consciousness of the chairman on this subject. If I can't why that is foreclosed, that is all there is to it.

And I expect, if I cannot do anything of that kind, that is, if my views cannot be made apparent to my associates, I, of course, will file a report of my own, and I think that is the only thing to do.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that certainly is the Senator's right to do it. I was asking whether or not he wishes us to take action by votes on these proposals.

Senator WILEY. Well, in the first place, I didn't answer that for I am not taking the position that when you are sitting in a committee of 3 or 4, and have simply proxies that that would foreclose someone on the floor, not myself, from objecting to the validity of the committee report, if this is to be the committee report.

INCORRECT ASSUMPTIONS

Senator WILEY. Here is a statement, "An argument was made to the committee if diplomatic considerations were taken into account, there would always be some reason for cancelling and postponing the flight and so forth." I don't think that is a proper statement to go in this conclusion. What we are doing is simply arguing the case against the executive branch and down the same page, "The fact that neither the President, the Secretary of State, nor the Secretary of Defense knew that this particular flight was even in the air, is an indication of how routine these flight operations have become."

I agree with that conclusion, that they were routine flights, but when you say that they didn't know that this flight was in the air, I think you are assuming something that is not particularly correct, but if it is to remain in, it remains in.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think that is borne out by the hearings.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that is borne out by the hearings that they did not in detail specifically know when this flight was in the air. They had given general orders that it could go on their opinion or when the weather was available.

Senator WILEY. Well, the answer to that is this: We created the agency, we provided the money for the agency, we put it in the hands of Dulles, he has conducted it for 4 years, and this flight had been partially discussed but be that as it may, it is an inference that they were not looking after their job.

Now in my opinion they looked after their job diligently and well for 4 years and gave us the information, contrary to what Khrushchev says, he said in this statement here that we did not have so and so and so. We have got it all. What did we do on page 56?

You took it out and then you scratch it out.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No, we left that in abeyance and no decision has been made on that yet.

Senator WILEY. What is your position on that?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, my position is really very strong that that paragraph ought to come out.

Senator WILEY. He says it ought to come out, this here.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that only puts a justification weapon in Khrushchev's hand and I feel very strongly.

Senator WILEY. The whole thing is justification for Khrushchev.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No, I don't quite agree with that, Alex.

Senator WILEY. Well, you see that is where neighbors disagree again.

CHANGES IN THE WORDING

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, you remember the chairman suggested just before we quit the other day that we would be willing to drop page 56 if you would agree to retain that on page 61, which, if omitted, would leave us dangling in the air.

Isn't that what you proposed?

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. That was the last thing we were talking about.

Senator SPARKMAN. On that note I thought they ought to accept it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No, I asked to think about some language there.

Senator SPARKMAN. There was some exchange in the wording.

The CHAIRMAN. We did change, the last wording was "If one accepts the conclusion, however, that the failure of the mission furnished the excuse for wrecking of the summit conference then in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary there is good reason to conclude that the flight should not have gone."

That was the language under consideration.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The mission furnished the excuse for.

The CHAIRMAN. Furnished the excuse for: "Furnished an excuse," rather than "the excuse," for the wrecking of the summit conference.

Senator WILEY. Which page are you on?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Page 61.

Why not say, "Then in retrospect the argument could be made that the flight should not have gone," because it is hindsight.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Well, of course, it is all hindsight, that is the only way we can do it. We can't go back and put ourselves ahead of time. We didn't know the flight was going either.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. If the flight had been successful and we had known about it we would have said what a great thing it was.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Well, we wouldn't have known about it.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. We think the other flights that were successful were great things. I think it is perfectly logical to say that if you accept the conclusion, which we have in the main actually, that the failure of the mission furnished an excuse for wrecking the conference, then I think we could say then in retrospect—I don't say compelling, because it is not compelling to me at all, but I do say——

The **CHAIRMAN**. But then in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, because that is reference to the fact that they never gave any reason, any special reason for the flight.

MONDAY MORNING QUARTERBACKING

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Well, my whole point is that we can now say with hindsight that in view of the fact that it did fail, it can be argued that maybe it shouldn't have gone at all, but, to me, is hindsight operation which I am perfectly willing from my standpoint to state, but it is a hindsight position.

Senator **WILEY**. What about page 56, are you doing anything with that?

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. That is what we talked about. They said they would take out that paragraph on page 56.

Senator **SPARKMAN**. I think if I put it in I would put it in right at the beginning of the sentence, I say if you put in "in retrospect" or "looking back," put it in at the very beginning of the sentence.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Basically, I think we are Monday morning quarterbacking the thing.

The **CHAIRMAN**. That is true, that is what you do in all of these affairs.

Senator **SPARKMAN**. I think if you started that sentence with an expression with "Looking back, if one accepts the conclusion, that the failure of the mission furnished the excuse," and so forth. It doesn't seem to me that would damage it.

The **CHAIRMAN**. I think that is right. That is what of course we are going with the whole thing.

Senator **SPARKMAN**. Either looking back or in retrospect.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Say that again.

Senator **SPARKMAN**. "Looking back, if one accepts the conclusions that failure of the mission furnished the excuse," and so forth.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. "Then one might well conclude."

Senator **SPARKMAN**. Well, just go on with what is there.

The **CHAIRMAN**. You get it finally down to where it is nothing at all if you keep whittling away at it.

Senator **SPARKMAN**. I think if you said either looking back or in retrospect set off with a comma, and leave out the "however" and go right on with the rest of it, you have what you want.

Senator **WILEY**. Gentlemen, what you are saying which is contrary to what everybody has written on the subject, that this young man Khrushchev had his mind made up before he went there and now you are trying to find the excuse for him.

I don't think that is the kind of a report you want to write.

Senator **Sparkman**. That is not what we are trying to do.

TAKING A CRACK AT THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Senator **Gore**. Senator, there is a vast difference between having his mind made up before he went to Paris and before the U-2 incident.

Senator **Wiley**. Before he what?

Senator **Gore**. I say there is a vast difference between having his mind made up before he went to Paris and before the U-2 flight.

There is a difference of 2 weeks and the tragic event.

Senator **Wiley**. Are you arguing then that the U-2 incident caused it?

Senator **Gore**. I am not arguing at all. I just was trying to tell you that the two things did not necessarily follow.

Senator **Wiley**. Well, of course, they didn't. If it didn't happen it wouldn't have happened that is all, if that is what you mean. There is no logic in that. The point I am trying to make is that it is not our business at this time to be taking a crack at the executive branch of government or it servants in this state of world affairs.

Senator **Sparkman**. I will tell you, Senator, I just can't follow your reasoning. I don't see that we are taking a crack at the executive. I think this report as it has been worked down is rather generous.

And I think that we are trying to do this, to say "Let's watch ourselves more carefully in the future in order that we may not have a recurrence."

I just don't see how it could be watered down any more and be worth anything.

Senator **Wiley**. Well, what I want to say now is, I ask first what you are going to do with the paragraph on page 56 and in connection therewith——

Senator **Sparkman**. We would leave it in if we could leave in page 61 in connection with it.

Senator **Wiley**. Senator Hickenlooper said he thought that was scratched out.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. No, I said as they said, they would be willing to take that paragraph out if we could arrive at a satisfactory verbiage for the sentence on page 61.

Senator **Sparkman**. That's right.

Senator **Wiley**. Is that what you are driving at now?

Senator **Sparkman**. That is right.

Senator **Wiley**. All right, now let's see what you can do with 61. I want to know if you can get some agreement on them so I can see what you are going to agree on, that is all.

PLACING THE FAULT ON KHRUSHCHEV

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Well, we have been discussing stating it something like this, that last sentence:

"In looking back if one accepts the conclusion", leave out "however", if one accepts the conclusion that the failure of the mission furnished an excuse for well "wrecking," I don't like the word "wreck."

Senator **Sparkman**. Wrecking.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I don't like the word "wrecking".

The **Chairman**. Preventing.

Senator **Sparkman**. Collapsing.

The **Chairman**. We worried about that word, we couldn't find a better one. We tried every one, sabotage——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Furnished the excuse.

Senator **Sparkman**. It looks to me like wrecking is a pretty good term. You are applying this to Khrushchev and that is just what he did.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Let's say "for wrecking of the summit conference by Khrushchev," let's put the fault on him.

Senator **Sparkman**. That suits me. Or "for Khrushchev's wrecking the summit conference."

Senator **Wiley**. That is what I am complaining about.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. For Khrushchev's wrecking of the summit conference, then. I don't like the words "compelling reasons."

Senator **Sparkman**. How about "good"?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. "Then in the absence of good reasons to the contrary," I would prefer to say. "One might conclude".

The **Chairman**. That is too far. That just keeps watering it down.

Senator **Sparkman**. "In the absence of good reasons to the contrary there is good cause."

The **Chairman**. "There is cause."

Senator **Sparkman**. "There is cause to conclude that the flight should not have gone."

The **Chairman**. "There is justification."

Senator **Sparkman**. "There is justification for the conclusion that the flight should not have gone."

SENATOR LAUSCHE'S VIEWS

Senator **Lausche**. Mr. Chairman, may I read for your information a paper that I prepared this morning and it is expressive of my views?

One, the Congress of the United States appropriated the moneys that were needed for the development of a plane capable of reaching high altitudes and gathering information needed as a guide for the involvement in our country of defenses for national security.

Two, the Congress appropriated annually since 1956 the moneys required for the operation of U-2 plane in the acquisition of intelligence.

Three, the U-2s have been operating for a period of 4 years and during that time have obtained information indispensably and essentially needed in the preparation of an adequate national defense.

Four, without the information acquired by the operation of the U-2s our country at this time might well have been in the military posture incapable of meeting the Soviet military power.

Five, when Khrushchev learned as early as November 1959 that the allied powers would not yield to his demands with respect to

West Berlin and West Germany he began making statements and attacks intending to wreck the proposed conference of 1960.

Six, when Khrushchev left Moscow on May 14 instead of Sunday May 15 his previously declared date of departure he had already decided not to participate in the conference. At the time of his departure from Moscow on May 14 he and his associates carried with them an ultimatum to be made upon the President of the United States which Khrushchev knew the President could not accept as a pre-condition of the Soviets' participation in the meeting.

Seven, the Soviets have the largest espionage organization of any country in the world. In our country every Communist avowed to overthrow our Government is a spy of Communist Russia.

Eight, no unassailable judgment can be made that the flight of May 1 should not have been made. If it is now declared that the ill-fated May 1 flight was a mistake, such a declaration is challengeable and with great probability influenced by the present knowledge that the May 1st flight was a failure.

Nine, when the May 1 flight started on its journey every past experience justified the conclusion that it would not fail.

Ten, if a failure could have been expected and foreseen, then every other flight that was made while the discussions for a summit conference were in progress should have been canceled.

Eleven, the gathering of intelligence has been practiced by nations from time immemorial and though it is an unsavory and hateful occupation, its omission would come fairly close to constituting criminal negligence in the responsibility of a nation to provide for its common defenses.

Twelve, the representatives of the State Department, Defense Department and NASA neglected to coordinate the information which they gave to the public respecting the mission of the U-2 in the ill-fated flight of May 1st.

I do not have 13 here, but 13 might deal with the alert. I don't think the alert was soundly called.

Those are my conclusions on this testimony, and I am not saying that I am going to publish them.

A REASONABLY COMPATIBLE DOCUMENT

Senator **Wiley**. How long did you practice law and how long were you a judge? Let's get that because those are findings of law such as you get in a case, and with which I can agree with every one, and that is my philosophy in this thing here. It isn't the business of us in this world crisis to put implications that result in findings of any kind that negative the country's position or its safety. And I have not discussed those with you, have I?

Senator **Lausche**. No.

Senator **Wiley**. But I want to say they are the result of a legal mind that has gone through this situation from soup to nuts. I practiced law for 30 years myself. And I want to compliment you.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I can say that in listening to the reading of these points by Senator Lausche, that they express very succinctly and forcefully a great many of my views on this thing.

Senator **Lausche**. And the views that are probably in the document.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Pardon?

Senator **Lausche**. And the views that are in this document that we are studying.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. There are many views in this document on this point.

My purpose has been attempting to help, if possible, get a document that is reasonably compatible all around. I could have no hesitancy in saying amen to what the Senator has read. However, I hope if we are going to issue a document, it can be as mutually satisfactory as possible, that is what I wish to say.

There are a number of things in this document that I would not say the way they are said here, referring to the proposed report, and maybe there are a lot of things that I would say that other members would not say that way. So it has not been a question that everybody agrees with every statement that is made in the document. But, as I say, I feel very strongly. The more I have read it, and I have read it over time and again, I feel very strongly that the paragraph on page 56, without reference to any other paragraph, but just in and of itself, is not good. That that paragraph alone could be waved around by Khrushchev and say that "Well, here, they admit that my actions in Paris were perfectly understandable because they would have acted the same way", that is the basic feeling. I may be wrong about that but I can't avoid that and I have read it and read it and read it.

So far as saying that for the benefit of the American people is concerned, every person in the United States is perfectly aware of that, that we would be upset if the Russian plane was flying over us spying. That is the basis of my reason for saying that.

Senator **Gore**. You are speaking of what?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. The first paragraph on page 56.

Senator **Gore**. The first paragraph.

WHY DID WE DEVELOP THE U-2?

Senator **Lausche**. May I ask this: Why did we develop the U-2? Why did we appropriate the money for its operation, over what countries was it supposed to go? Was it supposed to go over all of the countries of our enemy except the Soviet? How can you answer that?

Senator **Sparkman**. Frank, I think the answer is simple. Certainly it was supposed to fly over the Soviet at the proper times, and it did, but when we got into this negotiation, working up to a summit conference through a long series of visits and conferences and talks and were right on the eve of holding a conference at which it was hoped some step might be taken toward thawing the cold war, certainly that was no time to be sending flights over Russia. It seems to me that is the basis. It seems to me we state that very well, in the paragraph on page 61. I am not sure that you were here when he read what he proposed to rewrite?

Senator **Lausche**. Yesterday?

Senator **Sparkman**. No, this morning.

To strike that out on page 56. We propose striking that out and rewrite the one on page 61.

The **Chairman**. This is so watered down now I don't particularly want to take this.

Senator **Sparkman**. After all, we are almost outdated already anyhow. The Government Operations Committee has put out a report that is much stronger.

The **Chairman**. They put out one already. I think the time has come to either vote it down or have it.

Senator **Sparkman**. We ought to put out one or decide not to put out one.

EVERYONE IS AT LIBERTY TO SIGN OR NOT SIGN

The **Chairman**. I was very afraid in the beginning that we could never get one, but there seemed to be some hope for it and I thought well, we will proceed. We have had 12 sessions. I don't see any reason to have any more and I think we either ought to vote to have one or not. Everybody is at liberty to sign or not sign it and to make their own report.

I have no objection to Senator Lausche or Senator Wiley or anyone else saying what they think about it. I wouldn't think of criticizing them if they take exactly the opposite view. This has happened time and again. But now we have this document. So far as I am concerned, as I say, if Bourke has the feeling or his side or his group feels that they are willing to take this on page 61, I would be willing to take out page 56. I think they are perfectly justified but that is not, that is neither here nor there, I don't want to argue the merits on it but I think we have spent enough time on it and we ought to dispose of it.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. We have spent enough time on it.

The **Chairman**. The other committee has issued a report. This is dead now and I don't think anybody is going to pay any attention to it but it is one of those duties to get through with it or not, and I think we ought to. If the committee wishes to vote it down or not sign it, that is certainly all right with me. I am not going to cry about it. I think we ought to get rid of it.

Senator **Wiley**. Well, now, Mr. Chairman, I don't want to be unfair in this. I haven't had a chance, I have been here listening to you fellows talk, and I haven't had a chance to make my exceptions, and I understood that was the purpose of this meeting today that I could be heard. I am presenting the matter, and Senator Hickenlooper agrees with me that the first paragraph on page 56 should go out. You agree, why can't it go out?

The **Chairman**. I agree if the one on page 61 is accepted, we said that yesterday.

Senator **Sparkman**. And one reason we said it was because there was a certain amount of duplication.

The **Chairman**. I think they both ought to be in there but I know that it doesn't please Senator Hickenlooper, you or me. It doesn't please me. This is the usual process of trying to arrive at some kind of a statement that a number can sign.

We all would prefer our own statement in our own words.

A COMMON REPORT

Senator **Green**. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry to be late, I couldn't help it. I was on the floor and listening to a very remarkable presentation by the Senator from Montana, and part of the time I was the only Senator on the floor.

Senator **Sparkman**. May I at that point if the Senator will yield, the speech from the Senator from Montana illustrates the point that there are differences of view, over here, I mean differences in degree. He is making a speech that goes much further than this report goes, stronger than this report goes as I understand.

The **Chairman**. I would say now it is down to the point.

Senator **Green**. I want to know what the question is.

The **Chairman**. The question is whether or not the members of this committee or a large number wish to make a common report which more than one signs or whether we will have no report.

Senator **Green**. I think if I may express my views, I don't know what the others have said, I think we should have a report and I think it is an admirable report.

The **Chairman**. The only way we can finally come to a conclusion if you are ready to vote on whether or not we can have it. We have spent 12 meetings on this and I don't think we ought to spend any more time. Another committee has already issued its report which is much stronger than this one. We can't get agreement, and there is nothing we can do about it.

Senator **Green**. Is a motion made?

Senator **Sparkman**. Mr. Chairman, will the Chair entertain a motion?

The **Chairman**. Yes.

STRIKE OUT THE PARAGRAPH

Senator **Sparkman**. Mr. Chairman, I would like to move that we strike out the paragraph objected to on page 56, I think everyone knows which one it is, it is the first full paragraph, it is the first paragraph in the body on page 56, and that we rewrite the second full paragraph on page 61 so as to——

The **Chairman**. As follows: Why don't you read it?

Senator **Sparkman**. Unfortunately I don't have it written here.

The **Chairman**. This is the way you have it,

> In looking back if one accepts the conclusion that the failure of the mission furnished an excuse for Khrushchev's wrecking of the summit conference then in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary there is good reason to conclude that the flight should not have gone.

That is the way you read it.

Senator **Sparkman**. The second sentence. The first sentence is the——

Senator **Aiken**. Furnished an excuse.

The **Chairman**. Furnished an excuse for Khrushchev's wrecking, that is the way I read it, "an excuse for Khrushchev's wrecking." It starts—I will read it one more time slowly.

> In looking back if one accepts the conclusion that the failure of the mission furnished an excuse for Khrushchev's wrecking of the summit conference then in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary there is good reason to conclude that the flight should not have gone.

Senator **Aiken**. I still think "the" is better than "a."

The **Chairman**. We changed that at Mr. Hickenlooper's request.

Senator **Aiken**. You just think one excuse.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. He had other excuses.

The **Chairman**. What is the Senator's motion?

Senator **Sparkman**. My motion was to strike the paragraph referred to on page 56 and rewrite the second sentence in the paragraph on 61 as read by the Senator from Arkansas.

The **Chairman**. Well, are you ready to vote on that?

Senator **Gore**. Would you accept "furnished reasons or excuse"?

Senator **Sparkman**. Well, they preferred excuse.

Senator **Aiken**. I think it was an excuse, actually.

Senator **Sparkman**. Let it stand.

Senator **Gore**. All right.

Senator **Sparkman**. Bourke or George suggested an excuse and that is what we used previously.

Senator **Gore**. Well, of course, just as good a case can be made that it was the reason as the excuse.

Senator **Green**. I am not just jumping at a conclusion since I came into this room, but I had the conclusion at the last meeting.

Senator **Wiley**. Wasn't that the alleged excuse instead of the real excuse?

Senator **Sparkman**. It was the excuse he gave.

Senator **Aiken**. Alleged would be weaker.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. It was an excuse which he used.

Senator **Sparkman**. It probably was not the real reason but it was the excuse.

Senator **Wiley**. There you go.

Senator **Aiken**. Excuse is the word.

Senator **Wiley**. It was not the real reason but excuse.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. With this qualification, I will support that motion of the Senator from Alabama.

Senator **Aiken**. I go along with it.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. And that qualification is that I want to reserve the right to object to the use of the words "compelling reasons."

Senator **Sparkman**. How about "strong reasons"?

SECOND-GUESSING

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I say I will go along with reserving the right. I would prefer to see it worded differently, because I don't believe, actually believe that in the absence of compelling reason to the contrary there is justification to conclude that the flight should not have gone, because I think the flight should have gone at a time when it was auspicious for it to go, climatically and otherwise, and I think we are second-guessing this and hindsighting it.

Senator **Wiley**. Scratch it out then.

Senator **Sparkman**. We are saying that.

Senator **Lausche**. You are not saying that, John.

Senator **Sparkman**. We are saying looking back.

Senator **Lausche**. You are second-guessing.

The **Chairman**. We all admit the whole thing is second-guessing, there is no argument about that. We are all reviewing it in retrospect and we are saying we are looking back. Nobody knew about it ahead of time. We couldn't have looked at it, none of us on this committee.

Why can't we bring it to a conclusion? Maybe the committee will not want any report. Can you veto that motion? Are you ready to vote on it? Is there anything more to say?

Senator LAUSCHE. What is the motion?

Senator SPARKMAN. That we strike the paragraph on page 56 that is objected to and rewrite the second sentence in the page on 61 as read.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, I frankly want the committee to know that these views that I have set forth here are my findings and they are going to be expressed.

The CHAIRMAN. We understand that. I understand it certainly.

Senator SPARKMAN. The chairman has stated that he expects everyone to feel free.

The CHAIRMAN. Everyone can comment on it. You are not bound to sign it. You can go in either direction.

Senator GORE. In either direction.

The CHAIRMAN. Just as a question of procedure of getting on with it. I think we ought to terminate this business.

DAMAGE TO INTEGRITY OF THE UNITED STATES

Senator GORE. I want to express my disappointment that the report makes to reference to what I regard as the more serious consequences of the entire episode, the damage to the public standing and the integrity of the United States. I think it is in the long run it is the deepest damage we have suffered and the report makes no reference to it at all, but in the interest of accommodation of views I shall not insist on it.

Senator AIKEN. I would have to disagree completely with your conclusions, Albert. We have got of course to leave it to history and time to determine what the damage was, but I think that the effect on our opposition has been more profound than it has on us. And in the long run we may have started a new policy in the world of truth in diplomacy, truth in intelligence systems. Of course, there has not been any great rush to get on the band wagon so far, but I won't concede that it has damaged us out of proportion to the opposition.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's vote on it.

Senator GORE. I would hope that is the result but it took us a long time to tell the truth and we told a lot of falsehoods in between.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's not go back into the merits on it. How about voting on this. We will have two votes, having one on this one and then vote on whether we will have one.

Senator WILEY. Can we separate it?

The CHAIRMAN. We will have a first vote on this and whether to have a vote at all.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I said I would support the motion of the Senator from Alabama with that understanding and if the Senator from Ohio makes his statement and findings, I am going to join in wholehearted agreement with his basic conclusions.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, all in favor of the motion——

DEFEAT OF SUBSTITUTE MOTION

Senator WILEY. Just a moment. Can't we separate first striking out this on page 56 and then striking out or adopting the language on page 61?

The CHAIRMAN. No, that isn't the motion.

Senator WILEY. What?

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the motion.

Senator WILEY. Well, I amend the motion to that effect.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. How do you amend it? You offer an amendment.

Senator WILEY. An amendment that we vote first striking out the paragraph on page 56.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, the Senator makes a substitute motion to strike out.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Green?

Senator GREEN. Aye.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Sparkman?

Senator SPARKMAN. Aye.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Humphrey?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Humphrey, I have his proxy. No—wait a minute this goes back onto your motion which covers it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well——

The CHAIRMAN. This is a substitute, if it fails——

Senator SPARKMAN. This is a complete substitute, I thought he was separating the motions.

All right, I will vote no.

The CHAIRMAN. My thought was——

Senator SPARKMAN. Then the vote will recur on mine.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the vote will recur to the Senator's motion which couples them together.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am in favor of striking them out, but I prefer to couple them together.

The CHAIRMAN. At this point, then we will have a second vote on it.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Humphrey?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Mansfield?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Morse?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Long?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Kennedy?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Gore?

Senator GORE. No.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Lausche?

Senator LAUSCHE. Aye.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Church?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Wiley?

Senator **Wiley**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Hickenlooper?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Aiken?

Senator **Aiken**. Aye. I am for the other part of it, too.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Capehart?

Senator **Wiley**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Carlson?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Williams?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Chairman?

The **Chairman**. No.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I have Mr. Williams' general proxy on this but not on this particular matter.

Mr. **St. Claire**. The motion is lost 9 to 8.

ADOPTION OF THE MOTION

The **Chairman**. Now the motion recurs to the motion of the Senator from Alabama. Call the roll.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Green?

Senator **Green**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Sparkman?

Senator **Sparkman**. Aye

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Humphrey?

The **Chairman**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Mansfield?

The **Chairman**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Morse?

The **Chairman**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Long?

The **Chairman**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Kennedy?

The **Chairman**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Gore?

Senator **Gore**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Lausche?

Senator **Lausche**. I am not satisfied with it, but I vote aye because it is an improvement over what is in the document.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Lausche votes aye.

Mr. Church?

The **Chairman**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Wiley?

Senator **Wiley**. I withhold my vote.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Hickenlooper?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Aiken?

Senator **Aiken**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Capehart?

Mr. Carlson?

Mr. Williams?

Mr. Chairman?

The **Chairman**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Motion carried.

Senator **Sparkman**. I move, Mr. Chairman, that we approve the report and issue this as the report.

A CHANCE TO MAKE SUGGESTIONS

Senator **Wiley**. John, just a minute. I had the understanding before you came here and stated on the record that in all the meetings we have had I have not had a chance to make any suggestion and I thought we could go over these and I have got a few other suggestions to make and get your ruling on them, and it is not going to take very long, but I think in the interest of fair dealing, and I mean that, with emphasis, fair dealing that I am entitled to be heard.

The **Chairman**. How much time does the Senator want?

Senator **Wiley**. Not too long.

The **Chairman**. How long?

Senator **Wiley**. That is my business, not yours, that is what I object with you if you want to run the committee.

The **Chairman**. I don't think the Senator ought to delay this.

Senator **Wiley**. I am not going to delay.

The **Chairman**. We have had 12 meetings on this matter and I think the time has come to come to a vote.

Senator **Wiley**. I have heard that three times and if you look at the record, you will find day after day I never had a chance to get in a word.

The **Chairman**. You had the same chance as everybody else has.

Senator **Wiley**. Now you are making a ruling and I will take exception to that.

The **Chairman**. All right.

Senator **Wiley**. And I will see hereafter that you give me the chance. Now remember what I said, and I am going to keep right on now, sir.

Senator **Aiken**. Mr. Chairman, I think we are going to be held up to a lot of ridicule if we don't get out a report. I think we ought to get out a report that with the understanding that anyone can at any time in the future get out a different report.

Senator **Wiley**. I have no objection to that.

Senator **Aiken**. But I don't think we ought to delay this until after Congress adjourns.

Senator **Wiley**. There is no such intention on my part.

I want to be heard on three or four matters here this morning that I have tried to get in edgewise before.

PRESS OVERPOWERED THE ADMINISTRATION

Senator **Lausche**. George, may I say that if the administration in coordinating their informational service had not allowed themselves to be overpowered by the outside press, we would not have today been confronted with this argument about it.

The press overpowered them but they are not going to overpower me in hurrying me to get something out.

Senator **Aiken**. You are right. The right to know is probably responsible for NASA's making their initial statement.

Senator **Lausche**. That is right.

Senator WILEY. If I can proceed, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

A SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE

Senator WILEY. On page 57, this paragraph

> The committee feels perhaps too much emphasis may have been placed on justification of the flights. If justification was to be made it would have been enough to say that we are seeking intelligence vital to our own security.

I think that should be stricken. What are you trying to do?

Senator LAUSCHE. Senator Wiley, what page is that?

Senator SPARKMAN. Page 57.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We have been over it several times.

Senator AIKEN. We have already condensed it.

Senator WILEY. If that is the answer, "The committee placed too much justification on the flights," is that the answer?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I actually don't think it has but in the spirit of compromise, I mean I don't think too much justification has been placed on the flights but rather in a spirit of compromise in this business, we rather passed it over and left it in there.

Senator WILEY. Would it serve any purpose?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The second sentence of that was put in there as a modification with the idea that probably what all we should have said was that we were seeking intelligence vital to our own security. And we should not dwell so much on the matter of justification one way or the other.

That was the discussion on that point.

Senator WILEY. I can't disagree with that but you start out "The committee feels perhaps too much emphasis has been placed on justification." I don't think you can place too much emphasis on the justification for these flights.

DEFEAT OF THE MOTION

Senator LAUSCHE. He has made the thing pretty clear time and time again. I move it be stricken.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator moves it be stricken. The Clerk can call the roll.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Green?

Senator GREEN. No.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Sparkman?

Senator SPARKMAN. No.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Humphrey?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Mansfield?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Morse?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Long?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Kennedy?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Gore?

Senator GORE. No.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Lausche?

Senator **Lausche**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Church?

The **Chairman**. No.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Wiley?

Senator **Wiley**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Hickenlooper?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. No, with the understanding that I can explain what my understanding of that paragraph is without being handicapped on it.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Aiken?

Senator **Aiken**. No.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Capehart?

Mr. Carlson?

Mr. Williams?

Mr. Chairman?

The **Chairman**. No.

Mr. **St. Claire**. The motion is lost, 12 to 2.

Senator **Wiley**. I should have voted Capehart on that.

Mr. **St. Claire**. 12 to 3, sir.

The **Chairman**. All right, do I hear another motion?

ARGUMENTATIVE STATEMENT

Senator **Wiley**. Yes, on page 59, the last paragraph, it is argumentative, "This is not to say the Summit Conference would have been a success if the U-2 incident had not occurred. It is to say simply that there probably would have been a Summit Conference."

You are injecting into it which I think is an absolute mistake.

Senator **Gore**. That was the testimony of Mr. Herter.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I have to leave for a couple of minutes. My own position was I supported that as a compromise.

Senator **Wiley**. I won't call for a rollcall but just move it be stricken.

The **Chairman**. All in favor of the motion, say "aye"?

Opposed, "no"?

[Chorus of Noes.]

The **Chairman**. The "noes" have it. The motion is lost.

A THIRD OF THE VOTE

Senator **Wiley**. May I ask, to return to 61, and ask what was done in relation to, I have got it marked out, but in regard to the second question "For the reasons stated above it seems that the U.S. reaction to the failure of the U-2 complicated the problems which resulted from a failure," is that still in?

The **Chairman**. Yes, that is in.

Senator **Wiley**. Well, I don't think there is any chance. I object to it. And I think it should be stricken out. But with the cards stacked against me, look at him smiling over there——

Senator **Aiken**. We only have a third of the vote. When you only have a third of a vote there is a tendency to look favorably upon the idea of compromise.

Senator **Wiley**. Well, I agree ordinarily that is true but I want to say that when the question of my own country's welfare is involved I can't compromise.

Now, return to page 62, John, I wish you would take a look at this.

Senator **Sparkman**. I will.

STRENGTHENING KHRUSHCHEV'S POSITION

Senator **Wiley**. The last part of that sentence, of that paragraph, you are talking about it would have been in our interest to have done what we could, which would have been marginal at best to strengthen Khrushchev's position vis-a-vis the Soviet military and Chinese Communists.

If you can tell me just what that means and what the purpose of it is, why I would like to have it explained.

Senator **Sparkman**. Well, you have got to go back up to the sentence above that, "Although the evidence is neither solid nor consistent there is indication, as cited above, that Khrushchev's attitude in Paris was due, at least in part, to pressure from his own military and from the Chinese Communists" and I think what we are saying down there is if this was true, it certainly would have been to our advantage to go along on the thawing of the cold war rather than to yield to the pressures of the Soviet military and the Chinese Communists.

I don't see there is any argument to it.

Senator **Gore**. Unless you take this view, then you must condemn the whole development for the past 2 years, Mr. Nixon's trip over there, the exchanges, the whole purpose, it seems to me, has been to develop some accommodation between the East and the West. There are forces, we are told by the Secretary, in the Soviet Union who want a hard policy, who do not believe in co-existence. The whole policy and the approach of the administration has been that it is in the interest of peace to encourage those in the Soviet Union who want to reach an accommodation with the West. As far as I am concerned—I have had some questions about the whole thing but it seems to me this is more in support of your view than against it.

Senator **Wiley**. When you say whole thing what do you mean, that whole paragraph?

Senator **Sparkman**. You mean developments leading up to the summit.

Senator **Gore**. Let's vote.

DRIVING A WEDGE BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA

Senator **Aiken**. There could not be a question of whether this argument belongs in this particular report or not, but there can be no question as to the desirability about driving a wedge between warlike Red China and those people of Russia who we have reason to believe don't want to get into war.

Senator **Wiley**. Well, my question apparently was not very clear but if you will look at the first part, you will see that what you are doing, "There remains the question of future policies in the light of U-2 incidents and the failure of the summit conference," there are a lot of those people who have reached the conclusion, and if you will read in the papers that in the interest of national safety you have got to continue these U-2s and that out of the exposure of Khrushchev's actions that it was not negative.

It will be positive in our results that the action in Japan is just a follow up of what had been planned and planned and planned.

Senator **Sparkman**. Did you read the story in the Washington Post this morning of Khrushchev's speech in which he challenged the Red Chinese. It looks like he is swinging back around.

Senator **Wiley**. Sure.

Senator **Sparkman**. And everything we can do to drive that wedge in there we ought to do. Remember we are not saying anything here about the continuing or resuming the U-2 flights.

President Eisenhower has announced they will not be made.

Senator **Aiken**. Well, apparently Khrushchev's tirades did not inflame the Russian people against the United States or the West.

Senator **Sparkman**. That's right.

Senator **Wiley**. That's right.

Senator **Aiken**. It didn't work.

Senator **Wiley**. And we say in here it did in substance.

Senator **Sparkman**. No, I don't think so at all.

Senator **Gore**. Let's vote, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Sparkman**. Is there a motion, did he move to strike it?

APPEND SENATOR LAUSCHE'S CONCLUSIONS

Senator **Wiley**. I have one more motion to make. Mr. Chairman, I think there should be appended to this draft the conclusions not as they are stated but as stated by Senator Lausche, because they are the legal conclusions of the facts, and I do move.

Senator **Gore**. Well, he has that privilege without any motion.

The **Chairman**. Yes.

Senator **Wiley**. If he feels a separate report, I am talking about not getting around so where every one else has been talking that there should be a compromise.

Senator **Sparkman**. We have been working nearly a month.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I think Senator Lausche had either the right or would be accorded the privileges of appending his views at the end of this thing in the same document.

The **Chairman**. As his individual views.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. As his individual views, and I am frank to say that I would seriously consider not only signing this document but also expressing approval of the succinct way in which he has expressed his views.

Senator **Wiley**. I agree to that, Bourke. But my motion was to make it part of this document as the finding of this committee.

Senator **Gore**. Well, this committee can't make two findings.

Senator **Wiley**. Did you hear his conclusions?

Senator **Lausche**. Yes, but on that score may I say you haven't made findings, you have made arguments.

Senator **Wiley**. That's right.

Senator **Gore**. So have you, Frank.

Senator **Lausche**. I just stated what the findings are.

The **Chairman**. Let's not argue. If the Senator wants to file it he can.

Senator **Wiley**. I ask for a vote on my motion.

The **Chairman**. Call the roll?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. What is the motion?

Senator **Wiley**. To make it part of this report.

A SEPARATE STATEMENT

Senator **Sparkman**. I think it is commendable and I have a very high regard for it. I can't say that I agree with his——

Senator **Lausche**. Judgment.

Senator **Sparkman**. No, I wouldn't say judgment, the way you move from one conclusion to another. I don't think it is necessarily a logical sequitur, and that is my difference.

Senator **Lausche**. May I say this, that I realize that I haven't grouped the subjects as they should be grouped—espionage, congressional authority, May 1 flight. I dictated this this morning at 5 o'clock into a machine and I picked these thoughts up but now they have to be grouped properly.

Senator **Sparkman**. I would think that in order to incorporate that in our report we would have to start thrashing the whole thing out and seeing whether we have covered this in our report.

Senator **Lausche**. I think there would be conflicts. And if we are to put it in it ought to go in as a separate statement subscribed——

Senator **Sparkman**. As a statement of his own views or as others undoubtedly will do.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Mr. Chairman, in order to shorten it up, what is the motion made to adopt?

The **Chairman**. To incorporate it as part of a report.

Senator **Aiken**. I haven't seen it. I don't know what you are talking about.

Senator **Gore**. Even Senator Lausche doesn't want to do that.

Senator **Lausche**. What is that?

Senator **Gore**. I say you don't want to incorporate it as part of the committee's report. This is your views and anyone can join you in that who desires to do so.

The **Chairman**. Yes.

Senator **Lausche**. I wanted to point out before that some things that I have concluded are in conflict with what——

Senator **Gore**. That is right, we could not conclude that way.

Senator **Sparkman**. And some. The others are included in our report.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. We have a lot of things to do here. I am supposed to have a broadcast——

DEFEAT OF THE MOTION

Senator **Wiley**. I ask to vote on my motion.

The **Chairman**. The Clerk will call the roll.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Green?

Senator **Green**. What is the motion? No.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Sparkman?

Senator **Sparkman**. No.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Humphrey?

The **Chairman**. No.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Mansfield?

The **Chairman**. No.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Morse?

The **Chairman**. No.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Long?

The **Chairman**. No.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Kennedy?

The **Chairman**. No.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Gore?

Senator **Gore**. No.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Lausche?

Senator **Lausche**. I don't vote.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Church?

The **Chairman**. No.

Senator **Lausche**. I think it ought to go in the report and I will supply in my own statement which will be documented in support of my conclusions.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Wiley?

Senator **Wiley**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Hickenlooper?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. No.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Aiken?

Senator **Aiken**. No.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Capehart?

Senator **Wiley**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Carlson?

Mr. Williams?

Mr. Chairman?

The **Chairman**. No.

Mr. **St. Claire**. The motion is lost 12 to 2.

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I just want to make a motion, just for the clarity, that these views as finalized by Senator Lausche be authorized to be appended immediately following the report that is made, if he so desires.

Senator **Gore**. Why don't you do this, Bourke, if I may make a suggestion: That any member or group of members who desire to submit personal or additional views——

Senator **Sparkman**. Individual.

Senator **Gore**. Could do so.

Senator **Wiley**. Minority views.

Senator **Gore**. Individual views. That would include me or Senator Lausche.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. They be published in the same document.

The **Chairman**. Mechanically they ought to be supplied by tonight.

Senator **Aiken**. You ought to reshape these up a little better. Because I think they belong in a separate statement.

The **Chairman**. By what time tonight?

Mr. **Marcy**. By 5 o'clock.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Can you get those ready by 5 o'clock.

Senator LAUSCHE. I have to get this assembled. You have your staff work on it. I can't get it by 5 o'clock.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Can you get it by tomorrow?

Senator LAUSCHE. I say I will have it here by Saturday and issue it by Monday.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is too late.

RELEASES FOR THE PRESS

Senator LAUSCHE. Let's get that clarified on the press, I don't want the press hounding me to find out my views. I want to issue them through the document that I am going to speak on.

Senator AIKEN. How much are you going to tell the press about the main report?

The CHAIRMAN. If the committee votes on it then it is final as far as this goes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The suggestion was made that you have a release deadline.

The CHAIRMAN. Tomorrow.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. A release deadline so it won't be piecemeal.

The CHAIRMAN. That's right, tomorrow noon.

Senator WILEY. I don't think any report should be released to the press until you get Lausche's report and others attached to it. They should go out as one.

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Chairman, one of the press men suggested that if the committee releases a report it might be made for Sunday a.m., and he suggests Sunday a.m. because that is both the morning and the afternoon newspapers and gives them an equal break because on that day they normally publish both morning papers.

The CHAIRMAN. What would be the deadline on getting for printing the individual views in that case.

Mr. HOLT. Well, sir, if it is to be a Sunday a.m. release it should preferably be in the hands of the press on Friday.

It could be in the hands of the press as late as Saturday morning. If the committee wants it printed in pamphlet form without taking the precaution first of seeing proofs on it, it could be sent to the printing office Friday night and copies could be available Saturday morning. If the committee wants the precaution of proofs being read on it then it would have to go to the printing office tonight, proofs would have to come back tomorrow and you would have the final document Saturday.

Senator AIKEN. That means it would be ready for release at 6 o'clock Saturday night.

Senator GORE. I so move.

Senator AIKEN. Mike and I in our country newspapers are going to get left out of these in releases left for Sunday morning.

REPORT THE DOCUMENT FAVORABLY

Senator SPARKMAN. Bourke, did your motion include a favorable report on the report as it has been presented?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Senator **Sparkman**. With the privilege of individual views being presented.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I understand the motion was made.

Senator **Sparkman**. It was some time ago.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I wanted to amend it.

Senator **Sparkman**. I will reinsert the motion here.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I said in a spirit of compromise I will vote to vote it out, but I want to amend it in certain ways and I think there are other members who may disagree with some of the things.

I have the right to discuss it.

Senator **Aiken**. You have the right to discuss it. Mr. Chairman, it is going to be difficult for anyone to disagree seriously with the supplemental statement of the Senator from Ohio. Suppose about 12 members of this committee decide to go along with the Senator from Ohio on his statement?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I think they have a right to do it.

Senator **Gore**. They have a right to do so.

Senator **Aiken**. They would simply sign it as individuals.

The **Chairman**. Can you restate so the record is clear, Senator Sparkman, how you understand your motion?

Senator **Sparkman**. My motion was to report favorably the document as it has been finally edited.

The **Chairman**. Yes, plus——

Senator **Sparkman**. And then Senator Hickenlooper moved an amendment to the effect that individual views would be printed along with it.

Senator **Gore**. Why don't you adopt his amendment?

The **Chairman**. And the deadline for the furnishing of those is tomorrow night at 6 o'clcok so that they would be ready.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Tomorrow night at 6.

The **Chairman**. Tomorrow night.

Senator **Sparkman**. I am agreeable.

REPORT ADOPTED

The **Chairman**. It is understood. The Clerk will call the roll:

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Green?

Senator **Green**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Sparkman?

Senator **Sparkman**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Humphrey?

The **Chairman**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Mansfield?

Senator **Mansfield**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Morse?

The **Chairman**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Long?

The **Chairman**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Kennedy?

The **Chairman**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Gore?

Senator **Gore**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Lausche?

Senator LAUSCHE. No.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Church?

The CHAIRMAN. Aye.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Wiley?

Senator WILEY. I withhold my vote.

Senator LAUSCHE. I withhold my vote. There are parts of it with which I agree but if I file this individual report I better withhold my vote.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aye.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Aiken?

Senator AIKEN. Aye.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Capehart?

Senator CAPEHART. No.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Carlson?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aye.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Williams?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aye.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Aye.

Mr. ST. CLAIRE. Motion carried 14 to 1, with two abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN. I guess that finishes this, thank God.

QUESTIONS OF SYNTAX

Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I hesitate to raise any further questions about this because the committee has gone over it so carefully but in going over it again myself I find a number of what I think are relatively minor points of pronouns with confused antecedents, and those sorts of things, most of which arise from the process of editing.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I move if any question of grammar or syntax arises that the staff be authorized, with your approval and Senator Hickenlooper's approval to make the necessary adjustments.

Senator AIKEN. Second the motion.

Senator CAPEHART. Mr. Chairman, I think I ought to explain my vote. I am not voting particularly against the report. I am voting against the idea of any report on this particular subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator CAPEHART. I think possibly the report is about as good as it could be written. I am not criticizing anybody for voting for it but I think in the best interests of the world it could be served with no report just as I thought the President should not go to Japan and Khrushchev should not have come over here.

The CHAIRMAN. The motion of the committee is that on all of the type of errors that the staff finds of syntax, grammar, typographical errors that may exist that they be authorized to change those with the approval of myself and the Senator from Iowa.

All in favor of the motion, say "aye." [Chorus of ayes.] Opposed, "no"?

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. The "ayes" have it.

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m. the committee proceeded to other business.]

AMBASSADORIAL NOMINATIONS

THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 11:30 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Captiol, Hon. J. William Fulbright, presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Sparkman, Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Capehart.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Denney, and Mr. St. Claire of the committee staff.

[Senator Lausche raised the question of consideration of passport legislation. The chairman stated that it was a subject scheduled for the committee's next meeting on Tuesday, June 28.

On motion by Senator Sparkman, the committee ordered favorably reported the bill H.R. 12263, to authorize the conclusion of an agreement for the joint construction by the United States and Mexico of a major international storage dam on the Rio Grande in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of Feb. 3, 1944, with Mexico (Armistad Dam).]

REPORT ON U-2 INCIDENT

Senator **LAUSCHE**. Let's find out how we are going to handle the press.

Senator **SPARKMAN**. Wait, we have got more work to do.

The **CHAIRMAN**. We are going to tell them that we have agreed upon it and it would be ready to be given to the press for release on a.m. Sunday.

Mr. **MARCY**. We will give it to the press on Saturday morning, with the statement on that for Sunday a.m. release.

The **CHAIRMAN**. That's right.

Mr. **MARCY**. That means the radio can begin using it at 6 p.m. on Saturday evening but no newspaper can use it unless the newspaper is published on Sunday morning.

Some New York editions go at 12 o'clock at night.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. All I am going to say is that it is rather detailed and I can't discuss the details. They will all be in the report.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. They will ask you if you are in accord, now I am not going to tell them that I am going to file a dissenting view at this time because they will begin probing and asking what it is.

Senator **GORE**. That is your privilege.

Senator **Lausche**. I want to tie my statement in with the chairman's.

The **Chairman**. They will undoubtedly say was it unanimous? Will there be dissenting views? I think I will have to say yes, there will be.

Senator **Gore**. Why not say this, each member is given the privilege to file separate views.

The **Chairman**. When they press you, you don't want me to say that, nobody.

Senator **Aiken**. Say it is a question for each member to answer for themselves.

The **Chairman**. You have to say there will probably be individual views.

Senator **Gore**. Why don't you say without identifying his.

Senator **Lausche**. He should not identify me.

The **Chairman**. They are bound to ask was it unanimous or are there individual views or a minority report.

Senator **Lausche**. You can handle it.

The **Chairman**. I will say that will not be finally determined until the deadline tomorrow night at 6 o'clock, if you should fail in the meantime to file it you might not do it. But I will say there probably will be individual views.

Senator **Aiken**. Mr. Chairman, have we got our cover story decided? [Laughter.]

The **Chairman**. There is a whole lot more here to be done. We have taken so much time on this.

Senator **Gore**. George, you are worth a million.

The **Chairman**. Mr. Henderson, I apologize for the lateness of the hour but the committee found it very difficult to agree on the proceeding matter.

STATEMENT OF LOY HENDERSON, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ADMINISTRATION

Mr. **Henderson**. I am very pleased to be here at your service.

The **Chairman**. Gentlemen, here is the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration.

The questions were raised yesterday why there are so many career ambassadors. I forget now who did it.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I did, I raised it.

The **Chairman**. And there is another matter of Senator Carlson's.

Would you give us some light about this matter, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. **Henderson**. I will be glad to.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. What are you talking about?

The **Chairman**. First someone did or you raised it about the career ambassadors.

Senator **Wiley**. What is meant by career ambassadors?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. That is what he is going to tell us about.

CAREER AMBASSADORS

Mr. **Henderson**. The career ambassador is the name of the highest rank in the Foreign Service. The Foreign Service's highest rank is career ambassador and the second rank is career minister and then the third rank is Foreign Service officer Class 1.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. When was the career ambassador rank established?

Mr. **Henderson**. In 1955 legislation was enacted which created the new rank of career ambassador. At that time we, the State Department, in justifying the creation of that rank indicated that it was the intention not to have more than 8 or 10 career ambassadors at any one time.

Shortly afterwards, four career ambassadors were appointed. Three of those four were over 60 years of age, and one was about 56, if I am not mistaken.

The idea at the time was that the title or rank of career ambassador should be conferred upon a Foreign Service minister who had served a number of years for the Government, at least 15, who had been an ambassador at least 3 years, and who had been a career minister at least 3 years. The idea was that the title of career ambassador would be conferred upon senior officers who had had long and distinguished careers.

At the present time the regulations provide that there shall be no more than 10 career ambassadors. That a person must be in his latter fifties in order to be a career ambassador. He must have served for the Government at least 15 years, must have had the rank of an ambassador, of ambassador outside the continental United States for at least 3 years, and that he should have been a career minister for 3 years.

Senator **Green**. What does that mean outside of the United States?

Mr. **Henderson**. That is, it wouldn't count if a man has the rank of ambassador and stationed in the Department of State or is stationed in Washington or anywhere in the United States. If he is to have credit for the 3 years he must have been a chief of mission or have had the rank of ambassador while serving abroad in some capacity other than chief of mission.

AN HONORARY TITLE

Senator **Capehart**. What is the purpose of the career ambassador, what do you hope to accomplish by having career ambassadors over just ambassadors?

Mr. **Henderson**. A career ambassador is not over ambassadors.

Senator **Capehart**. I mean why career ambassador, why not all ambassador?

Senator **Mansfield**. Will you yield there, this is the result of legislation passed by this committee creating this position. It gives special recognition to men performing outstanding service.

Senator **Capehart**. Purely an honorary title.

Mr. **Henderson**. It is an honorary title, it takes with it the salary of $20,000 a year, but for many years, up to this time no one's salary has been increased by his employment as a career ambassador since every officer who has been made a career ambassador was receiving a salary more than $20,000 a year.

Senator **Green**. Was there separate legislation for that?

Mr. Henderson. It was incorporated in a bill which had several features.

Senator Mansfield. And which was reported out by this committee unanimously about 2 years ago.

Mr. Henderson. In 1955.

Senator Mansfield. 1955.

Mr. Henderson. Yes.

The Chairman. Any further questions on this?

ONLY ONE ACTIVE CAREER AMBASSADOR

Senator Hickenlooper. At the present time are you the only active career ambassador?

Mr. Henderson. No, sir, I am retired from the service.

Senator Hickenlooper. Who is it?

Mr. Henderson. The career ambassador is Freeman Matthews who is the Ambassador in Vienna; all the others have retired.

Senator Aiken. The 10 who have the title can be either in or out of the service.

Mr. Henderson. No, they have to be in the service.

Senator Aiken. They have to be in the service.

Mr. Henderson. They have to be in the service.

Senator Aiken. Those who are out would be career ambassadors emeritus.

Mr. Henderson. We hope it would be emeritus.

Senator Aiken. You hope it would be emeritus for a long time.

Senator Hickenlooper. A career minister can be assigned as an ambassador.

Mr. Henderson. So can a Foreign Service officer Class 1 be assigned as ambassador.

Senator Hickenlooper. What is the limitation or the perquisites so far as assignments are concerned of a career ambassador?

Does he have to always be an ambassador thereafter?

Mr. Henderson. No, sir, that is merely a rank that is conferred upon him, a personal rank.

Senator Hickenlooper. Can he be appointed as a chief of mission with a lesser rank than ambassador?

Mr. Henderson. Yes sir, he can be assigned to any post that the Secretary or the President desires to assign him. This is a personal rank that goes with him.

It doesn't change with his position.

Senator Hickenlooper. But he always carries the rank of ambassador?

Mr. Henderson. Of career ambassador.

Senator Mansfield. That friend of yours in Hong Kong is a career minister although he is just a Consul General actually?

Senator Hickenlooper. I understand that, but I am talking about what we are freezing these career ambassadors into, whether it is freezing them into a particular situation——

Mr. Henderson. Could I answer that? All ranks in the Foreign Service are attached to the person and not to the position, and this is a Foreign Service rank and therefore a career ambassador can be assigned as I said a moment ago to any position.

WHY SUCH A LARGE GROUP?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Well, the question raised in my mind why so many sent up here and why suddenly we have to have 7 career ambassadors here all in a batch?

It would seem to me we could approach it more easily if maybe year by year we would send up one or two. This pretty well fills the ranks now. The cup is full almost, here, that will make eight career ambassadors and there is room for only two more than that and I don't know that there is any particular objection to it but I was just mystified as to why it came up at this time.

Mr. **Henderson**. It was our original intention to limit as I said a moment ago the number to between 8 and 10. After 1956 when the first group of career ambassadors was appointed, Mr. Dulles for various reasons, was unwilling to send any more names up.

I think that one reason was that he wanted, he thought some of our best men were not old enough to be career ambassadors since we had an age limit of the latter fifties, and he preferred to wait until they reached an older age until some of these men whom he considered particularly valuable were old enough to qualify to be career ambassadors, so at the present time when the panels met, it was very difficult to choose some of these officers and not include others, and so the result was seven officers have been chosen all of whom have a very high reputation in the service, all of whom are over 50 years of age, and all of whom, it is believed, are worthy of this title.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Well, they are all very distinguished public servants so far as that is concerned, we have a lot of other distinguished public servants.

Senator **Capehart**. I presume one reason why the six or seven names coming up at once is the same reason that the postmasters are being held up at the moment and it is just the opposite. Here the President is going out of office, so he is awarding six people or seven.

Mr. **Henderson**. Could I answer that?

Mr. **Capehart**. Yes, sir. I have no objections to it.

Mr. **Henderson**. I assure you that was not the reason.

The **Chairman**. Gentlemen, can we recess and come back? There are two or three other matters; the Secretary is here, and it would be very inconvenient for him to come back.

We will recess for 10 minutes.

[Brief recess.]

The **Chairman**. The committee will come to order.

Senator Hickenlooper. I believe, was engaged or Senator Capehart, one or the other——

Senator **Capehart**. I think I finished.

The **Chairman**. Senator Hickenlooper, if Senator Capehart finished——

REQUIRED QUALIFICATIONS

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I don't know, these are all able men in the Foreign Service, no question about that. Of course, I am in no position to pass on the qualifications.

The **Chairman**. Could I ask a question while you are thinking?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. I am just bothered about it is all.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't want to interrupt. I want to ask you a question.

In Section 502 under the first condition of appointment, it says "Serve for at least 15 years in a position of responsibility in a government agency." It doesn't say—or agencies. "Including at least 3 years as career minister." Does that mean a man who has served as an employee of the Department of Agriculture or a Senator or a Congressman or anyone else qualified for this, does he count the years he served in any agency?

Mr. HENDERSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. This would mean a man could be made a career minister or ambassador without having been an ambassador?

Mr. HENDERSON. No, that is one qualification. Another is he must have been a career minister for 3 years.

The CHAIRMAN. How does he get to be a career minister?

Mr. HENDERSON. He must have been a Foreign Service officer of Class 1 for at least 3 years.

The CHAIRMAN. Then do the cumulative requirement of the three elements there mean that he must have been in the Foreign Service at least 15 years?

Mr. HENDERSON. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it work out that way?

Mr. HENDERSON. No, it means he must be in the Foreign Service at least 6 years and he must have been in government service 15 years.

The reason we put in our bill 15 years in government service is because we didn't want to prejudice some of the latter entries, some of the officers, from becoming a career ambassador if they had spent a number of years in some other government department.

The CHAIRMAN. As a practical matter, have every one of these seven names been in the Foreign Service 15 years?

Mr. HENDERSON. In the State Department or the Foreign Service for more than 15 years. The average length of service in the State Department or Foreign Service is more than 25 years.

The CHAIRMAN. In the State Department or Foreign Service.

Mr. HENDERSON. Is more than 25 years.

The CHAIRMAN. These are not transfers from some other government agencies.

Mr. HENDERSON. No, the one who has been in every one of these offices have been in more than 30 years, except one, that is Livy [Livingston] Merchant. Livy Merchant came to us about 15 years ago, I think. He has been in a little over 15 years.

The CHAIRMAN. In the State Department?

Mr. HENDERSON. In the State Department.

THE BOARD OF FOREIGN SERVICE

The CHAIRMAN. Who makes up the Board of the Foreign Service who make these recommendations?

Mr. HENDERSON. The Board of Foreign Service is composed of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, who is chairman, that is I.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. **Henderson**. Two other assistant secretaries of State designated by the Secretary to serve on the Board, the Director General of the Foreign Service, and one representative each occupying positions with comparable responsibilities from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce and Labor, designated respectively by the heads of such departments.

The **Chairman**. Who is on the Board?

Mr. **Henderson**. There was appointed a group, a panel to make recommendations to the Board of Foreign Service. The panel was composed of the following: Would you like to have the names of the panel?

The **Chairman**. Yes, put them on the record.

Mr. **Henderson**. Mr. Dillon, Mr. Robert Murphy, Mr. Merchant, Mr. Freeman Matthews, part time, he put in a vote but had to leave to go to his post——

The **Chairman**. This was a panel, you say special panel?

Mr. **Henderson**. Panel established to make recommendations to the Board of Foreign Service.

The **Chairman**. Go ahead.

Mr. **Henderson**. That comprises the panel. This panel selected five officers.

CASE OF LIVINGSTON MERCHANT

Later Mr. Merchant was on this panel because at that time he was not eligible to be a career ambassador since he had not served 3 years consecutively as chief of mission with the rank of ambassador as provided for in the regulations at that time.

Subsequently, the regulations were changed so that any one who has served abroad 3 years as an ambassador would be eligible. Mr. Merchant had served 2 years abroad with the rank of ambassador in ECA, so when you added those 2 years in the ECA with the rank of ambassador, plus 2½ years in Ottowa, he was eligible for promotion to the rank of career ambassador.

So a second panel was set up to consider who would be eligible under the new regulations. This second panel was composed of Mr. Dillon, Mr. Ray Hare who is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs, Mr. Gallman, Director General of the Foreign Service, and I. This panel voted in favor of Livy Merchant as being eligible under the new regulations.

The **Chairman**. Were these regulations tailored specifically to fit Mr. Merchant's case?

Mr. **Henderson**. I wouldn't say that, Mr. Chairman. However, I don't believe that they would have been adopted if the question of Mr. Merchant had not arisen.

I may say, Mr. Merchant knew nothing about this, didn't even know his name was on the list until it was announced.

These regulations were changed because it didn't seem quite fair for a man who served 2½ years, 2 years abroad with the rank of ambassador, not to have had some credit for that, even though he was not chief of mission.

Mr. Livingston Merchant is Under Secretary of State for Political——

The **Chairman**. Was that ECA you are talking about?

Mr. **Henderson**. Before that, he was in ECA in Paris.

The **Chairman**. In Paris?

Mr. **Henderson**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. That is when we had 5 or 6 ambassadors in Paris?

Mr. **Henderson**. Yes, sir, well, not 5 or 6, we had 3 or 4, I think he was one of those ambassadors.

The **Chairman**. Well, it was a large number. [Laughter.]

What had he been before that?

Mr. **Henderson**. He had been ambassador at Ottawa.

The **Chairman**. Before ECA.

Mr. **Henderson**. Before ECA he had been in the Department.

The **Chairman**. Foreign Service officer.

Mr. **Henderson**. No, he was a Foreign Service officer reserve, I believe, he served in China, and in several capacities in the Department, and then he was detailed to ECA. That is during the last 15 years.

TWO PANELS

The **Chairman**. Does it appear, if I understood you, that this panel has on it the men who are to be selected?

Mr. **Henderson**. No, sir, they haven't.

The **Chairman**. Didn't they?

Mr. **Henderson**. This was the second panel. The second panel considered only those people who would be eligible under the revised legislation.

The **Chairman**. You had two panels?

Mr. **Henderson**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. Now did you give the name of the Board of Foreign Service who makes the final——

Senator **Sparkman**. Mr. Chairman, before you leave that——

The **Chairman**. Yes.

Senator **Sparkman**. There was this thing that struck me as a little—well, raised a question in my mind. Mr. Merchant was on the first panel.

Then this question came up about his appointment.

Mr. **Henderson**. No, it didn't come up at the panel.

Senator **Sparkman**. I realize that but it came up within the mind of some of you people.

Mr. **Henderson**. The first panel was given in advance a list of people who were eligible to be ambassadors.

Senator **Sparkman**. And his name was not on it?

Mr. **Henderson**. Yes, that is right.

Senator **Sparkman**. But in the meantime the question came up that he ought to be eligible, it became discussed.

Mr. **Henderson**. Yes, that's right.

Senator **Sparkman**. Then you constituted a new panel and left Mr. Merchant off?

Mr. **Henderson**. No, what we did was——

Senator **Sparkman**. And put on the second panel, Mr. Hare, who had been selected by the first panel that Mr. Merchant was on.

Mr. **Henderson**. Yes, that is right but let me explain, Mr. Hare had not been informed and so far as I know he was not aware he had been selected as ambassador.

This second panel had the obligation of selecting, of finding those people who were not eligible.

Senator **Sparkman**. Did they just have additional names?

Mr. **Henderson**. Who were not eligible the first time.

Senator **Sparkman**. Yes.

Mr. **Henderson**. They were now eligible at this time, and therefore they were eligible the first time they were considering only those eligible at this time.

Senator **Aiken**. How much time had elapsed between the first and second panels?

Mr. **Henderson**. About 5 months, 4 months.

The **Chairman**. How many people were considered by the second panel?

How many names were submitted to them?

Mr. **Henderson**. I beg your pardon.

The **Chairman**. How many names were submitted to the second panel? How many turned out to be eligible under the new regulations?

Mr. **Henderson**. Only one name.

The **Chairman**. Mr. Merchant?

CASE OF JAMES RIDDLEBERGER

Mr. **Henderson**. Yes, sir, however, this second panel took another position while it was in session, and that was it took upon itself to recommend the appointment, the addition of Mr. Riddleberger's name. It was pointed out that at the time the first panel met which was in December, Mr. Riddleberger——

The **Chairman**. December 1958.

Mr. **Henderson**. Yes, Mr. Riddleberger was suffering from a heart attack, and although his name came up it was left out because it was thought at that time he would never be able to return again to the Service. Since he was eminently qualified, and this second panel made the suggestion, without being authorized to do so, to the Board of Foreign Service that it might consider adding his name to the list in view of the work which he was doing, in view of his career and in view of the fact that his name had been dropped from consideration the first time because of his illness.

So the second panel added the name of Mr. Merchant and Mr. Riddleberger.

Senator **Aiken**. Mr. Chairman——

The **Chairman**. The Senator from Vermont.

Senator **Aiken**. I would like to say I have observed the work of Livy Merchant more than probably any of the others there. I do know he did outstanding work in Canada. I think he was instrumental in quieting the situation in Panama, and is by nature a diplomat, and by nature is well liked by people that he has to work for and with.

I don't know how the criteria were set up, but if it were set up to include Mr. Merchant it is no different from criteria set up in most other agencies in government, but I would say that he is one of the worthy people in the State Department.

A CASUAL KIND OF PROCEDURE

The **Chairman**. I don't think there is any criticism of any of these people. I am trying to get into the procedure. It looks like a rather casual kind of procedure that ought to be looked at.

Senator **Aiken**. One hand washing the other.

The **Chairman**. I think it might subject the Department to some criticism. I think a thing of this importance could be handled a little more orderly in a regular manner so there would not be so much criticism.

Senator **Aiken**. I am not sure that Mr. Livy Merchant had 15 years when that first panel met.

Mr. **Henderson**. He had had it.

Senator **Aiken**. It met in December.

Mr. **Henderson**. Yes.

Senator **Aiken**. He came in 1944 or 1945.

Mr. **Henderson**. I don't recall but he had 15 years.

Senator **Aiken**. He had as I recall it just at the end of World War II or immediately thereafter.

ROTATION WITH RETIREMENTS

Senator **Sparkman**. Mr. Chairman, if I may ask just a couple of other questions and I will be through, I am going to have to leave, I have an appointment at 12:30 and I have to be back here by 1 o'clock. There are only 10 under your regulations to be placed in the list of career diplomats.

Mr. **Henderson**. Yes.

Senator **Sparkman**. And in this it brings the number to nine.

Mr. **Henderson**. To eight.

Senator **Sparkman**. To eight is it?

Mr. **Henderson**. Yes.

Senator **Sparkman**. What is going to happen when you get that filled? Do they retain this title after they retire, or when they retire, does the place become vacant?

Mr. **Henderson**. When they retire the place becomes vacant.

Senator **Sparkman**. So there will be rotation by the normal retirement?

Mr. **Henderson**. That's right. I think eventually the men who become career ambassador will be older than the average man on this list and I don't think it is bad.

I think it is preferable that they should be older.

Senator **Sparkman**. It seems that way to me. I said something to you a while ago about it, the appointees under the Wriston Program, and you told me, and I certainly think I can see, that they really haven't had time to ripen yet, is that right?

Mr. **Henderson**. That's right.

Senator **Sparkman**. I was just thinking of one who it seems to me has been there a long time, Francis Russell who was Ambassador to Australia, I believe he came into the Foreign Service under the Wriston Program, did he not?

Mr. **Henderson**. He did, sir.

Senator **Sparkman**. Is he on the eligible list yet?

Mr. **Henderson**. Could I speak off the record a moment?

Senator **Sparkman**. Yes.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator **Sparkman**. All right, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Any other questions along this line?

MEMBERSHIP OF THE BOARD

Did you put in the record who was on the Board of Foreign Service, how many are there on that board? That is a permanent board, is it?

Mr. **Henderson**. I put on the record who is on it.

Let's see, six, I believe, five or six.

The **Chairman**. That is not just an ad hoc committee?

Mr. **Henderson**. No, that is by law.

The **Chairman**. It continues from year to year?

Mr. **Henderson**. That's right. It does not have to accept any suggestion made to it by any panel.

The **Chairman**. Does the Secretary of State appoint the Board of Foreign Service officers?

Mr. **Henderson**. Yes, except the chairman provided by law, the members of the Board of Foreign Service, the membership is provided for by law.

The **Chairman**. It is?

Mr. **Henderson**. Yes, except that the Secretary shall determine which two other Assistant Secretaries of State shall be on the Board of Foreign Service.

The **Chairman**. It is their responsibility for final action.

Mr. **Henderson**. That is right.

The **Chairman**. They recommend to the Secretary.

Mr. **Henderson**. That is right.

The **Chairman**. And the Secretary makes the appointment.

Mr. **Henderson**. What I have been describing to you the actions of the panel I think you will bear in mind these panels were merely making recommendations to the board.

Usually the board accepts the recommendations of the panel but it does not have to.

The **Chairman**. I see.

APPROVAL OF ALL SEVEN

Well, you feel it is very important that all seven of these be approved at this time, is that right?

Mr. **Henderson**. I do, sir, I think it would be very unfortunate to have any one dropped from this list. I think that every one of these officers on the list is a dedicated officer who devoted his life to the Government, and to the Foreign Service.

The **Chairman**. Does the record clearly show what is the advantage of this designation, they get, what is it $750 more salary than they do as ambassador?

Mr. **Henderson**. No, they get $20,000 a year, and every one on this list except one is receiving already more than $20,000 a year in his present post. That one is the present career minister assigned to the Department and he will receive an increase in salary of $750.

The CHAIRMAN. Which one is that?

Mr. HENDERSON. Mr. Bohlen.

The CHAIRMAN. Well now, the others, are they going to take a decrease in salary?

Mr. HENDERSON. No, they already have larger salaries than the salary of a career ambassador. Under the law, if a Foreign Service officer holds a Presidential appointee position which pays more than his rank in the Foreign Service, he receives a salary from that position.

The CHAIRMAN. Would an example of that be, I just think the record ought to be clear. We may be asked about this.

Mr. HENDERSON. Please.

The CHAIRMAN. And I don't understand it, if one of these men is serving as an assistant secretary at a higher salary, if he does go back to the field as a career ambassador he drops back to the $20,000.

Mr. HENDERSON. No, sir, if he goes back to the field as an ambassador, he will draw the salary of the ambassador in charge of a mission. There are four ranks of ambassador in charge of missions, the lowest is $20,000, then there is $22,500, there is $25,000, $27,500, therefore, any ambassador in charge of a mission receives as much as a career ambassador and many of them receive more, so that he would not receive any more salary because of his rank.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you sum it up by saying this is essentially an honorary title? It does not really carry in and of itself any particular advantage, is that correct?

Mr. HENDERSON. That is right, sir, yes.

AMBASSADORS AND MINISTERS

The CHAIRMAN. And a while ago when you were describing it you said "A career ambassador and a career minister," what is the title of just plain ambassador?

Mr. HENDERSON. An ambassador when we refer to an ambassador we refer to a person who is chief of an embassy, that is an ambassador.

A career ambassador can serve as an ambassador or he can serve as Assistant Secretary or Under Secretary of State.

The CHAIRMAN. What we in common parlance refer to as political appointments, they are called just an ambassador.

Mr. HENDERSON. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And when his term is over on that particular appointment he won't carry any title. He may leave the service as many do.

Mr. HENDERSON. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, any other questions?

Senator CAPEHART. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator CAPEHART. I will be happy to move we approve these.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper had to go make a little broadcast and I told him we would discuss this other matter, maybe, for the record.

Senator Hickenlooper is a personal friend of one of them and I was trying to accommodate him.

SITUATION AT TUNIS

He rather wanted to be here when he came in and he thought maybe in the meantime you might for the record discuss the matter which Senator Carlson is interested in so that he could at least read the record and see what the explanation is although he is unable to be present and it might save another meeting. If it is agreeable with you.

Senator **Capehart**. I read this yesterday.

The **Chairman**. Have you read the letter?

Senator **Capehart**. I have read the letter.

The **Chairman**. Would you comment on it for the record as to an explanation?

Mr. **Henderson**. Yes, sir, could I speak for a moment off the record?

The **Chairman**. Well the main reason for this is for the enlightenment of Mr. Carlson.

Mr. **Henderson**. If I could just speak off the record to ask a question.

The **Chairman**. All right.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator **Capehart**. Is there anything to the charges?

Mr. **Henderson**. There is to the charges something true in that he did fly the flag at half mast.

Senator **Capehart**. Why?

Mr. **Henderson**. Could I read the telegram?

The **Chairman**. Yes, let him go ahead and make the story for the record.

Mr. **Henderson**. Could I read briefly the telegram?

The **Chairman**. Yes.

Mr. **Henderson**. This is from the ambassador [Walter N.] Walmsley, a telegram dated June 22 in response to an inquiry from us. "I hope the following will be helpful to Mr. Macomber and Mr. Henderson." I am reading this in some paraphrase, if you don't mind.

The **Chairman**. All right.

[The document referred to follows:]

Paraphrase of Telegram Number 1851 from Tunis, Dated June 22, 1960

In answer to your telegram the following should be helpful in handling matter.

1. To my knowledge there were no Chiefs of Mission invited to go to CAP BON with President Bourguiba on his five-day tour. I was aware that Bourguiba planned to inaugurate a dam at Menzel Bou Zelfa (ICA had made a contribution to its construction) on the 13th of April and I asked the Foreign Office if I would be receiving an invitation to attend. I had thought I would make a short talk, for the purposes of public relations, if there were no objections from the President. USOM's Acting Director attended, though no diplomats were invited.

2. I received on approximately April 13 or 14, from the president of the annual fair at Nabeul, an invitation to attend ceremonies on Good Friday which were to be under the "haut patronage" of the President . . . a local indication that it is not mandatory to accept. I asked the acting chief of protocol if there would be any misunderstanding if I did not appear, explaining that I did not normally accept invitations on Good Friday. He replied that there was no reason why I should not be excused. I sent a letter of regret to the fair's president.

3. At my request, Robert Black, Acting Director of USOM, represented me. This seemed appropriate since Nabeul is the center of the Ceramic Industry in Tunis and ICA had contributed to its modernization, with Brian O'Brian serving as ceramic consultant.

4. It was later learned that several Chiefs of Mission had not accepted the invitation and that the President had fallen behind his schedule, thus was unable to visit some of the exhibits (including ceramics) before going on the air at 10:00 a.m.

5. Since Good Friday is a Christian day of mourning at the Chancery, and to help explain any possible questions about my not attending the ceremonies at Nabeul, I had flag flown at half mast. Some staff members raised question and accepted explanation. Staff members who wished to attend church on Friday afternoon were excused (including my wife and I). To my knowledge this was not considered by anyone to be a joke.

6. No signs of "adverse public relations" have been reported by [deleted.]

7. Re procedure for flying flags in Tunis, refer to EMDES 856 which enclosed two FONOFF notes, and DEPT's A-107. The Foreign Office notes, the second governing, recommends that we display flags in accordance with Tunisian custom, that is, on Fridays and Sundays, on our own national holidays and those of Tunis. In DEPT's A-107 we were instructed to conform "with local regulations and customs re flag display."

8. In our G-315 we verified this custom.

FLAG-FLYING CUSTOMS

The CHAIRMAN. Does that mean you don't fly the American flag every day over the embassy?

Mr. HENDERSON. No, we don't.

The CHAIRMAN. Only on Fridays and Sundays.

Mr. HENDERSON. Our regulations provide that the American flag should be flown every day unless it is the custom of the country or unless the government of the country asks us not to do it at which time and under which circumstances we shall conform with the custom of the country or with the request of the government.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the custom varies from country to country.

Mr. HENDERSON. It does.

The CHAIRMAN. Only in Tunisia do you fly only on Friday and Sunday.

Mr. HENDERSON. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. In a place like Paris you fly it every day.

Mr. HENDERSON. Every day. In most countries we fly it every day. I have here a list of countries, which I brought with me, which show in some countries we fly it every day and in some we fly the various days of the week and we had authorized him——

The CHAIRMAN. Is this uniform for all embassies there for other countries?

Mr. HENDERSON. Every other embassy did it except he says here the Ganyan Embassy didn't do it because it seemed to be a new embassy and didn't seem to realize what the regulations were but our other embassies were living up to the regulations.

The CHAIRMAN. Did every other embassy's fly at half mast?

Mr. HENDERSON. Yes, sir, the Catholic embassies did.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean about that?

Mr. HENDERSON. The embassies from Catholic countries.

The CHAIRMAN. What does that mean?

Mr. HENDERSON. Spain, Argentina.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the custom.

Mr. HENDERSON. That is the custom in all countries where it is an established religion.

Senator **Capehart**. To fly the flag at half mast.

Mr. **Henderson**. That is correct.

CRITICISM OF FLYING FLAG AT HALF-MAST

Senator **Capehart**. What criticism could this man have?

Mr. **Henderson**. Well, the criticism would be that we are not—the Church is separate from the state here and therefore we should not have flown the flag on Good Friday since we are not a Christian state or Catholic state.

The **Chairman**. You mean not flown it at half mast.

Mr. **Henderson**. Should have flown it but not at half mast.

The **Chairman**. Is he a Catholic?

Mr. **Henderson**. Yes, sir, he is a strong Catholic but not fanatical.

He lives very rigorously up to the Catholic religion, and therefore, it has been his custom for many years not to accept any invitation on Good Friday.

And he made a mistake of judgment, in my opinion, by using the flag to strengthen his excuse. That was a mistake of judgment which in my opinion is not primary.

Senator **Capehart**. That is right, I think that is about all there is to it.

The **Chairman**. I think that covers the letter all right. Does it not?

Well, now, gentlemen, I think——

APPROVAL OF CAREER AMBASSADORS

Senator **Capehart**. Could we approve these ambassadors? I make a motion.

The **Chairman**. I was trying to accommodate Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator **Capehart**. I move to approve.

The **Chairman**. You move to approve the career ambassadors. Without objection the motion is carried. What about these other three?

Bourke is a personal friend of Summers and the committee asked all three to come. They are all three waiting here.

Senator **Capehart**. I move we confirm them without seeing them.

The **Chairman**. I had an understanding with Bourke that we would wait.

Why don't we go back and vote here?

[Brief recess.]

The **Chairman**. The committee will come to order.

We have three new appointments here that the committee requested to come before us, Mr. Summers of Maryland, I wonder, would you come over and sit here, Mr. Hickenlooper wants to talk to you.

Mr. Summers is nominated to be Ambassador to Luxembourg in place of Vinton Chapin.

Senator Hickenlooper, would you care to address the committee.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. In the interest of the committee of course I have known him for a good many years, and I am a very good friend and so on and I would appreciate it for the committee and the record if you would merely put into the record your international experience and where you have been over the years, if you could do that.

[Mr. Summers' biographical data follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA OF A. BURKE SUMMERS

Present Position: Business and financial consultant
Considered For: Ambassador to Luxembourg
Born: Mattoon, Illinois, July 27, 1898
Education: Student, University of Washington; B.S., University of Pennsylvania; Student, Language School, Vienna, Austria
Marital Status: Married
Experience: Non Government:
1919—Alaska Bureau of Fisheries and Hudson Bay Company in British Columbia
1930—Made an Industrial study of Western Europe
1939—Comprehensive studies of development of Mexican industries
1945—Mem. of Commission, assisted by National City Bank of New York and Pan American Airways, studying post-war economy and financial requirements of all Latin American countries
1947—Made market and sales surveys of South Africa, British East Africa, the Near East, Egypt, Greece, as well as Western Europe, Finland and Scandinavia
1948—Studied post-war economy and financial requirements of Spain, Portugal and France
1947-48—At request of then Luxembourg Ambassador LeGallais and Luxembourg Minister of Economy Strunk attempted to assist that country in securing and developing its medium industry
1953—Discussions with Prime Minister Pella and other Italian officials covering Italy's post-war economic industrialization and immigration-population problems. Also, held interviews with bankers, manufacturers and businessmen in France and Spain
1956—Made comprehensive study heavy and medium industry, chemicals and transportation systems in fifteen Western European countries and also Algeria
1958-59—Visited Japan, Korea, Thailand, The Philippine Islands, south Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaya, Indonesia, Burma, India, Nepal, Kashmir, Pakistan, Lebanon, Cyprus and Turkey—making an economic and political survey for an Am. broadcasting corporation
Present—Business and financial consultant
Government:
1920—Sec. to first Senatorial Congressional Committee to visit the Philippine Islands, China, Korea, Manchuria and Japan
1922—Analyst and writer for Federal Reserve Bulletin, following taking B.A. degree from Wharton School of Commerce and Finance at University of Pennsylvania. Previous study at foreign trade and currency at University of Washington at Seattle
1959—Appointed by President Eisenhower to American Committee for World Refugees
1959—Mem. U.S. Delegation to inauguration of President Tubman of Liberia, and installation of Republic of French Cameroun. Appointed by President on Delegation headed by U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. Secured first-hand information on financial, industrial and trade conditions affecting the United States.
Military: None stated
Home: Holly Oaks, Tilden Lane, Rockville, Maryland
Office: 308 Barr Building, Washington, D.C.
Legal Residence: Maryland

STATEMENT OF A. BURKE SUMMERS, NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR TO LUXEMBOURG

Mr. **SUMMERS.** Yes, Senator.

The **CHAIRMAN.** That is what experience you have had in foreign countries and over the years and the times and the dates and things of that sort.

Senator CAPEHART. You mean at a later date?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I mean right now.

Mr. SUMMERS. Do you want me to cover all of these experiences in any detail?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I wouldn't say in any detail. I would just suggest it to you. I know you have been in many foreign countries and many times under various circumstances and I would like just for the record to show your foreign experience.

EXPERIENCES ABROAD

Mr. SUMMERS. Well, of course as a boy, I was with my father in Vienna, he was President of the American Medical Society there at the University of Vienna. I went to a German-Austrian school there and spent considerable time and studied German. In 1930, I spent a good deal of time in Western Europe.

I went through many of the countries, went through many of their industrial plants, and then in 1945 I headed a commission that was sponsored by many of our leading American corporations who wanted to get a close intimate picture of what had happened in South American and Latin American countries during the war when there was practically no communications.

They were especially anxious to know about the possibilities of political umbrella and what they had to do to do business there, the possibilities of foreign exchanges so I spent 6 months down there with two other men and Mrs. Summers. It was a very revealing and rewarding experience because many of these countries wanted to subsequently establish plants there.

In 1947, I was chairman of the board of an export corporation, and we were interested in foreign trade so I spent 6 months in Africa, Middle Europe, the Near East, and all the way through Scandinavia. I also took some time out while I was down there in Kenya for a safari which is something I will always cherish. I had an opportunity of finding out what the competition was from the various European countries, the various American countries, and it gave me a very close insight into the possibilities of what has since become the Common Market and the Outer 7.[1] Then in 1948 I went back to Europe again, also in a business capacity, and I was particularly at that time in Spain and Portugal and the low countries, and up into Scandinavia again.

In 1953 I was back in Europe doing the same thing. In 1956 I spent about 6 months in North Africa, Southeastern Europe, all of Central Europe, and all of the Scandinavian countries. I had the opportunity of meeting the heads of many of the largest cartels and banks and financial institutions, having gone through their plants, evaluating their labor and their productivity and all the problems they were faced with. It also pointed up the competitive situation that we have since become faced with.

In the fall of 1958, I started in the Orient and was gone a little over 6 months throughout all the countries of the Orient or the

---

[1] The "Outer 7" were the United Kingdom, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland, who organized the European Free Trade Association in 1959. They were the counterpart to "The Six" original members of the Common Market.

Western Pacific as the Navy calls it down through Southeastern Asia, through India, and then into Europe again.

I did that for a broadcasting system who wanted both economic and political background for a series of broadcasts, and I have just come back from that a year ago.

Subsequently the President appointed me to the mission for the freedom of the Cameroons and Tubman's inauguration in Liberia.

While I was there I took the opportunity to make every possible inquiry into the economic as well as the political facets of both those countries. I have had other trips including the time I spent in Mexico, I used to have a home established there, one time I knew considerable Spanish, I don't remember too much of it, and this industrial development of every part of the world has been a major problem and a major interest to me, and it applies particularly to Western Europe.

Is that sufficient?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, yes, I just wanted for the record an outline of what I consider is an unusually broad experience in international observation and travel and contacts. I wanted it just for the record. My own personal view is that you have had an unusual experience, unusual background for a person who has not been in the diplomatic service. That is all I have to say, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Capehart?

Senator CAPEHART. No questions. I just wish you good luck. And lots of it.

A VERY GOOD APPOINTMENT

The CHAIRMAN. I have known Mr. Summers for a number of years and I have the very highest regard for him as a person and also I know of many of his public activities. I think he will be a very good appointment to Luxembourg.

Senator SPARKMAN. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't see the Senator over there. I thought he had gone.

Senator SPARKMAN. I wish him well at his mission.

Mr. SUMMERS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to insert in the record a letter from Congressman Feighan recommending you.

Thank you very much.

[The letter referred to follows:]

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., June 21, 1960.

HON. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
United States Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The President's nomination of Mr. A. Burke Summers to be United States Ambassador to Luxembourg impressed me as the exercise of excellent judgment.

It has been my pleasure to know Mr. Summers for more than a decade and I have always admired him as a gentleman and a man of unusual stature. Mr. Summers possesses superior qualifications to honorably and wisely discharge the very important duties which challenge an Ambassador.

Mr. Summers has a warm personality and a very keen perception of national and international political and economic problems. I commend the President for this excellent choice in nominating Mr. Summers.

Mr. Summers has had a distinguished career and I have full confidence that he would prove to be an outstanding Ambassador.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL A. FEIGHAN.

Mr. SUMMERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We also have Mr. Richards to be Ambassador to Ethiopia.

Will you come forward, please sir? Are you a member of the Foreign Service?

[Mr. Richard's biographical data follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA OF ARTHUR LINCOLN RICHARDS

Present Position: Special Assistant for Law of the Sea Matters, Office of Under Secretary of State
Considered for: Ambassador to Ethiopa
Born: Idaho, June 21, 1907
Education: Pasadena Junior College, 1925-28; George Washington University, 1929-30
Marital Status: Married
Experience: Non Government: None stated
Government:
1930—Appointed Clerk at Guadalajara
1930—FSO, unclassified, Vice Consul of career and sec. in Diplomatic Service
1930—Foreign Service School
1931—Vice Consul at Teheran
1932—Also 3d Secretary at Teheran
1934—Vice Consul at Jerusalem
1935—At Cairo
1938—FSO-8
1938—Vice Consul at Capetown
1941—FSO-7
1942—2d Secretary at Pretoria
1945—FSO-5
1945—To Department
1945—Assistant chief, Division of British Commonwealth Affairs
1946—FSO-4
1947—FSO-3
1947—Consular
1948—Detailed to National War College
1949—FSO-2
1949—Consular of Embassy at Tehran
1952—FSO-1
1952—To Department; Dir., Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs
1954—Consul General
1954—Consul General, Istanbul
1956—Operations coordinator, Dept. of State
1958-present—Spec. Assistant for Law of the Sea Matters, Office of Under Sec. of State
Military: None stated
Home:
Office: Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Legal Residence: Maryland

STATEMENT OF ARTHUR L. RICHARDS, NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR TO ETHIOPIA

Mr. RICHARDS. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have been in the Foreign Service since 1930.

The CHAIRMAN. And how many posts have you served in that interim?

Mr. RICHARDS. I can enumerate them, I never counted them, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Approximately how many?

Mr. RICHARDS. Ten, I should say.

The **Chairman**. In 30 years?

Mr. **Richards**. In 30 years.

The **Chairman**. Most of your service has been abroad.

Mr. **Richards**. Most of it has been abroad, almost all of it in the Near East and Africa.

The **Chairman**. Most of it in the Near East and Africa.

Mr. **Richards**. Yes, sir.

The **Chairman**. Is the average then approximately 3 years on posts?

Mr. **Richards**. Approximately 3 years on post.

The **Chairman**. That is a little above the average of the Department as a whole, isn't it?

Mr. **Richards**. I think that is the optimum.

The **Chairman**. The average is 2 years, the average for the whole Foreign Service.

Mr. **Richards**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. What languages do you speak?

Mr. **Richards**. Spanish and French.

The **Chairman**. French, I presume would be in Ethiopia——

Mr. **Richards**. Yes, sir, although English is used much more than French, it is the second language in Ethiopia.

The **Chairman**. Any questions, Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. No.

Senator **Capehart**. Just good luck to you.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much. We are very pleased you came in.

Mr. **Richards**. Thank you.

The **Chairman**. And the next one is Mr. Joseph S. Farland of West Virginia to be Ambassador to Panama.

[Mr. Farland's biographical data follows:]

Biographical Data of Joseph Simpson Farland

Present Position: A.E.P. to Dominican Republic
Considered for: Ambassador to Panama
Born: Clarksburg, West Virginia, August 11, 1914
Education: A.B., West Virginia U., 1935; LL.B., West Virginia Coll. of Law, 1938; Princeton U., School of Military Government, 1944; Stanford U., School of Civil Affairs, 1945
Marital Status: Married
Experience: Non Government:
1938-42—Member of Firm, Farland, Morgan & Peairs General Counsel, Christopher Coal Co. (later acquired by Pittsburgh Consolidated Coal)
1946-47—Christopher Coal Company
1947-50—President, Christopher-Farland Coal Co.
1950-55—Owner, Farland Fuel Corporation
1953—Chairman of Board, Colonial Loan Co.; Board of Directors, First National Bank of Morgantown
Government:
1942-44—Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation
1956—Consultant to Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs
1957-present—A.E.P. to Dominican Republic
Military: 1944-46—Ensign, U.S. Naval Reserve; Military Governor, Yosu, Korea; and Navy Liaison Officer, U.S. Military Government for Korea
Office: Care of Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Home: Caré of Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Legal Residence: West Virginia

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH S. FARLAND NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR TO PANAMA

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Farland, are you a member of the Foreign Service?

Mr. FARLAND. No, sir, I am not.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever been in the Foreign Service?

Mr. FARLAND. I have never been in the Foreign Service. I have served in the Department prior to the appointment from which I have just returned.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that you have just returned from?

Mr. FARLAND. From the Dominican Republic.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't notice that. I see, I skipped one line. You now are Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, how long have you been down there?

Mr. FARLAND. I have been there, or the Senate confirmed me on May 20, 1957. I have served over 3 years.

The CHAIRMAN. That is your only diplomatic post?

Mr. FARLAND. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you enjoyed that post?

Mr. FARLAND. It has been extremely interesting.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you straightened things out down there.

Mr. FARLAND. The answer to that question is extremely difficult.

ELECTIONS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The CHAIRMAN. I have been reading this in the paper that Senator Smathers and others have taken quite an interest in trying to persuade Mr. Trujillo to hold elections. Is there any prospect of that?

Mr. FARLAND. Senator, this was one of the objectives I had when I first went down there. I worked on it for 2 years. As far as a valid election is concerned, I have my doubts.

The CHAIRMAN. You have tried to urge them.

Mr. FARLAND. I certainly did. I believe that Trujillo will attempt to go through at least a certain form of elections from what I have most recently learned. Whether or not this will be sufficient in point of time, I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you had any differences with Mr. Trujillo?

Mr. FARLAND. I have had several major differences with him.

The CHAIRMAN. He hasn't requested your change has he?

Mr. FARLAND. No, he did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper, do you have any questions?

LEFTWING ELEMENTS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Farland, if they have or should have, this year or next year what might be considered a free and open election in the Dominican Republic, would there be a strong change that very leftwing elements such as those now in power in Cuba might take over?

Mr. FARLAND. Senator, I am particularly concerned about this aspect of it. I served in the FBI as a counter-espionage agent primarily working on communism, and I have been in the Far East in the military government and I think I know somewhat about the workings of the Communist machine.

Unfortunately I can say in this closed session that I know that two of the men who Trujillo has asked to come back to set up a so-called opposition party are militant Communists and have had training from a Cuban Red, Trujillo in this respect is playing with fire. In answer to your question——

Senator **Capehart**. Is he aware of the history of these men?

Mr. **Farland**. I presume he is aware by this time, Senator, but he let them in and from what I have seen of their work so far, it is straight down the party line on procedure. One thing I am worried about at this particular moment is if these men are able to get some of the so-called pro-American underground to voice their position they may end up as they did in 1946 decapitated, and if so, this is going to leave more of a vacuum there than presently exists. There are in the Dominican Republic some extremely capable, intelligent, pro-Americans who can run that government and take over the machinery of the government.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Is there, in your opinion, a strong nucleus of stable citizenry there, I don't mean necessarily in numbers, but I mean in quality and so on, that we could say are basically oriented toward the West?

Mr. **Farland**. Senator, I am very happy to say that my last 6 months' presence there was predicated on the desire to ascertain who these people are. I have done so, I think there is a basic nucleus of excellent qualified people.

The Dominicans themselves are extremely pro-American, these people have been trained in the United States or elsewhere and I think they are highly qualified.

The **Chairman**. Bourke, will you yield for just a minute? You two gentlemen don't have to stay here. If you have appointments or things you are perfectly free to go unless you care to stay but I thought you understood you are free to go.

Mr. **Summers**. Mr. Chairman, I find this fascinating if it is proper for us to stay.

The **Chairman**. I think it is all right for you to stay. I wanted you to know you didn't have to stay. Pardon me.

DANGER FROM WITHOUT RATHER THAN FROM WITHIN

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Would there be any possibility, and I am just speculating here, that some device might be worked out whereby the Government of the Dominican Republic, if there should be a change there, could be protected by or at least the stable end of the elements of the Dominican Republic could be protected in their views and in their position against some mob rule or mob uprising generated by Communist agitators?

Mr. **Farland**. The danger primarily lies from without and not from within.

Over 30 years Trujillo has virtually erased any semblance of communism within the country itself. However, I feel more than I know that there is at least one small Communist cell. The problem you pose, I think, is one that is being carefully studied and considerable thought and weight has been given to it.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Yes.

Mr. **Farland**. The biggest danger lies in the event of an overthrow using, for example, an assassination, immediate influx by air from Cuba, from Venezuela, from Puerto Rico, from Miami and New York of the so-called dissident element that has been on the outside. This would be a catastrophe to the local group, because with them are going to come the direction of various and sundry political parties, and one of the things which they themselves, and I am speaking of the group as a unit, although it is fairly well fractured in its parts desire particularly a stoppage of airlines and shipping until they have the chance to consolidate.

Communications being what they are in the Dominican Republic, it is extremely difficult to organize in toto.

TRUJILLO'S HEIR-APPARENT

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Does Trujillo want his son to take over as heir apparent down there?

Mr. **Farland**. From the time Rampas was 3 Trujillo looked upon him as the heir apparent. I think——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. You say free, what do you mean?

Mr. **Farland**. Three.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I thought you said from the time he was free.

Mr. **Farland**. Three years of age.

He was a colonel, I think, at the age of 7, he is his father's son, and is the apple of his father's eye. His son cavorted in the States a year ago or thereabouts, to the extent that while the father far from disowning him, felt somewhat dejected, this went into almost an eclipse later on and as of January 1, the son attempted to have relations with the wife of one of his close relatives, and his father kicked him out of the country for psychiatric treatment. He had been under the care of a Spanish psychiatrist some time there, he came up to a little private hospital above New York and susequently returned.

My latest information is that he had calmed down somewhat and is taking a more active interest in politics vis-a-vis military aspects which he took over when he returned from his visit to Leavenworth.

TRUJILLO'S LEADERSHIP

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Is there a feeling in the Dominican Republic that Trujillo may want to die with his boots on down there so to speak and not give up and just keep on?

Mr. **Farland**. I personally feel that this is Trujillo.

I think analyzing him, and I have seen Peron, Batista, and Perez Jiminez,[2] and this is a different quality of man, entirely different. This man is a leader, he is hard, he is capable, he is shrewd, and he is cunning, and he told me personally one time leaving the vulgarity out of it that any man who assumed the mantle of dictatorship had to take the chances, in other words, fight for it, and that is what he would do.

---

[2] Juan Peron, deposed as President of Argentina in 1955; Fulgencio Batista, deposed as President of Cuba in 1959; and Marcos Perez Jiminez, deposed as President of Venezuela in 1958.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Yes, thank you very much.

Senator **Capehart**. I just want to say I have had occasion to visit the Dominican Republic a couple of times when the ambassador was there and my observation was that you were doing an excellent job. It is not an easy post of course, but you were doing an excellent job and I wish you good luck in your new post.

Mr. **Farland**. Thank you.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Yes, I want to wish you good luck.

STATE DEPARTMENT PLANNING

The **Chairman**. That is all. The authorities are entirely aware of this, do you think they have any plans about this?

Mr. **Farland**. Well, I assure you that the Department is thoroughly aware of the situation and I came back somewhat early prior to any transfer to another post for the purpose of discussing with various agencies the total aspects of what I know.

The **Chairman**. I hope they are aware of it.

Senator **Capehart**. Did you say they are aware of it?

The **Chairman**. Yes.

Senator **Capehart**. I imagine they were aware of it, but the question is whether they have done any planning.

The **Chairman**. I didn't hear you.

Senator **Capehart**. I say I am sure they are aware of it but the question is do they have any plans to deal with it?

The **Chairman**. I was coming to that. Are they developing a plan to deal with it?

Mr. **Farland**. You are hopeful.

The **Chairman**. I am hopeful?

Mr. **Farland**. I am hopeful that a plan will be developed that will be of merit to our whole program.

FLYING THE FLAG IN PANAMA

The **Chairman**. The last thing I wanted to ask you, what are we going to do about the flag in Panama?

Mr. **Farland**. On November 3 and 4 of last year, the flag was torn down. On November 17 the present Ambassador, based upon the precedent of the area, affecting all embassies, decided to fly the flag on national days. It is being presently flown 37 days out of the year. In the Dominican Republic——

The **Chairman**. This is just on the embassies?

Mr. **Farland**. On the embassies or are you referring to the other flag?

The **Chairman**. The other flag.

Mr. **Farland**. We will drop that one then. This is a question which I have attempted to go into at length since I have come back because I know of the emotional and factual character of it.

The executive branch to date has not reached a decision.

The **Chairman**. They have not?

Mr. **Farland**. They have not, and I with personal views, will attempt to encourage the reaching of a decision prior to the time I depart, but as the situation now stands the flag does not fly and the executive branch has not decided the question.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much. We will excuse them. We thank you all for coming and we will excuse you.

Mr. **Farland**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Capehart**. I move we report the three of them favorably.

The **Chairman**. Any discussion? All in favor say "aye", without objection they are approved.

[Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.]

PASSPORT LEGISLATION

TUESDAY, JUNE 28, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:05 p.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol, Hon. J. William Fulbright, presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Sparkman, Humphrey, Lausche, and Hickenlooper.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Denney and Mr. St. Claire, of the committee staff.

[The nomination of Winthrop G. Brown to be Ambassador to Laos was ordered to be reported.

The committee concluded, after discussion, to examine certain incidents and events occurring in United States Embassies in Ceylon, Lebanon, and Tunisia. The chairman said Loy Henderson, Under Secretary, would appear.

The chairman raised the question of a proposed visit by NATO parliamentarians to military bases in Europe during August. On later consideration, Senator Sparkman said the matter should be looked into further.

By unanimous consent, the committee agreed to the amendments of the House to the bill, S. 1502, To provide for adjustments in the annuities under the Foreign Service retirement and disability system.]

DISCUSSION OF PASSPORT BILLS

The CHAIRMAN. The last item is a discussion of what the committee should do with these passport bills. You have got a list of them before you.

The last time we met on this subject we instructed the staff to prepare this document before you which gives in an understandable way the different bills, what they do and so on.

Senator HUMPHREY. What, Mr. Chairman, happened to items 3, 4, and 5 on the agenda?

Mr. MARCY. You are on 3 now.

Senator HUMPHREY. No, you are not.

Mr. MARCY. Senator, maybe you are using an agenda that was sent to your office.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is right.

Mr. MARCY. There is a new one.

Senator HUMPHREY. I see. What I was asking then is about 4, 5, and 6.

Senator **Sparkman**. We haven't reached that yet.

Senator **Humphrey**. There is great argument on the passport bill.

The **Chairman**. That is now in order.

Senator **Sparkman**. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make this suggestion with reference to the passport bill. I am sorry that we did not have time during the year to go thoroughly into this passport legislation. Now we have got three basic views.

We have got the one introduced by Senator Humphrey, we have got the one introduced by Senator Wiley which represents the State Department view. We have got the one introduced by the chairman, which is more or less in betweeen the two.[1]

CONTROL OVER PASSPORTS TO COMMUNISTS

Of course even if we could get one of those bills out of this committee, we could not get action on it this year. There is a House bill that relates to just one thing, and that is permission to the State Department to deny passports because of Communist affiliation. I think I am correct in making that statement, am I not?

Senator **Humphrey**. Wait a minute, or if there is belief on the part of the Secretary that the activities of anyone will aid the Communist movement.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Does it go that far?

Senator **Sparkman**. That is as much as it does.

The House passed it. It seems to me we could pass a bill like this to give them some control over passport issuance to Communists.

The **Chairman**. Is this for just 1 year?

Senator **Sparkman**. We could make it for that if you wanted to, on the ground that we would study the whole thing. I don't know what the terms of the House bill are.

Mr. **Marcy**. There is no term in the House bill. We have a simple amendment here which would add a freeze to the bill.

Senator **Sparkman**. To make it 1 year?

Mr. **Marcy**. Yes.

Senator **Sparkman**. I think we could do that with the——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Why send it to conference?

Why not pass it? We can change it next year if we want to.

A GULF OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THESE BILLS

Senator **Humphrey**. Mr. Chairman, there is another committee that is doing this, too. We just issued a big staff report from the Committee on Government Operations. We have held hearings in the Committee on Government Operations. There is a bill in there by Senators [Karl] Mundt and [Carl] Curtis, I believe it is. You are going to have a new administration next year. There will be, it seems to me, an opportunity for the responsible officials of this government to make some recommendations. There is a gulf of difference between these bills. I see that the purpose of the House bill, I understand full well the purpose of denying a member of the Communist Party opportunity to run around the world stirring up trouble. It is a very legitimate and desirable privilege of the Secretary of State to deny that. I can understand that. But I wonder if we want to act in the field of passport legislation when we have so many conflicting points of view before us.

---

[1] See Appendix B.

Senator **Sparkman**. That is exactly the point I made, that when you get into the substantial part of it, there are these conflicting points. This deals with just one facet, and I think it is a facet that all of us recognize as needing some remedy. It was brought about by reason of the Supreme Court decision and this is intended to meet it. So far as I am concerned, I would be very glad to see written in it the 1 year limitation.

Bourke, I think it would be better to put it in there, and I think the House would consent to it.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I don't have any objection to the 1 year limitation, other than I think that some legislation, at least some stopgap legislation along this line limited ought to be passed now and then we can get into the general passport legislation next year.

Senator **Sparkman**. That is my thought exactly, and I would urge putting in the 1 year limitation.

Senator **Humphrey**. When did the court decision take place?

Senator **Sparkman**. Two years ago.

Senator **Humphrey**. Has the safety of the country been jeopardized since then?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I think it has. I think we have had a flood of this riffraff going abroad and the applications for passports and granting of passports which they have had to grant has jumped up many-fold.

POSTPONE CONSIDERATION

The **Chairman**. I want to say for the information of the committee Senator Morse feels very strongly about this matter. I don't know that he would accept the 1 year. He told me he wouldn't accept it at all, the one that passed the House. That is one reason why I suggest that I am not sure he would in the last days of the session. You know the possibilities of preventing action on any kind of a bill.

Senator **Sparkman**. Mr. Chairman, I think we ought to put it on the docket. If he wants to fight it let him do it. I move favorable report on the bill with this amendment. If you will look at the bill, on page 6 after line 3 insert, "Section 3. This Act shall be effective for 1 year from the date of its enactment."

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Page 6?

Senator **Sparkman**. Page 6, yes, just add a new sentence.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I second that.

The **Chairman**. The Senator seconds the motion. Is there any discussion?

LIMITATIONS OF THE LEGISLATION

Senator **Humphrey**. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have some discussion of the bill. I want to just call to the attention of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations what I consider to be some of the limitations of this legislation. First of all, this is, as was indicated by Senator Sparkman, only a minute part of the total problem of passport legislation.

Second, there is another committee that is dealing with this subject extensively. And, third, there is a staff report that has just been approved by this other committee, the Committee on Government Operations, which is a very extensive report, asking that the matter be carried over until next year when the new administration is in to receive the guidance of the new Secretary of State and the new President and the new officials. Also, in this bill, it's the standards for the denials of passports that are rather vague. For example, the bill allows denial of passports to Communist sympathizers whose "activities or presence abroad would be harmful to the security of the United States," but there is no description of harmful acts to be feared.

The bill has no definition of key phrases such as "affiliated with the Communist Party" on page 2, line 19, and "activities intended to further the international Communist movement" on page 2, line 21.

The bill contains inadequate procedural safeguards for the passport applicant. It permits the use of confidential evidence against the passport applicant in administrative proceedings. The meaning of "on the record" is obscure. The bill requires a hearing but gives no other specification of the rights of applicant in such a hearing.

The bill contains no safeguard against indefinite delay by the Department of State. The bill prescribes no periodic review by the Congress. Of course, that would be eliminated now by the 1 year which I say is a salutary feature. And the bill fails to state a policy regarding elimination of barriers to international travel, which is a matter, I suppose, of difference of approach to this problem.

My bill introduced was not only for myself but Senator [Thomas] Hennings, who as you know has very strong views on this matter and had conducted if not hearings at least studies in his role as a member of the Judiciary Committee. Senator Clinton Anderson has very strong views relating to the passport legislation, and he joined with me, as did the late Senator [Richard] Neuberger, and Senator [Dennis] Chavez. These are men who have a different point of view than expressed in the bills that are pending before us.

I have the feeling that we are not treating this subject as it ought to be treated. Maybe there was a need for more hearings. We did have some hearings. I have a feeling that the bill introduced by the chairman of the committee was a reasonable middle ground.

THE REAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION

There is the real philosophical question as to the whole matter of the limitation to the right to travel. I understand full well that a member of the Communist Party traveling abroad can be a source of embarrassment to the United States, and some of them highly placed in the Communist apparatus could be a source of jeopardizing our security. I am sure that there are reasons for adequate safeguards, and I have no objection to that.

After all, my reaction to the Communist Party is that it isn't a party, that it is a conspiracy, and it doesn't even meet the tests of what we ,call the normal political party. But I don't know whether this is the way we ought to legislate.

We get this thing up in the Senate, and it is quite obvious that because it will be labeled as an anti-Communist bill that regardless of the refinements or lack of refinements of the legislation, it will pass. I think we have a responsibility to legislate in the field of passport legislation, and we ought to legislate methodically and responsibly and not just take an area that stands out like a sore thumb because it is a highly emotional area. That is my view of it.

A 1-YEAR STOPGAP PROPOSAL

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me, if I may be heard one more time, we are not going to be hurt by a 1-year stopgap proposal at this time. It may be if we had time we could refine the bill. I agree with the Senator from Minnesota on that. So as far as general passport legislation is concerned, I repeat I am sorry we did not find the time to act on it. I have felt all along that the bill introduced by the chairman represented a very good approach to the problem and had we been able to enact it into law it would have answered our questions and probably satisfactorily for all groups, even though there are divergence of views.

Now with reference to the report of the Government Operations subcommittee——

Senator HUMPHREY. The full committee.

Senator SPARKMAN. The full committee, that is on the matter of reorganizing the passport division, as I understand it.

Senator HUMPHREY. No, it is also on the matter of the powers of the Secretary of State. We had quite an argument about it.

Senator SPARKMAN. It seems to me that you have to draw a line pretty closely there, not to infringe on the legislative committee.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is what I thought. That is my argument against it.

Senator SPARKMAN. You have got a perfect right in that committee to set up reorganization and shift functions and such as that, but I don't see that you have control of passport legislation.

That is all I care to say, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Ohio.

CANNOT ALLOW THIS CONDITION TO CONTINUE

Senator LAUSCHE. In my opinion, we will be making a serious mistake unless we send to the floor some bill dealing with this subject. I personally would feel badly if we did nothing on it, and I think that each member of this committee will be subject to censure if we allow this condition to continue for any further period, knowing that the Supreme Court 2 years ago sort of paralyzed the Department in its control even in a moderate degree in the issuance of passports.

Senator SPARKMAN. Will the Senator yield?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Remembering that the State Department asked for this legislation, that it passed the House September 8, 1959—in other words, it has been lingering in this committee now for the whole session.

Senator **Lausche**. We had hearings on this 1 year ago. I remember distinctly the testimony of the representatives of the Americans for Democratic Action, and then the representatives of some veterans association in New York that was unable to give any list of its membership, but that it had an office.

Senator **Humphrey**. Don't list the ADA with that organization, Mr. Senator, because I am a member of the ADA, and it is an American patriotic dedicated organization.

Senator **Lausche**. Yes.

Senator **Humphrey**. And I don't like that affiliation.

Senator **Lausche**. I say the testimony was given here, and we heard this matter 1 year ago and there is no justification in not acting upon it. All other matters were given paramount consideration, and this item has been sort of sent down the side tracks. That is the attack that will be made. I think I cannot honestly answer the people who write to me on this subject, "Why haven't you taken action?" I cannot give an answer in which in my own mind I believe is honest and justified. I just can't do it.

Senator **Humphrey**. We have this problem, Senator. We invite Mr. Khrushchev to come to the United States. We have delegations of people from the Soviet Union that are here by the dozens, and there are obviously some of them members of the Communist Party. At least there is one or two top Communist agents with them. We have opened up what we call the exchange program. So the so-called danger of the Communist movement, I mean of the moving around of members of the Communist Party at least has been taken into full review by the Government and decided that there was an advantage to the moving around rather than there was to the restriction.

OBJECTS TO LANGUAGE OF THE BILL

My point about this bill is not that it is directed primarily at the Communists, but listen to this language: "The Secretary of State is authorized to deny a passport to or revoke the passport of any person who is or has been since January 1, 1951 a member of or affiliated with the Communist Party." Now, what do they mean by affiliated with? A member of the Communist Party, I know what that means.

The next line is, "or knowingly engages or has knowingly engaged since January 1, 1951 in activities intended to further the international Communist movement." What activities further the international Communist movement?

I think one of the activities that furthers the international Communist movement is when, for example, you pay people low wages. Does this mean that somebody in the United States that is a low wagepayer isn't permitted to travel?

I think some people that get up and make some of the statements they do about some of our allies overseas further the Communist movement. Does this mean that they can't travel?

I got a letter at my home in Minnesota this week demanding the end of foreign aid, calling upon every American to be a patriot, to strike out every dollar of foreign aid, to reduce the appropriations for our foreign services. Does that mean that this fellow who lives up in Boston, Mass., shouldn't travel overseas?

I think from my point of view that that letter furthers the activities of the Communist Party.

Now, if I am the judge, if I were the Secretary of State, and if I were to have no better guidelines than this, I would say that fellow shouldn't travel, because he ought to have enough sense to know that this furthers the activities of the international Communist movement. There are some people that will say that cutting the quota of Castro's sugar will further the activities of the international Communist movement. I don't think so. I happen to think the authority given by the President is right. When we legislate against these fellows, we ought to have guidelines, that is all, and firm standards. I don't think we have.

A BIG DEBATE ON THE FLOOR

The **Chairman.** I remind the committee we did bring this up once before and for very much reasons like these it was put off. I don't remember what the particular occasion was, but it was 2 or 3 months ago. You can see it is extremely controversial. I don't feel too strongly one way or the other, but I know Morse spoke to me the other day. He said, "I am not for the bill." Of course what bothers me a little under the present situation is it will precipitate a big debate on the floor if it should come up that would be emotional and cause a lot of trouble. If it could be unanimous and we felt we could all back it, that would be one thing. But I am a little leery of getting into it if there is going to be a big fight here in the last 2 or 3 days of the Senate.

Senator **Hickenlooper.** Mr. Chairman, I feel we have got an obligation to bring something up on the floor and then it becomes the responsibility on the floor to either bring it up or not.

The **Chairman.** I am perfectly willing to do what the committee wants. I feel a little bit leery of doing it without more people here, and particularly without those who feel strongly. Morse has given me notice as to how he feels about it. If the full committee wishes to do it, I am not going to—I wonder if we can agree to notify Morse if he can be here and take this up again on Thursday. We have got a meeting set anyway.

Senator **Sparkman.** Notify the committee. I say, Mr. Chairman, I would not want us to be in the position of railroading something. I would want a majority of the committee to agree to it.

Senator **Hickenlooper.** If the committee feels like postponing it, I am not going to raise any objection.

Senator **Sparkman.** Neither would I.

Senator **Hickenlooper.** I don't think there is any railroading on this. It was on the list. Every member of the committee got a notice. We are pretty generous, you know, if somebody wants to go off and make a speech someplace, we postpone action on legislation and all that sort of stuff.

The **Chairman.** We do. This, as you can see, is a very controversial matter.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I know it is controversial, and it happens that this bill doesn't satisfy me at all. It doesn't go far enough, but it is a step.

The **Chairman**. Is it agreeable that we take it up again on Thursday and give him one more chance to be here?

Senator **Sparkman**. It is with me.

The **Chairman**. We have only got six here, not that I insist on a quorum, as you know.

Senator **Sparkman**. What is a quorum, nine?

The **Chairman**. Usually on things that are controversial you get in difficulty.

Senator **Lausche**. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say this to you. We cannot silence the cry for a bill of this type by not sending it to the Senate. We can vote it down, but that will not be the end of the discussion on this bill in the ensuing months.

The **Chairman**. I agree with you.

Senator **Lausche**. It is going to be the subject of great discussion.

The **Chairman**. I agree with the Senator.

Senator **Sparkman**. And will plague us even more with the stepped up cold war.

Senator **Lausche**. I have that in mind surely.

The **Chairman**. Because of that, I think that the full committee or many more should be here.

[The bill H.R. 808, to authorize the Secretary of State to evaluate certain financial assistance loans expressed in foreign currencies arising as a result of World War II, was approved by unanimous consent.

On motion by Senator Humphrey, seconded by Senator Sparkman, the committee approved for favorable report the resolutions H.J. Res. 672, authorizing and requesting the President to issue a proclamation with respect to the 1960 Pacific festival, and H. Con. Res. 225, expressing the sense of the Congress with respect to official recognition by the United States of the Centennial Anniversary of the unity of Italy. Senator Lausche declared the understanding of the committee to be that it was not committing itself to provide money for participation by the United States in the foregoing festivals if said resolutions were to be approved. The committee passed over the agenda item of S.J. Res. 210, to provide for the determination of the United States participation in the New York World Fair to be held at New York City in 1964 and 1965.

[Whereupon the committee adjourned at 12:45 p.m.]

RESTRICTIONS ON PASSPORTS TO COMMUNISTS [1]

THURSDAY, JUNE 30, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:40 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol, Hon. J. William Fulbright, presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Lausche, Gore, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

Also present: Loy Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, accompanied by Cass A. Kendzie, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, and Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Denney, and Mr. St. Claire of the committee staff.

[The committee held discussions of the activities of Maxwell H. Gluck, former Ambassador to Ceylon, in which Mr. Henderson and Mr. Kendzie participated.

On suggestion of the chairman, the committee suspended its 6-day rule on consideration of nominations, to consider the nominations of Andrew G. Lynch, to be Ambassador to the Somali Republic, and Clare H. Timberlake, to be Ambassador to the Republic of the Congo. The chairman stated his suggestion was prompted by the urgency of having these men assume their posts in the new nations as soon as possible, and that both were career men. He pointed out that Timberlake's nomination was not even before the Senate, but would arrive that afternoon. A letter from the Department of State asking for prompt attention of the nominations was inserted in the record. On motion by Senator Green, seconded by Senator Sparkman, both nominations were approved for reporting unanimously.]

CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 9069

The CHAIRMAN. I understand Mr. Hickenlooper said he had your proxy. He said he had it and I was going to call him as soon as we finish this matter to proceed with the discussion of the passport legislation.

Senator AIKEN. All right. I may be able to get back anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. Everybody is drifting away here. We will take up for consideration H.R. 9069. I will ask the Clerk to call Senator Hickenlooper to notify him that we are ready to take this up.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, may I make a statement?

---

[1] See Appendix B.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Oregon.

Senator MORSE. In making this statement, I want to assure the chairman that I am one of these fellows that always desires the good will and approval of his associates. It is much more pleasant to serve on the committee or in the Senate when you feel you have the camaraderie, love and affection of your associates.

Sometimes, however, in the course of your duties you have to follow a course of action which temporarily and in some individual instances, I am sad to report, you sort of lose the love and affection of your associates. I hope that in announcing my course of action this morning that any offense I may cause anyone will be only temporary; that in the due course of time they will come to recognize that I act within my rights and that maybe on some other occasion they will see that it was important for them to follow a similar course of action in regard to something that they have such deep convictions about, as I have with regard to passports.

I am unalterably opposed to this bill in its present form so far as its present status is concerned.

I have a series of amendments to it, and I have worked on these amendments, and I would like to have hearings on my amendments.

I would like to call witnesses before the committee in support of my amendments.

Therefore, I very much desire that we take no action on this matter until we come back on August 8; that we report nothing at this time.

INTENTION TO PREVENT ANY ACTION ON PASSPORTS

Senator MORSE. I think this is such a vital issue, and one on which I have such deep convictions, because I think there is no emergency, no reason why we have to have passport legislation passed in the next few days, I respectfully say that whatever my parliamentary rights are, that I can discover, I am going to exercise them in order to prevent any action on passports between now and August 8.

I thought with my respect for the chairman and my colleagues that I should notify you of that before we start this discussion, because I think you all know that each Senator has that right and I am very impersonal and professional about it. I thought the chairman ought to know that.

The CHAIRMAN. I say to the Senator that I recognize he certainly has the right to ask for both hearings and for delay.

The chairman does not feel very strongly that there is any overwhelming urgency about this matter. The Senator from Iowa at the meeting the other day, as you know, takes a contrary view about this matter, and we agreed simply to defer the discussion until today, partly at least because the Senator from Oregon was unable to be there then and would be here today, and I wrote the Senator from Oregon a letter.

Senator MORSE. I appreciate that very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Especially calling his attention to this.

Senator **Morse**. I speak only for myself. It is my understanding that I am not singular in my feeling that there should not be any action at this time, but others will have to speak for themselves.

The **Chairman**. I was told the Senator from Iowa would be notified when we completed the hearing on the Gluck matter, in order that the committee would be in a position to discuss it.

Now, whatever the committee wishes to do, I am not going to quarrel with it, and I do not quarrel with the Senator from Oregon on his position.

Senator **Morse**. I understand that, but in the spirit of a completely impersonal approach to this, I raise a point of order that the committee under the rules cannot proceed with the discussion of it.

Senator **Sparkman**. Do not do that at the present time until I get in my little statement.

Senator **Morse**. I will withhold it, but I only serve notice as to what my first procedural step is going to be.

Senator **Sparkman**. That will not be necessary.

ABSENCE OF A QUORUM

Senator **Morse**. I am going to insist on the application of section 133, subsection (d), that no measure or recommendation shall be reported from any such committee unless a majority of the committee were actually present, and at the present time I am willing to sustain the proposition that means their bodies have to be in the room and not their proxies, and I shall object to any meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee today in the absence of nine members actually in the room.

Senator **Sparkman**. Mr. Chairman, let me say this. I was the one that made the motion the other day to take up this bill because I have felt that we have lingered too long on the enactment of some kind of passport legislation. I do not mind saying that my own personal desire would be to take up one of the general bills, and my preference is for the chairman's bill because I think it does more nearly the job than any one of the others.

However, since the time was so short, we had not acted and the House had acted on this nearly a year ago, I made the motion that we take it up and report it out.

Now, in the discussion in which Senator Humphrey, Senator Hickenlooper, and several of us took part, there was suggested language. In fact, Senator Humphrey gave the language that he would be willing to accept and let it go through, and, in fact, he said to me privately that he rather felt we ought to have some kind of legislation.

With reference to the Senator's concern about losing love and affection, I can assure him that he can never make me lose love and affection for him by any parliamentary procedure that he adopts. And I fully expect him to make full use of it.

I respect the right of the full use of the parliamentary procedures. In fact, he knows that some of us have fought for a long time to preserve those rights, and we will keep on fighting for the right for the Senator from Oregon to hold his——

The Chairman. I hope we can welcome the Senator from Oregon into that school of thought on all occasions.

Senator Sparkman. He holds the record.

Senator Morse. I have protected your procedural rights many times. But now that my friend from Iowa has come in——

Senator Sparkman. Let me say this to complete my statement. I think a good bit of the pressure and haste on this is relieved by the fact that we are coming back here for, I imagine, about a month, I imagine we will be here 4 weeks.

The Chairman. Three to 4 weeks, I expect.

Senator Sparkman. And so it does relieve the pressure, and it is entirely possible that we might get into consideration of general passport legislation.

The Chairman. I will say that we have cleared our decks pretty well. This is the only bill that I know of, of any significance at all, that is left on our calendar, is it not?

Mr. Marcy. That is correct.

USE ALL PARLIAMENTARY RIGHTS

Senator Morse. I want to say to my friend from Iowa, if the chairman will permit me, before he came in all I said was that I always prefer to have the approval and friendship of my comrades on this committee, but that sometimes you have to follow a procedural course of action to protect your convictions that creates misunderstanding temporarily—I hope only temporarily—and that I have served notice that I would use all my procedural rights to prevent any action on this legislation until August 8th.

I have worked hard on the whole set of amendments that I have, on which I want to call witnesses. I am suggesting and I am willing to start on August 8th to schedule hearings after we come back and it will give me an opportunity to present some witnesses on these amendments.

I have no intention to prevent any action ultimately taking place on passport legislation, but I am unalterably opposed to the action being proposed.

All I did, Bourke, was say that, to the best of my ability, I would use whatever parliamentary rights I have to delay action.

The Chairman. I say to the Senator we finished the discussion of the Gluck affair and also somewhat in his behalf I asked him to comment on the cases of our Ambassador to Lebanon.

We did not get to Tunisia. He told us about what he knew the other day. Then I called for the passports and that is when I told them to telephone you to come.

Senator Hickenlooper. I did not get the message.

Mr. Marcy. You had already left.

Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you anyway. I left as soon as our meeting was over. We had a rather important matter before Atomic Energy and I had to be there.

FAVORS THE HOUSE BILL

Senator Lausche. I am for the House bill with the limitation of time of operation.

The **Chairman**. The Senator from Oregon has announced that he will now insist upon the rules and ask that this go over until August the 8th. What he means by "insist upon the rules" is that he insists that there be a quorum present. As you know, we cannot get it right now.

Senator **Lausche**. I have one complaint I want to make. Why do you do it so graciously? Why do you not do it more offensively?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. You mean so we can get mad at him?

Senator **Morse**. I love you, that is why.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. He never does it so you can get mad at him.

The **Chairman**. That is all, unless the Senator from Iowa wishes to say anything in response to the Senator from Oregon.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I have nothing to say.

The **Chairman**. Is there anything more this morning? We cannot proceed now.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. If you feel like it, I think your decision as to whether we try to proceed on the 8th, we had better take it up then. I do not know what the situation is going to be.

PREPARED TO FIGHT IT OUT

Senator **Hickenlooper**. In view of the fact that the Senator from Oregon is determined to use every parliamentary right at his disposal, which he has a perfect right to use, and which I do not object to his using, I might get a little restless, but I do not object, I would want to put a caveat on that that if we can get together a quorum of this committee prior to any adjournment for August, that we will fight it out, and if we can vote it out, I am very much in favor of voting it out to the floor.

I sit here with proxies in my pocket by the bushelbasket to vote it out. But if we can get a quorum——

Senator **Sparkman**. Wait a minute. He says you have got to have a quorum present.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I understand that.

Senator **Sparkman**. Measured in corpus flesh.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Yes, not delecti. I understand that and that is what I am saying. I am just putting that out as my position, that I would favor, if we can get a physical quorum present: notify the Senator from Oregon; and then if we can vote the thing out, why, we will vote it out, and if he can stop it, why, that is his privilege.

Senator **Morse**. That is perfectly fair.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Maybe we cannot vote it out.

Senator **Sparkman**. Mr. Chairman, I would like to move that if we do not act on this, this particular bill, that upon our return in August, it be made the pending order of business.

I don't mean the bill, but passport legislation.

PREPARED TO CALL WITNESSES

Senator **Morse**. I would like to have the staff instructed to proceed to make the arrangements to start some passport consideration as soon as we come back. I would like to call in about six witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you seen the work staff has done? Does that up to that point satisfy you? It was done with the idea that we would have consideration of this legislation. What do you want the staff instructed to do?

Senator MORSE. I think they should start making arrangements for some very short hearings that first week we get back.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have in mind the witnesses and so on?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you work with the staff?

Senator MORSE. I will work with the staff and give them witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right, then,

Senator MORSE. My witnesses will be limited pretty much, may I say, to legal witnesses and people whose legal scholarship in this field cannot be questioned.

The CHAIRMAN. Any you would like them to try to arrange hearings beginning the week of the 8th?

Senator MORSE. The week of the 8th, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that suit you, Senator?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No. I mean I am just ready to state I do not favor hearings and I would not support hearings. I favor voting on the Sparkman bill. However, that is up to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought maybe in order to make progress, if the Senator from Oregon wants it, we have had a lot of hearings.

Senator MORSE. There would be no alternative, if Bourke is successful in getting action before we adjourn on the suggestion he made, then mine is out the window. If he is not successful, then I think we ought to be prepared for the alternative procedure, which would be mine.

Senator SPARKMAN. That was my thought.

Mr. Chairman, in running back over this, may I say that some time ago we had this matter up before the committee. That was when the staff was directed to make this comparative study.

I may call your attention to the fact that Senator Morse at that time said that he felt we ought to have very brief hearings, and he referred to getting in some of these people who had written articles.

Senator MORSE. That is right.

Senator SPARKMAN. So this is nothing new, I will say that.

Senator MORSE. Oh, no.

The CHAIRMAN. I am trying to clarify for the staff's information. We will try to have a hearing on the first Tuesday after we get back, if we can get a quorum. I do not know whether they are going to come back or not, but we will call a hearing for the 9th—that is a Tuesday, as I recall—and then we can bring it up; and if you have a quorum, they can vote to have hearings; or if they have got the votes, they can vote out the one bill, is that all right?

Senator MORSE. It is all right with me.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do not let my silence be assent, but I am not raising any quarrel about it.

The CHAIRMAN. That is about the only way we can proceed, having a meeting and decide.

Senator SPARKMAN. Bourke, you just bide your time until you get a physical quorum present.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I will just lie in wait.

The **Chairman**. The Senator from Iowa, then, we will give him the responsibility of getting a quorum here so we can vote.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I do not know, that is too great a responsibility.

The **Chairman**. The committee then is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the executive session was concluded.]

BRIEFING ON THE WORLD SITUATION

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—Congress recessed on July 2, 1960, and did not reconvene until Aug. 9, after the nominations of Vice President Richard Nixon and Senator John F. Kennedy as the Republican and Democratic Presidential candidates. During the recess, the Soviet Union shot down an American RB–47 over the Barents Sea, and Premier Khrushchev warned that such "provocative" flights were raising international tensions to the point "where a war may break out." A mutiny of military forces, the fleeing of European settlers, and the secession of Katanga Province in the newly independent Republic of the Congo, caused the United Nations to send in a peace-keeping military force. The United States and the Soviet Union clashed at the United Nations over the American quota cut of Cuban sugar and subsequent purchases of Cuban sugar by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Also on July 11, President Eisenhower announced a new program of economic cooperation with the nations of Latin America. These were the subjects of Secretary of State Herter's briefing of Foreign Relations Committee members.]

THURSDAY, AUGUST 11, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room F–53, U.S. Capitol, Hon. J. William Fulbright, presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Kennedy, Church, Lausche, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

Also present: Theodore Achilles, Counselor, Department of State; William B. Macomber, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations; Philander P. Claxton, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations; and John O. Bell, Deputy Coordinator for Mutual Security, Department of State.

Messrs. Marcy, Holt, Kuhl and St. Claire of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Since everybody has much on his mind, I think we ought to start early even though all the members are not here.

Mr. Secretary, we are very pleased to have you and welcome any statement that you may have to offer the committee. So you may start in your own way.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTIAN HERTER, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary HERTER. Mr. Chairman, if it is agreeable to the committee, I might review some of the things that have happened since the Congress took its recess in the interim period, and perhaps do that very informally and to submit to questioning on that and then address myself for a few minutes to the question of legislation that has been recommended coming before this committee.

With respect to the latter I have got a brief statement that I would like to read.

ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

The first matter that I wanted to discuss with you will be the attitude of the Soviet Government as revealed during the last 3 months.

Because I think that the chronological order of the various statements that the Russians have made are as revealing in total as anything I might say in general terms, I have jotted them down, beginning with the Soviet walk-out from the Geneva Disarmament Conference on June 27—which was just before the recess of the Congress began—and carrying through up to the present time.

On June 29, Tass released the Soviet Government statement urging Japan to abrogate its security pact with the United States. On June 30, Soviet notes were sent to the United States, to the United Kingdom and France, to protest the alleged use of West Berlin for the military build-up of the Federal Republic and the recruitment of West Berliners into the Bundestwehr.

I may comment with that, there is not one word of truth in the allegation that they made.

On July 1, the U.S.S.R. shot down the B-47 in international waters and of course you are familiar with the sequence of events on that.

On July 4, speaking in Austria, Khrushchev praised Austrian neutrality and declared that the U.S.S.R. will not remain aloof if anyone violates this neutrality.

On July 6, Khrushchev warned that the United States' use of bases in Italy would be a deliberate violation of Austrian neutrality.

On July 8, at a Vienna press conference, Khrushchev threatened if the West German Bundestag met in West Berlin in September he might then consider signing a peace treaty with the West German regime. He has since repeated that and indicated that, if he should do that, the members of the Bundestag who met in Berlin would have to find their way out through East Germany. In that connection, this morning the East Germans have made a statement to the effect that once again Berlin is on East German territory, which is clearly contrary to the facts as anything could be but they have repeated that and it has been repeated over and over again, apparently with the intent to get the world to believe it is really a part of East Germany.

On July 9, in a Moscow speech, Khrushchev warned that the U.S.S.R. will use missiles to defend Cuba against United States aggression. On July 10, the Khrushchev message read by Cuban President Dorticos, in Havana, alleges that the U.S.S.R. will buy Cuban sugar refused by the United States if the Cuban Government has difficulty selling it.

On July 11, the U.S.S.R. sent a protest note to the United States alleging a violation of air space by the B-47 revealing that Moscow will try a living crewman. A similar note was sent to Norway alleging complicity.

On July 11, Khrushchev alleged the U.S.S.R. incident, Cuba and the Congo, on the plane incidents, of openly provoking a serious military conflict, and charges that the RB-47 flight gave the lie to the President's assurances concerning the suspension of overflights.

He also repeated and confirms the continuing validity of the Malinovsky missile threat against U.S. overseas bases. On Cuba, Khrushchev asserts that the Monroe Doctrine is dead, and pledges Soviet support if the United States should undertake aggressive action against Cuba.

SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE SITUATION IN THE CONGO

On the Congo, Khrushchev denounces the sending of Belgian troops as a policy of brigandage and accuses NATO of complicity in such aggression.

On July 13, a Soviet Government statement on the situation in the Congo, handed to all missions in Moscow, condemns supposed Belgian and Western military intervention against the Congolese Republic.

Again on July 13, the U.S.S.R. in a note to Belgium, charges Brussels with enslavement of the Congo.

On July 13, in a Security Council session on the Congo, the U.S.S.R. accuses the United States of planning to take away the Congo's independence.

On the same day, the Soviet memorandum that was handed to the United States protests the provocative buzzing of Soviet ships by U.S. planes. Similar notes sent to other Western countries.

On July 15, in a message to the Congolese Government, Khrushchev warned that the U.S.S.R. might consider direct intervention in the Congo if aggression continues.

And that same day a Soviet note to the United States on the RB-47 attacks the U.S. note of July 13 as full of inventions.

On July 18, a Tass statement disclaims that the U.S.S.R. meddles in Latin American affairs, accuses the United States of doing so, and reasserts Soviet support of Cuba against the United States. The statement makes a full-scale attack against the Monroe Doctrine.

On July 18, Tass announced that the trial of U-2 pilot Powers will begin on August 17 before the Military Collegium in open session.

On July 19 Soviet notes to the United States and the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] on the arming of the Bundeswehr with Polaris missiles warn of fearful and dangerous consequences.

On July 20, Soviet-Cuban communiqué issued at the end of Raul Castro's visit in Moscow repeated Khrushchev's pledge that the U.S.S.R. would support Cuba against the United States. At Security Council meeting on the Congo, the Soviet delegate reiterates the threat of Soviet intervention.

On July 26, U.S.S.R. vetoes two Security Council resolutions on the RB-47, one of which would have permitted the International Red Cross to render humanitarian aid to the surviving crewmen.

On July 28, Soviet notes to the United States, the United Kingdom, and France protest the Bundestag's passage of a law establishing a Federal German radio council with its seat in West Berlin.

On July 31, a Soviet Government statement on the Congo threatens that the U.S.S.R. will take resolute measures if the imperialist aggression against the Congo continues.

On August 2, Soviet note on the RB-47 to the United States reiterates past Soviet stand, and rejects U.S. charges.

On August 3, Soviet note to the United Kingdom on the RB-47 accuses the British of adopting a strange position and conniving with the United States in aggression.

On August 5, Soviet Government statement on the Congo declares that if U.N. troops are unable to secure the withdrawal of interventionist troops, then forces should be sent by nations which are prepared to share in carrying out this fair act.

On August 9, U.S.S.R. releases indictment of U-2 pilot Powers, says he pleaded guilty to the bulk of the charges.

I have listed those merely by way of an indication that during the period of the recess the Russians stepped up very materially a continuing barrage of notes. Actually they were coming into the Department at the rate of almost every other day for a period of some weeks and this is clearly a psychological attempt on their part which is very difficult to analyze from the point of view of its motivation, but is obviously a disturbing development.

The next item I would like to discuss briefly, if I may, is the Congo itself.

Senator **Lausche**. May I at this time interrupt?

Secretary **Herter**. Yes.

INVESTIGATION OF RB-47 INCIDENT

Senator **Lausche**. When did the Soviet vote against an impartial investigation of the RB-47 incident? On August 2, they repeated, I think you said, their charge?

Secretary **Herter**. Yes, sir, I have got the date right here.

Senator **Lausche**. Are you going to go into it later?

Secretary **Herter**. Yes, I can give that to you right here, on July 26. It voted on two security council resolutions.

Senator **Lausche**. On July 26.

Secretary **Herter**. July 26.

Senator **Lausche**. And on August 2 they again repeated the charge that this was a transgression of their territorial rights.

Secretary **Herter**. Yes. And they sent again another note to the Norwegians today.

Senator **Green**. May I ask whether any one of them have been individually or collectively answered?

Secretary **Herter**. Individually.

Senator **Green**. Individually?

Secretary **Herter**. Individually.

UNCERTAINTY IN THE CONGO

With respect to the Congo, I think you probably are very familiar with the situation, because of the very wide coverage that developments there have had in the press. The Congolese picture even as of now is one of very real uncertainty.

The movement of United Nations troops into the Congo, 90 percent or better than that, was done by U.S. transport planes supplied by the military. It was, I think, one of the finest operations of which we can be very proud. I got a call from Mr. Hammerskjold last night just before he went back to the Congo in which he officially conveyed his thanks and congratulations to our military for the superb job that they had done in the airlifting of the troops. I have all the figures here if you should be interested in them as to exactly what has been done. We get a daily report from the Defense Department with respect to each movement of troops, where they have been landed, the numbers and the amounts of freight that has been carried in the same time in the form of equipment.

There are now something over 12,000 United Nations troops in the Congo. I have here a map showing their distribution within the Congo, if you should be interested in it. They are distributed in all of the provinces now except Katanga.

The Secretary General plans to move into Katanga on Friday, tomorrow, with two companies of Swedish troops, and last night he received a message from Lumumba[1] saying they would be courteously treated and assured complete protection, and that he was prepared to discuss without any condition—I meant to say Tshombe.[2] Excuse me.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Lumumba.

Secretary HERTER. That he was prepared to discuss the further entry of United Nations troops with Hammerskjold at that time. Hammerskjold felt that this was a very real move forward from the point of view of an adjustment in that situation.

AMERICAN TROOPS IN THE CONGO

Senator MORSE. Can you tell us, Mr. Secretary, how many of them are American troops?

Secretary HERTER. There are no American troops whatever.

Senator MORSE. No Americans?

Secretary HERTER. There are roughly 140 American technicians at the Air Force base handling the communications, the loading and the unloading of the transport planes. But from the very outset, we agreed with the United Nations or they agreed with us, that American military planes and American military crews should not be used for any internal transport within the Congo—that that had to be done by the United Nations planes.

We have turned over to the United Nations a considerable number of planes. In each case we have done it on requisition of the United Nations, so I think they have got enough internal transport but we didn't want American soldiers in American marked military planes moving around on internal transport service within the Congo itself.

Senator MANSFIELD. Are these in Leopoldville and Brazzaville?

Secretary HERTER. Are they in Leopoldville?

Senator MANSFIELD. In Brazzaville?

Secretary HERTER. There are no American troops that I know of.

Senator MANSFIELD. The American technicians and plane landings?

Secretary HERTER. I have got the places where they are right here. I say I have them here, they are usually marked—no, this last report does not show where they are, but the great majority of them are at Leopoldville.

---

[1] Patrice Lumumba, leader of the militant faction of the Congolese National Movement, who became premier of the newly independent Congo Republic in June.

[2] Moise Tshombe, pro-western leader of the Katanga Province, which seceded from the Congo Republic on July 11.

BELGIAN INVOLVEMENT IN KATANGA INDEPENDENCE

Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Secretary, what evidence is there that the Belgians before they left the Congo made arrangements with the Katanga group for an independent movement and how much did that Belgian holding company have to do with it?

Secretary HERTER. I don't think any arrangement had been made with respect to the independence of Katanga at the time.

Senator KENNEDY. By the Belgians?

Secretary HERTER. No.

Senator KENNEDY. Wasn't a prearranged plan in order to drop this economic——

Secretary HERTER. No, the Belgians had agreed to the Federal State with the power—the Belgian Government passed a law in May under which the Congolese Government is operating today. That law called for the calling, very rapidly, of a contingent assembly after independence for the adoption of a constitution and for whatever form of government the Congolese themselves wanted but the form of government was the one that was approved by the Belgian Parliament and it is under that that Lumumba was elected and operated and there was no thought of independence.

Senator KENNEDY. Was this spontaneous from the bottom up?

Secretary HERTER. The sequence of events as I recall it, on July 7 came the revolt of the Congolese troops, the Force Publique against Belgian officers and that was the first signal of a splitting away from the Belgians.

General Janssens [3] who is the commander, a Belgian, was removed and there wasn't a single Congolese officer in that whole group.

They were all noncommissioned officers and they were all unhappy not only because of the Belgians maintaining all of the officerships but they were angry at the Lumumba government because that government created some 30 cabinet officers and never recognized a noncommissioned officer in the army who were actually among the best educated and the most knowledgeable people in the Congo.

The Congo itself is a pretty awful situation. There was not a single magistrate in the whole of the Congo that was not Belgian. There isn't a single lawyer in the whole of the Congo. There is not a single doctor who is Congolese. There are 16 people they have counted who have a college degree, 14 of whom got it in the last 2 years. There is only one with a college education in the entire 32 of the Cabinet.

It is that type of thing that we are dealing with at the present time, which makes it all the more important, if possible, to hold the Belgian technicians who are there in place to try to hold some semblance of an economic and social structure that is just going to bits and with the revolt of the only element that could keep order and that is the Congolese Force Publique, there is just nothing left at all.

---

[3] Maj Gen. Emil Janssens, Belgian commander of the Congolese army, who resigned on July 6 and was replaced by a Congolese, Gen. Victor Lundula.

INFLUENCE OF COPPER COMPANIES

Senator **Mansfield**. I think, Mr. Secretary, what Senator Kennedy had in mind was, was there any indication ahead of time that the Union Miniere, that is the company which controls the Katanga copper holdings, is doing anything under the table, so to speak, to spark the movement by Tshombe or his people or did that come after the incidents that started the whole flame?

Secretary **Herter**. It came after, so far as we know, it did not come before the independence. I think, you may recall that the Belgians had roughly 4,000 troops in the Congo at the time of independence, and under their treaty agreement with the Congo which had never been ratified on either side but was signed just before independence they had the right to the maintenance of those troops based on two bases: Kamina, which is in Katanga, a large air base, and the other one, Katona which is down near the mouth of the Congo, those were the two air bases that they keep talking about which they had the right to maintain these troops in.

When the revolt of the Congolese troops came, the Belgians, of whom there are over a hundred now in the Congo, saw some of the excesses that were perpetrated in those early days and panicked and asked the Belgian Government for more protection. It was then that the Belgians sent in roughly 4,000 more troops, paratroopers, and in the Katanga area, obviously, where the largest economic interests of the Belgians are, there have been allegations that Tshombe has been on the payroll of the Union Miniere and so on. Whether that is actually true or not, we don't know but he played very closely with the Belgians throughout this picture. The most curious development in the last 2 or 3 days has been a growing bitterness between Tshombe and the Belgians themselves. He is apparently indicating that the Belgians were making use of him and he wants to get out from under the stigma of that from the point of view of trading for some federalist type of state in a constituent assembly, if it can be called together.

BELGIAN TREATMENT OF CONGOLESE INDEPENDENCE

Senator **Morse**. From what you say, Mr. Secretary, the Belgians never followed the British policy of training native civil servants. They just kept it in control of Belgian nationals.

Secretary **Herter**. Yes, the really tragic thing that happened was that the Belgian Government panicked from the point of view of declaring independence. They had this meeting and it was in March, I think in Brussels, of the principal tribal leaders of the Congo and at that time notice was served on them that they had better get independence or give them independence and give it to them quickly or there would be very serious troubles in the Congo itself. The Belgian Government did panic and agreed that by July 1 they could become independent and then this law of May was passed which gave them their basis for the formation of a government.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I may say, Mr. Secretary, that according to a certain line of reasoning, a strong argument can be made for the Belgian Government doing what it did. I think the Belgian Government has got a good argument that the so-called civilized nations did not stay with them in an attempt to correct that situation.

NOT ALL ONE-SIDED

I have been through the Congo. I have been at Brazzaville and I have been in Leopoldville and I have been in Kamina and I have been in Elisabethville, I have been at Tadotville down there, and while one does not become an expert in a country in a short time I have had some firsthand observations of that place down there. From my observation in Katanga, it is the only area in the Congo where they have a substantial cadre of trained people.

It is the most enlightened area in the Congo so far as I am able to ascertain with two exceptions of the area immediately around Leopoldville. There they trade in coconuts and handicraft and whatever they bring down, things like that, it is a trading center. In the Katanga area for a number of years the Belgians have really had quite an enlightened program of training the people from the technicians' standpoint. They have tried to get these savage tribes out of the jungle—that is what they have had to deal with, savages, perhaps the most backward area in the world, with the exception of the Amazon jungles. And I think there is a genuine feeling on the part of the Belgians that they are probably not understood, they have had very little cooperation from the rest of Western Europe. I don't find it in my soul to criticize the Belgians too heavily. Maybe they made some mistakes, but they basically did not have the source from which to train civil servants down there.

They didn't have the capabilities with which to train civil servants but they were rapidly developing from or attempting to develop from, one or two tribes that had some real capability and promise. They have done everything.

By the same token, I think the Belgians have been kicked around in the Congo situation because of all this fanfare about freedom and liberty and self-determination and so on in an area that is aboriginal in its basic concept and make-up. So I just want to make that little statement that I have not got complete sympathy with Belgium because I think they made some mistakes but I don't think it is all one-sided.

Secretary HERTER. We have made two statements on it, one from the State Department and the President made one statement yesterday by paying tribute to what the Belgians had done in the Congo and hoping they continued to do their part.

The troops unfortunately have become somewhat of a symbol and we have taken the position, and so has the Secretary General, that the Belgians should not move out of Katanga unless the United Nations troops were in there to maintain order and protect life and property.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, the Senator from Ohio.

THE CULTIVATION OF A REVOLUTION

Senator **Lausche**. Have you and your associates attempted to rationalize what would have been the advantage of the legislative body of Belgium voting independence and having hidden in their mind the cultivation of a revolution of the setting up of an independent Katanga?

Secretary **Herter**. I don't think that was in their mind, they acted in perfectly good faith. I think the unexpected thing was the revolt of the Force Publique against the Belgian officers which took away the principal strength of the one element that there was to maintain law and order.

Senator **Lausche**. My question is why would they have chosen the course of voting full independence?

That is while hiddenly setting up a proposed revolution for the establishment of an independent Congo rather than in the declaration of an independence keeping Katanga out of it? Why would this course which has been attributed to them be advantageous?

Secretary **Herter**. Well, Katanga has gotten 60 and 70 percent of all the wealth-producing industry in the whole of the Congo. It is the area that has been developed, just as Senator Hickenlooper said, by far the most of any section of the Congo.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. It is industrial.

Senator **Lausche**. I understand that but if I were trying to devise and scheme and plot, I would try to figure out which method would be most effective, and I would have before me, question number 1, will it be to our greatest advantages to vote for full independence and then after the independence is granted to move for the establishment of a separate Katanga?

Number 2, would it be better when we vote to keep Katanga out and allow the balance of it to become independent, and that is how I would approach it.

So has it been rationalized why they would have chosen this hidden method which is now ascribed to them? You say it has not been done.

Secretary **Herter**. Well, we have no evidence that this was something that they had worked out in advance. I think they were supporting the independence of the Congo as a federal unit entirely loyally until this break came.

Actually, you know Belgium has never recognized Tshombe, they never recognized the independence of Katanga. The Belgium Government never recognized the independence of Katanga.

INDUSTRY IN KATANGA

Senator **Morse**. Most of this industry Belgium owns?

Secretary **Herter**. Yes.

Senator **Morse**. What is the nature?

Secretary **Herter**. Copper and cobalt. It is one of the great copper areas of the world. That same ridge of copper actually goes over into Rhodesia and has been developed by the British on the other side.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. They supplied us all the uranium for the World War II activity, Union Miniere. The most extensively rich uranium deposits in the world have been discovered in Katanga.

That is pretty much petered out, the veins are thin and the production is low because the rich high grade has been taken out, now.

Senator **Aiken**. Was not Katanga included in the grant of independence of the Congo by the Belgians?

Secretary **Herter**. No, under the temporary law which they were operating the separate six provinces of the Congo had very little in the way of what you might call state tribes, they had separate government.

Senator **Aiken**. What puzzles me is they said Katanga seceded from the Congo. How could they secede if she was not included?

Secretary **Herter**. She was included.

Senator **Aiken**. Then she was included in the grant of independence?

Secretary **Herter**. Oh, yes, she was an integral part of the whole republic of the Congo.

Senator **Aiken**. After she seceded from it?

CONGOLESE TREATY OF INDEPENDENCE

Senator **Hickenlooper**. If I may just ask this and I hate to interrupt you, in the agreement or whatever you may term it, between the Belgian Government and this loose political organization with which the Belgian Government dealt down there at the time they got out prior to the adoption of a constitution, then what specific rights did the Belgians retain there with the agreement of whatever Congolese authorities they dealt with, for the maintenance of Belgian troops in there for the protection of Belgian property and lives?

Secretary **Herter**. They maintained the right. There was the unratified treaty that they made with the Congolese just in the last few days, before they became independent, that that treaty gave to the Belgians the right to maintain troops at these two airports of Kamina and Katanga; one in Katanga itself, a very large base there that employed some 15,000 people, and the other one at the very tip of the Congo, the mouth of the Congo River in what is called the Bi-Congo.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Is that for the purpose of maintaining protection for Belgian civilians throughout the Congo?

Secretary **Herter**. I am sorry to say that I don't know whether the purpose as such was stated. Do any of my associates here remember that?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Now the treaty has not been ratified as yet you say?

Secretary **Herter**. By either party.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Where does the Congolese independence stem from?

Secretary **Herter**. This treaty had nothing to do with the independence. It was a separate treaty negotiated.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. A separate treaty negotiated with the Congolese Government.

Secretary **Herter**. Yes, a separate treaty negotiated with the Congolese Government.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I see.

Secretary **Herter**. This was entirely separate from the Organic Act that gave them their independence.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I see.

U.N. TROOPS IN THE CONGO

The **Chairman**. Do you think it is planned that the U.N. troops will stay there for some time and take the place of the Belgian troops?

Secretary **Herter**. It seems to me it is inevitable. I just cannot see how they can get anything of an indigenous nature organized and functioning in a very short period of time.

The **Chairman**. Do you think the Congolese Army will cooperate with the U.N. troops?

Secretary **Herter**. That is what we hope.

The **Chairman**. Who commands the Congolese Army now?

Secretary **Herter**. A sergeant.[4]

The **Chairman**. A sergeant.

Secretary **Herter**. A sergeant, a former sergeant of the Congolese.

The **Chairman**. All Belgian officers have been——

Secretary **Herter**. Have been wiped out.

The **Chairman**. Is this sergeant responsible?

Secretary **Herter**. I am afraid he is not too knowledgeable. And I think that is going to take time. You remember the very first contingent that the U.N. planned to send in were what they called technicians to try to reform the Force Publique, and train a cadre of officers that could take——

The **Chairman**. Are any of these U.N. troops African troops?

Secretary **Herter**. Oh, yes, the Ghanians and the Guineans.

The **Chairman**. Are they well trained?

Secretary **Herter**. The Ghanians are all under British officers, General Alexander [5] who is their principal officer is a Britisher and their principal officers are British, they have some——

The **Chairman**. Considered reliable troops?

Secretary **Herter**. Yes, they consider them reliable troops. There has been some difficulty from a political point of view because Ghana and Guinea have both indicated they were going to fight Belgians if the United Nations was unable to get the Belgians out.

The **Chairman**. You mean run all the Belgians out. They want them all to leave?

Secretary **Herter**. They were prepared to go and fight against the Belgian troops in Katanga.

BELGIAN CIVILIANS IN THE CONGO

The **Chairman**. They want all the Belgians civilians?

Secretary **Herter**. No. Everybody is in agreement that they hope the civilians will stay. And that, again, obviously depends entirely on what kind of order and protection can be restored.

The **Chairman**. Yes.

---

[4] Gen. Victor Lundula, who was promoted from Sergeant Major.

[5] Lt. Gen. Henry T. Alexander, a British officer serving as chief of Ghana's Defense Staff.

Secretary HERTER. There are still some 20,000 technicians in Katanga that are Belgians and the Belgian Government has urged them to stay.

The CHAIRMAN. In the industries?

Secretary HERTER. In the industry, yes. Not only in the industries but all the public utilities, everything had been run by Belgian technicians.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there no schools for the natives in the Congo?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, there are but that has all been a very slow development.

The CHAIRMAN. Recently.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Excuse me just on the question of schools, Frank.

In the Katanga especially the Belgians began to start some kindergartens, I was in some of them down there.

Senator MORSE. I didn't hear that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The Belgians started schools, as low as the kindergartens and up, trying to bring these people eventually through the high school grades and get them ready for college education. They said it would be a 20-year program from the time they started, which was some years ago. I have been in these schools and they are about as modern as you will find in this country except they don't have pictures on the wall, but the equipment was good. In the schools that I saw these little folks were being trained in basic education and so on, but this was in Katanga, that is the only place I saw it.

Senator AIKEN. Using the French language.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, using the French or the native languages, I don't know, I don't recall about that.

U.N. TROOPS AND KATANGA SECESSION

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Secretary, are the U.N. troops in there to compel Tshombe and the Katanga people to remain an integral part of the Congo?

Secretary HERTER. No, one of the agreements that was reached, and it was specifically put in the last resolution adopted by the Security Council, was that the United Nations would not interfere in any way in the internal political arrangements of the Congo. That was for the Congolese themselves to decide.

Senator LAUSCHE. What are they supposed to do there?

Secretary HERTER. Maintain law and order. In other words, that whatever changes take place should be done by constitutional means rather than by violence.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, what if in Hungary there is a part of the people that would revolt to establish an area independent of Budapest, would the United Nations go in and say that it must be done by constitutional means?

Secretary HERTER. That I don't know, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. If that principle is correct, would the United Nations have gone into Cuba when Castro revolted and didn't follow constitutional means?

Secretary **Herter**. You may recall that Castro in the early days of his revolt promised that the democratic process would be followed and that elections would follow very shortly.

IN EVENT OF CIVIL WAR

Senator **Aiken**. What would the United Nations do in the event of civil war in Katanga and other parts of the Congo?

Secretary **Herter**. There, this is one of the very serious problems that I am going to come to in the Congo and that is the tribal wars that have been historic there. One of the great misfortunes in Africa as a whole is that in days gone by, when Africa was being carved up among various nations, the national line didn't follow tribal lines at all. For instance, in Katanga there are two tribes that have historically been at war with each other. Each of those tribes has got their counterparts, that is a part of the tribe in Rhodesia so that whatever may happen between those tribes in Katanga is very likely to spread over into Rhodesia.

The same way in the lower part of the Congo, what is called the Bi-Congo part of Leopoldville going to the coast that is a tribal group very closely related to the tribe. In fact they are a part of the same tribe as the French Congo right across the river that Brazzaville is the center of.

A normal tribal division would have them all in one country instead of having them divided as they are. But at the moment the fighting that seems to be the most acute is going on in Kasai Province, that is in the center and that is entirely a tribal fight, it has nothing to do with Belgians or anybody else. They are just taking off on each other.

CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE FOR KATANGA

Senator **Lausche**. What would be the constitutional means of gaining independence for Katanga?

Secretary **Herter**. Well, Tshombe at the present time has departed from his original independence position and is saying that he is willing to take a position in a federation with very considerable autonomous powers as a member of a federation willing to make a contribution from the revenues of Katanga for a Congolese federation. I would hope that something of that kind will be what will come out of this because the separatist tendencies of these various provinces are increasing all the time.

Senator **Lausche**. That does not answer my question. Let's assume he wanted independence. He decided that it had been attained by revolution but the United Nations says "You must follow constitutional means to gain your independence." What would be the constitutional means?

Secretary **Herter**. Through a secession that would be recognized by the central government. This may happen as far as other provinces are concerned, they may break up. We have got a surrounding——

Senator **Lausche**. That means that no secession can be had in any country unless it is approved by the central government, and if there is an effort to secede, the United Nations here will enter and prevent the secession.

Secretary **Herter**. No, I think not necessarily prevent secession, but will try to keep them from engaging in a civil war for that purpose, and this is merely for the protection of lives and property so that there isn't complete and utter chaos.

Senator **Lausche**. I think what has been done is going to rise to plague us some time in the future.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I think there is a difference, Frank, perhaps, and I may be wrong about this; but there is this difference in this particular case. I believe that the United Nations at the outset is in the Congo at the request of whatever recognized government there is of the Congo.

Secretary **Herter**. That is correct.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. And that was not the case of Hungary. There was no request from Hungary in the United Nations and there is no request from Cuba and it is the policy of the United Nations not to go into the internal affairs of a country except at their request, is that correct?

Secretary **Herter**. That is correct.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. There is a distinction.

Here there is an official request as far as it could be official for the United Nations to come in.

Secretary **Herter**. It was an official request that went through all the processes in Leopoldville.

The **Chairman**. That was from Lumumba's government.

Secretary **Herter**. That was from Lumumba's plus his cabinet.

The **Chairman**. Not Katanga?

Secretary **Herter**. Well, Katanga was represented in the assembly.

Senator **Mansfield**. Plus the fact it had the unanimous approval of the Security Council including the Soviet Union.

Secretary **Herter**. Yes, including the Soviet Union. Of course the Soviet Union has been playing on the outskirts of this just waiting for a chance to move independently.

CONGO DEVELOPMENT PACT

Senator **Aiken**. Is there any validity, Mr. Secretary, to the contract which is reported to have been signed between Lumumba and this New York promoter to operate the resources of the Congo for the next 50 years, any validity to a contract of that nature?[6]

Secretary **Herter**. No, that contract has no validity at the present time. It was signed by Lumumba and signed by certain members of his cabinet and the last clause of the contract, and I have seen it, says it shall not become valid unless approved by the Parliament and it has never been submitted to the Parliament and when he left this country he refused to see Mr. Detwiler, I think it was a very naive performance, this was a fantastic thing.

The **Chairman**. Who was it?

---

[6] On July 22 Congo Premier Patrice Lumumba signed a 50-year development agreement with L. Edgar Detwiler, president of the Congo International Management Corp., making the company the sole advisor and manager of Congolese industrial and mineral development. But on July 26 the Congolese Finance Minister ruled the contract invalid because it was made without the consent of the Cabinet.

Secretary **Herter**. A man named Detwiler that Lumumba has signed a contract with for the development of all the mineral and water resources of the Congo.

Senator **Mansfield**. Did he collect the $2 million?

Secretary **Herter**. I don't know. He has gotten some hard money from somewhere and there are rumors as to where he has got it, but we don't know.

U.N. TROOPS IN AN INTERNAL CRISIS

Senator **Church**. Mr. Secretary, is this the first time that U.N. troops have ever been used within a country to cope with a crisis that is purely internal in nature?

Secretary **Herter**. No, well purely internal in nature, yes.

Senator **Church**. So in this sense this is a unique use of U.N. troops?

Secretary **Herter**. Yes, you are right. The intervention in the Palestine—Israeli——

Senator **Church**. Involved an international dispute.

Secretary **Herter**. That was an international picture, right.

I probably have taken longer than I should have on that. There are just two other continually troublesome things, one very recent, Cuba and Laos that I would like to say a word about.

DETERIORATION IN CUBAN SITUATION

In the Cuban situation as you know, there has been a continual deterioration since the Congress left, deterioration in the sense that the Communist-dominated elements have taken a stronger and stronger hold on the entire administrative machinery of the country. The statements that have been made particularly by Che Guevara and Raul Castro with regard to the Marxist leanings of the government indicate they were becoming franker and franker about their Communist affiliations and beliefs.

We know very little about Fidel Castro's health. It is a considerable mystery. That he is sick there seems to be no question about it. Whether or not he will come back, I don't know. Raul Castro in a statement he made ony 3 days ago said he would be back in full vigor, but there has been very serious questioning on that score.

The only information that we have had from somebody who had seen him and——

[Off the record.]

Secretary **Herter**. The group that is controlled by Che Guevara, who of course controls the entire economy of the island, and Raul Castro controls the army, they seem to be sitting in the driver's seat very strongly. They have just brought in a new recruit in the form of Arbenz who used to be for a short time the president of Guatemala, who Che Guevara had put in as president of Guatemala.

As you know, this question is coming up before the Organization of American States in a double-barreled form. It is coming up because the United Nations referred to the Organization of American States the complaint that Cuba had made against our economic aggression, which was referred by the United Nations to the Organization of American States.

SAN JOSE CONFERENCE

The second way it is coming up is through a resolution introduced by Peru with respect to the introduction into the inter-American system of foreign influence contrary to the Rio Treaty and the Caracas resolution. These matters will be discussed at this coming conference in San Jose, but the agenda of that conference requires action first in connection with Santo Domingo. The Venezuelan Government brought charges against Trujillo personally and the Government of Santo Domingo for having plotted and tried to carry out the assassination of him. That complaint was brought to the OAS and they appointed a special investigating committee which has just completed its work and submitted a report, and the evidence, as brought out by that committee sustains to a very great extent the charges that the Venezuelans have made of the complicity of Trujillo himself and of the government in trying to get rid of Betancourt. That will be presented to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers, and then Venezuela is going to ask that certain actions be taken.

They have not revealed what those actions are. But we think the thing that they are going to request is to request an entire group of central and South American countries to break off diplomatic relations and probably ask for additional sanctions.

HANDICAP OF THE OAS

There is one very real handicap under which the Organization of American States operates and that is that from the point of view of sanctions that are binding on the different nations they cannot be taken without referral to the United Nations.

The Organization of American States can merely recommend and then the individual states act on the recommendation as to what action they shall take but there is nothing binding upon each of the individual states to go along with those recommendations.

In other words, it isn't like the sanctions that are provided for in the charter of the U.N.

This is going to be an extremely interesting conference. It started out pretty well in that at the meeting the other day for the adoption of an agenda, the Cubans came in with an agenda which was damning us from hell to breakfast.

It was rejected 20 to 1. This other agenda brings up a number of different points, the principal one of which, of course, is the interjection of foreign influence as a threat to the American states. The wording of these agenda items is broad enough so that it will be possible to have a very frank airing of the complete violation by Cuba of every one of the resolutions that was adopted at Santiago last year as being a requisite for healthy democratic institutions in the American States. All the human rights; all the present freedom of press; all the freedom of individuals; judicial system and so on, the documentation of that is so complete that it will show that Cuba has violated every single one of those resolutions that they themselves voted for only a year ago. When they were voting for them, they were the leaders in proposing these things because they wanted them directed against Trujillo and in the last year the developments in Cuba have indicated that we have got now today a form of dictatorship that is just as absolute as anything that Trujillo ever thought of.

THE CUBAN CABINET

One thing that is rather interesting is that the Cabinet passes laws in Cuba today, and I happen to have brought with me if any of the members of the committee would want to see it, the text of the law confiscating all of these American properties, with a list of them.

As a piece of legislation passed by a Cabinet it is something absolutely unique. I won't take the time to read it here, it is quite long, and it is a copy of a telegram that we received getting the text.

If you want to see something unique in a way of governing the country——

The **CHAIRMAN**. How many in the Cabinet?

Secretary **HERTER**. I have forgotten how many there are.

Senator **AIKEN**. The Cuban Congress is in session?

Secretary **HERTER**. It just doesn't function.

Senator **AIKEN**. It does not exist, they exist but do not meet?

Secretary **HERTER**. Not at all.

The **CHAIRMAN**. How does it exist, they haven't had an election.

Secretary **HERTER**. There was a hangover that they called the Congress at the time of the revolution but they never utilized it. They put the legislative power in the Cabinet.

The **CHAIRMAN**. I thought most of those were liquidated, most of the Congress.

Secretary **HERTER**. Many of them have escaped, have left.

PLAN FOR PREVENTING SATELLITE NATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA

Senator **KENNEDY**. Mr. Secretary, just on that, I noticed in today's paper the President made some reference to a plan they had. Is there some plan or would you be likely to discuss what the plan is?

Secretary **HERTER**. The plan, Senator, is something I was going to come to in just a moment, and go into in some detail because that has to do with the legislative recommendations.

The **CHAIRMAN**. The plan you mean for the conference at Costa Rica.

Secretary **HERTER**. No, the plan has to do entirely with the setting up of a special fund at some given time.

Senator **KENNEDY**. No, I was wondering about the plan where the President said that they had a program if it appeared that the government had been imposed as a satellite on the people of any Latin American country that there would be action, specifically referring to Cuba.

Secretary **HERTER**. The President spoke of the fact that if the Cuban Government actually became a satellite it was an intolerable situation that we could not live with and I don't think he went beyond that.

I don't think he spoke of any specific plan.

DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES BETWEEN CUBA AND CHINA

Senator AIKEN. Do you anticipate diplomatic exchange with China, Red China?

Secretary HERTER. Between Cuba?

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Secretary HERTER. Yes, we expect it will happen almost any time.

Senator AIKEN. I noticed in the paper a report that Red China has appointed an ambassador to one of the African nations, Ghana, I believe. Would that represent a change in the policy of Red China towards non-Communist nations?

Secretary HERTER. I think if Red China can appoint an ambassador anywhere it will appoint it if it can be received.

Senator AIKEN. I think if they appointed a full-fledged ambassador to Cuba it would mean they recognized Cuba as a Communist nation. Would that be a proper assumption?

Secretary HERTER. I don't think so necessarily. You see the British Government has recognized Red China. They have an embassy in Peiping.

Senator AIKEN. An embassy or a trade mission?

Secretary HERTER. They have an embassy in Peiping but with a Chargé.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The Chinese have never recognized Britain.

Secretary HERTER. No, they have no mission there. It is one of the strangest situations.

Senator AIKEN. It is interesting. I didn't know the Chinese had ambassadors in any countries that they did not recognize as Communist countries.

Secretary HERTER. Oh, yes, they have in Burma, for instance.

Senator AIKEN. They have?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, Burma is a neutral state.

Senator AIKEN. Then an ambassador to Cuba would not necessarily be conclusive evidence that they regarded Cuba as a Communist country?

Secretary HERTER. It is additional evidence that the whole trend in Cuba has become so marked.

The last point I wanted to mention was Laos. We are very disturbed——

RESULTS OF THE SUGAR ACT

Senator MORSE. Can I ask one more question about Cuba?

Secretary HERTER. Surely.

Senator MORSE. Can you give us a very brief summary of what has happened since we passed the Sugar Act in regard to the distribution of the sugar allotments?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

The Department of Agriculture—just as the State Department, I am sorry I don't have the exact figures—they have made a distribution of the first 700,000 tons that were involved in the Cuban quota cut. Of that, as you know, none of it has gone to Santo Domingo. That has been postponed. There will have to be a further allotment made, and the law as it reads on the distribution of the allotments requires us, I think, to buy 37,000 tons from Santo Domingo which we probably should do.

The law as it passed was a very stringent law. It gave very little leeway to the administration in the allocation, and of course, we have had many more applications for the sale of sugar than you would probably want to take advantage of. We had some difficulties there. For instance, in Brazil, their harvesting season is beginning now and they can't make immediate delivery but they would love to know ahead of time because you see we buy the raw sugar and they do a good deal of refining themselves. They would like to know whether we are going to buy more raw sugar because they want to keep it in that state but we have got no leeway except 3 months of last year.

Senator **Aiken**. We have bought 100,000 tons.

Secretary **Herter**. We did. They had some 300,000, that they wanted us to buy.

Senator **Aiken**. Yes, that is right, we bought all the sugar that Peru had to sell.

Secretary **Herter**. There is one rather interesting phase of this with respect to sugar. As you know the Cubans have sold a million tons and the Russians have said they would take another 700,000 tons.

They have also made a deal with the Chinese I think for some 500,000 tons.

In the case of the Russians, they buy at this world market price which has been around 3 cents. They sell it to their own people at between 30 and 40 cents a pound, and this is an absolute bonanza for the Russians from the point of view of getting internal revenue at the expense of the Cubans. It is a very strange thing. In the case of China, I tried to get the figures on what sugar is sold for in China and it is around 25 cents, so if they are buying also at 3 cents, this is becoming a lovely source of revenue for them.

Senator **Aiken**. And the American sugar refiners have jacked the price up steeply.

Secretary **Herter**. Yes.

Senator **Aiken**. Since that bill was passed?

Secretary **Herter**. No, it is beginning to come down. That is the thing I was most afraid of.

Senator **Aiken**. It has come down on the raw sugar but not on the refined price, I understand.

Senator **Carlson**. Mr. Secretary, if I may, talking on this Cuban sugar allotment we have already given 100,000 additional tons and they are asking 300,000.

Secretary **Herter**. Yes.

Senator **Carlson**. I have been advised in this arrangement they have made with Russia they have agreed to take great quantities of wheat in exchange for sugar.

Secretary **Herter**. The Brazilians have.

Senator **Carlson**. Yes, I am speaking about Brazil, and our people are greatly concerned about it. As a matter of fact, I have had consultations with the various departments and it seems to me if we are going to make any more arrangements with Brazil for additional sugar we certainly ought to keep in mind trade arrangements with this country, not just say "Here, we will take your sugar," but let's make some trades and deals including, not necessarily all wheat, but wheat is one commodity that Brazil needs.

Secretary **Herter**. We have been very large furnishers.

Senator **Carlson**. We have and I think as we increase these sugar quotas we should keep in mind this matter.

Secretary **Herter**. Excuse me, these are not really quotas. They are one-time purchases because under the law the authority of the administration expires 3 months after the first of the year.

COMMUNIST INFLUENCES IN LATIN AMERICA

Senator **Capehart**. Mr. Chairman, may I ask, have we any facts or proof that there is any Communistic influence in the Dominican Republic?

Secretary **Herter**. There have been rumors that Trujillo recently has been lenient from the point of view of admitting some pretty leftwing people into Santo Domingo. Whether he is doing this consciously, as a threat if he is forced out by any internal developments or actions of the inter-American states it will be turned over to Communists, and of course we have a very, very real fear that if Trujillo goes out again a Castro type of government will take over which is something we don't want to see happen.

Senator **Capehart**. Do you have any facts that there is considerable influence, Communistic influence and infiltration into Venezuela?

Secretary **Herter**. Into Venezuela. Oh, yes, there have been right along. The leftwing elements there have been very strong.

Senator **Capehart**. Are we putting ourselves in a position at the moment because of the resolution against the Dominican Republic that we are possibly condemning the only country in Latin America, one of the best countries in Latin America that has been against communism?

Secretary **Herter**. That is true. On the other hand, the Dominican Government has been a really bad government and has been getting progressively worse.

Senator **Capehart**. You mean bad from the standpoint of what?

Secretary **Herter**. From the point of view of confiscation of property, from the point of view of jailing among what you might call the very best moderate elements. There are some 3,000 people in jail now who would form the nucleus probably of capable people who run the island on a reasonably democratic basis.

As you know, the churches have finally taken a stand in Santo Domingo against the government, which is an unusual procedure for it, just as it is taking a very strong stand in Cuba only recently.

POPULARITY OF CASTRO IS FALLING

Senator **Capehart**. Do you see any end to the Cuban situation?

Secretary **Herter**. Yes, sir, we have very real hopes that the Cubans will take care of the situation themselves. I say real hopes, there is no question but what the popularity of the government is falling really rapidly. It is still very strong with the Campesino, with the peasants, who hope they are actually going to get some land which will belong to them. So far it is rather interesting that at one mass meeting Fidel Castro addressed, he said that week by week we will announce how many people have now received land who never owned land before and he said there is now something over a hundred when he made the announcement. He has never made another announcement and the whole trend in the taking over, particularly of these sugar properties, has been of a collectivist nature and not of any ownership for the individual.

Mr. Chairman, might I just——

Senator **Capehart**. One more question—this 600 million dollars that the President recommends in loans to Latin America, is that to be handled through the Export-Import Bank?

Secretary **Herter**. No, Senator, if I may I have got a prepared statement on that when I came to the legislative recommendations that I am going into in some greater detail.

SITUATION IN LAOS

Just one word in regard to the situation in Laos.

The **Chairman**. Yes.

Secretary **Herter**. I say it is a disturbing situation, because we don't know too much about it. The communications are extraordinarily bad. This is the rainy season when communications between different sections of the country are extremely bad. In fact the king and most of the cabinet are now at Luang Prabang which as you know is in the northern part of Laos, which is on the Mekong River but it takes about 10 days by river to come upstream and about 4 days downstream. The road is actually closed as it usually is during the rainy season. So the only method of communicating between the capital at Vientiane and the seat of the government is by plane.

The air field in Vientiane is now held by this so-called revolutionary group. The revolutionary group has announced the names of a number of individuals who are a part of the group.

From the very latest information we have there are a number of those whose names were used improperly and are under house arrest in Vientiane itself. It appears that this revolutionary group has a fairly narrow base. On the other hand it does not mean that it is not a dangerous group.

The Minister of Defense who is out of Vientiane who was on his way to the southern part of Laos at the time this action took place has been in the Southern cities and reports they are remaining entirely loyal to the properly constituted government, Luang Prabang of course, but they are actually at Vientiane.

Until we get more information it is going to be very hard to tell just what the orientation of this group is. At first glance though it appears to be essentially a neutralist group and it has distributed a pamphlet and the substance of the pamphlet has not been carried out from any broadcasts that have come from the Vientiane station.

The pamphlet that was issued was pretty strongly an anti-American, anti-Western, strongly neutralist line, "We'll take help from whatever source we can get it," and it looks as though there were very strong Pathet Lao influence there and even if it isn't completely Pathet Lao this is undoubtedly a group that would make peace with the Pathet Lao.

The Pathet Lao have not shown their hand in this as yet. We know a certain number of them are still in the jungle, perhaps a few hundred, but a few hundred in Laos can be pretty effective if they were well organized and have a sense of direction.

I am sorry I can't give you more specific information but this is the situation that has us worried because if it should take a grip on the whole of Laos, and they moved strongly in a neutralist line it might have very great repercussions in the rest of Southeast Asia and that is what we are watching very, very carefully.

Are there any other matters?

WOULD UNITED NATIONS SEND TROOPS TO LAOS?

Senator **LAUSCHE**. I would like to ask this question: If there has been revolt in Laos how is that different from the Congo situation with respect to the United Nations?

If the government in Laos asked them to come in, would they go in?

Secretary **HERTER**. Well, there is a United Nations representative in Vientiane at this moment. We haven't heard a word from him. He is a Swiss man, what is his name?

Do you remember the Swiss man in there? He had been in there for some time now. And there is also a United Nations representative in Thailand, largely a part of this communicating apparatus that they set up from Laos through Thailand.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. I mean if the government asked for the United Nations to send in troops, how would that situation differ from the Congo?

Secretary **HERTER**. It might not.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. It might not?

U.S. TROOPS IN INDO-CHINA

Senator **CARLSON**. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire where General Williams, who is in charge of Vietnam, has any contacts. Does he have anything to do with the training of troops in Laos?

Secretary **HERTER**. No, under the Geneva agreement that was signed at the time of the ending of the Indo-Chinese War, the arrangement was that the French would be allowed so many troops to remain there to train the local army and so on.

There are about 200 American boys who are in there as technicians employed by the French in the training. They are doing most of the general warfare training and so on.

It is a temporary arrangement because under the Geneva accord American troops could not go in, nor other troops, except the French with whom this arrangement was made.

General Williams' group is a different group entirely.

Senator **CARLSON**. That is all.

SITUATION IN VIETNAM IS QUIET

The **CHAIRMAN**. Is the situation in Vietnam quiet at the moment?

Secretary **HERTER**. Yes, it is relatively quiet. There was a little rumpus near the Cambodian border recently. There are still in

Vietnam a considerable number of the North Vietnamese or dissidents who are adopting the general tactics and they have been using the Cambodian frontier to move in and out. It is one of the points of great friction between Vietnam and Cambodia.

The CHAIRMAN. Any more questions on this before he gets into the legislation? All right.

Secretary HERTER. If I may, I would like to read this statement with regard to the proposals that are now before you.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, go right ahead.

NEW PROGRAMS FOR LATIN AMERICA

Secretary HERTER. Today's meeting with the committee provided an opportunity to discuss with the members the President's request that this session of Congress authorize $600 million for two new programs in Latin America.[7]

Of this amount $500 million would be for projects designed to contribute to opportunities for a better way of life for the individual citizens of the countries of Latin America. The additional $100 million is for rehabilitation in the area of Chile devastated by earthquakes earlier this year.

In his Newport statement of July 11 on Latin America, the President said:

"Widespread social progress and economic growth benefiting all the people and achieved within a framework of free institutions are the imperatives of our times."

The legislation now before the Congress, and I believe that some enabling legislation was sent up last night, has as its objective the acceleration of social development, and thereby of economic growth, in Latin America. Thus it is designed to implement the President's program.

The concept of this proposed new program is to supplement existing forms of financial assistance which are devoted mainly to projects of economic development.

The new program would provide funds for cooperative projects in such fields as land utilization, land settlement, housing and public facilities. I believe this type of assistance will help the Latin American countries achieve the social stability which will assure steady progress and help strengthen free democratic institutions.

OPERATION PAN AMERICA

This program should be considered in relation to Operation Pan America, conceived some 2 years ago by President Kubitshek of Brazil.

President Eisenhower's program may be described as a complement to operation Pan America, which has already been launched on its course toward the acceleration of the economic development of Latin America.

Operation Pan America, like President Eisenhower's program, is based on the premise that the problems of economic development and those of the strengthening of democratic freedoms are inseparably welded.

---

[7] See Appendix C.

In his statement of July 11, the President declared:

> In the Americas, as elsewhere, change is the law of life, and the interests of the people will be better served if that change is effected constructively and peacefully, not violently. Clearly, the aspirations and needs of the peoples of the Americas for free institutions and a better way of life must be met. Our desire is to help the American nations to meet their own responsibilities and to help them develop their institutional and human resources, to strengthen the framework of freedom, to protest individual dignity, and to gain a better life for those who are under-privileged, under-employed and under-educated.

I welcome this opportunity to explain the background of his statement and what we have in mind.

For centuries the great mass of the population of Latin America, in contrast to the wealthy few, have lived in abject poverty.

For centuries they knew so little of the world beyond their own communities, of any amenities of life, that they accepted their lot in a fatalistic, unthinking way.

In recent years more of them have learned to read, have seen movies, listened to the radio in plazas and bars, worked in mines or seasonally on plantations, and learned of the existence of things ranging from shoes and blue jeans and soap and paint to radios and motor cars, which they had never dreamed of before.

Their aspirations have been growing by leaps and bounds and so has their insistence upon opportunity to satisfy these aspirations, particularly the simple ones for land, livestock, houses, health and education.

POVERTY AND COMMUNIST SUBVERSION

In countries where there is a glaring disproportion between the great wealth of the very few and the appalling poverty of the very many, as is the case in most countries of Latin America, Communist subversion finds fertile ground.

Where communism succeeds in bringing its local dupes or agents to power by revolution, as in Cuba today, the people there and elsewhere think they see, however mistakenly, the chance of attaining these things overnight by violence. They do not think, until too late, of the price they pay in sacrificing their freedom to totalitarianism.

I might interject here to relate this to one report we had from the Congo which was extraordinarily disturbing, and that is a report that had been going through the tribes of the Congo that from the graves of the white man in the Congo would come automobiles, would come jewelry, would come trinkets of all kinds, if only those graves could be opened and they could be released. Those things have not happened, and there have been a lot of disillusionments.

But there was word spread that all you have to do is kill off more Europeans and put them in graves and automatically you will get these things.

That life is just as primitive as that where people believe something of this kind will come automatically through violence.

There has recently been a growing awareness in this country in both the executive and legislative branches of the growing insistence of these demands by the common people of Latin America.

Our ambassadors have been reporting upon it with increasing urgency. In the Newport statement of July 11 the President referred to what he had learned on his own trip to Latin America and in talks with Latin American statesmen in Washington of the aspirations and needs of their peoples for homes and land and a better life and of their efforts to meet those needs.

Numerous distinguished members of the Senate have referred, in strikingly similar language, to the importance of the United States associating itself with efforts to meet those aspirations and needs.

As Senator Morse put it: "The countries of Latin America . . . need more evidence that the United States is on the side of the people in Latin America."

Senator Aiken said that what this government needed most was "greater understanding of the problems and hopes of the Latin American people and greater evidence of sympathy with those problems and hopes."

Senator Smathers expressed it in saying: "Within the next few years concrete evidence must be given to the people of Latin America that genuine progress can be obtained through democratic methods."

More recently Senator Mansfield in his speech of August 6 urged "full acceptance in our policies of the inevitability and desirability of change, change in the direction of an end to unnecessary misery and repression wherever these conditions exist in the Americas."

The resolution which he introduced on that date is further evidence of this parallelism of thought. While I have not yet had an opportunity to study the resolution carefully and may wish to suggest changes in it, it is clear that our objectives are the same and that we are thinking on similar lines.

PROPOSALS FOR SAN JOSE CONFERENCE

In his statement of July 11 the President also set forth the basic ideas which will guide the United States participation in the forthcoming meeting of Foreign Ministry Ministers in San Jose, Costa Rica, and the Committee of Twenty-One, which is the Economic Committee, which is meeting in Bogota, Colombia, on September 25, in the following terms.

First, widespread social progress and economic growth benefiting all the people and achieved within a framework of free institutions are the imperatives of our time.

Second, our Nation's history and traditions place us in accord with those who seek to fulfill the promise of the future through methods consistent with the dignity of free men. Our interests and sympathies are with them.

Third, a new affirmation of purpose is called for in our cooperation with friendly developing countries in their efforts to progress.

A CONSENSUS NOW EXISTS

Mr. Chairman, members of this committee may legitimately ask why this program was not submitted sooner and why it was originally announced after the Congress had adjourned in early July.

I think the most honest answer I can give is that in such things as this—which represent extensions of existing policy and depend on the cooperation of foreign governments—a consensus is required before the time for action comes.

A number of developments of the past 8 months have progressively pointed toward the consensus which I now believe exists between the Latin Americans and ourselves that a program of this nature is required.

The President returned from Latin America, and indeed from his very extensive tours through the developing nations of four continents, convinced that some such initiative was in order.

This conviction has been fortified in the intervening months by the visits of progressive Latin American leaders to this country; by several of the studies prepared recently for this committee; by the findings of the Caribbean Assembly in March; by the recommendations of the National Advisory Committee on Inter-American Affairs; and by the deliberations here in June of the Committee of Nine—a continuation of Operation Pan-America.

CHANGE IS THE "LAW OF LIFE"

However, I would add two observations: One is that what we are proposing is good in itself and would be desirable and necessary for the future of the Inter-American community even if communism and Castroism did not exist.

It is realistically in accord with that "change" which the President has called the "law of life" and Senator Mansfield "inevitable and desirable."

Social and economic progress will be necessary long after communism and Castroism have disappeared.

The other is that the Latin Americans themselves have been slow to realize the full significance of their social problem.

Demands for social betterment on the part of the masses of the people can make themselves effectively heard only in a democratic climate; under dictatorships such demands are generally repressed.

In recent years there has been a broad movement toward democratic government in Latin America. As part of the same process, there has been a steadily increasing pressure on governments to improve the living standards of the poorer sections of the population. As this has occurred, many of the Latin American leaders have come to realize that the future of democracy in their countries depends upon its ability to meet the legitimate aspirations of their people quickly and by democratic methods.

LATIN AMERICAN STATESMEN

Fortunately, there are today a number of far-sighted statesmen in Latin America who have taken forceful steps to restore economic and financial stability to their countries as an essential step toward accelerated economic and social progress.

Many of them now realize the danger and are taking urgent steps to meet it. This is where they have not put their own houses in order. Unfortunately, they cannot do it, certainly not quickly enough with their own resources.

A realization of this problem was behind the conception of Operation Pan-America, evolved by President Kubitschek of Brazil. Operation Pan-America, like President Eisenhower's program, is based on the premise that the problems of economic development and those of the strengthening of democratic freedoms are inseparably welded.

President Lleras [8] stated to this Congress in April:

> Without foreign aid the lag in our economic development would ominously falter toward paralysis—but not before millions of beings without schools, without hospitals, without industries enough to create employment, without sufficient food, without land, and worst of all, without hope, have repudiated their democratic leading classes and taken leap after leap in the dark.

I know that Prime Minister Beltran [9] expounded forcefully to this committee in June, as he did to the President and myself, his conviction that democracy in the Americas could be preserved only by an urgent and massive cooperative effort to give the common man a personal stake in private property through the opportunity to own his own land and home.

TO STRENGTHEN THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

These are the reasons why the President in his message of August 8, and I today, urge congressional authorization of at least $600 million to help our Latin American neighbors accelerate their efforts to strengthen the social and economic structure of their nations and provide greater opportunity to their individual citizens.

Of this sum, $100 million will be used to help the Chilean Government in its task of earthquake reconstruction.

In the past this country, including the executive and legislative branches of the government and the American business community, has relied upon private investment, the promotion of American exports, and self-liquidating public investment in productive enterprise to carry the burden of economic development in Latin America.

Little provision has been made for social development. Technical cooperation has done excellent work in helping the common man to better his lot—and Latin America has contributed twice as much in money as we have to the technical cooperation program—but it has been limited to demonstration and training.

No funds have been made available to finance this cooperation to the point of widespread social progress.

Real progress will, of course, require that each government cooperating with us take effective action to adopt and improve its fiscal and economic policies to assure effective and maximum use of its material and human resources.

As Senator Mansfield said on August 8, it will call for their initiative in mobilizing the enthusiasm, cooperation and sacrifice of their own people.

Execution of the program will depend upon the will and circumstances of each government. We will work most closely with those who do most to help themselves.

Wherever practicable we will seek multilateral initiative, cooperation and stimulation of social and economic development. But insofar as bettering the lot of the common man is concerned the field of multilateral cooperation is limited.

---

[8] President Alberto Lleras Camargo of Columbia addressed a joint session of Congress on April 6.

[9] Prime Minister Pedro G. Beltran of Peru.

NO NEW AGENCY

We do not have in mind the creation of any new agency, national or international, for this purpose. Instead we are asking the Congress to provide a special fund to the President, to be administered under his direction by the Secretary of State through any existing agency which can usefully contribute to the effort.

We have in mind particularly the Inter-American Development Bank, the Development Loan Fund and the International Cooperation Administration, each of which can play important parts.

We will seek the assistance of all other available resources, public and private in this country, in Latin America and elsewhere, insofar as they may be in a position to advance the purposes of the program.

SAN JOSE AND BOGOTA CONFERENCES

Within the next month two meetings of great importance for the future of this free hemisphere will be held.

On August 16 the Foreign Ministers of the 21 American Republics will meet in San Jose, Costa Rica, to consider matters of extreme gravity in the Caribbean, matters that involve a challenge to the ideals and purposes of the American community.

On September 5 the economic representatives of the 21 American Republics will meet in Bogota, Colombia to consider the problems of social reform and economic growth.

It is of great importance to the United States, to our sister republics, and to the future of democracy in this hemisphere that our representatives at those meetings be able to speak with assurance, and convincingly, of a bold new program of cooperation to advance the interests of the peoples of the Americas which has the firm backing of the Congress as well as of the administration.

EXPORT-IMPORT BANK

I might interject Senator, that the reason I have not put in the Export-Import Bank except that it might possibly be utilized as an administrative agency, is the Export-Import Bank, as you know, has to get repayment in dollars, and the concept in this case is that these would be soft loans.

The Export-Import Bank has done a superb job in Latin America, but of course it has to be repaid and in dollars which means that it is something that has got to be turned into useful projects that will develop exports which will allow them in turn to earn their dollars with which to make repayments.

If any kind of refinancing of this kind were done on a hard basis it would hurt the Export-Import Bank to carry on what we think has been a very valuable part of the whole development.

Senator **Capehart**. Is it your idea we are going to give some of this money away?

Secretary **Herter**. Some of it we will.

Senator **Capehart**. And some paid back in soft currency?

Secretary HERTER. Local currency, there are plenty of institutions of this kind in the hard money loan field.

Senator CAPEHART. Is this loan going to have a revolving character to it or is it going to be a one-shot-affair, that is you give the man the money and when it is gone that is through?

Secretary HERTER. Mr. Dillon will be here on Monday.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dillon is coming here on Monday to go into greater detail.

Secretary HERTER. We are not asking for an appropriation at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. You are asking for an authorization.

Secretary HERTER. We are asking for an authorization. What we hope the most out of this is the indication of a sympathetic attitude on the part of the Congress, which would, I think, help very greatly those negotiators who are going to the Bogota Conference also early in September.

Senator AIKEN. You are including the Caribbean in your thinking?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, it would not be specified as Latin American and we would include it.

A DEATH BED CONFESSION

The CHAIRMAN. This sounds like a death bed confession. These are some of the things this committee has suggested for many years and the administration has objected to. It does come a little late, this social development and so on. We discussed on several occasions the use of some of the modest funds for land utilization and housing and so on in this field for social betterment, and usually we have been opposed by the administration.

You remember we made efforts to divert money from military and economic and so on, very modest, I will admit, they were not very large, but the principle was there.

I am glad to see recognition of this aspect of the problem.

Senator AIKEN. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that it is also a recognition of the situation on the part of the Congress too.

The CHAIRMAN. But it was here in this committee.

Senator AIKEN. It seems to have been synchronized very well.

The CHAIRMAN. By the Senator from Vermont and the Senator from Oregon. The ideas are not new. We congratulate the administration.

Senator GREEN. I think we might ask why the proposal was not made earlier.

Secretary HERTER. This is what I state in my statement.

Senator AIKEN. You are going over the Mansfield resolution.

Secretary HERTER. We are studying it at the present time, and I think you have had some talks with some of our people already on it and Mr. Dillon will be prepared to testify on it.

A MUCH BETTER POSTURE

Senator AIKEN. It seems to me, Mr. Secretary, if you go over the Mansfield report and then we approve of your request for a further authorization and also act on the Mansfield resolution that then the American representatives at the Western Hemispheric meetings would be in a position to say "We really mean business, we have the executive and the legislative branches approving action or backing us in principle, and regardless of the outcome of the election in the fall we are going ahead with this program so that they can speak with more authority."

Secretary **Herter**. That's right. It would put our representatives and that would be Mr. Dillon at that meeting in a very much better posture from the point of view of talking turkey.

Senator **Aiken**. I can see no conflict in general, although there may be differences in detail, if we approved both resolutions, the Mansfield resolution and approved the executive request for an authorization.

Secretary **Herter**. No, I can't either.

Senator **Aiken**. And we would be much stronger.

Secretary **Herter**. We have some reservations on certain parts of the resolution itself. We are going over it.

Senator **Aiken**. We don't want such resolutions such as the one we had yesterday where we make a proposition and then have difficulty in living up to our proposition, but it worked out all right yesterday and I think it will in this case.

Secretary **Herter**. I think the members of this committee did a superb job.

Senator **Lausche**. Will Mr. Dillon handle this question or can you answer it?

Has there been any clearly defined program adopted with respect to this amount under which the gifts will be made and the loans?

Secretary **Herter**. No. Mr. Dillon will be prepared to talk about that.

Senator **Lausche**. That is, will we give money to build houses? Will he talk about it?

Secretary **Herter**. He will talk about that. I think he will probably talk in terms of our not giving money directly to build houses but to a housing development organization within the state itself and it will be local capital as well as our capital and properly planned with proper technicians.

NO SIMILAR PROPOSALS ELSEWHERE

Senator **Lausche**. Are we faced with the prospect of a similar program being offered for Africa?

Secretary **Herter**. I know of none at the present time.

Senator **Lausche**. Has there been any talk about it in the inner circle?

Secretary **Herter**. No, none at all.

Senator **Lausche**. Except what was submitted to us here several months ago.

Secretary **Herter**. No, not as such.

Senator **Lausche**. What about the Far East?

Secretary **Herter**. No, there have been no proposals in that area.

EXTENSION OF EXISTING PROGRAMS

Senator **Mansfield**. Mr. Secretary, what you really have in mind is an extension or accentuation of what you already put into practical effect in our dealings with Peru; to wit, the roughly $2 million loan for housing, and the $53 million loan for the transplanting, if I may use the term, of people from arid areas to the area on the other side of the Andes so that they could have a better home, a better chance for a livelihood and a greater degree of more security?

Secretary HERTER. That is correct.

Senator MANSFIELD. Two excellent programs.

Secretary HERTER. Those programs are in cooperation with the Export-Import Bank and the Development Loan Fund. The Export-Import Bank taking as much of that loan as they felt could be repaid and could be utilized for the purchase of goods in this country which is also a requirement in that.

DEVELOPMENT LOAN FUND CUT

Senator AIKEN. Now in making the appropriation for the Development Loan Fund, the House cut it $150 million.

Senator LAUSCHE. They did what?

Senator AIKEN. They cut it $150 million. It is my understanding if the Senate should restore that fund and if part or all of it will remain in final legislation, it has planned to use it wisely, the part that might be restored and it would enable us to do more in the South American countries.

Secretary HERTER. Yes, I think Mr. Dillon will be speaking about that because there is still a considerable authorization even over and above the $700 million which carries through this year. I think it was a 3-year authorization.

Senator AIKEN. That is in the hands of the Appropriations Committee.

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. But it seems rather important if we are to go ahead with this new plan for Latin America to get as much as possible of that $150 million restored.

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. Because at last, I probably should not say at last, the Development Loan and the Export-Import are working together to carry out the projects.

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. And I think you have got an awfully good start.

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

CRITICISMS BY PRESIDENT KUBITSCHEK

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, some days ago the press carried an announcement to the effect that President Kubitschek was critical of the programs proposed by our President. I judge from the story I read it was on the ground that he thought it inadequate, not providing for enough funds.

Is that the understanding of the State Department of his criticism or was the press story in error?

Secretary HERTER. I think President Kubitschek has got really fantastic figures in his mind.

Senator MORSE. $40 billion was his original figure.

Secretary HERTER. Yes. And further than that I think his concept which is one that we cannot go along with, was that this $40 billion would be put into a pool and that the recipient countries would be the ones who would determine what they would draw out of it. This, to our mind, would be a more demoralizing rather than helpful thing.

Senator MORSE. This $600 billion would be about $25 million per country if you just, for hypothetical purposes, divided it up among countries, as compared with the $40 billion that Kubitschek had in mind in this revolving fund plan of his.

Secretary HERTER. He has never gotten very specific about this. It is always very vague in its outline.

Senator AIKEN. Further than that you have to realize President Kubitschek is now setting up a target for his successor to aim at and it is very easy to put a very high target there.

But isn't it possible that Kubitschek's proposal could sort of be brought into at least a fair perspective with the proposals which are made by Senator Mansfield and by the administration? Is it possible to wangle them together?

Secretary HERTER. We hope so.

Senator AIKEN. So as to reserve for him an element of pride of authorship, and also avoid the presently impossible proposals.

SPECIAL PROBLEM WITH BRAZIL

Secretary HERTER. As you know, Senator, there was a very special problem in connection with Brazil.

Senator AIKEN. They have an election campaign this fall.

Secretary HERTER. Though this is not entirely that. There is also the fact that their monetary practices have been pretty unsound, and they have been operating for some time contrary to the views of the World Bank and the Monetary Fund. The Monetary Fund sent a commission there and urged them very strongly in their own interest to take certain steps which they have never been willing to take, and I think in hopes the great proposal they had in mind would bail them out to some extent.

Senator AIKEN. What is the cruzeiro worth now?

Secretary HERTER. I don't know. Do you know what it is worth now?

Senator AIKEN. It has been pretty constant for about a year now.

But Kubitschek has a very difficult proposition. I mean he could not do exactly right whatever he did.

Secretary HERTER. Yes, he has a very difficult political situation.

Senator AIKEN. He could slow up the economy or restore the value of the cruzeiro, either one he could not be exactly right whatever he did.

Secretary HERTER. He gambled a great deal on the building of Brasilia and took funds from all sorts of different sources from that operation which is a tremendous operation, employing 85,000 people.

Senator AIKEN. I think 50 years from now he will probably get full credit.

Secretary HERTER. It may work out very well. It is a very imaginative and bold program.

Senator MORSE. The Marshall plan, Mr. Secretary, was about $18 billion for 4 years. Kubitschek proposed $40 billion for 10 years, but as you pointed out, nebulous, not very clear cut procedures for its administration were set out by the President of Brazil. But how did we happen to arrive at $600 million? I am interested in why he would have $10 billion and we had $16 billion for the Marshall plan and how we have $600 million for this.

Why the figure of $600 million?

Secretary **Herter**. May I ask Mr. Dillon who has been working on the figure side of this thing to testify to that on Monday when he will come and he will give you the details?

Senator **Morse**. I will withhold it.

Secretary **Herter**. One of the reasons we are not asking for an appropriation at this time is because in the normal course it would be very difficult to specify a specific figure.

BLANKET AUTHORITY TO THE PRESIDENT

Senator **Morse**. The only other general question I wanted to ask today, awaiting Secretary Dillon's testimony, is the rather blanket authority that this gives to the President under the language of the act which you have submitted to us and which I think bears upon what the Senator from Indiana Mr. Capehart, makes in times past, "there is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President which shall remain available until expended and which the President may use in addition to other funds available for such purposes and on such terms and conditions as he may specify."

I want to make clear I want to give the broadest of authority for the administration of this fund with some consideration for reasonable checks, but the Senator from Indiana and I, at least in past discussions on our subcommittee, have talked about the desirability of increasing the loan procedures rather than the gifts.

To me a soft money loan is better than a gift. I am very much of the opinion that in Latin America there is a feeling on the part of some that if you holler loud enough and protest enough you may finally get Uncle Sam to give you a handout and I am not sure that that is the best way to help them or to strengthen their respect for us.

At the same time I don't want to seem to be throwing any obstacle in the way of this program, and as Senator Fulbright has said, some of us have been suggesting this for some time and we are glad to see the administration moving in that direction. But would we be tipping over the apple cart, so to speak, so far as the State Department is concerned if we amended this to provide for some specific procedures that the President would have to comply with, I don't care who the President is, procedures that would require a substantial amount of this money to be on a loan basis?

I give you one of my reasons for suggesting this. When the President of Colombia was here I talked to him about it. He said that the major problem he felt that confronted his country, and he thought it was true of some other countries was to obtain some loans or credits from the United States that would help them with their land reform program.

It is the number one problem, he said, as I see it.

But he said "Your country won't even give us a dollar of credit for a land reform program. Why I don't know."

If that is important, why shouldn't we consider at the time we adopt such legislation as this to spell out some procedures for that kind of a program on some loaning basis that the President would be expected to follow?

Secretary HERTER. I am not trying to evade the question. But this is a matter to which Mr. Dillon has given a great deal of thought and I know he is prepared to testify to that very point.

Senator MORSE. All right.

RFC-TYPE OPERATION

Senator CAPEHART. Mr. Secretary, I shall offer an amendment to this resolution. I have been thinking about it and I know others will join with me, and that is that we set up in each of these 20 countries if they want us to, an RFC Corporation[10] in which we put in a certain amount of money and in which they put in a certain amount of money and that corporation then will loan this money to farmers, bankers, merchants, utilities, and operate as a 100 percent business.

They repay the money and then reloan it, loan it over and over again, because otherwise we will just hand out $600 million here and it will be a one-shot affair and when that is used up they will be back for a billion or a billion and a half, and if we are going to do this and I am highly in favor of it why don't we do it on a businesslike basis where it will do the most good over many years.

You remember how successful our own RFC was. We can set up corporations in those countries. They would have directors and they would have as much to say on the management basis and any time they want to reimburse us for the capital we have invested we will get out and be very happy to get out and let them run the whole business.

I shall offer an amendment to this resolution to do this very thing because I think it is the only practical way to do it.

Because then you will reach the people, you really reach the people. And this bank would loan money, maybe $100, to a little farmer, a little businessman and be operated as a real institution with their having their own men on the Board of Directors. We have men on the Board of Directors. We help them manage it, they manage it, and it thus becomes a bank that loans money to the people. Then you will really accomplish something worthwhile. If the country doesn't want to do it all right. Because we will help them do it. Because otherwise this will be a one shot situation. For example, if you gave a country $100 million and they possibly loan it to their people or they give it away, then what happens when they repay it? It goes into the general fund of that country and instead of taxing their people why they use that money to pay their own governmental expenses and it is just a one-shot thing and there will never be any end to our giving any money away or loaning it. Furthemore, under this plan we will be teaching them the private enterprise system since this could be operated as a 100-percent private enterprise, and that revolving fund would build up and they would charge interest just as the Export Bank and the International Bank.

---

[10] Reconstruction Finance Corporation.

Secretary **Herter**. Senator, what you are suggesting is very similar to what has been successful in a number of other countries in setting up an industrial development corporation from the local countries received through 480.

Senator **Capehart**. Many of those countries now have a Development Loan Fund in which they are endeavoring to do this.

My idea is if they have one, we expand it, we go in and help operate it and run it and loan money. All the money will be loaned through them and then you will reach the individual people you are talking about.

Secretary **Herter**. We agree with you completely, Senator, that the money is thrown away unless you have got proper management. That is essential and I am sure Mr. Dillon will talk to you about it.

Senator **Capehart**. I shall offer an amendment and talk about it at great length on doing that. I think we should have done that from the very beginning, from the very day we started loaning money or giving money away to foreign countries. I think we can do it much easier in Latin America than we could even in Asia or the European countries. But we certainly can do it in Latin America and I shall urge very strongly and offer legislation to do that because to me it is the proper way to do it because then you will accomplish what you want to accomplish.

TIE INTO MUTUAL AID PROGRAM

Senator **Lausche**. Mr. Chairman, I would like to subscribe to the thoughts expressed by Senator Capehart and Senator Morse, and one of my reasons is that we have got to bring to an end the arguments which are constantly made on the floor of the Senate, if we can possibly do it, that we are giving money to others and refusing to give any money to our own people.

I know the answer to that argument, and one is, that it is national defense, but you can't very effectively advance it. It is now my understanding that they are going to tie into the Mutual Aid program some amendments under which we will be giving aid to our people. I just don't know what it is, but my interpretation is that it is going to be tied into the Mutual Aid program so as to make most effective the argument you are giving money to foreigners but you are not giving it to our own people.

Moreover, gifts have not brought us the friendship which we anticipated. The converse has been true, and I would like to say something about our problem. In March, Lafer of Brazil was here, he had lunch with us in this room. When my time came to put questions I said to him it is my understanding that your cruzeiro has depreciated in your value in the sum of 50 cents in this last year. He was shocked and turned to the man on his left and asked him and the man said it is only 25 percent. I asked him if there was any bonded indebtedness that Brazil had and he said there was not.

I said how do you finance your public activities? His answer was that "We print money". Well, that is the grossest type of irresponsibility to me and I think for that reason, for that reason also, we ought to set up safeguards so that this money will not just be used as printing press money down there. That is all I have to say.

The CHAIRMAN. That is one of the practices the Monetary Fund criticized them so strongly for and they had a big hassle about it. They had been following, as the Secretary said, a very irresponsible fiscal policy in Brazil for a number of years.

Senator LAUSCHE. This Lafer finally said, "I am a businessman employing 35,000 people. I believe in the orthodox method that you must have a stable currency."

He said, "But I finally yielded because I believe that after this is all washed out, the good that has been done will live and the bad will be forgotten." If that ever comes then there will have to be an overthrow of some kind and what will result, what will be brought up from that overthrow is pretty hard to foretell.

Senator Aiken a moment ago mentioned that they expected 50 years from now all will be well. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions of the Secretary?

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a few questions?

TWO STRONG RIGHT ARMS

First let me express my appreciation to the Secretary for the kind words he had to say about the resolution introduced and to assure him that the purpose of introducing the resolution was to be helpful and I hope constructive.

It appears to me that the request for an authorization for $600 million representing the desire of the administration and a sense resolution passed by the Senate on the initiative of the Senate, could furnish two strong right arms to our economic ministers who will meet in Bogota too on the 5th of September and could serve as an earnest of the seriousness with which we view the situation throughout Latin America as a whole and the need for something to be done on a cooperative multilateral basis.

The resolution itself just sets down guidelines.

They are not binding but they are an expression of intent.

Would you say that it would be helpful to have both the resolution, which was introduced and I realize you haven't had a chance to study it thoroughly, and the $800 million authorization in the legislative mill passed?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, I would.

Senator MANSFIELD. I note that the President yesterday in response to a question by Mr. Reston [11] relative to Latin America said "I wouldn't think—well, it is not a matter I have thought of yet. Congress has been here quite a bit this year but I am not asking for a specific program, Mr. Reston. I am saying I would like to have an expression of the sentiment in the Congress and its intent that we could together find ways to bring about the raising of living standards, the bringing of a better life to these people generally rather than just confining ourselves to the particular types of loans" of which he had previously spoken.

---

[11] James "Scotty" Reston, New York Times columnist.

It appears to me that that would be in accord with what you have stated relative to this resolution and this appropriation this *morning*.

Secretary HERTER. Yes, entirely.

APPROPRIATIONS THROUGH THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Senator MANSFIELD. Would it be helpful if the $600 million aid authorization were to provide for an appropriation to and through the Secretary of State so that responsibility for its disbursement might be clearly fixed.

In other words, what you have to do through your assistant secretaries of state for economic affairs and Latin American affairs, you have to deal with a diffused authority rather than a concentrated authority. Thereby you are pulled and hauled, you are blamed for many things you are not responsible for because you have so many pieces of the pie in this particular area.

Would it help to have it?

Secretary HERTER. I think it might.

Senator MANSFIELD. As a matter of fact, if you give it to the President, in effect, he does act through you but if it could be spelled out it would be more effective and probably give more responsibility and authority to you and the proper departments for the conduct of affairs in Latin America?

Secretary HERTER. Right.

Senator MANSFIELD. Would the passage of the $600 million aid authorization help to carry forward an inter-American program along the lines of that proposed in the resolution introduced if it also should be passed on the basis of your knowledge of it?

Secretary HERTER. You mean the resolution that you are offering?

Senator MANSFIELD. Would the authorization, the $600 million authorization which has been requested or will be to carry forward an inter-American program along the lines of the resolution introduced, should it also be passed?

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

PROSPECTS FOR MODERATION IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND CUBA

Senator MANSFIELD. Now are there any immediate prospects for the fall or significant moderation of the present regimes in Cuba and in the Dominican Republic?

Secretary HERTER. In the Dominican Republic?

There has been a shift as you know, of personnel. We have been doing our best to analyze the shift and our best judgment at the moment is that it is just the same thing under a different name.

Senator MANSFIELD. And Cuba you have already mentioned previously?

Secretary HERTER. Cuba has been moving steadily to a more communized state.

Senator MANSFIELD. Now, can you conceive of any additional practicable unilateral actions of the United States which would help to bring about either their fall or their moderation?

Secretary HERTER. I would be very hesitant to recommend specific unilateral action at this time.

Certainly until we have explored working through the OAS.

Senator **Mansfield**. Yes. You anticipated me.

Would it not be more helpful if any action to curb these two regimes were taken also that it would be a hemispheric rather than a unilateral basis? I say these two regimes because they have both been mentioned in the agenda which is to be considered in Costa Rica next week so I am not speaking personally but speaking generally and without bias.

Secretary **Herter**. We have got to meet those two situations. We have got the Dominican coming up first in the agenda, and the Cuban we have to call a separate meeting for which we hope will take place immediately after we have finished with Santo Domingo.

Senator **Mansfield**. But you are doing it on a hemispheric basis.

Secretary **Herter**. Entirely.

Senator **Aiken**. Would that mean the Canadians would have an observer there?

Secretary **Herter**. No, they have been considering sending an observer.

Senator **Aiken**. I know that.

Senator **Mansfield**. Would it be a good idea to consider extending an invitation to them?

Secretary **Herter**. I think we should, because we have been thinking of inviting them.

Senator **Capehart**. Why do you consider them in that order?

Secretary **Herter**. It was entirely because of the complaints filed with the OAS.

OAS PROCEDURES

Senator **Mansfield**. Are there decisions made by the OAS we have to adhere to——

Secretary **Herter**. Yes.

Senator **Mansfield** [continuing]. Are the procedures and processes developed under the OAS charter adequate to take inter-American action to curb any single American state whose policies and actions become obstreperous?

Secretary **Herter**. That is a twilight zone—from the point of view of their taking action by a vote and whether that will be binding and require action on the part of their government. As I said the question of sanctions, whether they were economic sanctions or military sanctions of some kind, to be binding would have to go back to the United Nations. But from the point of view of recommendations that each country could act on, the OAS can make those recommendations.

Senator **Mansfield**. But the recommendations would be up to each country to enforce.

Secretary **Herter**. Each country to carry out.

Senator **Mansfield**. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The **Chairman**. Any other questions?

TRUJILLO VISIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator **Morse**. I would like to ask one if I may about Trujillo. The press recently carried a story that he was contemplating coming to the United Nations as head of their delegation to the General Assembly. What do you know about that?

Secretary **Herter**. When it was first announced, at the time of the shift in the government, our interpretation was that this was a way of getting asylum in the United States that he might not get otherwise.

Senator **Morse**. That is what I thought.

Secretary **Herter**. And yet as we have seen the new cabinet develop and the new setup develop it looks as though it were completely Trujillo dominated and whether this means this is only a temporary way of his moving out, whether it is to try to make it more difficult for the Organization of American States to take action against him and his regime because of this shift, it is hard to tell but it looks as though it was part of the same continuing.

Senator **Aiken**. You see him this fall and straighten things out.

Senator **Mansfield**. Both of you can do that. [Laughter.]

The **Chairman**. Senator Hickenlooper?

MAKE LATIN AMERICA STRAIGHTEN OUT ITS HOUSE

Senator **Hickenlooper**. This whole business of aid to South America is one I think all of us have been interested in. We have heard it referred to from time to time as something comparable to the Marshall Plan, but as I recall the Marshall Plan's basic approach was for the European countries to see what they can do for themselves and see how we could aid them.

It seems to me that over the years we have been giving money to South America and we have been making donations one way or another, without requiring the Latin American countries to do the kind of things they have got to do internally so as to straighten their house out. There is so much of this aid they have been taking and excusing themselves through using these funds, excusing themselves from levying taxes on their people and from really setting up fiscal systems that will put them on the basis of development.

I just give you one illustration. One time, 4 or 5 years ago I was riding through one of these Latin American countries and the head of the particular province was there. He was very conscious of this and as we would go through these little towns and these houses, he was very interested about housing, but he said "Well, we will never get any place on housing as long as the government furnishes these houses to these people."

He said, "These people don't pay any taxes, they don't pay anything for the maintenance of the streets, the services; the government furnishes that all to them."

He said they have no individual responsibility and until we can get individual responsibility down into these people some way, until our government, and he was talking about his government, has a tax system that instills the idea in these people that the maintenance of streets here, that the maintenance of their utilities, that the maintenance of this, that or the other thing, the roads, is part of their financial responsibility, "We will make very little progress because they will just look to the government to furnish everything for them and they will go on their own merry way and we will be asking you people for money and our government will substitute American contribution for taxes which ought to come out of the people here." There is a lot to that statment.

The Latin American countries as well as some other countries in the world don't face up realistically to the fundamentals of this proposition of private responsibility and they substitute the requests for American aid to supplement, to ease the burden that would come upon them if they attempted to put in realistic tax systems and private responsibility systems in their country.

They just shy away from it. It is not politically popular, and in the next election, why they are going to deface that, and I think that is one of the major differences. The European countries recognize that principle.

They did what they could to help themselves. They did it very well and American aid supplemented that.

STILL A FEUDAL PEOPLE

The **Chairman**. Bourke, isn't it true in Europe they have gone through their revolutions and they rid themselves of feudalism but many of these countries are still politically and socially feudal countries and when you go to do anything there the people in control are still the feudal people and you have a devil of a time administering it?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. There is no question about that. You have a few very rich and many extremely poor. But the matter has got to be solved internally in these countries.

The **Chairman**. The traditional way is to have a revolution.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. The more we make it easy for people in power to take money from some place else and avoid the rather bitter, burdensome, troublesome, politically dangerous programs of getting down to the people and saying "Here, if you want better houses you are going to have to pay taxes on your house, you are going to have to pay taxes to maintain your streets, you are going to have to pay taxes to maintain your local civic institutions," and they just won't do it. They dodge away from it.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND OAS

Secretary **Herter**. Senator, I completely agree with you on that. There are two agencies that, it would seem to me, we can turn to best in that picture unless we are going to try unilaterally to try to tell them how to run their own business which is a pretty ungrateful job. One is the monetary fund which has done an excellent job on that—the International Monetary Fund. The second one which I hope we can strengthen is the Economic and Social Committee of the OAS itself, to have it begin to develop the kind of responsibility that the OEEC in Europe did where it took the responsibility and where it was spread in an organization at that time of 17 nations. They had this extremely good secretariat that worked out the respective responsibilities of the various countries in a very good way. If we could develop the same kind of a thing through the OAS and give it a good deal more of responsibility, it would take some of the difficult load off. It is always the private banker's difficulty in dealing with any situation where he has got to clean house.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not objecting to our assistance programs, the programs of soft loans which most of us have advocated for a long time. But I just say, and I shall support the program reasonably, it is the line of least resistance for these countries to take aid from some other country and not establish the firm internal economic and political measures that are absolutely necessary if they are ready to raise these people to a point of responsibility so far as the people are concerned.

Secretary HERTER. We hope the inter-American bank will help these.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is easier to deal with a bank. It is easier to deal government through government. And this thing that Senator Capehart talked about a while ago is not particularly new. We talked about it many times before. Some kind of a system for establishing credit for the little farmer to borrow $25 to buy a little seed, borrow $50 to buy a crude plow and pay it out of his crops, but the trouble with our loaning agencies in so many of these countries is that they will only deal with substantial groups and then at 12 percent and it does not contribute anything to the raising of the real standard of the individual.

They raise the standard of certain groups but it does not reach that point and too many, I have seen too many of our representatives abroad who take the line of least resistance and force a check on these people rather than force them to do the things that they ought to do.

It is easier to write a check on the U.S. Government and our agencies abroad.

There is a great tendency and temptation.

CREATING A FALSE IMPRESSION

The CHAIRMAN. Bourke, this is what bothers me about that approach. If we make a gesture that is not coupled with an understanding they will assume there are not going to be any conditions and they are going to be receptive then to a big grant. I am bothered about making this gesture for fear of creating a false impression in their mind that we are not going to require some kind of administration that you are suggesting.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am also aware of the very delicate nature of such negotiations, if we move in and try to tell people how to run their internal affairs and then the principle of sovereignty sticks up its head and they say we are sovereign and we will starve to death before we will let you run our country. All of these things creep into it, but I think we can be criticized in many places because we probably have taken the line of least resistance and we have not as strongly as we should laid down the leather on these things and I don't know that we will.

PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, right on the housing if I may mention it, I know the State Department is familiar with this, we do have a private concern in Wichita, Kansas that is building a substantial number of houses either in Peru or Chile and getting out into the area and they are doing it as I understand it on private capital.

But I understand they are getting along very well. I know these people and the State Department has helped them on several occasions to get down there.

Secretary HERTER. We have collected in Peru the equivalent of $2 million to purchase capital for the housing development.

Senator CARLSON. So it can be done in some of these countries. I have got pictures. I have not followed it too closely.

Secretary HERTER. The former ambassador to Peru is right here and he is very familiar with it.

Mr. ACHILLES. We have insisted on the use of one of two approaches—one is the private capital one of building and loan associations; we have been willing only to loan seed capital to promote private local investment. The other is through what is called aiding self-help projects where the government provides the land and we provide technical assistance and some credit for building materials. The people build their own houses and then pay back the government over a period of years, but the emphasis is all on those two forms rather than any kind of public housing.

Senator CARLSON. Is it not true they have built a substantial number of houses on at least this last basis where you contribute part of the funds?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, they built a good deal in Chile and Colombia.

Senator CARLSON. That is true. I want to look into it a little further. I think there is a possibility of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

NUCLEAR TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS

I wanted to ask a question. There was a reference you made the other day about this nuclear test ban explosion. Do you think in view of the Russian attitude as you explained in the beginning that any further negotiations are hopeless with the Russians at the moment?

Secretary HERTER. That is a very difficult question to answer. They have stalled very badly. They did one thing that was very distressing.

Senator GORE. Very what?

Secretary HERTER. They did one thing that was very distressing to us. When Mr. Macmillan and the President made that proposal, you may recall in regard to the moratorium, it was based on two things: one was the signing of a satisfactory agreement that took in the ban up to the threshold; the second was an agreement on a coordinated series of tests so as to improve seismic instrumentation.

With regard to the latter we sent our best seismic scientists to Geneva and they sat with the Russians for some 10 days or 2 weeks. They came to complete agreement as to how the tests should be carried out, in what numbers and what types of tests and agreed there should be nuclear tests, that they were essential in connection with this. Then they made their recommendations to the full committee and Tsarapkin, the principal Russian, kicked them all out the window and he said, "We are not bound by what the scientists said in any way whatsoever. These are political considerations and we are not going to take into consideration what the scientists have recommended."

And that has led to the haggling going on with the series of tests that we're going to get anywhere on seismic improvement and they have been just as sticky as they can be, and we may be at the end of the rope. We have under consideration now what might be the last effort to see if we are going to see reason on this. If they didn't it is just a question of whether we should keep on because in the process of keeping on, we are presumably penalizing ourselves in that there has been, while there is no official moratorium on our side we received the right to continue tests whenever we see fit, as a practical matter while we saw hope in the negotiations we have not been doing any testing. So that it is a pretty discouraging negotiation that has carried on now for nearly 2 years and whether they really intend to do anything or not it is awfuly hard to tell.

Senator GORE. The sticking point, was it the question of whether or not they should inspect the nuclear devices which might be used in the test?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, but they are completely unwilling to join in the tests themselves. They are unwilling to lift a finger to help in the improvement of the seismic instrumentation and if we want to go ahead with the tests we can go ahead with them but they will consider them a violation of a moratorium so to speak if we set off a nuclear explosion.

They have asked for a veto to determine how many shots there shall be, and what the size of them shall be and so on.

And yet they won't take any part in helping out in the thing at the same time.

The CHAIRMAN. So in effect it does look rather hopeless.

ROLE OF THE CHINESE

Secretary HERTER. Well, the only thing that sticks in back of my mind is that I suspect that the Russians are under very heavy pressures from the Chinese to share in the nuclear knowledge, and that while these negotiations are still going on they will contain that pressure and they don't want to break them off. They wouldn't want to break them unless they themselves had a real interest in this.

It is certainly very much in their own interest, I would think, to keep the Chinese from attaining a nuclear capability so that there may be some community of interest in it, but the way they act you get awfully discouraged.

CONTINGENCY FUND INCREASE

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything other than this bill that you sent us with regard to Latin America that the administration expects to propose that would involve this committee this session?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, there is.

The CHAIRMAN. What else?

Secretary HERTER. There are two things and Mr. Dillon will be talking about the detail of them but I should mention them now.

There is one which is an authorization for an additional $100 million for the contingency fund.

The CHAIRMAN. That is involved in this bill?

Secretary HERTER. It is in the last paragraph but it is a different subject matter from the rest of the bill.

It has been put in the same thing.

The CHAIRMAN. That is on just an amendment to the Mutual Security Act?

Secretary HERTER. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. I have forgotten, how much did they allow the Appropriations Committee on the existing authority?

Secretary HERTER. One hundred fifty million.

The CHAIRMAN. They allowed the whole amount?

Secretary HERTER. No. $175 million was asked and they allowed——

Mr. CLAXTON. The authorized was $150 million and the House allowed the $150. It is still before the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. But they did allow the amount of the authority so your authority is exhausted. You are asking here for an additional $100 million authority for the contingency fund.

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you expect the appropriation for that at this session?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir, that could be done.

The CHAIRMAN. In a supplemental?

Secretary HERTER. Yes. This after all is the one fund on which we can draw in connection with the Congolese situation.

HANDLE MATTERS SEPARATELY

The CHAIRMAN. Just in case there is any delay or difficulty over Latin America, shouldn't that perhaps be handled separately or would you recommend that?

Secretary HERTER. Well, I questioned the wisdom of putting the two things in one bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, you never know about this. You say this morning a number of questions were raised not so much about the objective but the mechanics.

Secretary HERTER. We have no objection whatever to their being separated. That authorization is a very simple two or three lines.

Mr. MACOMBER. Sir, we would hope it would not be a supplemental, but we could get the authorization from the Senate in time that the Senate Appropriations Committee could act on it when they are acting on the regular mutual security bill.

The CHAIRMAN. It occurred to me that perhaps it should be handled separately because I think the members this morning have evidenced considerable interest in seeing more of the details of how the Latin American matter would be administered.

Senator Capehart has already given his views.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, I think we ought to have authorization in accordance with this request this year.

Whether it is for $500 million or whatever it is for, any authorization at all would have an effect, of course. I don't pretend to know what the amount is; we will hear testimony on that from Mr.

Dillon. But I am thinking as to psychology and I just assured this representative from the Argentine out here that the election probably wasn't going to make any difference in our Latin American program, no matter what, and I don't think it is.

I haven't seen this committee indulging in devilish pursuits.

USE OF THE CONTINGENCY FUND

The **CHAIRMAN**. Is the $100 million in the contingency fund intended for use in Africa?

Secretary **HERTER**. Yes. On the other hand we don't want to specify that because right away Africa would say here is $100 million in our pocket.

The **CHAIRMAN**. I understand, but from our point of view of getting action assuming this session is not going to last beyond Labor Day it might be wise to divide those two and let it go ahead if there is not any objection to it.

Secretary **HERTER**. No.

Mr. **MACOMBER**. No problem for us, sir. The only reason we combined them is you might want to go to the floor once rather than twice.

Secretary **HERTER**. Yes.

The **CHAIRMAN**. That depends, we can tell that by maybe Tuesday. I would think by then, if there are considerable questions about additional provisions regarding Latin America, I would think you ought to separate them if that is agreeable.

FOOD FOR PEACE

Secretary **HERTER**. There is one other matter before you and that is a resolution in connection with Food for Peace but I think the text was sent up last night, was it not?

Mr. **MACOMBER**. No, sir, it is coming up today.

Secretary **HERTER**. We don't have it before us.

Mr. Dillon will be testifying on that too. It is in the form of a simple resolution.

Senator **MANSFIELD**. Will you be going to San Jose, going on Monday?

Secretary **HERTER**. Yes, going on Monday.

Senator **AIKEN**. How many countries have now ratified the Antarctic Treaty?

Mr. **MACOMBER**. Six now.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Six now. There were five as of yesterday.

Senator **AIKEN**. Any idea Russia will ratify?

Secretary **HERTER**. We expect so.

Senator **AIKEN**. They have got to put up or shut up.

Secretary **HERTER**. The Chileans and Argentines are going to be sticky but the way it was drafted you may recall during the course of the drafting that was our biggest worry.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Any other questions?

If not, thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary **HERTER**. I was going to give to the press a very brief 2-page statement dealing only with it, this is for foreign consumption rather than domestic consumption.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.]

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA [1]

TUESDAY, AUGUST 16, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:45 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol, Hon. J. William Fulbright, presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Mansfield, Sparkman, Lausche, Carlson, Aiken and Capehart.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Denney, Mr. Henderson and Mr. St. Claire of the committee staff.

CONTINGENCY FUND INCREASE FOR AFRICA

The CHAIRMAN. I think we might come to order and start discussion anyway. There is one thing that is fairly non-controversial that I would like to start with simply in the interest of time which is the proposal to increase the contingency fund for $100 million.

That as you know is for Africa. They want to have the money to be able to use it in Africa and it is in the nature of a contingency.

They don't know exactly what they want to do with it, but obviously the situation is so bad there is critical need for it and I thought we might be able to take it up before we get into the other matter which is complicated.

You all have a copy of it.

Senator AIKEN. This is for this year only.

The CHAIRMAN. That's right. In effect this increases the authorization of the existing MSA bill for this year, fiscal 61. The Appropriations Committee is meeting now and they cannot appropriate the money unless we pass the authorization and that is why this urgency.

If we are going to do it we have to do it right away because they are meeting on Friday of this week.

Senator LAUSCHE. On that subject, how much was included in the original authorization, my recollection is that it was $20 million for all of Africa.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct as I recall it, specifically earmarked for Africa.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. And you are also authorizing the use from this fund to finance administrative costs.

---

[1] See Appendix C.

The **Chairman**. Well, they said they had to have this increase.

Senator **Aiken**. Including increased salaries which Congress voted after we passed the authorization bill.

The **Chairman**. That is part of it.

Senator **Aiken**. Yes.

Senator **Carlson**. As I read this the only limitation is the time limitation which expires at the end of fiscal 61.

The **Chairman**. There is no difference from having done it in MSA originally.

Senator **Capehart**. You are lifting this from the bill introduced.

The **Chairman**. In order not to get bogged down. They have to get it by Friday. They are meeting on Friday in order to include the appropriation, that is the reason for it being a separate one.

Senator **Aiken**. I would move we approve this, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Sparkman**. Second.

Senator **Aiken**. I think this is a legitimate emergency that was unforeseen.

OTHER EMERGING AFRICAN NATIONS

Senator **Lausche**. That is there will be 17 more independent nations emerge in Africa this year I understand.

The **Chairman**. I have lost count. Eight more this month.

Senator **Lausche**. I said 17.

The **Chairman**. You are including all together.

Senator **Lausche**. Well, the purpose of my inquiry is how far do we go, that is now with Congo we are going to provide $100 million. When those 17 new nations attain independence, is there likely to develop a similar situation where we also have to step in——

The **Chairman**. It is not my understanding that is earmarked for the Congo alone. This is for the Congo plus any other contingencies in the area which might arise during the course of the year is my understanding as the basis for this request.

Senator **Sparkman**. My understanding is that the $100 million is simply to boost the amount that we had given without any earmarking.

The **Chairman**. That's right.

Senator **Sparkman**. To be used anywhere but they say that this typifies it, the Congo.

The **Chairman**. That's right, the justification is for——

Senator **Sparkman**. It typifies conditions.

Senator **Lausche**. Frankly, I become disturbed when hearing Lumumba saying if you don't give us the money, we will go to the Soviet.

The **Chairman**. I have already become concerned.

Senator **Lausche**. That is a technique and we become a prey and I don't know where it is going to lead us if some foreign minister or premier says "Unless you give us the money we go to the Soviet," and then we run mad trying to provide the money. We are giving them encouragement in the adoption of that technique. Castro did it to us, Lumumba is doing it to us now and someone else will do it again and some way, somehow we have got to stop that kind of intimidation on us.

Senator **Aiken**. I think the trouble in the Congo, Frank, was anticipated. It is generally believed that Congo independence was a little premature. I don't think there is the same feeling prevailing in regard to the French colonies which are now getting their independence although it is not conclusive that there won't be difficulties in some of those territories also.

But in the Congo, I am afraid, this trouble was expected there.

Senator **Lausche**. I recall distinctly the report that we had on Africa. It was an excellent document, and it stated that there were many areas where they were not ripe for independence.

Senator **Aiken**. Well, geographical rights cut right through the tribal territories.

Senator **Lausche**. That is correct.

Anyhow, I want to repeat that I don't think that we can continue suffering these threats that unless we provide the money they will go to the Soviets. We have developed the psychology among these nations that that is the way to get to us. From my standpoint, I would be just saying to Lumumba, "We will not be threatened with a gun. We will not be threatened by your declaration that you are going to the Soviet."

But we are. Castro did the same thing to us. We didn't provide him with money but we suffered him to go forward with his depredations.

REACTING TO LATE

The **Chairman**. Frank, I agree with you, I object to this, but I don't know what to do about it. I think the trouble has been we have reacted in these areas much too late in every case. Coming in here now for $500 million. It would have been much better if 2, 3, 4 years ago we had started an orderly program and so on, but we didn't do it. The administration didn't want to do it, I don't know that the Congress took any particular lead in it, although this committee several times made efforts to try to increase the economic aid down there, shift it from the military but we didn't succeed.

The trouble is they were confronted with this situation now, and it is the usual result of lack of foresight in getting in ahead of time, and I am not speaking particularly of the Congo but in many of these other cases you have mentioned saying we have gotten into the habit of doing it. In the Congo it looks just like chaos over there.

Nobody to administer the place, there are no trained technicians. Seventeen college graduates out of 17 million people, I read in the papers the other day, 17 native college graduates. There are about 30,000 Belgians, if they are run out the place is going to collapse and I think the main thing that might be achieved is to find a way to keep the Belgians there to administer the country. If they are run out, if order is not established, if there is not some reasonable order it really will become absolute chaos.

These are emergency operations, Frank. I don't like it any better than you do but we are faced with this situation, what are you going to do?

Senator **Lausche**. The point I am trying to make I believe the time has come when we ought to give a review to this whole task.

We foresaw that there would be trouble in the Congo. The Belgians didn't want to give it up.

The **Chairman**. That's right.

Senator **Lausche**. And exactly what was anticipated has happened.

The **Chairman**. Yes.

Senator **Lausche**. Now, then, it becomes our responsibility to lift them out of their trouble and I can't see how they are going to be able to run a government, as you describe it, they have got 17 college graduates.

The **Chairman**. I don't see much myself. I think it is a terrible situation, but the administration had asked for this in the nature of a fund which will give them an opportunity to keep order there and keep the Belgians there and re-establish some kind of order that may here present itself. The alternative is we say no, and then they have nothing to move in their with, and maybe the opportunity won't arise. But if it does, I don't want to take that responsibility—I am not going to give them anything to work with. I don't know whether it will work or not. I have my doubts about it.

Senator **Lausche**. Let's look at Cuba. Many of the people didn't like the situation there. So many of the leaders decided we should take out Batista and put in Castro. We have a Communist government down there.

I saw the figures yesterday, the cost of living has remained constant at 102 in Bolivia and it is comparatively high. We don't like Trujillo and we are going to drive him out and I suppose we will have there a Communist regime.

In the Congo we kept quiet when Belgium felt they were not ready for independence, we knew that a vacuum would arise and the vacuum has arisen, so I think that we ought to take a new look at this matter and I am going to want to say something on this item in accord with what I have said to you here at this time.

Seventeen more nations, and 17 more responsibilities of ours over there.

Senator **Capehart**. Will the Senator yield?

Senator **Lausche**. Yes.

MISTAKES IN POLICY

Senator **Capehart**. Of course, we should never advocate giving sovereignty or independence to a colony or a nation that can't support itself economically and militarily, that is the mistake we have made over the years and we are still making it.

Another mistake we make is we never do anything until an emergency exists and then we rush in and do something in a hurry and it is very seldom the right thing and very seldom accomplishes the purposes for which it is intended.

Go back to 1933 when Roosevelt was conscious of the fact that the Russians, if we recognized them would cause us trouble, and they have. He got an agreement out of them which they did not keep that they would not spread communism et cetera, et cetera. He was conscious of it then but he took the chance which he should not have taken. It is the same way all the way through, no matter what it is. We are always there too late. This Latin American situation, and this Cuban situation, the very, very idea, the Publishers Association of the United States invited Castro up here 2 days after he took over down there to address them.

Later on, we had him in this room here.

Senator **Lausche**. We accepted him as a hero, right in this room and on the floor of the Senate.

Senator **Capehart**. It has been the same way with Democrats and Republican Presidents.

The **Chairman**. I don't think this committee accepted him as a hero. We had all kinds of pressure to ask him here since he was in the United States.

Senator **Capehart**. I didn't say the committee said he was a hero, the publishers treated him as a hero.

The **Chairman**. The administration was not responsible for that. They couldn't help that invitation, Homer.

Senator **Capehart**. I know. I am just saying it is the mistakes we as a people make.

The **Chairman**. I agree with that.

Senator **Capehart**. Here is this fellow, who was up here, what, it was 2 years ago, at the request of the Publishers Association. I got one paper so sore at me at Indiana now because I said it was all wrong because he thought it was a great thing.

USE OF AMERICAN AID IN THE CONGO

Senator **Lausche**. What is your view on these threats that they make that Lamumba made "that I am going to the Soviet if you don't give us or do as I tell you in the United Nations."

I don't know whether I am just off base on the proposition that we ought to tolerate those things.

Senator **Mansfield**. Mr. Chairman, could I say something here?

The **Chairman**. Yes.

Senator **Mansfield**. I think these people who use us in that way ought to be told to just go to hell and go to the Soviet Union if they want to. But in this particular instance, I think what we are doing, and Mr. Herter brought this out last week, we are furnishing 90 percent of the transportation costs for the U.N. troops in the Congo. I imagine there are other costs as well, and it is undecided whether those costs will come out of the President's contingency fund or the Air Force. I have an idea what this money is to be used for is in connection with the United Nations, and what you have got is Lumumba in effect saying to Dag Hammarskjold that he is persona non grata, that the U.N. at present should not be in the Congo but I think we ought to back the U.N. presence there in order to bring order out of chaos. That is how the money is to be used and we can't let the U.N. down in this vital venture.

Senator **Aiken**. More than that, Mike, this is going to be used for the 30,000 to 40,000 white people in that area. That is why they moved in to keep them from being abused and exterminated.

The **Chairman**. That's right. And the only hope for the future is to keep them there for at least a reasonable time.

Senator **Aiken**. Lumumba has demonstrated his unfitness already and will have to go. But where is the question?

Senator LAUSCHE. I stated the other day if Katanga wanted to secede from the country I can't see that we ought to help them any more than if the Soviets should step down from Hungary and I did see in the Post or Star a very lengthy column, I can't recall by whom it was written, pointing out the weakness of our position with respect to sending in troops to suppress the Katangans in their efforts to be independent.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think we ought to either.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, we are not.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think that is what the purpose of this fund is for.

Senator SPARKMAN. We should keep in mind we are not sending in troops.

The U.N. is sending in troops and we don't even have a contingent among them.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think that is the purpose. It is merely to maintain order so that something can be worked out.

Senator CAPEHART. I think Frank's feeling and position is same as mine. I am very, very much discouraged at the world situation. We don't seem to be able to do something. Maybe we ought to take a look at it and so do something. We have had nothing but a series of errors and mistakes and the situation seems to be getting worse instead of better. I think he is just discouraged with the whole situation, and I know I am. I don't know what you are going to do about this except give them the money.

The CHAIRMAN. That is about the way I feel about it. I am no more happy about it than you are.

SITUATION IN EASTERN EUROPE

Senator LAUSCHE. All you can do is approve it and then express your views on the floor. This is not the vital thing to me. I think we have got to take a look at Poland. It is opposing us in every way. We are keeping it in office. We loaned it $150 million, I think a week or two ago. That is all I have to say on it.

I may want to say something on the floor.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Frank, on Poland, I agree that it creates some troublesome problems, but the alternative in Poland to that is to completely drive them into the Communist orbit, whereas they are only about three quarters in it now. There is some hope in Poland eventually.

Now whether we should have given them the $150 million can be argued persuasively on either side. We have a situation in Czechoslovakia that is tragic. The most orthodox Communist country today in Europe is Czechoslovakia, probably more properly orthodox than Russia itself.

Now, from what I can find out that has come about from a combination of circumstances. Some of us were in Czechoslovakia in 1947. The Czech Ministry told us at that time, it was about two-thirds non-Communist and about a third Communist at that time, the Marshall Plan had just been announced and Czechoslovakia accepted it quickly, sent word they wanted to join the Marshall Plan. We were there in October. They just got word from the Russian masters that they should not go into the Marshall Plan and they were just in a dither, they didn't know what to do.

The then Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia and I forget what his name was, it wasn't Masaryk.[2]

The CHAIRMAN. It wasn't Benes,[3] was it?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Benes.

Senator LAUSCHE. He jumped out of the window or something.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. When we had a meeting with three non-Communists at that time, he said "Unless we get some encouragement, unless we get some vigorous help from you folks and from the nations, the Communists are going to take us over in 6 months." He said, "I give them 6 months to take us over. We can't stop it, we can't resist."

CZECHS RECEIVED NO HELP

Well, of course, Europe was prostrate at that time. The Marshall Plan was just going into effect. It was almost 6 months to the day after that the Communist coup took over Czechoslovakia. True, they are an interior country, we can't get at them, but there was nothing done by the West, just as in the Hungarian situation, where they received no physical aid from the West. So far as I am concerned, I don't know how they could have received physical aid unless we sent armies or something of that kind which probably was unthinkable at that time, but a number of those things have caused the Czechs, as far as I can find out, to feel they are completely abandoned from the West and they have no hope. Therefore, they have reverted completely now to become orthodox Communists in the most conforming sort of way.

Now of all those people, probably in that whole area, of all the satellite countries, I think without doubt the Czechs are the most advanced economically, educationally, and abilitywise. The Czechs are very advanced people. They are hill people, and they are the biggest industrial producers in the Communist complex today outside of Russia. But here is a people who abandoned hope some time ago, especially after Hungary, and they are today so firmly and definitely integrated now, at least so far as the government and a great many of the people are concerned, into the Communist bloc that it would be the most difficult country today in the whole satellite area to get broken away from that Communist group.

True, I think the Russians have appreciated the Czech abilities, that is their factories, their production capabilities, their skills, and I think probably they have treated them just a little better than they have Bulgaria or Rumania or even Poland, as a matter of fact. I think they have treated them a little better. The iron heel has not been quite as hard on the Czechs because what they want is the production out of the Czechs. Be that as it may, the idea of futility and abandonment seems to have taken hold of the Czechs and they have succumbed now. They have said "Well, there is no hope this way, we might just as well try to get along, we might as well realize that inevitably we are in the utter control of the Communists and we might become conformists." They are somewhat in the situation of a convert to the Catholic Church who is a Protestant. About 9 times out of 10 they are more conformist than people born Catholics. Naturally they have adopted and espoused the religion and then they become the utmost conformists. I know at least among my friends people who become Catholics they conform a lot more to the Catholic Church than most of the Catholics born that way.

---

[2] Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister, Jan Masaryk, who died in a fall from a window on March 10, 1948.

[3] Eduard Benes, Czechoslovakian President who resigned in June 1948.

The Czechs are a whole lot like that. I am not comparing the Catholic Church with the Communists, don't misunderstand me, of course, but I am saying they became, of necessity, a part of this Communist bloc and now while they were not originally Communists they are the greatest conformists you have today.

It is a rather natural characteristic. That is the only reason I have been willing to go along with consideration for Poland, because if there is an abandonment of Poland, that same thing may happen to Poland. They may be irrevocably set up and driven mentally, psychologically and every other way they might just be set up to be utterly conforming Communists now and disassociate themselves from the West. That is my feeling about it.

FUNDS ARE NOT EARMARKED

The **CHAIRMAN**. Well, gentlemen, we had better pass on what we have before us.

Senator **SPARKMAN**. I second the motion.

The **CHAIRMAN**. It is moved and seconded we report out this authorization for increase of $100 million.

Senator **GREEN**. I am sorry I came in late, what is it?

The **CHAIRMAN**. This is the increase in the authorization for the Mutual Security bill contingency fund $100 million.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. It does not earmark it at all.

The **CHAIRMAN**. It does not earmark it at all but the contingency fund of the administration in any part of the world. The justification for it is the situation in Africa and it is presumed that will be used there.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Does that satisfy the administration?

The **CHAIRMAN**. I asked them yesterday, and they do. Because I asked them if it was not wise to separate it because it is anticipated the other part will be delayed.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. I mean you lifted it out.

The **CHAIRMAN**. It does. They recognize there may be delay and because of the necessity of getting the appropriation it ought to be passed.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. I know of nothing else to be done and it will be used any way most of it next year.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Is there any further discussion?

Senator **GREEN**. The justification of it is that we are going to adjourn shortly and there wouldn't be time before that to call another special session.

The **CHAIRMAN**. That is right.

Senator **GREEN**. And therefore we had better play it safe, is that the idea?

The **Chairman**. That is right, and the justification from a substantive point of view is the conditions in Africa. From the timing point of view is the fact that the Appropriations Committee is now meeting and they intend to take up this appropriation on Friday and without the authorization they have no authority to increase it.

Is there any further discussion?

All in favor of the motion, say "aye"?

Opposed, "no"?

[No response.]

The **Chairman**. The "ayes" have it.

Senator **Carlson**. I was for it, but may I have a minute?

SITUATION IN THE CCNGO

There is going to be a lot of discussion about Africa and particularly the Congo and some time we get information from people who have been over there 1 year or 2 or 3.

Last June I spoke at the commencement at Taylor University in Indiana, 280 in this graduating class and on the board of directors of that institution is a retired missionary who has spent in his life 41 years in that central section in Nairobi and the Congo and he told me very interesting things. I am not suggesting that he come up here but he knows Africa and he knows those problems and sometimes I think it might be well if we had someone who had spent 41 years in that area. He knows the people and the problems, and he told us we were going to have some problems and I think we ought to have him some time next year because the problem is going to be with us.

The **Chairman**. I agree.

Senator **Lausche**. I would suggest that study on Africa, made by—I don't know which agency. I am going to re-read it in view of the new developments up there.

Senator **Mansfield**. Northwestern University.

The **Chairman**. Mr. Herskovits came and testified.

Senator **Aiken**. Mr. Chairman, I have a suggestion even better than the one that Frank has. And that is that the chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa be designated to go over there and make an intensive study during the next 3 months and then report back to the committee. [Laughter.]

Senator **Lausche**. I do think we ought to try to ascertain——

The **Chairman**. The whole subcommittee is Senator Kennedy, chairman; Senators Green, Lausche, Church, Wiley, and Capehart.

Senator **Capehart**. Am I on that subcommittee?

Senator **Mansfield**. Don't you think we ought to put on the Vice President as an ex officio member?

Senator **Capehart**. We never had a meeting, have we?

Senator **Lausche**. No, we haven't.

PROPOSED STUDY OF AFRICA

Senator **Lausche**. May I make one suggestion and that is on the matter of Africa, I think it would be well to in some way now make a study and try to ascertain what should be expected in these newly created independent countries, and I suggest that so that we could take a foresight in it and collect our foresight with what actually happens.

If there are going to be vacuums and chaos in each of these newly created independent countries, it may be we ought to change our approach before the things occur rather than to begin pouring money in when we know in advance there is going to be chaos such as is in the Congo.

Senator **GREEN**. I think any sensible man, any sensible American who goes there would see that it is bound to come.

Senator **LAUSCHE**. That is with independence there is bound to come a vacuum.

Senator **GREEN**. Yes, as a result of extreme measures, military measures.

Senator **AIKEN**. We don't know, we thought there would be chaos in Malaya, we thought they were not ready for self-government, but it didn't result.

Senator **SPARKMAN**. I think experience has shown us any country administered by England has been pretty much ready for it.

Senator **AIKEN**. France next and Belgium less.

Senator **SPARKMAN**. I don't know what we can do now but I wonder if we may have been a little too rash in promising, urging and encouraging early self-determination for some of these countries, I don't know whether we could put the brakes on or help put the brakes on.

The **CHAIRMAN**. It is too late.

Senator **SPARKMAN**. I am afraid so.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Africa is more important in this in the world, but we have a similar situation brewing right under our nose in Latin America and that is the one in which there is more money involved and what to do there?

Senator **GREEN**. A special appropriation to send the vice president down there again. [Laughter.]

Senator **SPARKMAN**. For 3 months.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Send Kennedy to Africa and Nixon to Latin America. Do you make that as a motion?

Senator **GREEN**. Yes. [Laughter.]

A TRANSITION PERIOD IN THE WORLD

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Mr. Chairman, I think apropos of that, what has been said and of what several have said here, I realize that the Foreign Relations Committee probably can't originate contingency policy and it can't necessarily decide policy. That is foreign policy, the Constitution places that largely in the hands of the President and whatever administration is in power, in the formulation of the daily, monthly and weekly and periodic dealing with it as it comes up.

But we are, and we all realize it, I am sure, in one of those world convulsion situations that occur every century or two or three and we are in it right now. We are in a transition period in this world. What happens in this period, of course, will determine what the situation will be 50 or 75 years from now.

I think, and I don't know what the form should be, I don't know how or what the general type of approach should be, but this is the

Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, and it has basic responsibilities. I wonder if there is some way in which we, as a Foreign Relations Committee, can't give some serious thought, even though we meet a half dozen times and don't come to any particular conclusions but thrash this thing out, and get a better understanding of the problems. This is no criticism of the way the committee is run, please don't misunderstand me, that is not it, but I am just posing the problem that I think confronts us. We meet periodically here. This morning we are talking about a very important subject and we have got about 6 or 7 members of the committee here. It is hard to get all the committee members.

The CHAIRMAN. Nine, this is a good representation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, this is unusually good.

The CHAIRMAN. That's right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But I mean just to take the subject of Africa and have a seminar on the thing with our State Department people.

The CHAIRMAN. In defense of the committee——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not criticizing.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me recall though, you say we sit here and don't do anything.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No, I don't.

RESTRICTIONS ON THE COMMITTEE

The CHAIRMAN. Two years ago and before that we urged the committee and in fact we brought out a bill to put this whole program here on a long term basis. We recommended it be on a 5-year basis so that the administration, whoever it would be, could plan, they could say "This is a program that has to meet this situation," what were we met with? In the first place the Appropriations Committee of the House always objects to anything we do. The next was the Treasury. The State Department approved of what this committee did.

The Treasury intervened, Mr. Anderson [4] and the Budget Bureau and they said "No, we don't want any 5 year program. We don't want any continuing authority. We want just the annual thing." This is one effort, I mean and nearly every time this committee has undertaken to do that they have been frustrated. As you said, we can't determine the final action but I say the record of the committee for the last 5 years or longer has been more foresighted in this field than the Congress itself, and God knows we have trouble on all of these with the House Appropriations Committee.

Nearly everything of a forward looking nature in this field, they have sabotaged it and put restrictions on it and held it down.

In the field of exchanges, my God, if it had not been for that committee over there, we would have that up to a very respectable size but every year they cut it down, under the budget request, it is one of the items where in many cases they go over the budget, they always go over the budget on public works and things of that kind but every year since I have been in this committee, the House has cut under the budget, in many of these long-term programs that are looking to the solution of the troubles.

---

[4] John B. Anderson, Secretary of the Treasury.

You know that is true. This committee has time and again put in provisions that have been knocked out.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There is no question about it. You and I have been on this committee about the same length of time, I guess, been on it 14 years now, and generally speaking this committee has been vigorous, I am not criticizing the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. We can't make them do it, Bourke, I don't know how to make them do it.

NON-PARTISAN APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not criticizing the fact that this committee has come up through its various members from time to time with ideas and programs that have proven to be sound, maybe not always sound but there has been some very constructive thinking on the part of certain members of this committee in the foreign field. They have been very helpful.

I think this committee, in the main, has been unusually non-partisan from a political standpoint. I think it is unusual so far as committees of the Congress go. So I have no quarrel about that. But perhaps the thing I am trying to say here is this: I may have some idea about what ought to go in the Congo. I may have some idea about what we ought to do in Cuba. Frank Lausche has ideas, Homer Capehart, George Aiken, the chairman, Senators Green, Sparkman, Mansfield, and Carlson. Now those ideas may, if you thrash them out, if we could, and that may be impractical, if we thrash these things all out and devoted some time to it we might find we might come to more unanimity of opinion, than just having short cursory hearings and then having a vote on something which maybe you are not fully satisfied with and so on.

What I probably am trying to get at is just like sitting down with somebody and you don't know just what, exactly what your programs are but after a discussion of the question you decide what the programs are.

The CHAIRMAN. You mentioned a moment of getting the members here. They all want to get on this committee and then a lot of them don't come to the meeting.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I say it is maybe impractical.

PRESSURES OF DOMESTIC MATTERS

The CHAIRMAN. Take the hearings on a thing like the Herskovits hearing on Africa, I will bet the record will show there were not over four or five members there and that is normal. Nearly every one of those hearings of that type you don't get them here because the other pressures of domestic matters, appropriations especially, and minimum wage. Take our candidate, Mr. Kennedy, how many times now has he been to this committee?

How many times have you seen him here this year or last year or the year before, and I don't mean to pick him out. There are several who have other more pressing business. It isn't that they are lazy or not doing it, it is the fact that the pressure of domestic matters overrides the foreign every time.

You get great enthusiasm over the minimum wage bill, you get a terrific debate but when you get up there on mutual assistance there are two or three who hate it and don't like it and we are criticized at home for being for it.

By God, I am. My senior Senator[5] gets up down there and says in his speeches on the Arkansas River that he won't appropriate for or vote for one penny for this foreign aid until they finish this Arkansas River and that has been his policy and he got by without an opponent.

This is the final ultimate of the thing is that over the country they don't appreciate these programs and most of the members, if there are two meetings going on where do they go, they go to the one having to do with their State things and that has been true ever since I have been here and you know it is, Bourke.

You can't get them here because there is always a wheat bill or an Arkansas River bill, or a rice bill or something that is competing for their time and they won't come here.

Senator LAUSCHE. Bill, may I give you my view of what is bothering me?

RICH NATIONS AND POOR NATIONS

Manifestly, the difficulties throughout the world reside in the efforts of the people to attain a better economy. I pointed out yesterday that the per person participation in the gross national product of all the nations in South America is $120 a year.

Ours in 1959 was $2,500 a year. $120 per person is a very low amount.

The CHAIRMAN. It is.

Senator LAUSCHE. But we have in addition to that the human psychology and weakness of envying the person who has much.

The CHAIRMAN. That's right.

Senator LAUSCHE. So you have 2 factors in South America, one, they are poor. Secondly they envy us, and they hate us, and the second factor you can't eliminate. We have that attitude on the floor of the Senate where Senators envy and want to break down the rich. We have Castros in our Nation that are wanting to take away from the rich and ostensibly give to the poor.

I recognize that we should do something to help these impoverished people, and I recognize that that is the method to thwart communism from coming into South America. But now then I go to Africa, and in Africa the conditions are worse, I venture to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Much worse.

Senator LAUSCHE. They are in South America?

The CHAIRMAN. Much worse.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then you go to the Middle East and you find a similar situation. Bolivia has a per capita income of $65 per year or participation in the gross national product. In Jordan I think it is 70 or 80. So you go beyond the Middle East and you go to the Far East and conditions are still worse.

The CHAIRMAN. India itself, it is about $60.

---

[5] John L. McClellan (D-Ark.)

Senator **Lausche**. Now then what I think we ought to do is try to envision in advance how far we have got to go throughout the world to establish economies that will give some semblance of a living to people. I can explain South America because it is in the Western Hemisphere. But then you go to Africa. What is the priority that it should be given? The Middle East and the Far East?

I think that we ought to approach this problem with a view of anticipating what we will have to do. Now we are just taking things up, extemporizing is what we are doing.

The **Chairman**. I agree with that. That is just what happened.

NEED FOR LONG-TERM PLANNING

I know some years ago when we were trying to reform and improve the mutual assistance program, I had one of the leading members of this Senate, not on this committee, say, "Well, I am not for that. If you make this too efficient we won't get rid of it. We ought to get rid of it this year or next year," they never accepted it as more than an experimental program.

A big part of that Senate is not yet convinced that this is a continuing program and that you ought to plan it on a long-term basis. It has been year to year. One of these great troubles with MSA administration is that it is a year to year basis. They couldn't go beyond a year. This led them into doing quickies, taking this or that little project that made an impression that they could finish within a year, and it has been the policy, and it is not just the administration, it is partly theirs in this particular instance but the Congress itself has never reconciled to this responsibility.

Senator **Lausche**. Bill, to me the answer to the question why are we hated is simple. It is one of pure psychology. We are rich, the others are poor. They hate us. And you are not going to get it out, and then we go and aggravate that by misconduct on the part of our people as they go about the world.

The **Chairman**. Another thing that is very difficult is that in some of these Latin American countries they are more or less feudal, and the ruling classes are the ones that the local people also hate. We, in doing business with them, have had to do business with the government in power and that always identified us with the same people they don't like locally at home.

AID TO LATIN AMERICA

Let's come down to Latin America. We have before us the two or three revised drafts and we have Senator Capehart's suggestion.

Senator **Capehart**. Mr. Chairman, would it be possible for us to authorize the $500 million on a basis that we have the administration report back next year after making a study of the advisability of adopting, let's say, the so-called Capehart plan I presented yesterday or spending the money through the Inter-American Bank or consolidating our lending agencies in Latin America? Let them come back and tell us exactly how they propose to spend this money before it is appropriated, next year, thereby giving them what they want at the moment which is a political advantage at Bogota, but before they can proceed, they must come back and give reasons why they want to proceed to use *x* instrumentalities in loaning or granting the money.

The **Chairman**. Well, Homer, I asked the staff, just along that line, to mull over all of these.

Senator **Capehart**. I didn't see that.

The **Chairman**. If you will look at the authorization section, section 3 in that and I also will read it, it is very short. "In order to carry out the purpose of this act there is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President not to exceed $500 million which shall remain available until expended", and this is the key word "and which the President may use subject to such further legislative provisions as may be enacted. In addition to other funds available for such purposes on such terms and conditions as he may specify."

Senator **Hickenlooper**. That prevents him from using it.

The **Chairman**. Until they have the plan that he is talking about. It is just a suggestion to meet that idea. I am very impressed by Homer's suggestion. I don't know that it could be exclusively that way but I think that is a device that would be very useful in this thing, and I think that the administration thinks it is, too, the use of these financial institutions that he described in his proposal could be extremely useful in these countries.

Senator **Lausche**. What is this?

The **Chairman**. This thing here before you, we submitted the staff proposal that I asked them to prepare to the administration and this is their rewrite, revised by the administration, this copy here.

LEAVES THE INITIATIVE WITH CONGRESS

Senator **Aiken**. Their authorization there gives them the $500 million and leaves the initiative with the Congress to enact further legislation if they want them to spend it as they please.

The **Chairman**. That is it.

Senator **Aiken**. It says which the President may use subject to such further legislative provisions as may be enacted.

The **Chairman**. That's right.

Senator **Aiken**. If they won't enact it they have it without any strings.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. If they don't enact it they can't use it.

Senator **Aiken**. Yes, they can use it as they please unless we enact something prohibiting them.

The **Chairman**. It is an effort to reach a compromise to give them the idea to say it is authorized and yet retaining the idea that we would enact further legislation.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I see. I thought they authorized it but he had to be guided by, that is he couldn't spend it unless he had further legislative provisions. No, I guess that is correct.

The **Chairman**. There is their attempt to bring into this thing the idea that he had.

Senator **Sparkman**. As I understand it, would he be free to spend it as he sees fit in accordance with present legislation but at the same time you put him on notice we may modify it in the future?

Senator **Capehart**. Mr. Chairman, I would like to get a vote on my proposal unless you gentlemen are all vitally opposed to it as a wrong thing in principle of what we are trying to do?

The **Chairman**. I think in principle I like your proposal.

LOANING TO BIG OUTFITS

Senator **Hickenlooper**. What is your proposal? You mean vote on your bill, Homer?

Senator **Aiken**. Short notice.

Senator **Capehart**. In other words, we sent the Secretary of State to Bogota with that proposal rather than the one he asked for to spend $500 million as he sees fit.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Well, I am very much for the principle of your proposal but the bill you put in here goes so far beyond what I believe we ought to do.

Senator **Capehart**. How?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Well, the people you are going to loan to, I think you get back right in the same old rut you will be loaning to the big outfits to the exclusion of the little fellow.

Senator **Capehart**. That is not what the bill says. If they did that, it would be a violation of the spirit of the bill and the language of the bill.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I don't have the bill. Where is it?

Senator **Capehart**. It is printed there.

Senator **Aiken**. I understand you have some requests to be heard on it.

Senator **Capehart**. Under my plan we tell the President how to proceed. Under his plan he tells us that he may some day tell us how he is going to proceed. Which is the better, to have the Congress control these matters or have the President?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I said yesterday down to the point where you listed farmers, farm groups, homestead organizations, small businessmen, and here comes the stinger on this thing, large businessmen, other banks or loan firms, builders of either homes or business places, and then you come down here, "Communications, operations, either by government enterprise—shipping and other trade facilities, either private or public", those matters, most of them go beyond what my concept of this basic philosophy is, which is to get the money into the little guy so he will develop personal responsibility.

That is the only place I diverge. I am not in disagreement with your idea. I think it is a good one.

Senator **Capehart**. We put those other things in there because there may be occasions when they might want it, but do you know already that ICA has loaned money in Peru for a savings bank?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I am not objecting——

Senator **Capehart**. I just want to call your attention to that fact.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. To the money being available in one way or another to these institutions but I would envision this bill as being a bill rather closely limited to the little guy rather than the big operator, transportation system.

TEXT OF THE BILL

Senator **Capehart**. Let's get the bill itself and read it itself and see what it says to the idea.

Mr. **Marcy**. You should have S. 3839 in your folders.

The **Chairman**. S. 3839 is the administration bill.

Senator **Sparkman**. Homer's is an amendment to that.

The **Chairman**. I see.

Senator **Green**. Where does the amendment come in?

Senator **Sparkman**. It goes into the Fulbright bill right here.

Senator **Green**. I know I have the bill but whereabouts?

Senator **Sparkman**. You haven't got the Fulbright bill.

Mr. **Marcy**. You won't be able to tell from that looking at it.

Senator **Sparkman**. Yes, you can.

Mr. **Marcy**. Right here.

Senator **Capehart**. Here is what the bill says on loaning, may I read it? It is on page 6, number 11,

> To make loans on such materials and conditions and to engage in such other financial transactions with such persons or other entities as the Board of Directors may determine in order to accomplish the purpose of the title. Its functions shall include, but not be limited to, loans or other financial transactions designed to increase industrial or agricultural production, to impose housing, education, or public health or to finance programs of land redistribution or resettlement. Each Cooperative Bank shall give particular and continuing attention to the needs of small private business and small farmers.

That is all the bill says on it.

Of course, I was in the process of outlining some of the things that it might loan money to, but that would be entirely up to the board of directors.

Senator **Aiken**. Can you set up the terms under which a bank in another country shall operate?

Senator **Capehart**. You can say to the other country that we will buy half of your stock or more providing that your charter incorporates the provisions of this law, you can do that. If they don't want to do it or can't do it then they simply can't participate. You have that limitation.

COMPARISON TO EXPORT-IMPORT BANK

Senator **Sparkman**. Homer, how far does your provision go beyond present authorization to the Export-Import Bank?

Senator **Capehart**. Well, the present Export-Import Bank, I think, can probably do these things.

Senator **Lausche**. But they have got to take hard cash back, don't they in their principal lending?

Senator **Capehart**. They can buy stock in Development Loan Banks in foreign countries, or they can loan them money. They have done a little of that. ICA, you know, bought stock in a Development Loan Fund Bank in India, not long ago.

Either ICA or Development Loan Fund loaned money in Peru to start a savings bank.

The **Chairman**. Is that local currency?

Senator **Capehart**. Yes. Savings bank dealing in local currency.

Senator **Sparkman**. Well, the Export——

Senator **Capehart**. The question is do we want to be specific in our legislation as to what the administration can or cannot do or do we want to leave it up to the President, spend the money as he sees fit?

You see one of the weaknesses of the President's bill here is he doesn't even have to report back to Congress how or when and if and when he spends the money. It is the first piece of legislation I have seen that didn't require at least yearly reporting to the Congress on how the funds were disposed of. He doesn't have to do that under the bill.

The **Chairman**. There is no doubt this is inspired by the necessity of making a play at this meeting to show good faith that we intend to help them. That is all it is.

Senator **Capehart**. I am in favor of that, but isn't there some way that we can be more specific? I think it would be to the advantage of the administration if they could go to Bogota and say "Here, the Congress has made this suggestion and we might well organize a bank in each of your countries on this basis or if you don't like that what is your plan, how would you like to have us cooperate? We have authority from our Congress to cooperate with you gentlemen to the extent of $500 million or more."

Senator **Sparkman**. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask for information——

Senator **Capehart**. "Here is one suggestion made by our Congress." Excuse me.

RESTRICTING THE PRESIDENT'S USE OF THE FUND

Senator **Sparkman**. Homer, let me ask you this, for my own information: Does the Export-Import Bank make any loans in soft currency?

The **Chairman**. No.

Senator **Sparkman**. Or in local currency.

Senator **Capehart**. They wouldn't be making any loans in soft currency here. They buy the stock outright.

Senator **Sparkman**. Frank asked that question and I was going to say that it is my impression that the Export-Import Bank does not deal in local currencies or soft currencies. They deal in bankable loans.

Senator **Lausche**. In sound loans they are so set up. But he didn't say that. He said they could buy stock.

Senator **Capehart**. They could buy stock.

Senator **Sparkman**. The thing I was going to ask Homer, is this: If the Export-Import Bank can already do these things, and I am of the opinion it can under present law, then by stating them specifically in a program, aren't you actually restricting the President's use of the fund that he is asking for here?

Senator **Capehart**. That is what you want to do, I think and you don't want to give him a blank check.

WOULD NOT FINANCE AN IMPORT

The **Chairman**. I have not reviewed it lately but whether they do or not their practice is to make loans in furtherance of the export of machinery and goods from this country. They have never engaged in resettlement programs or that type of thing of an international nature and I tried once to get them to finance the import of some buses from Germany to this country because one of my constituents could not buy any in this country, but no, they wouldn't touch it.

They could only export American goods.

It says Export and Import but they wouldn't finance an import. I tried my best. This small bus company down there couldn't buy at all because Greyhound had monopolized the available market, and they were desperate to buy some buses that they could buy from Germany and they could finance them but they wouldn't finance them.

Senator SPARKMAN. That was under the assumption it did not stimulate business or export business.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not sure of the legal restraint but they haven't done it. They have only made loans for the sale in connection with the sale of exports to this country.

Senator SPARKMAN. Stimulate production and exporting from this country.

Senator GREEN. But you were convinced they could make other loans.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not convinced. Homer says so. I have not reviewed this charter lately.

Senator CAPEHART. They can make loans, almost any kind of loans provided they are repaid in dollars.

The CHAIRMAN. I never heard of them buying stock in a company. I don't say they haven't, because these companies operate in a big way but I never heard of them buying stock.

Senator CAPEHART. I didn't say buying stock, the Export-Import Bank. I say they have loaned some money to Development Loan companies in foreign countries, and ICA recently bought stock——

The CHAIRMAN. I am not talking about ICA, but the Export-Import Bank. If they did that, I don't know about the things you are talking about but I will wager it was in connection with financing the purchase of exports from this country.

Senator CAPEHART. Oh, yes, no question about that.

The CHAIRMAN. It was limited by that.

Senator CAPEHART. Oh, yes. They can't loan money unless the money is going to be spent in the United States.

INGENUOUS METHOD OF FINANCING

The CHAIRMAN. I think this gives them greater authority. What I like about Homer's suggestion is the method of financing.

Frankly, I think it is ingenuous and a real contribution, and I would be very interested in trying to work your idea of financing this projection to the program. That may take a little doing, but that appeals to me more than any other part of it although the other objective, I think, we all agree on as to what we want to do, but I like the way you propose to finance it.

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, it occurs to me we have a temporary situation that is to be met and it should be met immediately, and secondly, we have a long-range program and that is where I think the program of the Senator from Indiana fits. We are not going to solve the Latin American situation with $500 million in my opinion. It is going to be with us a long time.

The **Chairman**. You are quite right.

Senator **Carlson**. I would urge upon you that we try to get action on the resolution. If it is satisfactory, fine. If not, let's get it in order that our Nation goes down to Bogota and meet with these people and secondly I would urge this, that the Senator from Indiana's proposal be considered in the next session and we ought to have some hearings, on it.

The **Chairman**. I agree with you. This whole business of large undertakings without the adequate hearings distresses me. I don't much like it, but I was just trying to figure out a way. The idea we authorize it, but subject to further enactments which it seems to me might let them have their cake and eat it, too, appeals to me.

Senator **Carlson**. Why don't we write a report, Mr. Chairman, and in the report can't we say it was discussed along the line that this is a temporary, this is immediate and we feel it will require further actions and we have some thoughts along another line.

Senator **Capehart**. Would you want to go so far as to say we recommend to the President that, we urge the President that he consider expending the $500 million on the basis of organizing in conjunction with the 20 other countries a respective bank in these countries.

Senator **Carlson**. Personally, I would not.

Senator **Capehart**. I said urge, not recommend.

Senator **Carlson**. Urge.

Senator **Capehart**. Urge that he consider the advice, Bill.

Senator **Carlson**. I am in favor of considering it all right. Go as far as we can without losing the effect of this resolution, in my opinion.

Senator **Capehart**. I just want to say this.

Senator **Lausche**. I do think we have this problem posed to us.

RIGHT RATHER THAN EXPEDIENT

Senator **Capehart**. When is the time going to arise when we do something to the basis of it being the right thing and permanent thing rather than the expedient thing? Everything we do is on the expedient. I am getting tired voting for things that I know are wrong just because it is expedient to do it. It seems to me like that is what has gotten us into some of our trouble. Here the President rushes in here in this special session of Congress and wants $500 million to spend as he sees fit without even saying in the bill that he will give the Congress a report on how the money is expended.

The **Chairman**. I feel pretty strongly the same way. I hate to deal with this kind of a measure in this short session.

Senator **Capehart**. However, I am not going to push my proposal.

Unless the great majority of you want to do it, I am not going to do it. I hope some day to see our loaning activities to Latin America consolidated into some such plan as I have proposed and when that time arrives then I think you will get some place.

SUGGESTION FOR STUDY AT BOGOTA

Senator **Mansfield**. Homer, would you be receptive to the idea of including in the report a strong suggestion or urging to the effect that this matter be considered at Bogota?

Senator **Capehart**. Yes.

Senator **Mansfield**. And the Congress of the American Republics.

Senator **Capehart**. Yes, and even to the extent of printing the bill in this report.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I don't know.

The **Chairman**. Shouldn't we invite the President, the administration to develop an adequate long-term program to be submitted in the early days of the next Congress in our report?

Senator **Sparkman**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. In that connection we can suggest they consider it.

A MISTAKE TO VOTE ON IT

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I see no reason why we shouldn't consider this proposal of Homer's, but I think it would be a mistake to vote it out now and I think it would be a mistake to make a preliminary commitment of the committee along this line. I think this is a proposal, which I favor, and understand the basic objectives of this thing, but I think this has got to have hearings. I think we have got to know the limitations and the extent of this thing and how it is going to operate and so on.

This thing was just filed yesterday. The first time I ever saw it was yesterday. I talked about the idea for 2 years, off and on with various people and so on. I am familiar with the general philosophy of the thing, but here we have it in bill form and I think it would be a mistake to vote it out.

But I do think we ought to get at it the first thing when we get back here in January, I think we ought to get at it, hold some hearings, send it over to the Department, get their comments, ask them to dig into it, tell us what has been or can be done, and get on with the idea.

Senator **Capehart**. Let me say, I can't quarrel with your statement. On the other hand, I also want to say this, I can't say that my own conscience would permit me to give the President a blank check of $500 million to do with what he sees fit when you turn down my own proposal which is specific.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. That is the point; your proposition is not specific, Homer.

Senator **Capehart**. It is.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. And I don't know in my own mind what it would be. In other words, you go through here, here is a leeway for them to loan money to a lot of institutions that I don't think this particular legislation should touch and the easiest thing in the world for a bureaucrat to do is to deal in big figures and with big central agencies and central groups and even though the privilege is in there of dealing with the little fellow it is a lot harder to set up something of that kind.

The **Chairman**. It is.

Senator **Capehart**. One thing is certain, you don't know what the President is going to do with the $500 million.

Senator **Mansfield**. Mr. Chairman, could I say something there?

The **Chairman**. Yes.

APPROPRIATE MONEY TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Senator **Mansfield**. I have looked into this matter about money being allocated to the President, and I find that according to the legislative counsel's office, I spoke with Mr. Dwight Pinion, he informs me that appropriations are normally authorized to the departments rather than to the President and the practice under the Mutual Security Act of appropriating to the President rather than to the agency is the exception rather than the rule.

This is the measure before us, and I would think if we authorize to appropriate the money to the Secretary of State, because it will be administered through his department, it would strengthen his hand. It would give him a chance to do away with this diversity of funds which are applicable to Latin America, and it would enhance the possibility of getting under the Secretary of State a coordinated policy and administration. At the beginning of this new approach to Latin America we will be able to fix responsibility with a far greater degree of accuracy and justification on that department which is within the legislative purview of this committee. When Mr. Herter was asked the other day if it would be helpful if the authorization would go to the Secretary he was emphatic as I recall in replying that it would. So this is the unusual thing, and so far as I know, only under the MSA whereby funds are allocated to the President. This way you get it to the department, this is not an MSA bill, and I think you will be in a position then to have right under your thumbs the answer to the questions which you are raising around the table this morning.

You can question the Secretary, it is hard to question the President.

CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO SPEND MONEY

Senator **Lausche**. I think your suggestion is excellent but it still does not put to an end this carte blanche authority to spend money and I can not bring myself to approve a plan where you give a man $500 million to use it as he sees fit knowing that lawyers are going to be hired and pressures are going to be applied, and big fees paid to get the money given into channels, probably sound but possibly wrong.

I feel that we ought to in some way, if not now, later, put some limitations on what can be done with the money. They can't be unduly specific.

The **Chairman**. That was the thought I had in mind but what is not maybe clear enough is that we authorize it in order for them to say it is authorized. But subject to further enactment by the Congress as to what would be done.

Senator **Capehart**. And put in the report our discussion here to a degree, and our feelings about it.

Senator **Lausche**. The moment we appropriate $500 million without some limitations on it there will be 50 lobbyist lawyers in this town fighting——

Senator **Capehart**. We are not appropriating, we are only authorizing. He can't spend the money until it is appropriated.

Senator **Lausche**. I know that.

Senator **Capehart**. And he says they will not ask for it until next year.

Senator **Lausche**. When the Republicans are in they will be Republican lawyers and when the Democrats are in they will be Democratic. [Laughter.]

The **Chairman**. Of course, if we authorize it then it is out of our hands and the Appropriations Committee determines the limitations.

SHOW DEFINITE PLANS

Senator **Sparkman**. Mr. Chairman, would it be feasible instead of making the outright authorization without any strings to say that there is authorized to be appropriated not to exceed $500 million, such appropriations to be made upon the submission by the Secretary of State of plans showing how it is proposed to carry it out?

The **Chairman**. For submission to us.

Senator **Sparkman**. No, to the Appropriations Committee. In other words we would be authorizing, otherwise I don't see how we could authorize appropriations. What I am trying to do is fix that so instead of having simply a blank check for $500 million they have a drawing account but they can only draw such amount as they can show to the Appropriations Committee they have definitie plans.

The **Chairman**. I don't have any more confidence in the Appropriations Committee because they have emasculated our plans.

Senator **Carlson**. They will not vote a dollar until they have something to show what they are going to use it for. The Appropriations Committee are going to have plenty of guidelines, I think.

The **Chairman**. Here is a suggestion, Frank. I don't think they would like it much but this was a proposal, that in order to give effect to the foregoing statement of policy, much of which is the Mansfield statement, and it says

> (a) That it is prepared to give careful and sympathetic consideration to agreements which the President may negotiate for the purpose of promoting these policies.
>
> (b) That it will authorize and appropriate such sums that may be necessary to pay a fair share of the costs incident to the attaining of the objectives and policies set forth.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. That is not an authorization.

The **Chairman**. No, it is not an authorization but this is along the line of Frank and Homer have been talking.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. You don't need that statement.

The **Chairman**. These are alternatives.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Of course, the Congress always stands ready to appropriate such moneys as it deems necessary.

The **Chairman**. We are expressing our goodwill and intentions and so on.

Senator **Sparkman**. I don't see how one Congress can tie up another Congress.

The **Chairman**. It can't really. This is merely a declaration of sympathy and policy. You have really got that alternative. You either are going to authorize it or you have got to just make a statement like this. I think that is your choice. It is not much in between.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Well, I don't think you have got any choice but to authorize or not to authorize.

Senator **Lausche**. To be given directly to the President.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I would just as soon give it to the Secretary of State.

MORE INFLUENCE WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The **Chairman**. The Secretary of State would be all right with me. There is one thing then about the Secretary of State; we have a lot more influence with him, whoever it may be.

Senator **Carlson**. Closer contact. That's right.

The **Chairman**. And they won't be able to spend much of this money before the first of the year anyway, so your Secretary of State is more subject to be called up here, you can't do a thing with the President.

Senator **Sparkman**. I may be picking at straws, but it seems to me instead of (b) there, it will authorize such sums as may be necessary, it seems to me it would be more desirable to me to state in more general language to be prepared to take such action as may be necessary to implement this program.

You are being pretty specific when you are saying——

The **Chairman**. I am just trying to go as far as you could in giving them something to talk about.

Senator **Sparkman**. You have something here that somebody could seriously object to. We are saying now we will appropriate such sums.

The **Chairman**. There is no doubt about the administration's position. They want an authorization. That is really the question, are you going to give them an authorization of $500 million or not?

RESTRICTIONS ON THE APPROPRIATION

Senator **Lausche**. I am prepared to authorize $500 million but it is a mental state about what they are going to do.

The **Chairman**. I thought you were not prepared, I misunderstood.

Senator **Lausche**. No, no. I am prepared to authorize it.

Senator **Sparkman**. I trust this administration; I would be willing to authorize it.

I would like for them to give us a report though as to how they propose to use it.

Senator **Lausche**. That is what I mean. I am prepared to say we will provide $500 million down there, but I am not wanting to give what you call a non-end authorization where they shall deal with it in any manner that they can. I wouldn't trust myself with the money.

The **Chairman**. How are you going to restrict it? What do you propose? You say you are prepared to authorize. All right. What do you want to put on it?

Senator **Lausche**. He says we will deal with housing, extension services, large areas. Uncultivated land will have to be made available to the agricultural people, education and health. But the thing that I have primarily in mind, I don't want this money given away. I want it loaned. I am not prepared——

The **Chairman**. For local currency or for dollars?

Senator **Lausche**. It has to be for local currency.

The **Chairman**. Well, it is almost a gift.

Senator **Lausche**. Yes, that is a gift.

The **Chairman**. There is hardly any difference.

Senator **Lausche**. You are correct when they can pay it back with local currency.

REPORT BACK ON USE OF FUNDS

The **Chairman**. You say you were willing to authorize it. What, if any, condition do you say it must have?

Senator **Lausche**. Well, I would say at least to report back on how it has been done, how it has been loaned.

Senator **Sparkman**. How it is proposed to be loaned?

The **Chairman**. How it is proposed to be loaned?

Senator **Sparkman**. Let them give us their program and not wait until it has been carried out.

It doesn't mean we hold them up on it, but at least we are kept current on what has happened.

The **Chairman**. And it forces them to come up with some kind of a program.

Senator **Carlson**. If that report should be made to the chairman of this committee should it not also be made to the chairman of the House Committee if we are going to write that into the law?

The **Chairman**. Oh, yes, I should think so. It seems to me we ought to have something to say about how this is spent.

Senator **Carlson**. I don't see anything wrong with that.

Senator **Sparkman**. I certainly would agree with you.

The **Chairman**. That Appropriations Committee of the House has a very restricted view of anything they can do.

I think they have hamstrung the administration and frightened them down there more than anything else as to what they can do.

SUBSTITUTE "SECRETARY OF STATE" FOR "PRESIDENT"

Senator **Mansfield**. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest, if it meets with the approval of the committee, that if there is a proposal agreed to which will carry an authorization to be appropriated to the President, of not to exceed $500 million or in any other way that the words "Secretary of State" be substituted for "the President".

The **Chairman**. We might pass on that. Is there any objection to the suggestion? Without objection that change is adopted.

Senator **Mansfield**. This would not apply to the Chilean fund.

The **Chairman**. Just to this?

Senator **Mansfield**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. That is one note of progress.

Now come down to the other? Is there agreement——

Senator **Lausche**. Repeat your statement, that sounded all right to me.

The **Chairman**. Say that again?

KEEP US CURRENT

Senator **Sparkman**. My suggestion was that we go ahead and authorize the $500 million, but require the Secretary of State to file a report with plans when they have been made. The staff could draw the necessary language, in other words, not to wait for the program and give us a report post factum.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. You don't mean he would necessarily have to file the whole plan at once but any plan under which this money is spent.

Senator **Sparkman**. In other words, keep us current.

The **Chairman**. What is proposed to be?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I thought he was asking for a master plan all at once.

Senator **Sparkman**. Carl Marcy suggests something that sounds feasible to me.

He suggests, "shall keep the two committees informed of the current operations or obligations."

The **Chairman**. Plans.

Mr. **Marcy**. Plans.

The **Chairman**. Plans in advance, we want to know what they are getting ready to do.

Mr. **Marcy**. Yes.

Senator **Capehart**. Can we put in the report that we ask them to give——

Senator **Carlson**. Consideration to my proposal.

The **Chairman**. I see no reason for not.

I like that proposal for financing for the future. It could not apply to this but it could for the future.

Senator **Capehart**. It could apply that if they adopted it.

The **Chairman**. Those two are inconsistent.

Senator **Capehart**. They could take the $500 million appropriation and buy stock in these Latin American countries.

The **Chairman**. That is part of it.

Senator **Capehart**. They could put my proposal into effect if they wanted to.

MANSFIELD PROPOSAL

The **Chairman**. Let's see what this proposal that has been revised by the administration is.

Mr. **Marcy**. This is all in the photostat copy.

The **Chairman**. Plus these other provisions. I wonder if we couldn't make progress by considering it specifically to see where we would get and incorporate the suggestion of the Senator from Alabama, and also—well, you said in the report we would put it.

Senator **Capehart**. I would rather have it in the bill. In the bill or the report.

Senator **Carlson**. I think, Mr. Chairman, it should go in the report rather than the bill. I think you could put a very good strong statement in the report.

Senator **Sparkman**. It seems to me it is implied in section 3 of this draft.

The **Chairman**. Has everyone a draft in order to get at it?

Senator **Lausche**. Is that your draft?

The **Chairman**. This is the one that is a composite. The first one is the Mansfield proposal plus some additional changes, I mean some additions which go to the authorization. The Mansfield proposal did not have an authorization in it.

It was a statement of policy.

Senator **Capehart**. You mean on page 3, section 3 authorization.

Senator **Sparkman**. Yes.

Senator **Capehart**. Authorization it says.

Senator **Sparkman**. $500 million which will remain available until expended.

The **Chairman**. Wait a minute, we say to the Secretary of State.

Senator **Sparkman**. Which the Secretary of State may use subject to such further legislative provisions as may be enacted. I say that implies. And then if you couple it in the report reference to this legislation, it seems to me, you have got it pretty well tied up.

The **Chairman**. Put your suggestion in the report.

CAPEHART PROPOSAL

Senator **Sparkman**. No, I was talking about Homer. Homer was talking about putting his in the bill and I was saying it is already implied.

Senator **Capehart**. Then you make mention of my proposal in the report, will you?

Senator **Sparkman**. In the report.

The **Chairman**. In the report. How about revising this authorization in accord with what you said?

Senator **Sparkman**. Well, I think the staff could certainly do that.

Senator **Lausche**. That is filing the report with us.

Senator **Sparkman**. Keeping us currently informed which might not be, not a 6-month report. We might get one this week and another next week.

The **Chairman**. I would like to have that in the bill.

Senator **Sparkman**. So would I. Yes, I think it ought to go in the bill.

The **Chairman**. Where would it go?

Mr. **Marcy**. I think it should go in section 3.

The **Chairman**. How would it go there?

Mr. **Marcy**. I think "subject to such further legislative provisions"——

Senator **Sparkman**. It seems to me to let it stand just as it is, and then at the end here put in another sentence and say "The Secretary of State shall".

The **Chairman**. "The Secretary of State shall keep the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House, currently informed as to plans for the spending of this money."

Senator CARLSON. "The Secretary of State shall from time to time or currently inform the Chairman of the Committees as to the plans or progress."

Senator SPARKMAN. I think it is better to say "Keep the Committees currently informed."

Mr. MARCY. Not for expenditure but for utilization of the funds.

The CHAIRMAN. About what?

Plans?

Senator SPARKMAN. I suggest "and programs."

Mr. MARCY. "Plans and programs for the utilization."

Senator SPARKMAN. "For the utilization of such funds."

The CHAIRMAN. How does that strike you, Bourke?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is a good idea.

The CHAIRMAN. Is everybody agreed to that?

Senator CARLSON. I think it is a great improvement.

The CHAIRMAN. Just add at the bottom of that page. We have changed the President to the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State shall keep the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Foreign Affairs currently informed about plans and programs for the utilization of these funds.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is adequate.

Senator CAPEHART. Now will you put in the report that you consider my proposal and that we urge the Secretary of State to explore the feasibility from his standpoint.

The CHAIRMAN. Give serious consideration to this proposal.

Senator CAPEHART. Put that in the report.

The CHAIRMAN. I am in favor of that.

ADMINISTRATION OF DEVELOPMENT LOAN FUND

Senator LAUSCHE. For purposes of information how is the Development Loan Fund administered?

The CHAIRMAN. It has a director, Mr. Vance Brand and he is really under Mr. Dillon, and he reports to Mr. Dillon, and——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I know but isn't he hooked up with the Export-Import Bank?

Senator LAUSCHE. Tied in with it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Tied in crossways some way.

The CHAIRMAN. Tied in administratively not as a policy. There is an advisory committee that advises him.

Senator CAPEHART. Do you need a motion on putting in the report what you just stated?

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is so ordered that this shall be in the report and without objection this amendment, adding this sentence to section 3, is adopted.

Now the first part of it we have all gone over it. Is there any suggestion about that first part?

Mike, this is as much of your material, do you have any suggestion on the policy?

RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT

Senator **Mansfield**. Mr. Chairman, first let me say this is better than the proposal sent by the administration. I like the title "The American Republics Cooperation Act," which is I think indicative of what we are trying to do. I think the four statements of policy that you have, are excellent, but I would like to call to the attention of the committee 3 other statements which are not included and if I may, explain them.

The first one would be progressive development of common standards with respect to the rights and responsibilities of private investment which flow across national boundaries within the Western Hemisphere. If I may explain that, this is an attempt to encourage the executive branch to pursue policies designed to get the Latin Americans to agree to set a floor by common agreement on minimal fair treatment to our investors in Latin America and, to do this, by offering in return to recognize certain minimum standards of behavior as regards the practices of American business operating in Latin America. If such hemispheric standards can be developed, they may help to prevent mistreatment of American business in Latin America and strengthen our hand when mistreatment occurs. On the other side of the coin, our business would be encouraged to develop techniques of management to fit in better with the situation in Latin America and, at the same time, this Government would be under less pressure to defend such American businesses which might conduct themselves irresponsibly in Latin America and get into trouble as a result.

This was gone into with the administration, and they gave their approval to a proposal of this nature.

CONSOLIDATIONS OF AGENCIES

The next one is to the consolidation of the public institutions and agencies of inter-American cooperation insofar as feasible within the structure of the OAS and the strengthening of the personnel, resources and authority of the organization in order that it may play a role of increasing importance in all aspects of hemispheric cooperation.

In other words, to try to get the monkey off our back a little bit.

If I may explain, the whole structure of inter-American organization shows the same tendencies to follow Parkinson's law as the Federal Government and the U.N. This tendency will be enhanced if more activity is undertaken on a hemispheric basis in line with this new approach to Latin America. Further, some say there has been a tendency to use present inter-American organizations for sinecures for politicians on the part of some Latin American governments, and perhaps also on the part of our own.

All this section does is to urge on the executive branch that it exert itself to try to bring about a streamlining and integration of the various hemispheric organizations and to improve their personnel resources as an essential factor in the more effective use of this inter-American machinery for greater hemispheric cooperation.

SAFEGUARDING TRANQUILLITY OF THE HEMISPHERE

Then the last one is number VII, on the original resolution. It reads the safeguarding of the tranquillity of the hemisphere by developing due processes in the OAS to foreclose the establishment of military bases in this hemisphere by any nation not of this hemisphere and to curb any American nation whose policies and actions grossly outrage the conscience or threaten the security of the Americas.

Section VII, as it is now, we have written into treaties and into the Charter of the OAS specific courses of common hemispheric action against a non-hemispheric nation that disturbs the tranquillity of the hemisphere. But we do not have, in clear binding language, any similar hemispheric commitment to act in common against a disturber of the tranquility of the hemisphere if the disturber is an American nation.

We had the Declaration of Santiago last year which said, in effect, that American nations would not suffer in quiet a disturber in its midst. But binding commitments to give effect to this Declaration are lacking. This chapter advises the executive branch to seek to develop, as a matter of policy, ways and means to bring about common hemispheric action against an American nation which goes off the deep end.

What it encourages are changes in the Charter of the OAS and the Rio Treaty to increase common responsibility for the peace and security of the hemisphere as against internal threats as well as external threats. In this connection, the chapter would also have the executive branch anticipate attempts by outsiders to establish military bases in this hemisphere and to try to get inter-American agreement to shut them off by making such bases, ipso facto, by common agreement, a threat to the tranquility of the hemisphere.

Those are the ones that I throw out for the consideration of the committee, although I must——

Senator **Lausche**. What were you reading from?

Senator **Mansfield**. I was explaining some of the sections which I had proposed in a resolution which I introduced as a sense resolution only. But I think this is the best way to do it because this indicates committee action, and it is far better.

Senator **Capehart**. Are we ready for the question?

DECLARATION OF POLICY

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I have a couple of things I want to raise about this proposed bill.

Senator **Lausche**. Are you suggesting we put some of those thoughts in it?

Senator **Mansfield**. Only if the committee desires to.

Senator **Lausche**. Well, I think you have some excellent thoughts in there.

Senator **Capehart**. In the report.

Senator **Mansfield**. This would be as part of the policy statement.

The **Chairman**. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In the first place, I generally resist too lengthy and detailed declarations of policy in legislation although I agree with many things that Mike has said.

But in this bill we are considering which I call the thermofax copy here which I assume is the same as the original you have there.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There are two things I want to suggest here for just a moment. One that I feel very deeply on, and that is the question of whether or not we should not more clearly set out in our legislation or in our policy declarations the urgent necessity and the responsibility for these people to help themselves.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

Now, our whole statement of policy here is rather nebulous on that subject, and it devotes itself almost entirely to what it says mutual cooperation but we end up by authorizing $500 million and $100 million, and the whole connotation is that we are going to keep on carrying the burden and I just wonder about making stronger statements about the absolute responsibility of these countries themselves.

They are not going to make progress in South America as long as they think they can get us to pay the bill. I mean it is the line of least resistance until they realistically change their laws and their attitudes. And so on, they are going to keep on being the recipients of help from the outside and demanders of help from the outside.

I just raise a question of I know we ought to have them help themselves. I don't know whether it is strong enough.

The CHAIRMAN. It is awfully weak. I think it could be given more prominence and expanded some.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't believe in too much pussyfooting on this score and yet we can't go too far by offending people by accusing them of things they have not done.

Senator CAPEHART. I like the language in the bill that I presented as far as a declaration of purposes if you care to take a look at it, on page 1 of the bill, S. 3839. And I recommend that you read it.

PUT THEIR OWN HOUSE IN ORDER

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You have got here on page 2 in the third paragraph of my copy, a paragraph where probably some stronger statement of that kind could go in. The paragraph now reads:

> The Congress therefore reaffirms the policy of the United States to encourage and help our Latin American neighbors to accelerate their efforts to strengthen the social and economic structure of their countries and to provide greater opportunity to their individual citizens.

It would seem to me in connection with that paragraph there, we might put in something that would point up more specifically a declaration that they have got to put their own house in order. Not in those words but to that effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Something to the effect that this cannot be accomplished, of course, unless the cooperating countries take measures to——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Or that the essential or major element in any progress of this kind rests within the ultimate responsibility of each country itself with the mutual aid and cooperation of the other countries, but emphasize the fact that it cannot work unless they take hold of their own problems and solve them.

The CHAIRMAN. I certainly am in favor of emphasizing that aspect. It is quite true that unless they can be inspired to make adequate reforms in their own economies we can't do it. It would be ineffective.

Senator MANSFIELD. I think, Bill, you might find some language in what Mr. Dillon said yesterday, quoting part of his speech of what he said there in which he emphasizes the two-way street basis.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a copy of it? Can you identify it, Mike?

Senator MANSFIELD. Let's see, it is in the first paragraph on page 5, "to the extent that you yourself are willing to move ahead progressively in this field we would like to work with you and assist you. This must of course be a cooperative effort and cooperation is a two-way street." That is the general idea.

Maybe some words could be gotten out of that to get what Bourke is after.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. All I suggest is we strengthen that emphasis on the necessity for self-help.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be very well to keep that in there. It would minimize the idea that we were going to do it all.

SELF HELP AND MUTUAL COOPERATION

Senator CARLSON. The preceding paragraph calls attention to the fact that a united and cooperative effort—maybe it is weak, but it is a cooperative effort, preceding the one that the Senator from Montana said.

Senator CAPEHART. I suggest you take my language in my bill and read it.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think you have good language in there.

Senator CAPEHART. I think it is the best language of either what the President has or Mansfield has.

Senator LAUSCHE. I have to leave. I give you my proxy.

The CHAIRMAN. You vote for the bill?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Senator CAPEHART. Read the declaration of purpose in that bill and I think you may like it better than anything that has been suggested.

The CHAIRMAN. It is very good.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is very good, it is very good language. It is a little long perhaps but it has got everything in there.

Senator CAPEHART. It ends up by saying by participating in a joint development program based on self-help and mutual cooperation.

The CHAIRMAN. It almost is in place of all this other. It is very broad. It carries many of the things that are ——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think it is a very strong statement.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a good statement.

Senator CARLSON. To make the thing short you could take this paragraph that Bourke has read and where it reads, "Accelerate your effort and strengthen the social and economic structure in a joint development program based upon self-help and mutual cooperation and to provide greater opportunity to their individual citizens", that is just for shortening it, because that is just about what you are doing, you are saying all the things you listed there in about half a dozen words, but it is self-help.

Just words from the concluding sentence.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean add that last sentence really of Homer's into this, incorporate it into that.

Senator CARLSON. If you want to really keep this short. I think you get too much language in some of these, too.

The CHAIRMAN. We are liable to get a little profuse.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You are liable to get a little verbose but I like the language in the Capehart bill.

I am only arguing for the strongest possible statement we can make without giving unwarranted offense, and if you took out the last two paragraphs or, that is, really the first full paragraph and the second full paragraph on page 2 of this thermofax and substituted.

The CHAIRMAN. Homer's.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Homer's full paragraph there beginning on line 5 of his bill and ending on line 17, and then dropped down to parentheses 2 of the thermofax and say in order to carry out the above policy, you would have a pretty strong language.

Senator AIKEN. Where would you start the deletion?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Start the deletion here. "To achieve" and substitute this, beginning on line 5 of Homer's and going through 17.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is a very well stated provision.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is a good statement. Does anybody see any objection to that?

Senator CAPEHART. I so move.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Without objection. The staff, do you understand that? Take from line 5 on page 1, down to 17 on 2 of Capehart and insert in lieu of the two paragraphs on page 2 of the thermofax.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then you pick up parentheses 2 of the thermofax.

Mr. MARCY. I think there may be some repetition, Senator, in the material thereafter in this resolution, because what in effect you are doing is incorporating the Mansfield language which has some reference to individual liberty.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I don't think that repetition would be harmful.

There is another comment I have on page 3 I want to bring up, as soon as we decide on this.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't see—a little repetition won't hurt very much.

COOPERATION WITH RATHER THAN ASSISTANCE TO

Senator AIKEN. I would still prefer cooperation with all American Republics instead of assistance to. They resent that word "assistance".

The CHAIRMAN. Where is that?

Senator AIKEN. It is on line 15, page 2 of Homer's.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that would be all right.

Senator AIKEN. Cooperation with, because I know they don't like to have it called assistance.

The CHAIRMAN. Cooperation.

Well, it also carries the implication they have got to do something rather than assistance by itself.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think it is much better.

Senator MANSFIELD. Cooperation with.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, instead of assistance to.

Senator SPARKMAN. Has that been agreed to, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Has that been agreed?

Without objection that is agreed to.

Any other objection?

REGIONAL COMMON MARKETS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have comment on page 3 of the thermofax, top of the page. I raise a question here as to whether or not we want to be so specific at this time as to say in the last phrase there, "and encourages the gradual development of regional common markets among the American Republics." Do we want to say specific common markets?

Senator AIKEN. Broadening markets, expanding markets.

Senator MANSFIELD. That meets with the approval of the administration, Bourke, and originally, it was stated following "the encouragement of regional." They were the ones who suggested the regional common market rather than the adherence to a common market for the Americas, because they had in mind that you have got a common market of sorts emerging in Central America and one in South America to which Mexico has some affiliation.

It was a means of giving encouragement to initiative which they had shown themselves in trying to bring into effect, in time, I assume, a sort of customs union which might bring about a greater dispersal of goods between them, the removal of tariff barriers and things of that sort.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is a good idea. I think we ought to encourage them.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think they ought to be encouraged to come back but whether we want to do it through a common market——

Senator AIKEN. That gradual is a big word.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes, but these little countries are so small that I would think it is all right.

Senator MANSFIELD. It is going to take them an awfully long time themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes, a pat on the back for what they are doing or trying to do. I think this particular——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. If you want to let it go that way it is all right with me, I just raised the question.

Senator **Aiken**. The two words regional and gradual modify it.

Senator **Sparkman**. Mr. Chairman, if there are no other questions, or changes, I move the approval of the resolution as amended.

The **Chairman**. Mike, do you think you still want yours, those three?

Do you want them in?

STRONG STATEMENT OF POLICY

Senator **Mansfield**. I think they would help because I think they give assistance to both business and government, and they strengthen the OAS, and it is a statement against the establishment of military bases which has been talked about from time to time. But just to bring the matter to a head I will move——

The **Chairman**. The only question I think the last line is a little strong in 7, "whose policies and actions grossly outrage the conscience", I would rather leave that and say "whose actions threaten the security of the Americas," I believe that is a little strong in a statement of policy.

Senator **Mansfield**. Let's eliminate 7 altogether, and I will move the adoption of 4 and 5.

The **Chairman**. Four and 5. All right, is there any objection to the insertion of 4 and 5? He explained those.

Senator **Mansfield**. It meets with the approval of the administration.

Senator **Carlson**. I am glad you eliminated 7 because I think it is really an affirmation of the Monroe Doctrine which is probably all right but I don't think we ought to get into it.

The **Chairman**. I think it is better to leave that out. Four and 5 then, without objection will be inserted at the proper place.

That would come I guess at the end of just in addition to, would it not?

AVOID ANY INTIMIDATION

Senator **Sparkman**. Mr. Chairman, I renew my motion.

The **Chairman**. The Senator from Alabama moves it be reported.

Senator **Sparkman**. As amended.

The **Chairman**. Wait a minute.

Senator **Sparkman**. With power to the staff to make the necessary minor changes, nonsubstantive.

The **Chairman**. Yes.

Senator **Aiken**. I would suggest in writing up the report, I understand the suggestion of the Capehart proposal will be in the report.

The **Chairman**. In the report.

Senator **Aiken**. I have a suggestion, however, that we avoid to the fullest extent any intimation that we are trying to force our image on anyone or all of the Latin states.

The **Chairman**. We urge them to give consideration to this proposal with the idea of——

Senator **Aiken**. Because as I said yesterday, Homer has pinpointed the need.

The **Chairman**. Staff, you understand that?

Senator **Aiken**. But 24 hours is not enough to work out the details.

The **Chairman**. Are you ready for the vote? We had better have a record vote on a matter of this importance, don't you think?

Senator **Carlson**. I suggest we have it, Mr. Chairman, because the Republicans have a conference in a few minutes.

Senator **Capehart**. I think it is better if it just be unanimous.

MOTION ADOPTED

The **Chairman**. I think it is better to call the roll. The Clerk can call the roll.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Green?

Senator **Green**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Sparkman?

Senator **Sparkman**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Humphrey?

Mr. Mansfield?

Senator **Mansfield**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Morse?

Mr. Long?

Mr. Kennedy?

The **Chairman**. Mr. Kennedy gave me his proxy and asked me to vote him for it.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Gore?

Senator **Mansfield**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Lausche?

The **Chairman**. He also did. Mr. Lausche votes "aye."

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Church?

Mr. Wiley?

Mr. Hickenlooper?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Aiken?

Senator **Aiken**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Capehart?

Senator **Capehart**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Carlson?

Senator **Carlson**. Aye.

Mr. **St. Claire**. Mr. Williams?

Mr. Chairman?

The **Chairman**. Aye.

I think the staff ought to call these offices.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I don't have any proxies for all of them.

Senator **Capehart**. I move the staff be permitted to call the offices and record them.

The **Chairman**. Without objection that is agreed.

Senator **Mansfield**. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest we make a strong statement about the $100 million Chilean aid program in the report because that is an unusual situation, and I think it is entitled to serious and special consideration and I ask unanimous consent that it be done.

The **Chairman**. All right. Do you understand that, sir?

Mr. **Marcy**. Yes, sir.

The **Chairman**. It is understood that the authorization of course remains.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. We have a Republican conference to find out what is going on.

The **Chairman**. We have got to have another meeting before too long on nominations.

PASSPORT LEGISLATION

Now, on passports, Senator Morse has insisted that he has a great many witnesses and so on. As a practical matter I don't think there is a ghost of a chance.[6]

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I, therefore, move, Mr. Chairman, and I think we have a quorum here, that the Sparkman bill be voted out.

Senator **Sparkman**. It is not the Sparkman bill. It is the House bill.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Senator Morse served notice that he would take advantage of every technicality possible to delay action on passport legislation.

At the same time I served notice that I would take advantage of every technicality we have——

The **Chairman**. We have lost the quorum here.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. We have a quorum here.

Wait a minute.

The **Chairman**. We don't have a quorum. We are one short.

We will have another meeting. And do it on the record.

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m. the hearing was recessed.]

---

[6] At its executive meeting on Aug. 25. The committee voted to defer action on passport legislation until the next session of Congress.

MINUTES

THURSDAY, AUGUST 25, 1960

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee proceeded into executive session at 11 a.m., in room 4219, New Senate Office Building.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Green, Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

The nominations of Frederic P. Bartlett, to be Ambassador to Malagsay, Fraser Wilkins to be Ambassador to Cyprus, Henry S. Villard to be Ambassador to the Federation of Mali, Christian M. Ravndal, to be Ambassador to Czechoslovakia and Edwin McC. Martin, to be Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, were, on motion by Senator Mansfield, seconded by Senator Hickenlooper, reported favorably.

The chairman then invited discussion on passport legislation pending before the committee, and directed attention to the comparative study prepared by the staff. Senator Mansfield moved that action be deferred until the next session of Congress. Senator Sparkman offered a modification to the motion that the matter of consideration of passport legislation be placed on an early agenda next session. The motion and its modification were agreed to without objection.

Consideration of S.J. Res. 210, To provide for the determination of U.S. participation in the New York World's Fair to be held at New York City in 1964 and 1965 was put over in the absence of Senator Lausche.

S. 2827, To provide for the presentation by the United States to the people of Mexico of a monument commemorating the 150th Anniversary of the independence of Mexico was next in order. Following discussion, it was decided to make the bill's subject a matter for examination and review by the American-Mexican Interparliamentary Group meeting next year in Mexico.

Senator Mansfield proposed, and the committee agreed, that a letter be directed to the Department of State asking for a full explanation of the Cowles Newspapers articles by Knebel and Bailey on the Potsdam Conference and papers.

The committee deferred action on S. Con. Res. 111, Providing for the development through the United Nations of international educational programs.

The staff was directed to contact each Senator on the committee to see who might accept an invitation to attend the British-American Parliamentary Union Meeting proposed for Bermuda in November.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[Whereupon, at 11:30 p.m. the committee proceeded back into public session.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, AUGUST 26, 1960

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee proceeded into executive session at 10:45 a.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Green, Humphrey, Mansfield, Long, Church, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

The chairman brought to the committee's attention the nominations of James Wadsworth to be Representative of the United States at the United Nations, and James Barco to be Deputy Representative of the United States to the United Nations.

The chairman suggested that a motion be made to waive the committee's 6-day rule on nominations in order that both nominations above could be considered. This was accomplished on a voice vote on motion by Senator Hickenlooper, seconded by Senator Carlson. Senator Wiley then moved that Mr. Wadsworth's nomination be reported favorably, which carried without objection.

On motion by Senator Mansfield, and by voice vote, the committee approved unanimously for favorable report the nomination of Mr. Barco to the U.N.

The chairman then laid before the committee the resolution S. Con. Res. 114, Providing for the provision of food to needy peoples through the U.N. of member States in the U.N. After the text had been amended in certain aspects, it was concluded that the committee should report a clean concurrent resolution utilizing the amended text of S. Con. Res. 114, and that the report should be made by Senator Humphrey. (This later resolution was S. Con. Res. 116, Favoring further exploration for the establishment of an international food program for relief purposes.)

The committee held a general discussion on the uses of the Subcommittee on Disarmament.

The chairman led the other members in paying tribute to Senator Green, Chairman Emeritus of the committee, as this was his last meeting with the committee.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[Then the committee adjourned at 12 noon.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session at 10:40 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol, Hon. J. William Fulbright, presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senator Gore.

Members of the committee discussed the various international educational and cultural relations programs with a panel which included Dean Rusk, president of the Rockefeller Foundation; Kenneth Holland, president of the Institute of International Education; Dr. Anna Hawks, president of the American Association of University Women; Professor Sumner Crosby, member of the Advisory Committee on the Arts, Yale University; Hurst Anderson, president of the American University; Walter Laves, chairman of the Department of Government, Indiana University; Richard A. Humphrey, of the American Council on Education; Kingman Brewster, Jr., Provost-designate of Yale University; John Howard, staff director of the Committee on the University and World Affairs, sponsored by the Ford Foundation; Robert Thayer, special assistant to the Secretary of State for the coordination of international educational and cultural relations; Saxton Bradford, deputy for operations to the special assistant, Department of State; George V. Allen, Director of the U.S. Information Agency; William Handley, director of Information Center Services, U.S. Information Agency; and Fred Teal, State Department.

For record of proceedings, see the official transcript.

[At 5:40 p.m. the committee recessed to reconvene at 10:30 a.m. the next day.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1960

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:35 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol, Hon. J. William Fulbright, presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright.

The chairman met with panel members to discuss international educational and cultural relations programs.

For record of proceedings, see the official transcript.

[At 12:45 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A: CORRESPONDENCE RELATED TO SECRETARY HERTER'S TESTIMONY ON EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE, MAY 27, 1960.

JUNE 2, 1960.

HON. CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: During the hearing regarding the Summit Conference I asked you about three official statements which dealt with the matter of the continuation of the U-2 flights after May 1. These were: (1) the following paragraph of the Department of State statement of May 7, 1960:

"It is certainly no secret that, given the state of the world today, intelligence collection activities are practiced by all countries and postwar history certainly reveals that the Soviet Union has not been lagging behind in the field. The necessity for such activities as measures for legitimate national defense is enhanced by the excessive secrecy practiced by the Soviet Union in contrast to the free world.";

(2) the following paragraph from the statement by you of May 9, which was repeated verbatim at your background news conference in Paris on May 15:

"I will say frankly that it is unacceptable that the Soviet political system should be given an opportunity to make secret preparations to face the free world with the choice of abject surrender or nuclear destruction. The Government of the United States would be derelict to its responsibility not only to the American people but to free peoples everywhere if it did not, in the absence of Soviet cooperation, take such measures as are possible unilaterally to lessen and to overcome this danger of surprise attack. In fact the United States has not and does not shirk this responsibility.";

and (3) the following paragraph from the prepared statement which President Eisenhower read at his press conference on May 11:

"The first point is this: The need for intelligence-gathering activities. No one wants another Pearl Harbor. This means that we must have knowledge of military forces and preparations around the world, especially those capable of massive surprise attack.

"Secrecy in the Soviet Union makes this essential. In most of the world no large-scale attack could be prepared in secret, but in the Soviet Union there is a fetish of secrecy and concealment. This is a major cause of international tension and uneasiness today. Our deterrent must never be placed in jeopardy. The safety of the whole free world demands this.

"As the Secretary of State pointed out in his recent statement, ever since the beginning of my Administration I have issued directives to gather, in every feasible way, the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for defense."

During the hearing on May 27 I asked you the following question: "You believe that it is an unreasonable and far-fetched interpretation of your statement or the President's in his press conference that these would be continued, is that correct?" You replied, "Yes, I do."

I also asked you, "Were you aware that he had so interpreted it in his statement to the Presidium?" You replied, "I think I may have been, but if one took cognizance of every interpretation of his of everything that happens in this country one would be spending all one's time trying to correct his statements."

Unfortunately, I did not have before me when you appeared before the committee the note of the Soviet Government to the Government of the United States of May 10 which commented on the May 7 statement of the Department of State. In the

Soviet note of May 10 there is contained the following interpretation of the Department of State release of May 7:

"The Government of the U.S.S.R. cannot avoid pointing out that the State Department's statement, which is unprecedented in its cynicism, not only justifies provocative flights of the armed forces of the U.S.A. but also acknowledges that such actions are a 'normal phenomenon' and this in fact states that in future the United States intends to continue provocative invasions into the confines of the air space of the Soviet Union for the purpose of intelligence."

Having received that official interpretation by the Soviet Government, the President nevertheless made the statement at his press conference on May 11 which I quoted above and you repeated on May 15 what you had previously said on May 9 (quoted above).

In the light of this history do you wish to supplement your testimony before the committee as to the reasonableness of Mr. Khrushchev's interpretation prior to May 16 that the United States intended to continue the U-2 flights?

Very truly yours,

J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 6, 1960.

HON. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I am responding to your letter of June 2 in which you ask whether I should like to supplement my testimony of May 27 before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in regard to the reasonableness of Mr. Khrushchev's interpretation prior to May 16 that the United States intended to continue the U-2 flights.

I do not think that the statements cited or the Soviet interpretation put on the Department's May 7 press statement would cause me to revise my testimony before the Committee on May 27. The statements made by me on May 9 and by the President on May 11 were carefully considered and in my opinion did not contain a threat to continue these U-2 flights. In his report to the American people on May 25 the President stated inter alia "our necessity to proceed with such activities was also asserted by our Secretary of State who, however, had been careful—as was I—not to say that these particular flights would be continued".

Moreover, in the meeting with Mr. Khrushchev at Paris on May 16 the President had the following to state in regard to Mr. Khrushchev's statement:

"There is in the Soviet statement an evident misapprehension on one key point. It alleges that the United States has, through official statements, threatened continued overflights. The importance of this alleged threat was emphasized and repeated by Mr. Khrushchev. The United States has made no such threat. Neither I or my government has intended any. The actual statements go no further than to say that the United States will not shirk its responsibility to safeguard against surprise attack.

"In point of fact, these flights were suspended after the recent incident and are not to be resumed. Accordingly, this cannot be the issue."

There were those of course who undoubtedly in all good faith interpreted my statement of May 9 and the President's statement of May 11 as reflecting a United States intention to continue these flights. This interpretation may have appeared to them reasonable and logical. But I submit that this was a misapprehension of what had actually been stated.

You say that you did not have before you when I appeared before the Committee the Soviet Government's note of May 10 which contained the following interpretation of the Department of State's press release of May 7:

"The Government of the U.S.S.R. cannot avoid pointing out that the State Department's statement, which is unprecedented in its cynicism, not only justifies provocative flights of the armed forces of the USA but also acknowledges that such actions are a 'normal phenomenon' and this in fact states that in future the United States intends to continue provocative invasions into the confines of the air space of the Soviet Union for the purpose of intelligence."

You state that having received that official interpretation by the Soviet Government, the President nevertheless made the statement at his press conference on May 11 and I repeated at my background news conference in Paris on May 15, paragraph 4, of my May 9 statement.

As regards the Soviet Government's interpretation in its note of May 10 of the press statement issued by the Department on May 7, I can only say that by no logical interpretation could it be read as containing a threat to continue U-2 flights. I know of no one other than the Soviet Government who interpreted the May 7 statement as such. It therefore appears that the Soviet Government was prepared as always to twist the actual words used to an interpretation it desired for its own purposes.

In the light of the above I would not wish to supplement my testimony before the Committee of May 27 but I should have no objection if you wish to include this exchange of letters in the record of the Committee.

With warmest regards,

Most sincerely,

CHRISTIAN A. HERTER.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, July 1, 1960.

HON. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During my testimony before your Committee on May 27, a number of questions were asked about a decision not to suspend the U-2 flights because the Summit Conference was pending. On reading the transcript, it seems to me the testimony has left that point unclear. Accordingly, I should like to take this opportunity to clarify it, and would appreciate it if this letter could be made a part of your hearing record.

There was a decision not to suspend the flights. The President so stated in his May twenty-fifth radio-television talk, when he said ". . . the question was really whether to halt the program and thus forego the gathering of important information that was essential and that was likely to be unavailable at a later date. The decision was that the program should not be halted." While I did not participate in that decision, the President was nevertheless fully aware of my views and I thoroughly agree—as I indicated in my testimony—that the decision was a wise one.

This will clear up any uncertainty on this point which your hearing record may reflect.

Most sincerely,

CHRISTIAN A. HERTER.

JULY 2, 1960.

HON. CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Thank you for your letter of July 1 directed toward clarifying the Committee's record regarding whether there was an affirmative decision not to suspend U-2 overflights in light of the approaching Summit Conference. Unfortunately, it will not be possible to include your letter in the hearing record, because that record has already been published. Your letter will, of course, become a part of the permanent records of the Foreign Relations Committee, and I shall also have it printed in the Congressional Record, along with this reply.

With all due respect, I do not think your letter clarifies the point very much. It states that "there was a decision not to suspend the flights" and quotes the President's speech of May 25 to the same effect. The President's speech was, of course, before the Committee at the time of the hearings, and you quoted it then.

At that time, you also agreed that no specific decision not to suspend the flights was taken (p. 58). I infer from your letter that such a decision was in fact taken, that you did not participate in it, but that you agreed with it. Your letter also supports the inference, though less clearly, that the decision was taken by the President. But we are still left in the dark as to when it was taken and as to who, if anyone besides the President, participated in it. I am somewhat disturbed by the thought that such a decision would be taken without the participation of the Secretary of State.

Most importantly, the record is still unclear as to whether the decision applied to the program of flights, as an intelligence device to be continued over an indefinite period of time, or whether it applied to specific flights included within the overall program.

A related point has to do with the question of whether or not the flights were ever suspended for other than technical reasons. Because I intend to make this correspondence public, I am inhibited from citing here all the relevant statements in the classified record. If you will review this classified record, however, I think you will agree with me that it is, as the Committee report says (p. 7), "at best highly ambiguous."

If earlier flights had in fact been suspended for other than technical reasons, the question arises as to why the Summit Conference was regarded as less important than prior events which were the basis for suspension.

I would welcome your further clarification of these matters.

Very truly yours,

J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman.

APPENDIX B: S. 2287—RESTRICTION OF PASSPORTS TO COMMUNISTS.

86th CONGRESS
1st Session

S. 2287

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

June 29, 1959

Mr. Fulbright introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

A BILL

To promote the foreign policy of the United States; to provide for the protection of United States citizens abroad; to provide standards for the issuance of passports by the Department of State; and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "United States Travel Act".

TITLE I—TRAVEL AND PASSPORT POLICY; DEFINITIONS

Sec. 101. The Congress of the United States reaffirms that freedom of movement is essential to the maintenance of American values and institutions and includes the right to travel abroad as well as the right to travel within the United States. It is the policy of the Congress that travel abroad by citizens should be free of governmental restraint, subject only to those minimal restrictions sanctioned by this Act and required by demands of national security. It is also the policy of the Congress that the President shall seek, in conjunction with other nations, to eliminate existing barriers to international travel.

SEC. 102. No restraints, whether temporary or permanent, may be placed on the travel abroad of any citizen except those restraints specifically provided for in this Act. Every citizen is entitled to receive and use a passport except as otherwise specified in this Act.

SEC. 103. For the purposes of this Act—

(a) The term "citizen" includes only citizens of the United States and other persons owing permanent allegiance to the United States, whether such citizens and such other persons are situated temporarily or permanently abroad or within the United States.

(b) The term "passport" means the document issued by or on behalf of the Department of State to a citizen which identifies him as such to the representatives of any foreign state in which he may choose to travel, and which requests that he be permitted to travel safely and freely and, in case of need, be given such help as would be extended to citizens of the foreign state when traveling in the United States.

(c) The term "travel abroad" means exit from the United States, entrance into the United States, and travel outside of the United States.

(d) The term "Department" means the Department of State.

(e) The term "United States" means the States, the District of Columbia, the Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and all territory and water, continental and insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

TITLE II—ISSUANCE OF PASSPORTS

TRAVEL RESTRAINTS ON INDIVIDUALS

SEC. 201. (a) The Secretary of State and any officer of the United States duly authorized by him may issue, renew, deny, or revoke passports in the United States, in territories over which the United States exercises trusteeship, and in foreign countries. No other persons shall issue, renew, deny, or revoke such passports. The Secretary of State is authorized to prescribe regulations consistent with this Act pertaining to passports.

(b) There shall be collected and paid into the Treasury of the United States quarterly a fee of $2 for executing each application for a passport and $9 for each passport issued: *Provided,* That the Secretary of State may authorize the retention by officials of the several States of the fee of $2 for executing an application for a passport. No fee shall be collected for passports issued to officers or employees of the United States proceeding abroad in the discharge of their official duties, or to members of their immediate families accompanying or residing with them abroad, or to seamen, or to international airmen, or to widows, children, parents, brothers, and sisters of American soldiers, sailors, or marines buried abroad whose journey is undertaken for the purpose and with the intent of visiting the graves of such soldiers, sailors, or marines, which facts shall be made a part of the application for the passport.

(c) Whenever a fee is erroneously charged and paid for the issuance of a passport to a person who is exempted from the payment of such a fee by subsection (b) of this section, the Department of the Treasury is authorized to refund to the person who paid such fee the amount thereof upon proper notice from the Department of State.

(d) Whenever the appropriate officer within the United States or any foreign country refuses to visa a passport and the unused passport is returned within six months from the date of issue, the Department of the Treasury is authorized, upon notice from the Department of State, to refund the issue fee of $9 to the person to whom the passport was issued.

(e) At the request of the head of a family, the Department may issue family passports covering the head of the family, the spouse, and children under sixteen years of age, but no group passport shall be required.

(f) Passports shall be valid for three years, unless validly revoked on one of the substantive grounds specified in section 203. During a period of two years after such three-year period and upon the payment of a fee of $5, passports may be renewed for a period not to exceed five years from the date of issuance. Passports may be restricted at any time as to validity pursuant to section 401.

SEC. 202. Before a passport is issued to any person, such person shall subscribe to and submit a written application, duly verified by his oath or affirmation before a person authorized to take passport applications, containing answers to questions asked by the Department. Such questions shall be relevant to the substantive grounds for denial of passports specified in section 203. Any person authorized to take passport applications may administer oaths in connection with such applications.

SEC. 203. Travel abroad by citizens may be restrained, and passports may be denied to citizens, only on the following grounds:

(a) That the citizen is under indictment or information for a felony; or is under indictment or information for violating sections 206 and 402 of this Act; or is free on bail pending appeal from criminal conviction; or has been convicted within five years of violating section 402 of this Act, unless a bond in the sum of $5,000 is posted conditioned upon compliance with such section during the period for which a passport may be issued; or

(b) That there are reasonable grounds to believe that the citizen, when abroad, would endanger the national security of the United States by (1) transmitting, without proper authority, highly classified secrets of the United States; or (2) inciting, or conspiring to bring about, international hostilities or conflicts which might involve the United States; or (3) inciting, or conspiring to bring about, attacks by force upon the United States or attempts to overthrow its government by force and violence; or

(c) That the citizen owes the Government of the United States money for previous transportation back to the United States.

SEC. 204. Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 202 and 203 of this Act, the Secretary of State may direct the issuance of a passport in any case, provided he deems such action advisable in the national interest. Such passport may be limited with respect to duration and the areas for which it is valid.

SEC. 205. Upon application therefor, duly completed, a passport shall be issued, or the applicant shall be informed in writing of a denial thereof, within thirty days after the receipt of such application. A passport may be revoked whenever the holder thereof is not entitled to a passport under the terms of this Act. Upon denial of an application for a passport, upon revocation of a passport, or upon any any other adverse action taken on an individual basis with respect to a citizen's right to receive or use a passport, the applicant for, or holder of, the passport shall be informed in writing of the specific reasons for the adverse action, shall be afforded a detailed statement of the information, including the sources thereof upon which such action was predicated, and shall be informed in detail of his rights to administrative and judicial review of such action.

SEC. 206. Subject to such general exceptions as the President may authorize and prescribe, it shall be unlawful for any citizen to travel abroad without a valid passport. The prohibition contained in the first sentence of this section shall not apply to travel between the United States and any other country or territory in North, Central, or South America or in any island adjacent thereto. The

President shall, in accordance with the policy set forth in section 101 of this Act, utilize to the extent possible the power conferred upon him by the introductory clause of the first sentence of this section in order to increase the opportunities of citizens to travel without passports to countries or areas outside the Western Hemisphere.

TITLE III—PROCEDURE FOR REVIEW OF PASSPORT DENIAL, REVOCATION, OR RESTRICTION

SEC. 301. (a) There shall be established within the Department of State a Passport Hearing Board consisting of three officers of the Department to be designated by the Secretary of State. Except in cases of action taken by reason of noncitizenship or by reason of geographical restrictions of general applicability authorized by title IV of this Act, this Board shall have jurisdiction to hear all cases wherein a written request for a hearing is received by the Department within sixty days after actual notification to the individual involved of the initial denial, revocation, or restriction of his passport. The Board shall hold a hearing within thirty days after receipt of the request unless such time limit is extended at the request of the individual, and such hearing shall be completed without unnecessary delay.

(b) At least one of the officers of the Board shall be a member of the Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department. None of such officers shall have participated in any manner in the initial adverse determination concerning the passport in question.

(c) The Secretary of State shall appoint a Counsel who shall present to the Board at the hearing the reasons for, and the evidence supporting, the initial adverse determination concerning the passport in question. Such Counsel shall participate in proceedings of the Board solely to the extent of serving as advocate in behalf of the initial adverse determination, and shall have no communication with any member of the Board concerning any case that is, or may come, before the Board, unless the individual involved is present and unless such communication is made a part of the record of the proceeding in question.

SEC. 302. The Secretary of State shall establish and make public rules which accord to every individual in proceedings before the Board the following rights:

(1) To appear in person and to be represented by counsel;

(2) To testify in his own behalf, present witnesses and offer documentary and other evidence;

(3) To examine all documentary evidence, including

confidential data, introduced against him and to cross-examine the sources thereof; to cross-examine all witnesses, including confidential informants, appearing against him.

(4) To have a hearing conducted in private unless he freely waives this protection in writing.

(5) Within ten days of completion of the hearing to examine a copy of the transcript of the proceedings, which shall include all documentary and testimony evidence presented to the Board and the sources thereof, and, upon request, to be furnished a copy of such transcript at the expense of the United States.

SEC. 303. (a) Within ten days of the completion of the hearing required by section 301 the Board shall recommend whether or not the initial adverse determination should be sustained.

(b) The Board shall not recommend that the Secretary of State sustain the initial adverse determination unless such determination is warranted on one of the grounds set forth in section 203 of this Act.

(c) If the Board does not recommend that the initial adverse determination be sustained, relief shall be granted the individual forthwith.

(d) If the Board recommends that the initial adverse determination be sustained, it shall make detailed and specific written findings of fact and conclusions. These shall be transmitted with the entire record to the Secretary of State, who shall personally make final administrative determination in such cases. A copy of the Board's recommendation and of its findings and conclusions shall be furnished the individual contemporaneously with announcement of the recommendation. Within twenty days following receipt of such copy the individual may submit to the Secretary of State written objections to the Board's action. Within fifteen days following receipt of such objections the Secretary of State shall announce his determination, which shall be based upon the entire record, including all findings and conclusions made by the Board and any objections submitted by the individual. In appropriate circumstances, the Secretary may remand a case to the Board for further proceedings. In the event he takes action adverse to the individual, the Secretary shall make detailed and specific written findings and conclusions, a copy of which shall be furnshed to the individual. If the Secretary decides favorably to the individual, relief shall be granted forthwith.

SEC. 304. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States district court for the judicial district in which the individual has his principal place of residence shall have jurisdiction to determine whether there has been compliance with the procedural and substantive provisions of this Act and of any regulations issued thereunder. In any such proceedings the Court shall not sustain the substantive findings of the Secretary unless they are supported by substantial evidence contained in the record when viewed as a whole.

TITLE IV—GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATIONS OF GENERAL VALIDITY

SEC. 401. (a) The President shall have the power by appropriate declaration pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, to restrain the travel of all citizens and to limit the validity of all passports with respect to travel to the following places:

(1) Countries with which the United States is at war;

(2) Countries or areas where armed hostilities are in progress;

(3) Countries or areas to which the President finds that travel must be restricted in the national interest either because the United States Government is unable to provide adequate protection to citizens traveling therein or because such travel would seriously impair the foreign relations of the United States.

(b) In the event that the President determines the necessity of promulgating a general geographical restraint upon travel and the use of passports under subsection (a) of this section, he shall declare and publish such determination, stating specifically and in detail the reasons for the necessity of such action, and shall cause notice thereof to be stamped on each passport thereafter issued, renewed, or amended. If not sooner revoked by the President, the general travel and passport restraint imposed by such declaration shall be effective for a period of not more than one year, unless such time is extended by law.

(c) In the national interest the President, without stating his reasons, may make exceptions to any such general geographical restraint for particular individuals or categories of persons.

SEC. 402. No citizen shall travel to any country or area as to which there is in effect, to his knowledge, a declaration made and published by the President under section 401.

TITLE V—PENALTIES

SEC. 501. Any person who willfully violates the provisions of sections 206 or 402 of this Act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or by a fine not exceeding $1,000, or both.

TITLE VI—LAWS REPEALED, MADE INAPPLICABLE, OR AMENDED

SEC. 601. (a) The following Acts or parts of Acts and all amendments thereto are repealed:

(1) Section 4076 of the Revised Statutes (22 U.S.C. 212);

(2) Section 4077 of the Revised Statutes (22 U.S.C. 218);

(3) Section 1 of title IX of the Act of June 15, 1917 (22 U.S.C. 213);

(4) Sections 1, 2, and 4 of the Act of June 4, 1920 (22 U.S.C. 214, 215, 216);

(5) Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Act of July 3, 1926 (22 U.S.C. 211a, 217a, 214a);

(6) Section 6 of the Act of September 23, 1950 (50 U.S.C. 785);

(7) Section 215 (b) of the Act of June 27, 1952, chapter 477, title II, chapter 2 (U.S.C. sec. 1185);

(8) Section 1545 of the Act of June 25, 1948 (18 U.S.C. 1545).

(b) All other laws, or parts of laws, in conflict or inconsistent with this Act are, to the extent of such conflict or inconsistency, repealed.

(c) Section 1001 of the Act of June 25, 1948 (18 U.S.C. 1001) is made inapplicable to the subject of passports.

(d) Section 1542 of the Act of June 25, 1948 (18 U.S.C. 1542), is amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 1542. Whoever, in an application for passport, willfully and knowingly (1) falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or (2) makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations of a material nature, or (3) makes or uses any false writing or document known to him to be false, with intent to induce or secure the issuance of a passport under the authority of the United States, either for his own use or the use of another, contrary to the laws regulating the issuance of passports or the regulations prescribed pursuant to such laws; or

"Whoever willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to use, or furnishes to another for use, any passport the issuance of which was secured in any way by reason of any of the intentionally false actions listed in paragraph 1 of this section—

"Shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."

TITLE VII—SEPARABILITY

SEC. 701. If any provision of this Act is held invalid, the remaining provisions shall not be affected.

TITLE VIII—EFFECTIVE DATE

SEC. 801. This Act shall take effect fifteen days after its enactment.

APPENDIX C: S. 3839—ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICA.

86TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. 3839

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

AUGUST 12 (legislative day, AUGUST 11), 1960

Mr. FULBRIGHT (by request) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

A BILL

To provide for assistance in the development of Latin America and in the reconstruction of Chile, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

CHAPTER I—PROGRAM FOR DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

SEC. 101. Chapter II of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, which relates to economic assistance, is amended by adding after title IV the following new title V:

"TITLE V—PROGRAM FOR DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

"SEC. 425. DECLARATION OF PURPOSE.—The Congress of the United States reaffirms the warm and enduring friendship of the people of the United States for the peoples of Latin America. The Congress recognizes that for these peoples to continue to progress within the framework of our common heritage of democratic ideals, there is a compelling need for the achievement of social and economic advance adequate to meet the legitimate aspirations of the individual citizens of the countries of Latin America for a better way of life. To achieve this advance requires the maximum of self-help measures on the part of the individual countries aided by a united and cooperative effort throughout this hemisphere in a positive program for social and economic progress. The Congress, therefore, reaffirms the policy of the United States to encourage and to help our Latin American neighbors to accelerate their efforts to strengthen the social and economic structure of their countries and to provide greater opportunity to their individual citizens.

"SEC. 426. AUTHORIZATION.—In order to carry out the purposes of this title, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President not to exceed $500,000,000, which shall remain available until expended, and which the President may use, in addition to other funds available for such purposes, on such terms and conditions as he may specify.".

CHAPTER II—RECONSTRUCTION IN CHILE

SEC. 201. Section 400 (b) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, which relates to special assistance, is amended to read as follows:

"(b) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President not to exceed $100,000,000, which shall remain available until expended, for use, in addition to other funds available for such purposes, in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Chile on such terms and conditions as the President may specify.".

CHAPTER III—CONTINGENCY FUND

SEC. 301. Section 451 (b) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, which relates to the President's special authority and contingency fund, is amended by striking out "$150,000,000" in the first sentence and substituting "$250,000,000".

86th CONGRESS
2d Session

S. 3839

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

August 15 (legislative day, August 11), 1960

Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed

---

AMENDMENTS

Intended to be proposed by Mr. Capehart to the bill (S. 3839) to provide for assistance in the development of Latin America and in the reconstruction of Chile, and for other purposes, viz:

In section 425, after, "Declaration of Purpose.—" insert "(a)".

Insert at the end of section 425, the following new matter:

"The accomplishment of these objectives calls for a plan of hemispheric development, open to all American Republics which cooperate in such plan, based upon a strong production effort, the expansion of foreign trade, the creation and maintenance of internal financial stability, the growth of free economic and social institutions, and the development of economic cooperation, including all possible steps to establish and maintain equitable rates of exchange and to bring about the progressive elimination of trade barriers. Mindful of the advantages which the United States has enjoyed through the existence of a large domestic market with no internal trade barriers, and believing that similar advantages can accrue to all countries, it is the hope of the people of the United States that all American Republics will jointly exert sustained common efforts which will speedily achieve that economic cooperation in the Western Hemisphere which is essential for lasting peace and prosperity. Accordingly, it is declared to be the policy of the people of the United States to sustain and strengthen principles of individual liberty, free institutions, private enterprise, and genuine independence in the Western Hemisphere through assistance to all American Republics which participate in a joint development program based upon self-help and mutual cooperation.

"(b) It is the purpose of this title to effectuate the policy set forth in subsection (a) of this section by furnishing material and financial assistance to the participating countries and to private enterprise in such countries in such a manner as to aid them, through their own individual and concerted efforts, to achieve a satisfactory and self-sustaining rate of economic growth within the period of operations under this title, by—

“(1) promoting industrial and agricultural production in the participating countries;

“(2) furthering the restoration or maintenance of the soundness of currencies, budgets, and finances in each such participating country;

“(3) facilitating and stimulating the growth of international trade of participating countries with one another and with other countries by appropriate measures including reduction of barriers which may hamper such trade; and

“(4) encouraging the growth of the free political, economic, and social institutions which are necessary to provide greater opportunities for the individual.”

Strike out all in section 426 and insert in lieu thereof the following:

“SEC. 426. COOPERATIVE BANKS.—(a) The Secretary of State, after consultation with the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank, is authorized to conclude, with individual American Republics or any number of such Republics or with an organization representing any such Republics, agreements providing for the establishment, under the laws of such Republics, of cooperative banks to carry out the purposes of this title.

“(b) Each cooperative bank shall be organized under a charter or articles of incorporation under which it is established as a body corporate governed by a board of directors and administered by officers elected by the board. It shall have such authorized capital stock as may be provided in its charter or articles of incorporation and in the agreement concluded under subsection (a) of this section. Such agreement may provide that the Export-Import Bank will subscribe for an agreed amount of capital stock, said subscription to be payable in dollars. The balance of the capital stock may be subscribed in either dollars or other currencies by the foreign government concerned or by individuals, corporations, or other entities.

"(c) The agreement provided for in subsection (a) of this section and the charter or articles of incorporation of any cooperative bank established thereunder shall also contain provision that:

"(1) So long as any of the cooperative bank's stock is held by the Export-Import Bank, the Export-Import Bank shall have the right to designate a number of the cooperative bank's directors, which is proportionate to the portion of the outstanding stock of the cooperative bank held by the Export-Import Bank, with the other directors to be elected by the other stockholders.

"(2) The cooperative bank may, at any time, at the option of its other stockholders, retire the stock held by the Export-Import Bank by paying to the Export-Import Bank the issue price of the stock plus an amount of the profits of the cooperative bank which is proportionate to the portion of the outstanding stock of the cooperative bank held by the Export-Import Bank.

"(d) Each cooperative bank established under this section shall have power—

"(1) to adopt, alter, and use a corporate seal, which shall be judicially recognized;

"(2) through its board of directors, to prescribe, amend, and repeal bylaws, rules, and regulations (not inconsistent with the provisions of this title) governing the manner in which its business shall be conducted and its powers exercised;

"(3) to make contracts;

"(4) to lease, purchase, sell, or otherwise dispose of such real estate as may be necessary for the transaction of its business;

"(5) to sue and be sued, to complain and defend, in any court of competent jurisdiction;

"(6) to select, employ, and fix the compensation of such officers, employees, experts, technicians, attorneys, and agents as shall be necessary for the transaction of its business;

"(7) subject to the provisions of this title, to determine, by its board of directors, the necessity for and the character and amount of its obligations and expenditures, and the manner in which they shall be incurred, allowed, paid, and accounted for;

"(8) subject to applicable national laws, to engage in foreign exchange transactions;

"(9) to establish within the participating country such agencies or branch offices as may be necessary for the execution of its powers;

"(10) to create and control subsidiary corporations organized under the laws of the participating country when necessary for the execution of its powers;

"(11) to make loans on such terms and conditions and to engage in such other financial transactions with such persons or other entities as the board of directors may determine in order to accomplish the purposes of this title. Its functions shall include, but not be limited to, loans or other financial transactions designed to increase industrial or agricultural production, to improve housing, education, or public health, or to finance programs of land redistribution or resettlement. Each cooperative bank shall give particular and continuing attention to the needs of small private business and small farmers.

"(e) A cooperative bank organized pursuant to this section shall not—

"(1) permit the payment of any fee or commission by any applicant for financial assistance in connection with any such application; or

"(2) permit any director, officer, attorney, agent, or employee of such cooperative bank to participate in any manner, directly or indirectly, in the deliberation upon or in the determination of any question affecting his personal interests, or the interests of any corporation, partnership, association, or other public or private entity of which he is a member or is directly or indirectly interested.

"(f) The property of each cooperative bank (including its franchise, capital, reserves, surplus, income, and those of any other public or private corporation, firm, or enterprise wholly financed or managed by it) and that of the Export-Import Bank shall be exempt from all taxation of any kind imposed by the national government of the participating country, or by any political subdivision thereof, except that real property owned by such cooperative bank may be subject to special assessments for local improvements and to real estate taxation to the same extent according to its value as other real estate of like character situated in the same locality is taxed.

"(g) Each cooperative bank shall transmit quarterly to the Export-Import Bank a report of its operations (containing such information, including detailed accounts of its financial transaction, as the Export-Import Bank may request) so long as the Export-Import Bank shall hold any stock of such cooperative bank.

"SEC. 427. AUTHORIZATION.—(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended (12 U.S.C. 635), or of any other law, the Export-Import Bank is hereby authorized to subscribe to the capital stock of cooperative banks organized pursuant to section 426 of this title: *Provided,* That the total amount of such stock in all such cooperative banks held at any one time by the Export-Import Bank shall not exceed an issue value of $1,000,000,000.

"(b) Obligations of the Export-Import Bank purchased by the Secretary of the Treasury for the purposes of enabling the Export-Import Bank to subscribe to the capital stock of cooperative banks shall bear interest either at a rate determined in accordance with the third sentence of section 6 of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended (12 U.S.C. 635d) or at a rate equal to the dividends received by the Export-Import Bank on such capital stock, whichever is lower.

"Sec. 428. Exemptions.—The provisions of sections 451, 501, 507, 509, 510, and 517 of this Act shall not apply to activities carried on under authority of this title."

86TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. RES. 353

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

AUGUST 8, 1960

Mr. MANSFIELD submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

RESOLUTION

Whereas the United States shares with the other American Republics a common interest in the freedom, tranquillity, welfare, and progress of the Western Hemisphere, and

Whereas the safeguarding of this interest requires an increase in inter-American cooperation and more effective use of the instrumentalities of hemispheric solidarity: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Senate reaffirm the policy of the United States in support of inter-American cooperation for the common benefit of the peoples of the Western Hemisphere and that the President be advised of the sense of the Senate that this Government by its constitutional processes should pursue, particularly, in its relations with the other American Republics:

V

(1) The development of agreements, setting forth specific plans of action designed to foster economic progress and improvements in the welfare and level of living of all the peoples of the Western Hemisphere on the basis of joint aid, mutual effort, and common sacrifice.

(2) The development of long-range agreements to facilitate the marketing and to insure an equitable price for the principal commodities entering into trade among the nations of the Western Hemisphere and, further, to encourage the gradual emergence of a common market among the American Republics.

(3) The development of uniform standards and practices with respect to the operation, rights, and responsibilities of private capital which flows across national boundaries within the Western Hemisphere.

(4) The consolidation of the public institutions and agencies of inter-American cooperation, insofar as feasible, within the structure of the Organization of American States and the strengthening of the personnel, resources, and authority of the Organization in order that it may play a role of increasing importance in all aspects of hemispheric cooperation.

(5) The development of a more accurate and sympathetic understanding among the peoples of the Western Hemisphere through a greater interchange of persons, ideas,

techniques, and educational, scientific, and cultural achievements.

(6) The safeguarding of the tranquillity of the hemisphere by joint action by due process in the Organization of the American States to foreclose the establishment of military bases in this hemisphere by any nation not of this hemisphere and to curb by all necessary means any American nation whose policies and actions grossly outrage the conscience or threaten the security of the Americas.

APPENDIX D

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS PUBLICATIONS FOR 1960: HEARINGS, COMMITTEE PRINTS, SENATE DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS

HEARINGS PUBLISHED IN 1960

Jan. 19, 1960	Greater Cooperation Among Atlantic Democracies.
Jan. 20, 1960	Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Jan. 24, 1960	North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement. Mexican Broadcasting Agreement. Part 2.
Jan. 26, 1960	Agreement on Importation of Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Materials.
Jan. 27 and Feb. 17, 1960	Compulsory Jurisdiction. International Court of Justice.
Jan. 28, Feb. 11, and Mar. 16, 1960	U.S. Foreign Policy.
Feb. 4, 1960	Technical Problems and the Geneva Test Ban Negotiations.
Mar. 18 and 21, 1960	International Development Association.
Mar. 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 30, 31, and Apr. 5, 1960.	Mutual Security Act of 1960.
Apr. 12, 1960	Czechoslovak Claims Fund.
May 17, 1960	International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Seas by Oil.
May 27, June 1 and 2, 1960	Events Incident to the Summit Conference.
June 7, 1960	Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan.
June 10, 1960	Disarmament Developments—Spring 1960.
June 14, 1960	The Antarctic Treaty.
June 21 and 22, 1960	Amistad Dam and Reservoir.
June 28, 1960	India Tax Convention.
Aug. 15, 1960	American Republics Cooperation Act and Other Subjects.

COMMITTEE PRINTS

January 1960	Questions and Answers on the St. Lawrence Seaway.
Jan. 13, 1960	U.S. Foreign Policy: The Formulation and Administration of U.S. Foreign Policy. Study No. 9.
Jan. 17, 1960	U.S. Foreign Policy: Ideology and Foreign Affairs. Study No. 10.
Jan. 22, 1960	U.S.-Latin American Relations: U.S. Business and Labor in Latin America. Study No. 4.
Jan. 31, 1960	U.S.-Latin American Relations: United States and Latin American Policies Affecting Their Economic Relations. Study No. 5.
Feb. 2, 1960	Latin America: Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, and Panama. Report by Senator Aiken.
Feb. 10, 1960	Subcommittees.
Feb. 11, 1960	U.S.-Latin American Relations: Problems of Latin American Economic Development. Study No. 6.
Feb. 14, 1960	U.S. Foreign Policy: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Eastern Europe. Study No. 11.
Feb. 20, 1960	South America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela. Report by Senator Morse.
Feb. 22, 1960	United Nations Action on Disarmament.
Feb. 26, 1960	U.S. Aid Programs in Vietnam.
Feb. 28, 1960	U.S.-Latin American Relations: Soviet Bloc Latin American Activities and Their Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy. Study No. 7.
Mar. 30, 1960	U.S. Foreign Policy: Economic, Social, and Political Change in the Underdeveloped Countries and Its Implication for U.S. Policy. Study No. 12.
Apr. 1, 1960	Study Mission to the Caribbean. Report by Senator Capehart.
Apr. 12, 1960	A Plan for the Establishment and Operation in Hawaii of a Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West.
May 27, 1960	Background Documents on Events Incident to the Summit Conference.
June 9, 1960	U.S. Foreign Policy: Middle East. Study No. 13.
June 9, 1960	Canada-U.S. Interparliamentary Group: Report to the Senate on the 3d Meeting.
July 26, 1960	Strengthening Free World Security.

Aug. 26, 1960	Administration of the Department of State.
Aug. 29, 1960	Chemical-Biological-Radiological (CBR) Warfare and Its Disarmament Aspects.
September 1960	Confernece on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests.
October 1960	Report on the Far East. Part I, Japan and United States Policies. Report by Senator Mansfield.
Nov. 30, 1960	The Far East and the Middle East. Report by Senator Sparkman.
Dec. 16, 1960	Agricultural Proposals in the European Economic Community, September-October 1960 Study Mission. Report by Senator Carlson.

SENATE DOCUMENTS

S. Doc. 82, Feb. 11, 1960	Fifth NATO Parliamentarian's Conference.
S. Doc. 83, Feb. 16, 1960	Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Meeting, Canberra, Australia, 1959.
S. Doc. 124, July 26, 1960	Strengthening Free World Security.
S. Doc. 125, Aug. 31, 1960	United States-Latin American Relations: Compilation of Studies.

SENATE REPORTS

S. Rept. 1024, Jan. 14, 1960	Reception of Foreign Dignitaries.
S. Rept. 1027, Jan. 18, 1960	Study of Foreign Policy.
S. Rept. 1082, Feb. 11, 1960	Parliamentary Conferences with Mexico.
S. Rept. 1122, Feb. 23, 1960	U.S. Citizens Commission on NATO.
S. Rept. 1286, Apr. 22, 1960	The Mutual Security Act of 1960.
S. Rept. 1294, Apr. 27, 1960	Authorizing a Payment to the Governments of Israel and France.
S. Rept. 1349, May 13, 1960	International Development Association Act.
S. Rept. 1419, May 24, 1960	Amending the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, as amended.
S. Rept. 1670, June 23, 1960	Amistad Dam and Reservoir.
S. Rept. 1676, June 23, 1960	Authorizing Appropriations Incident to U.S. Participation in the International Bureau for the Protection of Industrial Property.
S. Rept. 1761, June 28, 1960	Events Relating to the Summit Conference.
S. Rept. 1762, June 28, 1960	Centennial Anniversary of the Unity of Italy.
S. Rept. 1765, June 29, 1960	Pacific Festival.
S. Rept. 1766, June 29, 1960	Evaluation of Wartime Loans to Certain American Citizens.
S. Rept. 1836, Aug. 16, 1960	Increase of Authorization for Appropriation for President's Mutual Security Contingency Fund for Fiscal Year 1961.
S. Rept. 1838, Aug. 17, 1960	American Republics Cooperation Act.
S. Rept. 1922, Aug. 26, 1960	International Food for Peace Resolution.

EXECUTIVE REPORTS

Ex. Rept. 1, Feb. 8, 1960	Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Materials.
Ex. Rept. 2, Feb. 11, 1960	Broadcasting Agreements.
Ex. Rept. 4, Mar. 8, 1960	An Agreement Relating to International Circulation of Visual and Auditory Materials.
Ex. Rept. 5, Apr. 27, 1960	Law of the Sea Conventions.
Ex. Rept. 6, June 2, 1950	International Convention for the Protection of Pollution of the Sea by Oil.
Ex. Rept. 8, June 14, 1960	Treaty of Mutual Cooperation with Japan.
Ex. Rept. 10, June 23, 1960	The Antarctic Treaty.
Ex. Rept. 11, June 23, 1960	Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property.
Ex. Rept. 12, June 27, 1960	Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with Pakistan and the Convention of Establishment with France.

APPENDIX E

VOLUMES PUBLISHED TO DATE IN THE HISTORICAL SERIES

Legislative Origins of the Truman Doctrine.
Foreign Relief Act: 1947.
Foreign Relief Assistance Act of 1948.
The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty.
Military Assistance Program: 1949.
Extension of European Recovery Program: 1949.
Economic Assistance to China and Korea: 1949–50.
Reviews of the World Situation: 1949–50.

Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

- Volume I, Eightieth Congress, First and Second Sessions, 1947–48.
- Volume II, Eighty-first Congress, First and Second Sessions, 1949–50.
- Volume III, Parts 1 and 2, Eighty-second Congress, First Session, 1951.
- Volume IV, Eighty-second Congress, Second Session, 1952.
- Volume V, Eighty-third Congress, First Session, 1953.
- Volume VI, Eighty-third Congress, Second Session, 1954.
- Volume VII, Eighty-fourth Congress, First Session, 1955.
- Volume VIII, Eighty-fourth Congress, Second Session, 1956.
- Volume IX, Eighty-fifth Congress, First Session, 1957.
- Volume X, Eighty-fifth Congress, Second Session, 1958.
- Volume XI, Eighty-sixth Congress, First Session, 1959.
- Volume XII, Eighty-sixth Congress, Second Session, 1960.

○